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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation offers an analysis of the New Politics movement to reform and realign 
the Democratic Party in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The central problem is to develop 
an understanding of the origins, nature, and limits of the reform movement. This study 
also addresses questions regarding the interactive relationships between political parties 
and social movements, the capacity of social movement actors to transform party 
institutions to better influence American public policy, and the role of contingency and 
agency in moments of political crisis. 
 Whereas many scholars have interpreted the New Politics movement as a conflict 
between “amateurs” and “professionals” or “blue collar” workers and “white collar” 
reformers, I offer an explanation that roots the New Politics reform project in the longer 
historical struggle over Democratic Party structure and programmatic identity going back 
to the early New Deal period. By placing the New Politics movement in its proper 
historical and institutional context, this dissertation draws on extensive archival research 
as well as participant interviews to reassess this episode of reform, not as an effort to 
“dismantle the party” but to renew it by transforming it into a party of a different type.  
This study finds that the New Politics movement, while scoring many important 
victories, such as including more women, young people, and people of color in the party 
hierarchy, failed in its ultimate ambition to build a national programmatic party due to the 
staunch opposition of state party leaders, cold war intellectuals, and especially the 
leadership of the trade union federation. This was due primarily to the labor movement’s 
own institutional position in the party, which channeled its influence through the smoke-
 iii 
filled back rooms of elite brokerage – an arrangement which democratizing the party 
threatened. 
Rethinking the New Politics movement challenges the predominant narrative that 
treats the post-1980 reorientation of the Democratic Party toward the political center as 
the inevitable and “common sense” response to the “excesses” of the late 1960s. As I try 
to show, rather than the inexorable result of liberalism’s failures, the making of the 
modern Democratic Party was the result of a struggle between contending political 
projects. While the New Politics did not succeed in winning that war, it did decisively 
shape the contours of Democratic Party politics today. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In what will the history of a party consist? Will it be a simple narrative of 
the internal life of a political organization? … The history of any given 
party can only emerge from the complex portrayal of the totality of society 
and state. 
 -- Antonio Gramsci (Prison Notebooks)1 
 
This dissertation is about the New Politics movement to reform the Democratic Party in 
the late 1960s and 1970s. That movement took shape amidst the internal party crisis of 
1968 concerning the Vietnam War, however its roots stretched back to the long civil 
rights struggle within American society. For a generation, advocates of racial justice 
inside the Democratic Party had seen the latter’s decentralized, federal structure as one of 
the foremost obstacles to extending the New Deal’s nascent “rights revolution” beyond 
its primary beneficiaries: white male breadwinners. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, as 
the New Deal regime broke down due to its own contradictory dynamics, the New 
Politics movement took shape as an effort to realign the party to the left by reforming its 
internal structure and operations. 
 In its ultimate aims, the New Politics movement did not succeed. While it scored 
many impressive achievements between 1969 and 1972, its reform agenda eventually 
generated considerable opposition and organized resistance from stakeholders with 
vested interests in the “old politics” of party federalism: state party leaders, public 
officeholders, many labor leaders, and cold war intellectuals. By the mid-1970s, their 
resistance as well as the dissipation of pro-reform social movement activity outside the 
party effectively halted the New Politics movement inside the party. 
                                                
1 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 150-
1. 
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 The methodology employed in this dissertation breaks sharply from past 
scholarship on this episode of Democratic Party reform. Previous studies have almost 
invariably conceptualized the relevant intraparty cleavages in dichotomous terms: 
amateur versus regular; purist versus professional; ideological versus party oriented; 
white collar versus blue collar. However, as I will argue, frameworks premised on such 
polarized dichotomies are inadequate to capturing what people were actually fighting 
about and how the dynamics of political conflict informed actors’ interpretations of what 
was possible and how they should respond strategically. No single continuum of political 
styles, attitudes or other static variables is capable of explaining the dynamics of conflict 
that attended such a fluid moment in American politics.  
This study is rooted in the tradition of critical social science by trying to “bring 
the social back in” to better exemplify actors’ self-understandings, motivations, and 
strategic constraints within a dynamic historical context.2 Key to bringing the social back 
in is an analytical focus on the importance of institutions. Historical analysis of 
institutions has, of course, been a core concern for the multidisciplinary group of scholars 
working within the tradition of American Political Development (APD).3 But the APD 
literature’s tendency to emphasize path dependency over contingency has constrained its 
qualitative analyses of human agency during moments of acute institutional change.4 By 
probing the limits and challenges of purposeful efforts to transform institutions, this 
                                                
2 Dennis Pilon, Wrestling With Democracy: Voting Systems as Politics in the Twentieth-Century West 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013). 
3  See Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds, Bringing the State Back In 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, The Search for 
American Political Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Paul Pierson, Politics in 
Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
4 James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, eds, Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and 
Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
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dissertation attempts to unravel the complexities involved in historical processes of 
political change beyond the limits of the APD tradition. 
 An institutional approach is especially apt for the study of political parties. Most 
party scholars, of course, readily admit that parties are institutions. However, whether due 
to the convenience of measurement or one-sided theoretical premises, the study of parties 
has all too often substituted voters for study of the actual party organization itself. 
Whether conceptualized as the social voter, the partisan voter, or the issues voter, 
scholars have traditionally reduced the problem of party to the problem of voters, which, 
while generating important insights, tells us little about how parties operate or even why 
voting patterns change over time.5  
Some studies that model themselves as critical responses to the voter-centered 
approach, such as the investment theory of parties, have done little to correct this 
tendency.6 On the contrary, the investment approach has only inverted the traditional 
model, substituting the sovereignty of elite investors in the business community for the 
sovereignty of voters in the public sphere. The material basis of political behavior has 
always been an important part of American party politics, and especially as the capital 
intensity of year-round, mass-mediatized campaigning has increased the burden on 
aspirants for public office and recent Supreme Court decisions have reinforced the 
“common sense” view recognizing money as legitimate political voice protected by the 
                                                
5 For a review and critique of voter-centered approaches to political parties, see Cedric de Leon, Party and 
Society: Reconstructing a Sociology of Democratic Party Politics (London: Polity, 2014). 
6 Thomas Ferguson, Golden Rule: The Investment Theory of Party Competition and the Logic of Money-
Driven Political Systems (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995). See also, Thomas Ferguson 
and Joel Rogers, Right Turn: The Decline of the Democrats and the Future of American Politics (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1986). 
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First Amendment.7 However, while money and where it comes from are important factors 
to consider, political money is not the omnipotent force that many of its critics seem to 
imply. As the 2016 Republican primary campaign has shown, money power, when 
disorganized and uncoordinated, can fail, and fail dramatically, to pick the winner. 
Political money does not exist in a vacuum and its power must be understood within the 
institutional context of party organization, its nominating machinery, and the social 
forces they mold and channel. 
 Indeed, it was more than a century ago that Robert Michels redirected the flow of 
party-society relations altogether.8 Instead of a party controlled by voters from below or 
business insiders from above, Michels argued that it was the party itself, its leadership 
and their staff, that dominated society. The party’s “tendency to oligarchy” implied that 
even the most internally democratic political parties eventually succumbed to the 
bureaucratic logic of organization.9  
So-called realists such as Joseph Schumpeter and Anthony Downs have also 
sought to disabuse democratic theorists of their illusions, arguing that parties are simply 
“teams of professional office-seekers” pursuing their own self-interest. 10  Far from a 
voter-centered perspective, the realists argued that politics is driven by the competition 
between party professionals themselves. But in their view this need not result in top-
down Michelsian domination of party over citizens. On the contrary, the teams of party 
professionals are inextricably pulled by their competitive dynamic to the political center 
                                                
7 For a useful historical perspective, see Gary Gerstle, Liberty and Coercion: The Paradox of American 
Government from the Founding to the Present (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), chapter 5. 
8  Robert Michaels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern 
Democracy (New York: The Free Press, 1962). 
9 Michels, Political Parties, 70. 
10  Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper Perennial, 2008 
[1942]); Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957). See also, John 
H. Aldrich, Why Parties? A Second Look (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2011). 
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where the most votes are to be found. Thus, while only democratic in the sense that 
voters are permitted to choose between at least two alternative teams, the parties’ 
professional separation from society produces a stable system of two-party politics that 
ultimately serves the median voter. 
 However, both voter-centered and party-centered theories have tended to impose 
a radical separation of the party from civil society as well as the state. This has reinforced 
the tendency to diminish the causal significance of the formal organizational 
arrangements of the party as an institution. While David Mayhew is right to observe that 
in the United States parties have more often functioned as “arenas” than as 
“organizations,” it is misleading to conceive of parties are mere venues in which active 
social forces battle it out in a pluralist contest for political influence on public policy.11 
Institutions are never neutral, and very often it is the specific institutional terrain over 
which social movements and political elites are fighting.  
But even when the “bias” or “selectivity” of institutional arrangements is 
acknowledged, there is still a tendency to slip back into a passive view of political 
parties, as if they only reflected and reinforced the social cleavages that exist “out there” 
in society.12 On the contrary, the central takeaway of the stalemated Marxist state debate 
of the 1970s, which insisted on the “relative autonomy of the state,” should be interpreted 
as rescuing the fundamentally creative role of politics from the confines of class 
                                                
11  David R. Mayhew, Placing Parties in American Politics: Organization, Electoral Settings, and 
Government Activity in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 238. 
12 For a critique of political institutions as mere “echoes” of social cleavages, see James G. March and 
Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: The Free 
Press, 1989), 159; and Alan Ware, The American Direct Primary: Party Institutionalization and 
Transformation in the North (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 14. 
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instrumentalism or socioeconomic reductionism.13 To take the relative autonomy of the 
political seriously, parties, as political institutions, must be conceptualized as creative 
actors in society, not only as gatekeepers for access to public office, but as influential 
agencies that selectively structure the social and help produce shared political identities in 
ways that are oriented to systemic reproduction rather than transformation.14 
 The so-called UCLA school’s recent high profile interventions into the ongoing 
debates about parties in the United States has reconceived parties as “long coalitions” of 
“intense policy demanders” organized in civil society.15 This has done much to reorient 
party scholars away from narrow examinations of politicians for whom social groups 
were secondary. This approach, however, risks displacing the role of party professionals 
and party institutions from the analysis altogether. As Eric Schickler has noted, the 
UCLA school’s tendency to take for granted the internal coherence of parties ultimately 
disables analysis. It cannot explain why, for instance, two mutually incompatible groups 
of policy demanders were organized under the same umbrella of the New Deal 
                                                
13 On the state debate, see Paul Wetherly, Clyde W. Barrow, and Peter Burnham, eds, Class, Power and the 
State in Capitalist Society: Essays on Ralph Miliband (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Clyde W. 
Barrow, Toward a Critical Theory of States: The Poulantzas-Miliband Debate After Globalization (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 2016). On “structural selectivity,” see Bob Jessop, Putting the 
Capitalist State in Its Place (London: Polity, 1990). For one take on a post-state debate restatement of 
Marxist theory, see Michael Burawoy and Erik Olin Wright, “Sociological Marxism,” in Jonathan H. 
Turner, ed., Handbook of Sociological Theory (New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), 459-86. 
14 This has been called the “political articulation” approach by Cedric de Leon, Manali Desai, and Cihan 
Tuğal, “Political Articulation: The Structured Creativity of Parties,” in de Leon, Desai, and Tuğal, eds, 
Building Blocs: How Parties Organize Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015). But see also, 
Giovanni Sartori, “From the Sociology of Politics to Political Sociology,” Government and Opposition 4 
(1969); and Adam Przeworski, “Proletariat into a Class: The Process of Class Formation from Karl 
Kautsky’s The Class Struggle to Recent Controversies,” Politics and Society 7 (1977); and Leo Panitch, 
Working Class Politics in Crisis: Essays on Labour and the State (London: Verso, 1986). 
15 Kathleen Bawn et al., “A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands, and Nominations in 
American Politics,” Perspectives on Politics 10 (2012); Marty Cohen et al., The Party Decides: 
Presidential Nominations Before and After Reform (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008). See 
also, Christopher A. Baylor, “First to the Party: The Group Origins of the Partisan Transformation on Civil 
Rights, 1940-1960,” Studies in American Political Development 27 (2013); David Karol, Party Position 
Change in American Politics: Coalition Management (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); 
Seth E. Masket, No Middle Ground: How Informal Party Organizations Control Nominations and Polarize 
Legislatures (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009). 
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Democratic Party; or how the leadership of that party came to ally with one group over 
the other when such a decision would obviously jeopardize the party’s majority status.16 
The UCLA school has inadvertently returned to a pluralist conception of party 
organization, where organizational structure is irrelevant and which passively reflects 
preexisting cleavages and group identities originating in society. 
 In contrast, this dissertation conceives of parties as relatively autonomous 
institutions simultaneously present in both the state and civil society, inherently bound up 
with the dynamic interrelations that define them. As such, political parties constitute 
something of a paradox: they are simultaneously bureaucratic organizations; collections 
of power-seeking politicians; representative agents; and collections of organized “policy 
demanders.” As entities straddling the state and society, one should expect tension, 
conflict, contradiction, and dynamism to suffuse political parties as opposed to stasis or 
mere gravitation to the “median voter.”17 
 Not only are parties subject to the pressure of social movements and organizations 
that provide essential resources for its electoral campaigns, but they are also riven by the 
structural pressures of state administration and the need to facilitate capitalist 
accumulation attendant on any governing coalition. Party platforms conceived while out 
of office can become an albatross around the neck of party government, when fiscal 
constraints and administrative incapacity can hamper implementation of party program 
and consequently strain the intraparty relations between leaders and led.  
                                                
16 Eric Schickler, Racial Realignment: The Transformation of American Liberalism, 1932-1965 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2016), 10. 
17 See Stephanie L. Mudge and Anthony S. Chen, “Political Parties and the Sociological Imagination: Past, 
Present, and Future Directions,” Annual Review of Sociology 40 (2014). 
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 In addition to facing pressures from outside, parties are also saddled with their 
own internal problems of organizational maintenance and competitive viability. As 
Daniel Galvin has recently demonstrated, this dimension of institutional design has 
significant explanatory power in tracing the differential histories of Republican and 
Democratic parties in the second half of the twentieth century.18  
 But to locate parties at the intersection of the state and society is not to simply 
reinvent the functionalist view of parties as “mediating institutions.” While they certainly 
do referee access to public office, they do not only do that. Indeed, the intensity with 
which actors struggle to control parties is evidence of the significant role parties 
potentially play in shaping the wider field of politics. As uniquely positioned entities, 
parties can influence public policy and public discourse by using forms of co-optation, 
patronage, constitutional change, foreign threats, and electoral mobilization to reshape 
“common sense” understandings of social processes and set the very terms of legitimate 
political debate and contestation. As Alan Ware has put it, “it is not the voters, acting as 
an exogenous variable, whose changed behaviour transforms the party system; it is the 
actors in political parties, whose decisions about strategy (and their failure also to take 
such decisions) shape the likely responses from voters.”19 Parties – as organizational 
actors operating in both state and society – are also uniquely positioned to construct 
political orders or regimes, which sustain a discursive, intellectual, and policy framework 
within which political contestation is carried out.20  And while parties usually fail at 
                                                
18 Daniel J. Galvin, Presidential Party Building: Dwight D. Eisenhower to George W. Bush (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2010). 
19 Alan Ware, The Democratic Party Heads North, 1877-1962 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006).  
20 David Plotke, Building a Democratic Political Order: Reshaping American Liberalism in the 1930s and 
1940s (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Andrew J. Polsky, “Why Regimes? Ideas, 
Incentives, and Policies in American Politics Orders,” Polity 29 (1997); Andrew J. Polsky, “The Political 
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consolidating such regimes and cannot simply conjure them up out of thin air, it is the 
goal toward which they often aim, and one in which they occasionally succeed.21 
 It is with this framework in mind that this dissertation reexamines the New 
Politics movement’s attempt to reform and realign the Democratic Party. In doing so my 
account of this episode in the making of the modern Democratic Party departs from the 
prevailing wisdom concerning what the movement was about, how it fared, and what its 
legacy has been for American politics more generally. Contrary to the view of past 
scholars, who argue that the New Politics movement’s anti-party agenda effectively 
disfranchised the working class from the Democratic coalition, I argue that the New 
Politics’ attempt to democratize the Democratic Party ran into conflict with organized 
labor’s own institutional structure, which had historically relied on forms of elite 
bargaining rather than participatory mobilization to exert influence in American politics. 
As opposed to being fundamentally anti-party in their orientation, many within the New 
Politics movement sought to transform the Democratic Party into a party of a different 
type, not one that was indifferent to the interests of the working class but rather one 
which could spread the benefits and protections of the New Deal regime more equitably 
throughout American society. 
 The New Politics failed to overcome the institutional pressures and organized 
interests that favored party federalism. Even so, my account of their struggle to reform 
and realign the Democratic Party contributes to the growing body of scholarship 
                                                                                                                                            
Economy of Partisan Regimes: Lessons from Two Republican Eras,” Polity 35 (2003); and Andrew J. 
Polsky, “Partisan Regimes in American Politics,” Polity 44 (2012). 
21 de Leon, Desai, and Tuğal, “Political Articulation,” 5. 
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challenging the standard narrative of the decline of American liberalism. 22  As Lily 
Geismer has recently argued, the tendency to read the Reagan revolution of 1980 back 
into the crisis of the late 1960s artificially smooths out what was in fact a turbulent and 
contingent process of transformation.23 Indeed, it is to select one narrative account of 
many, which fingers the “excesses” of liberalism for its inexorable decline. Told in this 
way, the history of late postwar American politics reveals a teleology that inevitably 
eventuates in the decline and fall of liberalism and the triumph of conservatism. Such a 
narrative forecloses consideration of alternative pathways that might have been taken. 
The long 1970s was a period of intense flux, where many advocates of different 
competing political projects could and did point to evidence that suggested their 
alternative was the best option. One of these was the serious attempt to reform the 
Democratic Party by realigning its Cold War ideology along the lines of the protest 
movements of the 1960s. The New Politics movement was a punctuated window of 
opportunity in a longer process of transformation of the Democratic Party, one whose 
neoliberal outcome was not determined in advance. 
However, my approach to political parties also reopens deeper and more 
immediate questions confronting progressive politics in the early twenty-first century. In 
dialogue with the vein of scholarship that seeks to orient political science research toward 
contemporary political problems, this dissertation aims to do more than simply “get 
                                                
22 See Jonathan Bell and Timothy Stanley, eds, Making Sense of American Liberalism (Urbana: University 
of Illinois Press, 2012); Van Gosse and Richard Moser, eds, The World the Sixties Made: Politics and 
Culture in Recent America (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003). 
23 Lily Geismer, Don’t Blame Us: Suburban Liberals and the Transformation of the Democratic Party 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015). 
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history right,” as worthy a goal as that is.24 The bipartisan neoliberal political order 
constructed over the last three decades has presented advocates of egalitarian 
redistribution with fewer opportunities to influence public policy. Precisely because both 
Democrats and Republicans have converged on a broadly shared policy agenda of 
increased capital mobility, diminished welfare state commitments, and privatization, 
opponents of neoliberalism have found themselves without a significant organized voice 
within the political mainstream. In this context, reconsidering the limits and possibilities 
for reforming and realigning American party politics can contribute positively to a new 
progressive agenda. 
In addition to the secondary literature, this dissertation draws its sources from a 
wealth of archival material, a handful of interviews with historical protagonists, as well 
as contemporaneous media coverage (see the Bibliography for a full list). While I have 
employed many methodological tools found in the comparative-historical tradition of 
social science, this dissertation is not a comparison of two or more discrete attempts to 
transform a political party. Though that research may yield important insights into the 
possibilities and limits confronting projects of institutional change, it falls outside the 
parameters of this study. As Dietrich Rueschemeyer, among many others, has reminded 
us, single case studies are no less able to yield important theoretical gains than large-N 
comparisons. 25  Moreover, my reexamination of the New Politics movement in the 
                                                
24 See Ian Shapiro, “Problems, Methods, and Theories in the Study of Politics, or; What’s Wrong with 
Political Science and What to Do About It,” in Ian Shapiro, Rogers M. Smith, and Tarek E. Masoud, eds, 
Problems and Method in the Study of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
25 Dietrich Rueschemeyer, “Can One or a Few Cases Yield Theoretical Gains?” in James Mahoney and 
Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003). 
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Democratic Party challenges the method and conclusions of most existing scholarly 
monographs, as the following chapter sets out. 
  13 
CHAPTER 1 
 
THE NEW POLITICS AND ITS CRITICS 
 
By the late 1980s the US Democratic Party appeared to be mired in an unending 
existential crisis. Initially, many considered the party crisis that began with the explosive 
national convention in 1968 to have been effectively resolved by the landslide defeat of 
presidential nominee Senator George McGovern and the “New Politics” movement at the 
polls in 1972. The subsequent election of a southern Democrat, Georgia governor Jimmy 
Carter, to the White House in 1976 seemed to confirm the party had moderated its tone 
and been rewarded with a return to power. However, confidence in a restored Democratic 
majority soon evaporated as 1980, 1984, and 1988 delivered dramatic, lopsided defeats 
for Carter, former vice president Walter Mondale, and Massachusetts governor Michael 
Dukakis, respectively. Party centrists grouped together in the Democratic Leadership 
Council (DLC) diagnosed the root of the problem to be the stubborn persistence of the 
New Politics movement within the party. Like an unending hangover, the Democratic 
Party’s short-lived capture by New Politics insurgents in the late 1960s continued to 
linger and, as it was relayed by the party center, poison its image in the minds of 
American voters. By reforming the party’s presidential nominating system as well as its 
governing structure, the New Politics had allegedly institutionalized a “new elite” of 
“special interest groups” that owed their formative experiences to the popular activism of 
the late 1960s and 1970s. It was their influence that constrained moderate party leaders 
from building an appealing liberal political consensus like that which had sustained 
Democratic majorities under Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, John F. Kennedy, and 
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Lyndon Johnson. As a result, the public perception of the Democrats had shifted from 
associating the party with the interests of the poor, African Americans, unions, Catholics, 
and the middle class to black militants, feminists, welfare recipients, as well as gays and 
lesbians. The centrists’ proposed solution to the problem was nothing less than to “save” 
the Democratic Party from its “headlong dash into social democracy.”1 
 The success of the DLC in installing its New Democrat vision in the party is well 
known. What is less frequently recognized, however, is that the DLC was not the first 
organized internal party faction to go to war against the New Politics. In fact, the New 
Democrat indictment of the New Politics echoed substantially similar objections raised 
more than a decade earlier in a predecessor organization, the Coalition for a Democratic 
Majority (CDM). While mostly composed of Democratic intellectuals, party operatives, 
and labor leaders rather than officeholders, the CDM had been active in fighting the 
reforms as they took hold inside the party in the 1970s, warning that the New Politics was 
leading the party away from mainstream American voters who were “unyoung, unpoor, 
and unblack.”2 Their efforts were supported by a burgeoning academic literature, mostly 
written by CDM members or their students, that identified the New Politics as the source 
of the Democrats’ continuing post-1968 disarray. Taking up where the CDM left off, the 
                                                
1 On the Democratic Leadership Council see Al From, The New Democrats and the Return to Power (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Kenneth S. Baer, Reinventing Democrats: The Politics of Liberalism 
From Reagan to Clinton (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2000); Jon F. Hale, “The Making of the 
New Democrats,” Political Science Quarterly 110 (1995); Stephen Medvic, “Old Democrats in New 
Clothing? An Ideological Analysis of a Democratic Party Faction,” Party Politics 13 (2007); and Curtis 
Atkins, “Forging a New Democratic Party: The Politics of the Third Way from Clinton to Obama” (PhD 
diss., York University, 2015), where American National Election Studies survey data can be found on page 
5, fn. 7. The “headlong dash into social democracy” is a phrase of Al From’s in his The New Democrats, 
173. 
2 Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, The Real Majority: An Extraordinary Examination of the 
American Electorate (New York: Coward-McCann, 1970), chapter 4. 
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DLC appropriated the anti-New Politics narrative constructed by centrist partisans and 
put it to use in their realignment of the Democratic Party.3 
The CDM-inspired narrative of the New Politics movement has played a central 
role in the retreat of the Democratic Party from the left-liberalism of the late New 
Deal/Great Society era. Center-right political actors have used the specter of the New 
Politics as a weapon in their factional struggle to reshape the identity of the Democratic 
Party and the course of American public policy. Shifting the party away from the left, it 
was argued, was a “common sense” response in the face of Democratic defeat and 
Republican victory, which appeared to have captured the hearts and minds of formerly 
Democratic voters of the white middle class.  
This dissertation seeks to reassess the New Politics movement and its attempt to 
democratize the Democratic Party in the decade following 1968. In its first phase, from 
1969 to 1972, the New Politics engineered major alterations to the rules governing the 
party’s convention delegate selection procedures and the process of presidential 
nomination. Significant institutional barriers to popular participation in the choice of 
presidential nominee were dismantled, opening the party up to greater social movement 
influence at the expense of the power of party leaders and officeholders who had 
previously monopolized the process. In its second phase, from 1973 to 1978, further 
attempts were made to democratize the party, focused on strengthening the party’s 
                                                
3 While the CDM, like the neoconservative movement generally, had been born out of a concern for 
domestic politics, its increasing focus on foreign policy led it to support Reagan’s New Cold War policy of 
confrontation with the Soviet Union, and ultimately into the Republican Party, compromising its goal of 
recapturing the Democrats from the New Politics. CDM members who stuck with the Democrats discussed 
merging with the DLC in the late 1980s, but the latter preferred not to inherit the legacy of an earlier 
ideological conflict or the CDM’s close relationship to many in the trade union leadership. See Justin 
Vaïsse, Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2010), 209, 214-7; 
and Andrew Hartman, The War for the Soul of America: A History of the Culture Wars (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2015). 
  16 
policymaking capacities and its disciplinary mechanisms to hold Democratic 
officeholders accountable as agents of the party rank and file.  
 Hailing from civil rights, student, antiwar, and feminist movements, New Politics 
activists viewed institutional reform as a means of achieving substantive changes in 
public policy. While prefigured by parts of the civil rights movement, and subsequently 
precipitated by the internal party clash over the Vietnam War, the new entrants attempted 
to realign the Democratic Party around a radical social-democratic vision of guaranteed 
basic income, full employment, détente with the Soviet Union, and an Equal Rights 
Amendment to the US Constitution. The New Politics reform agenda entailed nothing 
less than the attempted transformation of the Democratic Party into a party of a different 
type. 
 However, the New Politics’ project to democratize the Democratic Party 
ultimately failed on these terms. Despite having achieved lasting changes to the 
presidential nomination system, its more ambitious structural reforms as well as its 
radical policy agenda met with pitched resistance at the hands of party and public 
officials, the majority of the labor union leadership, as well as the disaffection of many 
Democratic voters. In the face of the resistance offered by the anti-reform coalition, as 
well as the dissipation of the 1960s insurgent movements, democratization of the party 
was stalled and rolled back. The resulting product was a party composed of the various 
movements and tendencies that composed the New Politics, albeit one that integrated 
them on the basis of elite brokerage and popular demobilization. By failing to provide a 
new means for mass participation in party democracy, the New Politics pried open the 
party doors but found few waiting to enter. 
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 As both the climax of postwar left-liberalism and the whipping boy of the DLC’s 
Third Way ideology, the New Politics movement figures as a pivotal episode in the 
making of modern American politics. It is the purpose of this dissertation to demonstrate 
that the New Politics has been widely mischaracterized and misunderstood. Accordingly, 
as the first step in my effort to reassess the New Politics, this chapter will set out what is 
at stake in the debate by examining, in turn, what the movement was about, what its 
critics have said about it, and how the critics’ claims fail to withstand careful scrutiny. In 
this chapter I will argue that the critique of the New Politics has been produced in service 
to a distinct political project. The critics’ mischaracterization of the reform movement 
nurtured the false impression of New Politics’ alleged dominance within the Democratic 
Party, offering a pretext for the restoration of party leaders’ authority and a rightward 
shift in public policy. 
 
What Was the New Politics Movement? 
The “New Politics” movement may not be a household name, but its impact continues to 
be felt on the American political landscape in the way the Republican and Democratic 
parties select their presidential nominees. But while its effects continue to draw the 
attention of political scientists, the reform movement itself has sustained little scholarly 
attention in its own right. This is due in part to the difficultly of specifying its scope and 
boundaries. The movement calling for a new politics in the 1960s and 1970s crisscrossed 
institutional boundaries and international borders, finding expression in a variety of new 
left insurgencies in political arenas ranging from the American Congress and the 
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Democratic Party to the British Labour Party and the German Greens and elsewhere.4 
Scholars and commentators have coped with this bewildering extent of new politics 
activity in a number of ways. Some have narrowed the definition of the New Politics to 
what they consider to be its essential causal force, such as changing communications 
technology, while others have embraced its grand horizons, defining it as the generic 
mode of political action of the “new social movements.”5 In the face of such confusion, 
others have taken a step back to ponder whether the New Politics actually constitutes 
more of a “mood” than a  “movement.”6 
Uniting the diversity of the New Politics was a critical focus on political 
institutions and their basis of operation and authority. While the legacy of the 1960s New 
Left may evoke images of large street confrontations in Berkeley, Paris or Chicago, a 
significant swath of participants understood the limitations of protest as a form of 
political action, and the mutually reinforcing dynamics of activist militancy and state 
                                                
4 On the New Politics in Congress see Julian E. Zelizer, On Capitol Hill: The Struggle to Reform Congress 
and Its Consequences, 1948-2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Thomas P. Murphy, 
The New Politics Congress (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1974); and Sam Hoffman Rosenfeld, “A Choice, 
Not an Echo: Polarization and the Transformation of the American Party System,” (PhD diss., Harvard 
University, 2014), chapters 4 and 6. On the British experience, see Leo Panitch and Colin Leys, The End of 
Parliamentary Socialism: From New Left to New Labour (London: Verso, 2001). For the broader European 
experience, see Gerassimos Moschonas, In the Name of Social Democracy: The Great Transformation, 
1945 to the Present (London: Verso, 2002); Geoff Eley, Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in 
Europe, 1850-2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); and Donald Sassoon, One Hundred Years of 
Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century (London: I.B. Taurus, 1996). 
5 For an early treatment of the New Politics that emphasizes technological change, see James Perry, The 
New Politics: The Expanding Technology of Political Manipulation (New York: Clarkson N. Potter, 1968). 
For a more expansive characterization, see Claus Offe, “Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional 
Politics: Social Movements Since the 1960s,” in Charles Maier, ed., Challenging Boundaries of the 
Political: Essays on the Evolving Balance between the State and Society, Public and Private in Europe 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
6 See James Burkhart and Frank Kendrick, eds., The New Politics: Mood or Movement? (Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1971). For other important contemporaneous accounts of the New Politics see Frederick 
Dutton, Changing Sources of Power: American Politics in the 1970s (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971); 
Lanny Davis, The Emerging Democratic Majority: Lessons and Legacies from the New Politics (New 
York: Stein and Day, 1974); Michael Harrington, Toward a Democratic Left: A Radical Program for a 
New Majority (New York: Macmillan, 1968); and Stephen Schlesinger, The New Reformers: Forces for 
Change in American Politics (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1975). 
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repression promoted an entryist perspective as the 1960s wore on. This orientation 
toward entering the political process was itself premised on a widespread diagnosis that 
interpreted everything from policy failures in Vietnam to the generalized sense of 
alienation at university campuses and corporate workplaces as the result of unresponsive 
forms of social, economic, and political organization. The demand for more participatory 
mechanisms of popular control found expression in a variety of venues, from the Port 
Huron Statement and the Office of Economic Opportunity’s doctrine of “maximum 
feasible participation” to the Black Power call for community control. 
Challenging the operation of unresponsive institutions required expanding the 
reach of democratic rights into unconventional arenas. In some spaces, such as the 
internal operation of universities, this was a new frontier of contestation. In others, such 
as state regulatory bodies, this entailed repudiating the statist trajectory of New Deal 
reformism altogether. The nascent public interest movement, for instance, declaimed the 
“capture” of formally neutral government agencies by the business community they were 
supposed to regulate, and sought to substitute decentralized mechanisms of control 
instead.7 In each and every case, insurgent activists and organizations made claims that 
sought to introduce meaningful citizen input into decisionmaking procedures formally or 
effectively monopolized by experts, specialists, or elites. The expanded scope of 
democratic participation blurred the traditional boundaries that separated the private and 
the political.8 
Some have overemphasized the “new” in the New Politics, however, attributing to 
its advocates a postmodern set of values or even a return to pre-modern romanticism that 
                                                
7 On public interest liberalism, see David Vogel, Fluctuating Fortunes: The Political Power of Business in 
America (New York: Basic Books, 1989), chapter 5. 
8 Offe, “Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics,” 63. 
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motivated their rejection of mainstream political discourse and structures of authority.9 
But as Claus Offe has recognized, this overlooks the degree to which the new insurgents 
did not reject modern values but, in fact, “espouse[d] arrangements that would allow 
specifically modern values … to be realized more fully.”10 In the US case in particular, 
rather than treating the New Politics movement as an exogenous development in course 
of American postwar politics, it must be seen as emerging from the contradictions of the 
New Deal order. By simultaneously promulgating and limiting the universalist “rights 
revolution” born during the 1930s and 1940s, the contradictions of the New Deal regime 
paved the way for its own legitimacy crisis in the late 1960s. 
 
The Critique of the New Politics 
For my purposes, the focus of this dissertation will be the New Politics movement within 
the national extra-governmental Democratic Party in the United States. With several 
important exceptions, the scholarly consensus on the New Politics and its reform of the 
Democratic Party has been overwhelmingly shaped by neoconservative intellectuals.11 
                                                
9 On post-material values, see Ronald Inglehardt, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political 
Styles Among Western Publics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977). For a potent critique of this 
perspective that underscores the material interests of suburban constituencies articulating allegedly “post-
material” values, see Lily Geismer, Don’t Blame Us: Suburban Liberals and the Transformation of the 
Democratic Party (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015). 
10 Offe, “Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics,” 81. 
11 The key text here, and by far the most influential study to date of the post-1968 delegate selection 
reforms, is Byron E. Shafer, Quiet Revolution: The Struggle for the Democratic Party and the Shaping of 
Post-Reform Politics (New York: Russell Sage, 1983). See also Jeane Kirkpatrick, The New Presidential 
Elite: Men and Women in National Politics (New York: Russell Sage, 1976); Jeane Kirkpatrick, 
Dismantling the Parties: Reflections on Party Reform and Party Decomposition (Washington, DC: 
American Enterprise Institute Press, 1978); Nelson Polsby, Consequences of Party Reform (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1983); Austin Ranney, Curing the Mischiefs of Faction: Party Reform in America 
(Berkeley, The University of California Press, 1975); James W. Ceaser, Presidential Selection: Theory and 
Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); and Andrew E. Busch, Outsiders and 
Openness in the Presidential Nominating System (Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997). 
For an important exception to the neoconservative consensus within the first generation of party reform 
literature, see William Crotty, Decision for the Democrats: Reforming the Party Structure (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); and William Crotty, Party Reform (New York: Longman, 1983). 
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Their views appeared in scholarly journals such as The Public Interest, newspaper 
periodicals, and popular organs such as Commentary Magazine, and reflect a remarkable 
degree of consensus. Some of the foremost academic authorities on the subject, such as 
Jeane Kirkpatrick, Austin Ranney (himself a former reformer), and Nelson Polsby, were 
members of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, the anti-reform organization that 
formed inside the party to neutralize the influence of the New Politics movement.12 
Following the lead of James Q. Wilson’s influential study of the “amateur Democrat” in 
city politics during the 1950s, the critics have emphasized the distinctiveness of the New 
Politics activists’ “purist” political style, their attitudes, and their values.13 But because 
the New Politics movement succeeded where their “amateur” predecessors largely failed 
– namely, in actually reforming party institutions – the scholarly critiques have focused 
on the “perverse” consequences of party reform. Ultimately, their criticisms boil down to 
four nested claims:  
 
 
1) Party organization: By opening up delegate selection procedures, the reforms 
necessarily diminished the role of the party organization in selecting its 
presidential nominee, weakening the regular party. 
 
2) Electoral performance: By diminishing party control over the presidential 
nomination process, candidates who are unrepresentative of the average 
Democratic voter can capture the party nomination and cost the Democratic Party 
                                                                                                                                            
The neoconservative bent of New Politics reform critics is pointed out by David Plotke, “Party Reform as 
Failed Democratic Renewal in the United States: 1968-1972,” Studies in American Political Development 
10 (1996); as well as by Robert T. Nakamura and Denis Sullivan, “Neoconservatism and Presidential 
Nomination Reforms,” Congress & the Presidency 9 (1982). However, these authors do not point out that 
many of these same critics were active participants in the intraparty struggle. 
12 On the CDM and its participants, see Vaisse, Neoconservatism, chapter 3; and Chapter 7 below. 
13 James Q. Wilson, The Amateur Democrat: Club Politics in Three Cities (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1962). I will put to the side questions of values, style, and attitude in favor of more 
institutional concerns. For a critique of the critics’ use of Wilson’s variables, see Ronald D. Rapoport, Alan 
I. Abramowitz, and John McGlennon, The Life of the Parties: Activists in Presidential Elections 
(Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1986). 
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victory in the general election (George McGovern being the prime example). 
 
3) Public policy influence: The loss of presidential power diminished the influence 
of traditional Democratic constituencies on public policy, resulting in the decline 
of American liberalism and the breakup of the New Deal coalition. 
 
4) Reformers’ class character: The nature of the party reforms reflected the interests 
of the white-collar reformers who initiated them, bringing to power within the 
Democratic Party a new “elite” constituency at the expense of its traditional blue-
collar base. 
 
 
 
Party Organization 
In terms of examining their organizational effects, the neoconservative critics consider 
the reforms to have been fundamentally “anti-party” in nature. From their perspective, the 
opening up of delegate selection procedures necessarily came at the cost of party 
organization itself. Byron Shafer’s judgment is typical in this regard: “At bottom, the 
result of all these reforms was the diminution, the constriction, at times the elimination, 
of the regular party in the politics of presidential selection.”14 While a detailed account 
of party organization prior to the advent of the reforms will follow in Chapter 2, it is 
necessary to sketch out some of the basics in order to understand where these allegations 
of anti-partyism are coming from.  
For over a century prior to the post-1968 reforms, the national Democratic Party 
was nothing more than a loose confederation of state parties that came together every 
four years to nominate a presidential ticket and organize the national campaign. State 
parties themselves were not much more than networks of city machines, state and local 
officeholders, representatives of outside interest groups, and wealthy contributors. At the 
beginning of each presidential cycle, state party officials would caucus with local 
                                                
14 Shafer, Quiet Revolution, 525 (emphasis in original). 
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notables, party activists, and politicians to select the state’s delegation to the national 
nominating convention, often as a reward for loyal party service. Primary elections had 
been introduced into the nominating system in some states after the turn of the twentieth 
century to lessen the alleged abuses of “bossism” in the party-controlled caucus-
convention system, but primary voters’ presidential preferences were not binding on 
delegations, nor were delegates usually required to declare their own candidate 
preferences on the ballot. Under certain conditions primaries could function as an 
indicator of a lesser-known candidate’s potential in the general election, as when John F. 
Kennedy used several primary victories in 1960 to demonstrate his electability despite his 
Catholicism and relative youth. But primary results, while sometimes influential, were 
never determinative, providing only one more item of information for party leaders to 
consider when finalizing their negotiations at the national convention. 
In this mixed system of primaries, caucuses, and conventions, aspirants for the 
party’s presidential nomination had to build a coalition among state party leaders – not 
voters – such as state committee chairs, governors, or senators, who controlled the votes 
of their delegations at the national convention and collectively determined the nominee. 
In the event that no clear winner emerged on the first ballot at the convention, state party 
leaders and other party officials could negotiate among themselves in the “smoke-filled 
rooms” of the convention hall for a mutually preferred candidate, each bargaining with 
his delegation’s votes in his pocket. In this pattern of elite brokerage, the eventual 
presidential nominee had to be acceptable to most of the state party leaders, and sitting 
presidents were always assured of renomination.15 
                                                
15 See Edward C. Banfield, “Party ‘Reform’ in Retrospect,” in Robert A. Goldwin, ed., Political Parties in 
the Eighties (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1980), 21-2; as well as James W. Davis, US 
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From the critics’ perspective, the New Politics reforms radically transformed this 
system and, consequently, the kinds of candidates it was likely to produce. Before the 
reforms each stage of the nominating process, from the local precinct meetings to the 
national convention, had been conducted under the supervision of party leaders. After the 
reforms, the authority and autonomy of party officials to control the process had been 
reduced in favor of rank-and-file party activists. 16  Caucus participants and primary 
voters, whether seasoned activists or newcomers, were permitted to form their own 
delegate slates without the consent or approval of local party officials, giving any self-
declared Democrat the opportunity to serve as a national delegate. In addition, state and 
local party proceedings could no longer be conducted behind closed doors or in 
inaccessible locations, such as the private residence of a local committee chair. Most 
significantly, all those running for a delegate seat, including party leaders and public 
officials, had to declare their preference in the presidential race in advance, binding them 
to cast their initial ballot for that candidate and eliminating any room for brokerage at the 
start of the national convention. Winner-take-all devices in the allocation of convention 
delegates were discontinued in favor of proportional representation, no matter which 
candidate party leaders preferred. Lastly, party leaders and officeholders were stripped of 
their special privilege to attend the national convention as unpledged delegates, while 
stringent affirmative action provisions were instated for the representation of racial 
minorities, women, and people under thirty.  
                                                                                                                                            
Presidential Primaries and the Caucus-Convention System: A Sourcebook (Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Press, 1997); and Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in the American Mold (Madison: The University of 
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A consequence of the removal of party regulars from the presidential nominating 
process, critics tell us, has been the hollowing out of any significant role for the national 
party convention. What used to function as a deliberative body for state party leaders to 
engage in complex negotiations and select a viable nominee has become nothing more 
than “a body dominated by candidate enthusiasts and interest group delegates,” who only 
“ratify a choice made prior to the convention.” Because nearly all delegates were now 
pledged to support a particular candidate before arriving, the convention survived 
“primarily as spectacle.”17 
 
Electoral Performance 
Critics also maintain that the marginalization of those “dedicated to maintaining the party 
as an ongoing organization” has diminished “the gate-keeping functions” of party leaders 
and officeholders, portending disastrous electoral consequences for the party’s eventual 
nominee.18 The “near exclusion” of state party leaders from the presidential nominating 
process and the resultant openness of the party has made it more likely that a “radically 
unacceptable” candidate could capture the party’s presidential nomination by cultivating 
an enthusiastic but ultimately unrepresentative following among party activists and 
voters. 19  Whereas before the reforms, presidential aspirants had to build a coalition 
among party leaders throughout the country, after the reforms presidential hopefuls could 
accumulate delegates in state primaries and open party caucuses, venues that lent 
themselves to highly motivated, intensely ideological participants, circumventing the 
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party leadership altogether. According to the critics, in the absence of the intermediation 
between candidates and voters provided by party leaders, the presidential nomination 
system had lost a valuable moderating mechanism that tended toward more or less widely 
acceptable and highly electable candidates for national office. The landslide defeat of 
Senator George McGovern in 1972, the first presidential contest following party reform, 
was taken as evidence of the inability of the new institutional framework to filter out 
candidates who were out of sync with the mainstream of American politics.20 
 
Public Policy Influence 
Taking a further step back and considering the wider implications of reform for the 
contours of post-1960s Democratic politics, critics have argued that the reformed 
presidential nomination system, by producing unrepresentative and unpopular nominees, 
broke apart the Democrats’ New Deal coalition of working class voters, African 
Americans, liberals, and southerners, diminishing its influence on public policy and 
resulting in the general decline of American liberalism. Prominent liberal commentators 
have adopted this view as well. In their influential account of “the disintegration of the 
liberal coalition,” Thomas and Mary Edsall give the New Politics a special – indeed, 
“catalytic” – role in the “chain reaction” that drove white working class voters out of the 
Democratic Party between the 1960s and the 1980s. While the widespread association of 
the Democrats with countercultural permissiveness, racial integration, and the welfare 
state was see as the root cause of the defection, they claim it was the new party rules 
which “in fact functioned to reduce the role of white working and lower-middle-class 
voters” by marginalizing the party bosses with whom “ethnic, working-class leaders” 
                                                
20 See Polsby, Consequences of Party Reform. 
  27 
exerted influence in the selection of the presidential nominee.21 Thus, by diminishing the 
power of the party leaders, the New Politics necessarily disenfranchised the key class 
constituency of the New Deal coalition, giving rise to the Reagan Democrat phenomenon 
and a bleak future for the party of New Deal liberalism. 
 To sum up the critics’ argument so far, rule changes in the operation of the 
Democratic Party’s nominating machinery had enormous ripple effects throughout the 
party system and the trajectory of national politics. Because party organization plays an 
important role in structuring presidential elections and the content of national policy, by 
restructuring the delegate selection process in the name of openness and participation the 
New Politics undermined party leaders’ ability to act as a moderating force in the process 
of presidential nomination and ultimately damaged liberal forces in the American 
political arena.  
 
Reformers’ Class Character 
With consequences as dire as these it is not surprising that the critics of the New Politics 
have questioned the nature of the reform movement itself in an effort to come up with an 
explanation of its profound results. While some critics have emphasized the unintended 
consequences of political reform, especially that which naively seeks to base politics on 
principle, a consistent refrain heard throughout the anti-reform literature is that party 
reform was in essence the project of a “new class” elite.22  
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These critics argue that, by design, the New Politics reformers sought to remake 
the Democratic Party in their own image. Their members cohered around the postwar 
system of expanded higher education and new knowledge-based, white-collar 
professions. They articulated a new, “post-material” set of values that emphasized 
“quality of life” social issues, such as peace and environmentalism, over the economic 
“bread and butter” demands of the preceding generation.23 By injecting ideology into 
American politics through the introduction of such “divisive ‘issues’” such as Vietnam, 
“race,” and welfare, the reformers destabilized the non-ideological basis of compromise 
undergirding the New Deal party system.24 Their politics was a politics of “purism,” 
inclined to prioritize moral righteousness over electoral success or organizational 
maintenance.25 Consequently, after having been rebuffed in their antiwar insurgency in 
1968, the “new amateurs” became fixated on party reform “as an end in itself.”26 
According to the critics, reforming the party in the name of participatory 
democracy was a project inscribed with a specific class bias, one that privileged the 
highly educated, professionally skilled “new class” over the working class constituencies 
of the New Deal coalition. Indeed, this was evident in the character of the new party 
institutions created by the reforms at multiple levels of organization. At the grassroots 
level, participatory primaries, caucuses, and conventions – forums requiring more than a 
                                                                                                                                            
Shafer’s argument provides the basis for the Edsalls’ account of party reform in Chain Reaction. For 
another, though less committed endorsement of the “new class” hypothesis as an explanation of the New 
Politics movement, see Martin Shefter, Political Parties and the State: The American Historical Experience 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 88. For an argument that places its emphasis on unintended 
consequences, see Edward C. Banfield, “In Defense of the American Party System,” in Political Parties in 
the Eighties. For a potent critique of the new class hypothesis see Plotke, “Party Reform.” 
23 See Scammon and Wattenberg, The Real Majority.  
24 Kirkpatrick, The New Presidential Elite, 354. See also, Edsall and Edsall, Chain Reaction. 
25 Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky, Presidential Elections: Strategies and Structures of American 
Politics (New York: Scribner, 1976). 
26 Shafer, Quiet Revolution, 76. 
  29 
modicum of political consciousness, education, self confidence, and free time – 
necessarily “favored white-collar elements” within the party rank and file, drawing the 
Democrats away from their traditional “blue-collar constituencies” as represented by the 
leadership of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(AFL-CIO).27 The New Politics reforms, Shafer alleges, “meant that the discretion of 
those who had previously interpreted local party regulations, usually on the basis of 
experience and custom, would necessarily be curtailed, while the influence of those who 
specialized in mastering and then manipulating formal rules would simultaneously be 
enhanced.”28  For Kirkpatrick, the declining need of presidential aspirants to rely on 
formal party organization and its leaders further increased the demand for “symbol 
specialists” with the requisite skills and expertise in communications and public relations, 
inflating their prestige and influence in American politics.29  
  From the critics’ perspective, therefore, the democratization of the Democratic 
Party at the hands of the new, white-collar elite was an illegitimate political project 
carried out by a minority faction within the majority party. The reforms they pursued 
under the banner of openness and participation ultimately served to promote their own 
interests in the party by restructuring the organization in ways more conducive to their 
own political capacities. That their interests and values were unrepresentative of the 
average Democratic voter was seen in the outcome of the 1972 presidential race. Indeed, 
Martin Shefter has suggested that “the very demand for guaranteed representation 
through racial or sexual quotas” in the delegate selection process was evidence that the 
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New Politics movement was “unwilling or unprepared to do what was necessary to 
acquire additional support” and “win more votes than its rivals.”30  
 
Assessing the Critique 
It is clear that the critics of the New Politics movement place a very heavy burden of 
responsibility on the reformers for the general decline of New Deal liberalism in the post-
1960s era. The Democratic Party would only reclaim the White House once in the period 
between 1968 and 1992 – a victory whose slim margin was all the more surprising given 
the disgrace of the Republican leadership in the wake of President Richard Nixon’s 
Watergate scandal. The single-term presidency of Jimmy Carter was itself only further 
testament to the crisis of governance which critics of party reform laid at the feet of the 
New Politics movement, seeing an inexperienced peanut farmer’s ascension to the 
presidency of the United States as the predictable outcome of the party rule changes.31 
While no critics held that poor electoral performance and a crisis of the presidency were 
the intended outcomes of the democratization of the party as such, they alleged that the 
New Politics reformers had unwittingly created the conditions that facilitated such 
problems in the pursuit of their own class interests. 
 What are we to make of these arguments? Whether we look at the electoral 
dimension, the new class hypothesis, or the assertion that New Politics reforms were anti-
party in nature, the major claims of the critics do not withstand careful scrutiny. Rather, 
the hostility to democratic reform contained in these arguments is more influenced by 
politics and ideology than it is by evidence and analysis. While we will see how the New 
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Politics movement was limited in its success by its own internal contradictions, it is 
necessary to first clear away the mischaracterizations of its critics. 
David Plotke is one of the few political scientists who challenges the claim that 
party reform was responsible for the electoral disarray of the Democratic Party in the late 
1960s. Indeed, he shows that major electoral losses were recorded well before the advent 
of reform. Between 1964 and 1968, the Democrats lost ten seats in the Senate, fifty-two 
in the House, thirteen governorships, and suffered a 20 percent decline in partisan 
identification in the electorate. Rather than being caused by the entrance of the New 
Politics movement or the restructuring of the delegate selection process, the Democrats’ 
electoral misfortunes are attributed by him to the growing contradictions within the New 
Deal coalition itself, namely the inability to continue to reconcile, on the one hand, more 
assertive race-conscious policies with southern and working-class conservatives, and on 
the other, cold warriors and liberal doves. The growth of antagonistic relations between 
and within coalitional blocs defied the ability of the party leadership to hold the New 
Deal coalition together any longer.32 
Nor was this inability to manage an unstable Democratic coalition a matter of 
reformers having injected “issues” and “ideology” into a previously ideology-free arena 
of pragmatic politics. While sharp divergences at the level of culture and discourse did 
distinguish elements of the New Left from their parents’ generation, these surface level 
differences mask the similarities the late 1960s shared with the sharp ideological and 
political conflicts that characterized the 1930s and 1940s. Following the consolidation of 
the New Deal order’s “common sense” understanding of legitimate political discourse, it 
may have appeared to some during the 1950s and early 1960s that ideology had no place 
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in American politics. 33  But this proposition becomes unsustainable when intraparty 
conflicts between Taft and Eisenhower Republicanism, on the one hand, and Truman and 
Popular Frontism, on the other, are brought back into the picture. Those polarized 
conflicts were about the very basis of political contestation rather than negotiating over 
its terms. The destabilization of the New Deal coalition had reopened those debates 
before the end of the 1960s.34 
 Furthermore, the incapacity of party leaders to continue to broker the divergent 
interests within the New Deal coalition through the late 1960s casts doubt on the critics’ 
assumption of robust party organization at the local and state levels prior to the advent of 
reform. As Daniel Galvin has recently demonstrated, postwar Democratic presidents 
invested precious few resources in building or even maintaining the infrastructure of the 
national party committee, state-level committees, or their organizational capacities. This 
was the result of what Galvin describes as “the tendency of Democratic presidents to 
view policies as the primary instruments for nurturing their party coalition,” as well as 
the presumption that Democratic legislative majorities and deep levels of partisan 
identification in the electorate were permanent features of the postwar political order.35 
As will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, the institutional structure of the 
Democratic Party possessed very little ability to negotiate a stable consensus between 
competing political interests when their relations became strained. The New Deal order 
was sustained through a series of conjunctures that provisionally tied together very 
                                                
33 See, for example, Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties 
(New York: The Free Press, 1960).  
34 This point is made in Plotke, “Party Reform,” 233. 
35 Daniel J. Galvin, Presidential Party Building: Dwight D. Eisenhower to George W. Bush (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2010), 37-8. See also, Philip A. Klinkner, The Losing Parties: Out-Party 
National Committees, 1956-1993 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994). 
  33 
divergent interests around economic growth, Soviet containment, and gradual progress on 
civil rights. When the preferences of party leaders were tested in the 1960s, social 
movement insurgents were more often shut out of party affairs, rather than having their 
demands genuinely negotiated. Resort to these kinds of tactics indicates that the 
organizational capacities of party leaders to broker compromise among various interests 
have been exaggerated. It is perhaps not surprising then that very few accounts of party 
reform include any real institutional analysis of the party before it was reformed.36 
If the electoral problems besetting the Democratic Party began prior to reform and 
in fact reflected the organizational atrophy of the party’s institutional capacity to broker 
compromise, perhaps the reforms still bear the burden of privileging white collar elites at 
the expense of its working class constituencies, thus contributing to, if not causing, the 
unraveling of the New Deal coalition? The “new class” hypothesis, of course, has a 
certain plausible sociology and intellectual context to it. 37  Enrollment in America’s 
higher education system grew rapidly over the postwar period from 2.3 to 4 million in the 
1950s, and more than doubled again by the end of the 1960s. And while campus unrest 
was widespread throughout the second half of the latter decade, the prominence of the 
Free Speech Movement at Berkeley (FSM), Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) at 
the University of Michigan, and the building occupations at Columbia appeared to 
connect students at elite institutions with increasing political militancy, causing eminent 
sociologist and future CDM supporter Seymour Martin Lipset, among others, to rethink 
the typical cold war formula that associated radicalization with lower levels of 
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education.38 Moreover, FSM and SDS leaders such as Mario Savio and Tom Hayden 
drew much of their critical analysis from the texts of sociologist C. Wright Mills, who 
judged the “labor metaphysic” at the center of Marxist thought to be “unrealistic,” and 
indeed several New Politics theorists, such as Frederick Dutton and Michael Harrington, 
endorsed SDS’s 1962 Port Huron Statement, which placed special emphasis on the 
agency of university students to effect social and political change.39  
But for all the impact campus politics had on the nature and trajectory of “the 
Sixties,” the extrapolations made and conclusions drawn about a new class by the critics 
of the New Politics are superficial. For instance, citing Byron Shafer’s definitive study of 
party reform for support, the Edsalls claim that the New Politics reforms “produced a 
class shift in terms of the makeup of Democratic presidential convention delegates.”40 
However, this claim is highly misleading. On the one hand, while the Edsalls probably 
have the 1972 convention in mind, Shafer’s Quiet Revolution contains no analysis or 
account of the post-reform party conventions at all. But if the Edsalls cite Shafer in error, 
it is a mistake that is comprehensible. After all, it is indeed the major claim of Shafer’s 
tome that the reforms elevated a “new class” elite within the party hierarchy. However, 
this conclusion is purely inferential, extrapolated from a detailed history of reform 
politics between 1968 and the eve of the 1972 convention, and is not verified with any 
empirical data, especially regarding the composition of convention delegations. In the 
end, Shafer relies on what he admits are “speculations” and “projections” based on the 
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institutional analysis that preceded them. 41  Such an analysis relies on reading “the 
character” of institutions in a way that fails to acknowledge ambiguity or alternative 
interpretations, which could lead to different speculations and projections regarding their 
implications. Take, for instance, Shafer’s claim, quoted above, that the codification of 
rules for delegate selection privileged political actors “specialized in mastering and then 
manipulating formal rules,” namely, white collar elite activists. But why the advent of 
formal rules in place of custom and tradition should necessarily privilege white collar 
elites is never explained, nor is it backed up with empirical evidence for confirmation. 
Moreover, it flies in the face of the history of political struggles of the powerless to 
extract clear and binding rules of conduct and obligation from social and political rulers. 
As will be shown in the chapters that follow, it was precisely because formal party rules 
were not codified or transparent before reform that white collar party leaders were able to 
exercise arbitrary authority in the face of social movement insurgencies. 
But the Edsalls’ assertion that the 1972 convention offers evidence of an elite 
“class shift” is also misleading for another reason. Jeane Kirkpatrick’s enormous study of 
The New Presidential Elite does supply copious amounts of survey data and analysis of 
the composition and style of the 1972 Democratic convention delegates, claiming that it 
demonstrates the rise of a “new breed,” a “new class,” and a “new politics” in 
presidential nominations.42 Oddly enough, however, she does not compare her data with 
past conventions – a striking omission in a study that claims to be analyzing an emergent 
force in American politics. Scholars who have conducted comparative research on the 
party conventions before and after reform have found that while delegates with a college 
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education – the key characteristic of the “new class” – did increase from 43 to 52 percent 
of convention participants between 1968 and 1972, those with annual incomes of $10,000 
or less increased from 13 to 27 percent. 43  In addition to the massive increase in 
participation rates of African Americans, women, and young people, Democratic 
National Committee chair Lawrence O’Brien’s own records reveal that the 1972 
convention also hosted a larger number of union members – more than 300 in total – than 
any previous Democratic convention, increasing their proportion of delegate seats from 4 
to 16 percent.44 If any kind of “class shift” was evident in the makeup of the Democratic 
Party’s 1972 nominating convention, it was more in the direction of working class people 
than white collar elites. In fact, what the data suggest is that college educated, white 
collar party activists were already preponderate in the party’s presidential nominating 
conventions well before the reforms, and not much more so after their introduction.  
But if there was no elite, “new class” shift in the composition of convention 
delegations, perhaps the New Politics movement is responsible for severing the link 
between the working class and the Democratic Party at the level of rank-and-file voters? 
Ever since the blue collar defection in 1972 and the Reagan Democrat phenomenon of the 
1980s, it has become an artifact of common knowledge that white working class voters 
have abandoned the Democratic Party en masse. As the victims of court-ordered racial 
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integration, increased taxation, and racial quotas, white workers are widely seen as 
having felt abandoned by the increasingly radical liberalism of Democrats such as George 
McGovern. Republicans then capitalized on this rift by playing up culturally conservative 
issues to lure the white working class away from voting for their own economic 
interests.45 
First of all, it must be pointed out that the solidity of white working class support 
for the Democrats has often been exaggerated. After a very high degree of support in the 
wake of the New Deal and World War II, white workers’ votes for Democratic 
presidential nominees flagged severely during the 1950s within both union and nonunion 
households across the North. While support revived by 1960 and hit its historic peak in 
1964, it quickly returned to its 1950s levels thereafter.46 But, more importantly, as Larry 
Bartels has shown, “while Democratic presidential candidates have lost significant 
support among white voters over the past half-century, those losses have been entirely 
concentrated among relatively affluent white voters.”47 In fact, the steepest decline in 
low-income white voter support for the Democrats occurred before the party reforms, 
between 1964 and 1968. Support from white voters with high incomes fell faster than did 
their low-income counterparts during the period of the New Politics reforms (1968-72), 
and support among low-income whites bounced back as soon as 1976.48 Contrary to the 
impression that the white working class has been driven from the party by New Politics 
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ideology or its institutional arrangements, it was the “new class” elite that seemed to have 
moved away from the Democratic Party. 
What is most problematic, however, is the assumption on the part of the critics 
that because many of the leading officials of the AFL-CIO actively and vocally opposed 
party reform, the reforms must have been detrimental to the interests of the working class 
(and, therefore, in the interests of a different class).49 This not only reveals a naiveté 
concerning the representation of workers’ interests in the institutions of the trade union 
movement, but also distorts the actual dynamics of labor’s relationship to the reform 
movement. In fact, while most of the leadership of the AFL-CIO did oppose reform, 
significant labor unions, such as the United Auto Workers (by then no longer affiliated 
with the AFL-CIO), supported it from the start, while still more allied with the New 
Politics movement around the candidacy of George McGovern when AFL-CIO president 
George Meany organized a boycott of the presidential election in 1972. As will be shown 
in later chapters, labor’s relationship to the New Politics was crucial in accounting for 
both its successes and its failures. However, the nature of this relationship cannot be 
understood as a simplistic class opposition between blue collar workers and white collar 
reformers.50 
 If the electoral troubles afflicting the Democrats in the post-1960s period had little 
to do with the New Politics, and if the new class hypothesis fails to explain the causes or 
consequences of party reform, perhaps the critics remain on solid ground when they 
argue that the New Politics was fundamentally anti-party in orientation? According to 
Shafer, the reformers’ “emphasis on the virtues of participation came, inevitably, at the 
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expense of an effort at building the party as an organization.”51 The New Politics most 
certainly sought to disempower party regulars’ dominant hold over the determination of 
presidential nominees. And there was no doubt a minority tendency within the 
movement, perhaps best represented by Geoffrey Cowan, that did venerate the 
Progressive reformers of the early twentieth century who wanted to get self-interested 
party leaders out of the way through the use of primary elections and simply “let the 
people decide.” 52  However, it does not necessarily follow, as critics insist, that the 
movement’s reforms were “anti-party” or unconcerned with organizational matters. 
Again, Shafer offers a characteristic depiction of the effects of reform in both convention 
and primary states: 
Within the convention states, the party had moved from traditional party 
caucuses, where party officeholders came together to begin the [delegate 
selection] process, to participatory conventions, where any professed 
Democrat could come out to participate and where party officeholders 
might be at an active disadvantage. At a stroke, then, the regular party had 
been unseated. Within the primary states, the party had moved from 
delegate primaries, where local notables—usually party or community 
leaders—had been selected under their own names, to candidate primaries, 
where the name of the [presidential] contender was the dominant 
consideration and where the names of the delegates were not even 
necessarily presented. At a stroke, again, the guaranteed role of the 
regular party had been discarded.53 
 
The passage contains a revealing jump in logic. Between the first and second 
sentences Shafer leaps from the initial (and rather vague) notion that party officeholders 
“might be” at a disadvantage when competing for a delegate spot in participatory 
conventions to the firm conclusion that “the regular party” had been “unseated.” Just why 
                                                
51 Shafer, Quiet Revolution, 127. 
52 Interview with Geoffrey Cowan (phone), 16 April 2016. See also, Geoffrey Cowan, Let the People Rule: 
Theodore Roosevelt and the Birth of the Presidential Primary (New York: W.W. Norton, 2016). 
53 Shafer, Quiet Revolution, 526 (emphasis added). 
  40 
a party regular may be disadvantaged when competing against “any professed Democrat” 
for a delegate seat at the party’s national convention is not clear. (One might think just 
the opposite is the case given the advantages of expertise and prestige of party 
professionals.) Whatever that disadvantage might be, it certainly does not follow that the 
regular party has been definitively “unseated.” The New Politics reforms did not bar 
Democratic officeholders or party officials from participating in presidential nominations 
but, as the last sentence of the passage makes clear, only revoked their “guaranteed role” 
in the delegate selection process. 
 The passage from Shafer also reveals a conceptual elision of “party regular” with 
the “regular party,” as if eliminating the special privileges of individual party officials 
and officeholders constituted dismantling the party organization itself. In the rare 
instances where the disempowerment of particular individuals did result in the end of 
local party organization as such, this argument ends up defending authoritarian political 
structures that even the most ardent defenders of the regular party cannot come to endorse 
explicitly. But the blurring of the boundary distinguishing party regulars from party 
organization undergirds the assertion that party reformers were anti-organization in their 
orientation. While the New Politics, like any movement, was an amalgam of ideas and 
tendencies, some of which evinced a clear impatience with organizational questions, the 
critics’ charge of anti-organizational bias mostly misses the mark.  
First, it is simply misleading to characterize the reform of the party’s delegate 
selection methods as “weakening the party” when it was in itself an unprecedented 
assertion of national party power, not only over its state and local affiliates, but over the 
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state laws under which the subnational parties operated. 54  Thus, when state party 
practices deemed to violate the guidelines laid out by the Democrats’ reform commission 
were a product of state law rather than just a matter of party custom, certification of state 
delegates to the national convention required that good faith efforts to change the 
offending laws through state legislatures be demonstrated before the party’s Credentials 
Committee. (It was because state laws were eventually changed to accommodate the new 
national Democratic Party guidelines that reform of the presidential nominating system 
affected the Republican Party as well.) Neither the authority nor the capacity of the 
national party to formulate and impose a universal code of standards for local and state 
party governance existed prior to the reforms and therefore had to be built in the process 
of their implementation and enforcement. Critics who constrict the definition of the 
regular party to refer only to the capacity of state and local party leaders to control the 
selection of their party’s presidential nominee are of course correct to interpret the New 
Politics reforms as having weakened this “regular party.” But if the regular party were 
defined to include the national convention, the national committee, and their authority 
over the entire party apparatus then the advocates of the New Politics were party builders 
like no others.55 
 Secondly, the party building orientation of the New Politics movement is 
undeniable when the post-1972 phase of reform is brought back into the narrative. It is 
striking that this history makes no appearance in the neoconservatives’ critical 
                                                
54 Epstein, Political Parties in the American Mold, 209.  
55 To his credit, James Ceaser grants that one could see the reforms as strengthening the party if one focuses 
on the assertion of national party authority over its state affiliates. However, he concludes his point with the 
misleading assertion that “the reformers in the Democratic Party have used this power thus far to weaken 
the influence of existing state organizations and have made no effective provision for their replacement 
either by state organizations of a different sort or by a national organization.” As we will see below, 
precisely the opposite is true. See James Ceaser, Presidential Selection, 291. 
  42 
literature. 56  The very name of the official reform body – the Commission on Party 
Structure and Delegate Selection – suggests that the New Politics was not only concerned 
with reforming delegate selection procedures but was also concerned with restructuring 
and revitalizing the party organization itself. As we will see, this included truly novel 
institutional innovations such as mandating midterm party conferences on public policy 
and codifying the party’s first-ever constitution, the Democratic Party Charter. 
Including the post-1972 struggle over the shape and functions of the national 
party organization in the narrative of the New Politics movement fundamentally conflicts 
with the central arguments of the neoconservative critics. Take, for instance, the claim 
that the reforms dismantled the national convention as the “deliberative body” of the 
party. The critics hold that by binding delegates in proportion to the results of open 
primaries and caucuses, the convention no longer “selects” the nominee but merely 
ratifies the outcome of the decentralized nominating system. This curtailment of the 
convention’s brokerage function has allegedly weakened the institution’s role in 
ameliorating intraparty conflicts or factional feuds. Indeed, Penn Kemble, executive 
director of the anti-reform organization, the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM), 
went so far as to argue that “the smoke-filled rooms in which these crucial compromises 
[were] hammered out can be [considered] among the most vital of America’s democratic 
institutions.”57 Critics within the academy, such as Austin Ranney (also a CDM member), 
made the same argument, acknowledging that the party may be more open to 
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participation, but at the cost of stability and success. He lamented that “all the new 
reforms … have sought wider participation and better representation, [but] not closer 
cohesion and tighter discipline,” thus increasing the likelihood of continued intraparty 
conflict.58  
But in actuality the New Politics did not seek to sideline the role of the national 
convention. On the contrary, viewing it as the primary and most representative party 
organ, reformers sought to enhance the deliberative functions of the party convention by 
mandating that midterm policy conferences – sometimes called “mini-conventions” – be 
convened in the off years between presidential nomination cycles so that party program 
and policy could be formulated without the added pressure of nominating a presidential 
candidate. Moreover, as a venue for policy debate and political strategy, the reformed 
conventions offered party activists a mechanism for calling officeholders to account on 
their implementation of the Democratic program between elections. This would have 
entailed developing the tighter cohesion and party discipline the neoconservatives mourn. 
But as we will see, the CDM played a decisive role in defeating such a reform proposal. 
In fact, the pre-reform convention pined for by the critics was anything but an 
assembly of autonomous delegates concerned with organizational maintenance or party 
unity. More often, these were gatherings where local and state party leaders held 
complete sway over their delegations, most of which arrived with specific instructions 
from their party leaders on how to cast their ballots for the presidential nomination. In 
many cases, in fact, state delegates were bound by the unit rule to cast their votes as a 
bloc. So long as party leaders could control 51 percent of their delegation, they could 
override the preferences of the remaining 49 percent. In the event that delegations 
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declared themselves “unpledged” or cast themselves to a “favorite son” candidate before 
the first round of balloting, this was not out of genuine indecision about the best interests 
of the party, but a means of extracting promises of patronage or policy concessions from 
a candidate in exchange for a bloc of delegate votes.59 
In sum, the partial and highly misleading account of the New Politics movement 
constructed by the anti-reform critics hinges on historiographical omission and false 
binaries. Its claims concerning social composition, organization building, and the 
longevity of the New Deal party fail to withstand close examination. The New Politics’ 
project to democratize the Democratic Party entailed transforming it into a party of a 
different type, one that was both open at the grassroots and programmatically disciplined 
at the center. The critics are right to argue that reformers saw democratization as a means 
of promoting their policy goals in American politics. But they are mistaken to confine 
that policy agenda to the “class interests” of white collar elites. 
 
Explaining the Critique 
How do we explain the systematic mischaracterization of the New Politics movement that 
pervades the texts of its critics? As noted above, most of the principal arguments against 
the New Politics issued from partisans directly involved in the intraparty effort to uproot 
the reform coalition from its position of power. The arguments put forward for an 
academic audience repeat the same arguments as the memos, reports, and commentary 
offered by the members of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, albeit with greater 
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detail and an added scholarly apparatus.60 Those written by non-participants, such as 
Shafer, repeat the same fundamental and unproven conclusions of the CDM regarding the 
“new class” and “anti-party” bias of the reform movement.61 
It is worth pointing out, as Wilson did in his original study of party amateurs, that 
there is a philosophical disagreement between two competing models of democracy in the 
clash between reformers and regular party professionals. The latter operate from a notion 
of democracy that centers its attention on competition between parties: democracy is 
giving voters a simple choice from at least two options. Since the marketplace of 
electoral competition will reward the party with whom voters most resonate, the means 
by which the party develops its message and image is of negligible consequence. On the 
other hand, for amateurs who emphasize the importance of mass participation, democracy 
is especially important inside parties, as a means of developing citizens’ political 
education and ensuring responsive political representation.62  
 These contrasting philosophical differences have undergirded perspectives 
focused on explaining the practical problems of democratic politics in the modern world. 
Prior to the problems of the late 1960s, these analyses had in mind the origins of German 
fascism in the highly politicized and unstable Weimar Republic, which gave observers 
reasons to look upon high levels of political participation with suspicion.63 As Edward 
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Banfield argued in 1961, “those party systems that have been the most democratic in 
structure and procedure have proved least able to maintain democracy; those that have 
been most undemocratic in structure and procedure—conspicuously those of the United 
States and Britain—have proved to be the bulwarks of democracy and civilization.”64 
Samuel Huntington raised a remarkably similar line of argument on the other side of what 
he called the “democratic surge” of the 1960s. For him, “democracy” refers to the 
balance of government authority and the forces seeking its limitation. However, the rapid 
expansion of political participation and egalitarian values in the 1960s had come at the 
costs of legitimacy for the systems of authority in the United States. A specifically 
distressing manifestation of this was within the Democratic Party, which had become 
“less of an organization, with a life and interest of its own, and more of an arena in which 
other actors pursue their interests.” Interestingly, Huntington quotes a phrase of Al Smith 
employed by the New Politics movement, “The cure for the ills of democracy is more 
democracy,” but registers his disagreement: “applying that cure at the present time could 
well be adding fuel to the flames.”65 
 By diagnosing the crisis of the late 1960s as caused by an “excess of democracy,” 
a program for “moderating” the increased demands for democratic participation and 
representation seemed to follow naturally.66 However, if explicit critiques of democracy 
could be voiced within the discipline of political science, they gained little traction in the 
public sphere, where, as the critics acknowledge, the ideas had gained ground through the 
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1960s and 1970s. In response, opponents of the democratic insurgencies and their 
presence inside the Democratic Party cleverly framed their attack on the reforms in the 
rhetoric of the New Politics itself: its project was “elitist”; its use of affirmative action 
constituted an undemocratic “quota” system; and in privileging “special interests” over 
the will of the party’s base, it resulted in electoral disaster.  
Most puzzling, however, is that by omitting the post-1972 phase of the reform 
project from their accounts, anti-reformers have tended to overstate the success of the 
New Politics movement in transforming the party. Why is this the case? As my analysis 
in the proceeding chapters will make clear, the New Politics as a transformative force 
within the Democratic Party was decisively stalled by 1974, and had breathed its last 
gasp of life by 1978. But even though their most ambitious plans had been frustrated, the 
clock could not be turned back to the pre-1968 party system. Delegate selection methods 
had been permanently changed; state laws had been revised; candidate campaign 
strategies had altered accordingly. Most distressing to their critics, however, was that 
Democrats continued to lose, and lose tremendously, in presidential contests against 
Republicans. The 1980s delivered three humiliating defeats to Democratic presidential 
nominees. The CDM narrative, that the Democrats continued to lose because of the 
influence of the New Politics, proved functional to explaining this problem and was 
adapted by the political entrepreneurs in the Democratic Leadership Council.  
While it is tempting to read history backward, imputing our contemporary 
knowledge of outcomes to political actors in the past, it would be an analytical error to 
conclude that the centrist and neoconservative opponents of the New Politics understood 
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that the their rival had been defeated.67 The fact was that by the late 1960s the national 
Democratic Party was in crisis, and remained in crisis for nearly two decades thereafter. 
The depths of that crisis suggested that it was more than a party crisis; it was a crisis of 
the entire social and political order that had sustained Democratic majorities for well over 
a generation. It is not surprising that in their desperate search for an explanation for their 
defeat, concerned Democrats turned to (and turned against) the changes engineered by 
New Politics reformers.  
But the fact that members of the CDM laid the blame for electoral disarray at the 
feet of the reformers suggests an inability to come to terms with the end of the New Deal 
order. In their minds, had the New Politics not burst on the scene and remade the party in 
their narrow interests, the party of New Deal liberalism could have weathered the storm 
and continued on as the majority party. Concerned actors, including the New Politics and 
its critics, struggled to comprehend the nature of the crisis and formulate a response 
toward the same end: revitalizing the party. As time would tell, the New Politics 
understood how dramatic a change was underway as they sought to move beyond the 
New Deal coalition. For their critics, however, who did not share the sense that the New 
Deal was over, what was truly disastrous about the party crisis was their belief about how 
avoidable it could have been. Perhaps this helps explain why the DLC succeeded where 
the CDM failed: the CDM looked backward with rose-colored glasses on the postwar 
Democratic coalition; the DLC, accepting the end of the New Deal, looked forward to a 
neoliberal Democratic order. 
  
                                                
67 Amel Ahmed, “Reading History Forward: The Origins of Electoral Systems in European Democracies,” 
Comparative Political Studies 43 (2010). 
  49 
Reassessing the New Politics 
Given the deficiencies of the existing accounts of the New Politics, this dissertation will 
offer a revisionist history of the movement that attempts to correct the misleading picture 
crafted by its critics. However, I will not offer a narrative of heroes and villains.  
First, the critics’ attacks on the New Politics’ electoral consequences is based on 
the two erroneous assumptions: that the New Deal regime was politically stable; and that 
local and state level Democratic Party organizations were sufficiently “vital” to integrate 
legitimate interest group demands. This assumption is evident in the lack of attention paid 
to the party organization and its political dynamics prior to the advent of reform. Thus, as 
Chapter 2 will show, the New Deal order was full of contradictions, having drawn 
together increasingly divergent political blocs whose alliance became untenable by the 
late 1960s. From the 1930s to the mid-1960s, a party structure built on “states’ rights” 
had sustained these contradictions, even if it was a diminishing ideological influence 
within the Democratic Party leadership.  
Chapters 3 and 4 will analyze the making of the New Politics movement from its 
origins in the Mississippi credentials contest at the 1964 Democratic national convention 
to the antiwar insurgencies of Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy in Democratic 
primaries of 1968. I will show how the antidiscrimination ruling issued by the 
Democratic National Committee in 1964 was developed into a far-reaching critique of 
undemocratic practices in the party’s presidential nominating process. The party 
leadership’s initial resistance to these internal challenges brought about its own 
legitimacy crisis in 1968 and helped pave the way for the success of the reform project. 
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 Against those who have also imputed an anti-party, anti-organizational bias to the 
New Politics reformers, chapters 5 and 6 will show that the movement to democratize the 
party had at its core the intention to rebuild and revitalize the party as a national 
organization. That this goal was not achieved is better understood as the result of the 
internal party struggle in which many of the critics have participated rather than the 
unintended consequences of the New Politics’ success. 
While the critics are wrong to assert the reforms’ empowerment of a “new class” 
elite within the party, they are right to direct attention to the nature of class politics in the 
reform struggle. However, class, understood here as a historical concept, refers not to any 
static set of interests dividing white collar from blue collar workers, but to a process that 
is expressed through historically evolved institutions that have internal dynamics of their 
own. Institutions not only express class interests; they come to co-constitute them as well. 
While it is true that most top officials in the AFL-CIO opposed reform, this was not 
based on a class conflict between blue collar workers and a white collar “elite” – though 
they often claimed it was.  Rather, the AFL-CIO officials’ decision to resist reform was 
about defending their institutional privileges with the Democratic leadership. Moreover, 
as suggested above, trade union resistance to party reform was far from universal. Unions 
in industrial, service, and public sectors of the economy not only shared similar social 
and political characteristics with the New Politics movement, but saw in it the chance to 
revitalize the labor movement as a more significant social force within American 
politics.68  
I will show that the New Politics movement represented an insurgent force not 
only in the Democratic Party but within the labor movement as well. Instead of 
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representing a narrow band of elite reformers, the New Politics was a movement that 
sought to fundamentally reconfigure the inner workings of the political process in the 
hopes of realigning the political spectrum further to the left.69 This reframing not only 
helps in establishing the goals for which the New Politics struggled, but also the wider 
implications of its defeat. As chapters 7 and 8 will demonstrate, once the institutional 
threat posed by party reform was neutralized, liberal and labor forces inside the 
Democratic Party did converge around a party platform demand for full employment 
policy. However, the failure to translate their platform for economic recovery into public 
policy provides a stark measure of the costs of defeating the New Politics. In the absence 
of any formal party mechanisms to discipline officeholders, including the president, labor 
policy success depended largely on union leaders’ personal relationship with the 
Democratic president. Ironically, it had been the successful opposition of the labor 
leaders to the party reforms that had lost them the tools they needed when confronted 
with an intransigent Democratic Party in the face of increasing economic turbulence. 
However, the failure of the New Politics movement cannot be explained by 
referring only to the power of its intraparty opponents. Party reformers wanted to 
transform the Democratic Party into a more programmatic, progressive party. The means 
by which to accomplish this, they argued, was its democratization. By opening the party 
to greater grassroots participation and holding officeholders accountable to the will of the 
rank and file, the Democratic Party would be realigned to the left. While the reformers 
were quite successful in opening the party up to greater participation of previously 
marginalized groups, the practical effects of that participation, and the notion of 
“democratization” underpinning it, suggests the internal limitations of the project and the 
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movement that sponsored it. From this perspective, democratizing the party meant 
removing barriers to participation for those who were already demanding access. The 
reformed Democratic Party was meant to be a vehicle for the democratic movements of 
the 1960s and 1970s rather than an agent of democratization within the wider society, 
which would have involved taking on the responsibility of educating and politicizing 
citizens to support a new political project. This also meant that the New Politics 
movement was dependent on independent, extra-party sources of mobilization. Thus, 
when the wave of popular activism receded, the vitality of the New Politics movement 
went with it. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
IN THE SHADOW OF STATES’ RIGHTS: 
DEMOCRATIC PARTY STRUCTURE AND THE NEW DEAL COALITION 
 
To those who say that we are rushing this issue of civil rights – I say to 
them, we are 172 years late. To those who say this bill is an infringement 
on states’ rights, I say … the time has arrived for the Democratic Party to 
get out of the shadow of states’ rights and walk forthrightly into the bright 
sunshine of human rights. 
--Hubert Humphrey (1948 Democratic national convention)1 
 
The reforms proposed and implemented by the New Politics movement had immediate 
and far-reaching consequences for the structure and operation of the national Democratic 
Party. Indeed, one of the principal features of reform – establishing national party 
supremacy over state party affiliates – required major changes at the subnational level in 
the rules and practices of state and local party organizations for both Republicans as well 
as Democrats. But as we have seen, while the post-1968 changes to the party’s 
presidential nominating system feature prominently in the critics’ accounts of the New 
Politics reforms, few devote sufficient attention to the structure and operation of the party 
before it was reformed. Without so much as offering comparative statics of the pre- and 
post-reformed Democratic Party, the critics’ claims about reform and its implications are 
of dubious value. This systematic silence reflects a tacit framework that takes the pre-
reformed party as the normative standard by which to judge the reforms. But by leaving 
the pre-reformed party uninterrogated, the critics overlook its shortcomings and 
contradictions. Not only does this fail to provide an adequate account of the unraveling of 
the New Deal coalition in the mid- to late 1960s, such an omission also functions to 
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delegitimize the grievances of the New Politics movement, implicitly characterizing their 
demands for party democratization as inappropriate, overzealous, and reckless.   
 In this chapter I will correct this omission on the part of the critics by providing a 
description and analysis of the New Deal Democratic Party prior to the reforms. This will 
include not only describing the structure and functioning of the formal party apparatus 
but also analyzing the specific political dynamics produced by the relations among the 
three main coalitional players of the New Deal regime: the labor-liberal alliance; northern 
political machines; and southern party-states. These two areas of focus – structure and 
coalition – are not unrelated. Indeed, I will argue that the confederated structure of the 
national Democratic Party was an indispensible mechanism in reproducing the 
contradictory coalition undergirding the New Deal regime. A programmatic, disciplined, 
cohesive national party could never have simultaneously contained what political 
scientist Nicol Rae has described as “the most liberal and the most conservative elements 
… in American society.”2 Even though the executive-centered New Deal administration 
represented a substantial centralization of political power at the national level, the New 
Deal Democratic Party remained, as Hubert Humphrey protested at the 1948 Democratic 
convention, a party in the shadow of states’ rights.  
Attention to these contradictions and the federal party structure that maintained 
them also helps explain the limits of New Deal liberalism regarding African Americans’ 
civil rights. As the fractious 1948 Democratic national convention displayed, the national 
Democratic Party had little ability or authority to discipline state party affiliates that 
defied the party platform or broke from the national ticket. On the contrary, as we will 
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see, the infamous Dixiecrat revolt at the 1948 Democratic national convention displayed 
the capacity of state parties to discipline the national party in moments of intense 
intraparty conflict. In the decade and a half following the upheaval, the Democratic 
leadership beat a cautious retreat on the issue of civil rights, despite the growth of the 
southern black insurgency and landmark federal court decisions spurring the movement 
forward. As Chapter 3 will show, it is no coincidence that when civil rights advocates 
challenged the policy failures of the New Deal coalition in the 1950s and 1960s, 
Democratic Party structure became one of its main targets of struggle. 
 
States’ Rights, Class Politics, and National Party Structure 
In many respects, the Democratic Party that the New Politics reformers encountered in 
the late 1960s was fundamentally the same party structure which had been born well over 
a century before: a confederation of state parties with the sole purpose of capturing the 
national office of the presidency. While there were important efforts to check the power 
of state party leaders over the intervening period, which will be noted below, what is 
most impressive is the resilience of the states in the face of such efforts. This makes the 
task of reviewing the pre-reformed party fairly straightforward and easily traceable from 
its origins, which gave it its main characteristics. 
While American politics has frequently been said to be “exceptional” in nature, 
few features of the American political system are as distinctive as its parties. Rather than 
a “contagion of the left,” as Maurice Duverger famously depicted the spread of mass 
parties in Western Europe, the origin of American mass parties is better characterized as 
a “contagion of the post-revolutionary elite,” specifically those members of the political 
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class competing for the office of the presidency.3 In Western Europe, where propertyless 
citizens by and large lacked voting rights and civil liberties and responded by building 
mass organizations to break into the political system from the outside, political elites 
inside parliamentary institutions were compelled to construct rival mass organizations to 
try to retain office. Thus, European mass parties were “externally mobilized,” originating 
as extra-parliamentary organizations pursuing full citizenship rights for working class 
citizens, but spreading throughout thereafter as elites were forced to mimic the 
mobilizing successes of subaltern social groups.4 In the US, however, the revolutionary 
rupture of 1776 and the political dynamics that followed, especially the persistence of 
armed farmer militias, produced a very different pattern of party development with 
profound effects. As early as the 1790s, major policy disputes over the powers of the 
central state opened cleavages within the group of the founders, and ad hoc coalitions 
took shape along differing political visions for the nascent republic. The recently ratified 
US Constitution made no mention of political parties or how elections were to be 
organized and funded, allowing the rules guiding organized political contestation to be 
improvised by the states and an assortment of private actors. However, by the 1830s, in 
sharp contrast to Europe, extensive white male suffrage and popular selection of 
presidential electors in the American states presented contending elite groups with the 
opportunity to go out and mobilize mass followings behind their political coalition.5 
Inter-elite conflict over national power thus spiraled outward from the state into 
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organized partisan competition in society, a dynamic that produced “internally mobilized 
parties.”6 Under the leadership of Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren, the Democrats 
built the world’s first mass political party, mobilizing a heterogeneous group of farmers, 
laborers, and small business owners, all demanding greater access to political power and 
administrative spoils. The Jacksonians’ political opponents responded in kind, building 
their own mass organizations around distinct ethnocultural, religious, and economic 
cleavages in their effort to win election and retake national power.7 
Early and extensive suffrage for white male citizens and their mobilization into 
mass organizations improvised by political elites had lasting consequences for the class 
dynamics of American politics. While European working classes had forged durable 
forms of consciousness and organization in their collective struggle for full citizenship, 
the American working class was durably fractured and segmented, not only between rival 
party organizations that politicized laborers along distinct ethno-religious axes, but also 
between the white, male, native-born members, who enjoyed something close to full 
citizenship, and those who did not: women, African Americans, immigrants. This did not 
prevent American workers from engaging in forms of class organization. On the contrary, 
American workers engaged in enough sporadic strikes, riots, and acts of shop floor 
sabotage to qualify them as one of the most militant working classes of the nineteenth 
century. But the kinds of organizations that it did produce, such as the coalition of trade 
unions in the American Federation of Labor (AFL), premised their activities on 
protecting the wages and working conditions of relatively skilled workers, reinforcing the 
social hierarchies that skewed these abilities according to race, gender, and status. When, 
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in the Gilded Age that followed the Civil War, it seemed that the historic divisions within 
the American working class could be overcome by the development of more inclusive 
political organizations such as the Knights of Labor in the 1880s or the People’s Party in 
the 1890s, those efforts failed due to a combination of state repression, internal conflict, 
and calculated absorption by the existing party system. After the historic election of 
1896, when the Democrats cemented their lock on the southern states and assimilated the 
agrarian bloc, a dynamic of political demobilization set in, engineered by the architects of 
Jim Crow in the South, and facilitated in the North by the AFL’s official policy of non-
partisanship. Despite several attempts to forge a lasting alliance linking the AFL and the 
Democratic Party between 1906 and 1918, electoral demobilization and widespread voter 
abstensionism among workers would remain until the 1930s the overriding features of 
American class politics.8 
 Also setting American parties apart from their counterparts across the Atlantic 
was their material basis in patronage.9 The contagious mass parties of Western Europe 
built centralized organizations around a large dues-paying membership, whose 
contributions funded local party branches in their community organizing and 
campaigning activities. Partisan identity was formed around a distinct ideology and party 
program, often promoting full citizenship for the working class constituents of the trade 
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unions that supplied the dues-paying rank and file. American parties, by contrast, while 
not without their own ideological or programmatic content, throughout the nineteenth and 
well into the twentieth century subsidized their mass mobilizing activities by exchanging 
material rewards for voters’ support.10 State and local party organizations distributed 
government jobs (for example, public administration, fire, police, sanitation), government 
contracts, business licenses, immigration cards, and more to their partisan clients, all with 
the expectation that recipients’ votes as well as a percentage of their salaries would be 
offered in supported of the party come campaign season. It was the added material 
rewards of national power that motivated state parties to confer and agree upon a 
presidential candidate.11  
But if the major American political parties were born at the national level, the 
phrase “national political parties” is something of a misnomer in the US context. 
Organizationally, the national Democratic Party was nothing more than a loose 
confederation of state Democratic parties, each unit sovereign and independent in its 
internal affairs and its external affiliations. The national party had no independent 
existence apart from the state parties when they met in convention, aside from the 
periodic meeting of its national committee, a body described by its foremost scholars as a 
“headless, drifting organization” that functioned only as an “umbilical cord” linking one 
convention to the next (see below).12 The national party’s exclusive reason for being was 
to nominate a candidate and assist their campaign for the presidency. Thus, outside the 
                                                
10 On ideology in the American party system, see John Gerring, Party Ideologies in America, 1828-1996 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). For a rich, “thick description” of party activist-voter 
linkages in the mid-nineteenth century, see Richard Franklin Bensel, The American Ballot Box in the Mid-
Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
11 Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in the American Mold (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 
1986), 134. 
12 Cornelius P. Cotter and Bernard C. Hennessy, Politics Without Power: The National Party Committees 
(New York: Atherton Press, 1964), vi. 
  60 
quadrennial presidential election cycle, the national party could barely be said to exist as 
an organized force in American politics. 
But every four years, for four or five days, the national party did, in David 
Broder’s apt phase, “assume reality” in the form of the national convention.13 As extra-
constitutional entities, parties formulated their own rules regulating the nominating 
process, convention procedure, and intraparty governance. In fact, there were no standing 
codified rules between conventions; every convention began with approval of temporary 
rules, most often modeled off the rules of the convention four years prior. After the 
tradition of nominating a presidential candidate by congressional caucus collapsed in the 
1820s, national conventions convened anywhere from a year to only three months prior to 
the general election, depending on whether or not the party had the advantage of 
incumbency. The advent of the convention system in the 1830s not only removed the 
nominating process from Washington, DC, it also fended off criticisms that the early 
congressional caucus system was undemocratic and unrepresentative. 14  Convention 
delegations were sent representing every state according to their size in the Electoral 
College, and until 1936 presidential aspirants need a two-thirds supermajority of their 
votes to win the nomination. Presidential nominees therefore had to find broad-based 
support across party factions hailing from different regions of the country and 
representing a diversity of interests. Vagueness and ambiguity suffused aspirants’ 
campaign promises since the time of Jackson, ensuring broad consensus at the national 
level while providing substantial autonomy for state and local party candidates running 
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on the same party ticket. National nominating conventions also ratified the nominee’s 
selection for vice president (often representing a rival Democratic faction to “balance the 
ticket”), approved a perfunctory party platform meant to attract votes rather than propose 
concrete policy alternatives, and served as a launching pad for the general election 
campaign. 
While the quadrennial nominating convention was formally the highest authority 
in the party, decisionmaking power remained in the hands of the state party leaders. From 
1832 to 1908, delegates to the Democratic conventions were selected by state party 
organizations making their choice through either district caucuses or state conventions or 
central committee appointments or some combination of the three.15 Delegations were 
most often led by the top party officials in the state, and automatically invited ranking 
party officeholders such as senators, governors or big city mayors to attend as ex-officio 
voting members. The remainder of the delegation was most often composed of loyal state 
party officials and activists as a reward for their service. Even when state party leaders 
ascertained delegates’ preferences before casting their votes for them, devices such as the 
unit rule were employed to increase a state leaders’ bargaining power by binding the 
minority to cast their votes with the majority as a bloc. This facilitated the horse trading 
that took place between state party leaders, presidential candidates, and other major party 
or interest group actors in the “smoke-filled rooms” off the convention floor.16  
However, by the turn of the twentieth century, the convention system’s claim to 
representativeness came under challenge by Progressive reformers who alleged the 
delegate selection process was too tightly controlled by self-interested party leaders able 
                                                
15 Epstein, Political Parties in the American Mold, 89. 
16  See Gerald Pomper, Nominating the President: The Politics of Convention Choice (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1963). 
  62 
to marginalize elements in the party that did not meet their favor. Beginning in 1912, 
primary elections were introduced in many states’ delegate selection process to 
circumvent the intermediation of state and local party organizations or their leaders. 
Primaries were state-conducted operations akin to general election balloting, where party 
voters, and sometimes Independents, could select their own delegates to represent the 
state at the national convention. However, primaries did little to dislodge the influence of 
party leaders over determining the eventual nominee. The share of convention delegates 
selected through primary mechanisms peaked in 1916 at just over 50 percent (back when 
winning 66 percent of the delegate votes was the necessary threshold for the party’s 
nomination). In fact, in more than half the nominating contests under the mixed system of 
primaries and caucus-conventions the winner of the most primaries was denied the 
presidential nomination at the convention.17 After World War I, amid the general crisis in 
Progressivism, party leaders rolled back the number of primary states, bringing their 
frequency down from twenty-six states in 1916 to fifteen states by 1935. The results of 
those that remained were often redefined as advisory rather than binding, leaving party 
leaders free to take their results under advisement at their discretion.18 
If the national party was no more than a passive agent of the state parties, the 
national committee was little more than an agent of the party’s presidential candidate, the 
titular party leader. The Democratic National Committee (DNC) was not formally 
organized until 1848 and functioned on an ad hoc basis until it established a year-round 
headquarters of operation in the 1920s. Its members, two from every state (one man, one 
woman after the Nineteenth Amendment), were elected by their respective state parties to 
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serve four-year terms and ratified by the national convention. The DNC chair was also 
officially elected by the convention, but party norms granted the nomination of the 
position to the presidential nominee, to whom the chair was ultimately accountable. 
When in possession of the Oval Office, the Democratic president orchestrated leadership 
over the national party through a liaison network of White House aides and party 
officials, mostly geared to securing reelection. Similar to delegate participants, DNC 
membership was often a reward for past service, typically held by those who were 
successful players in local and state party affairs. But the DNC had little independent 
influence in party affairs at the subnational level. While it sometimes served as a vehicle 
for patronage appointments, these were directed at the behest of the party nominee and 
normally redounded to his electoral prospects rather than the autonomy of the national 
committee. When it was not consumed with coordinating the general election campaign, 
although usually as a junior partner to candidates’ personal campaign organizations, the 
DNC met periodically (one to three times a year) to plan the next nominating convention: 
selecting the site, allocating state delegates, drawing up a convention agenda, issuing the 
formal Call to Convention to the state parties, and coordinating the states’ selection of an 
equal number of delegates to serve on the three standing convention committees. The 
Rules Committee drew up convention procedure. The Platform Committee drafted a 
statement of principles intended to reconcile party factions by combining planks 
submitted by the White House (if the party held the Oval Office), ranking party leaders in 
Congress, and interest group organizations. And the Credentials Committee certified that 
convention delegates were duly chosen according to state party rules or, in primary states, 
state law.19 
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 In sum, the national Democratic Party was a creature of the state parties. As an 
electoral institution developed to coordinate competition for the presidency, the national 
party, whether embodied in the convention or the committee, lacked sufficient incentives 
or sanctions by which it could exert its authority over state affiliates. Its organizational 
structure, operation, and platform statements were intended to facilitate the successful 
election of a presidential candidate. In the context of the insurgent politics of the late 
1960s, this party structure would come to be seen as an obstacle to many liberals’ 
political goals, and the New Politics movement that ensued aimed to transform it. 
 
The New Deal Coalition 
The most successful era of Democratic Party politics in the twentieth century was without 
a doubt the period governed by the so-called New Deal coalition (1932-68). With the 
exceptions of Grover Cleveland (1885-89, 1893-97) and Woodrow Wilson (1913-21), 
Democratic control of the White House had remained elusive in the postbellum period. 
The rapid industrialization and transformation of the American economy in the wake of 
Reconstruction was a project conducted under the leadership of the Republican Party.20 
When that regime faltered in the crash of 1929, and the economic crisis deepened over 
the next election cycle, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Democratic Party achieved a 
historic landslide electoral mandate, several times over, to reshape American politics in 
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the name of economic recovery. The New Deal coalition constructed a new regime in 
American politics, institutionalizing a distinctive set of policies, discourses, and practices 
that embedded a new common sense about the relationship between state and society, one 
that would prove remarkably durable.21 
 What was most remarkable about the New Deal coalition, however, was the way 
in which it reshaped American class politics. While working class political mobilization 
had begun to reverse its secular decline in 1928 through the ill-fated presidential 
candidacy of northern urban Catholic Al Smith, the New Deal years saw not only 
increasingly active support from working class voters for Democratic candidates, but 
more significantly a veritable explosion of proletarian frustration that took overtly 
political forms. This included not only the massive strike waves of 1933-34, the famous 
sit-down strikes in the Midwest automobile plants, and the formation of the Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (CIO) as a more radical, more politically engaged alternative to 
the AFL, but also the veterans’ marches on the Capitol, the Hooverville tent cities erected 
across the American urban landscape, and the left-wing challenges to Roosevelt’s 
political leadership, whether from Louisiana’s Huey Long or Upton Sinclair’s End 
Poverty in California (EPIC) Party. By the mid-1930s, the Democratic Party alliance with 
the new labor movement formally reversed the long-standing depoliticization of the 
American working class, pulling it into mainstream politics and particularly into the 
Democratic Party.22 
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But the integration of labor into the Democratic Party did not result in the 
equivalent of an American labor party. This was because the party coalition forged under 
the auspices of the New Deal brought under the same umbrella a contradictory set of 
organized political actors whose success would eventually pave the way for its later 
crisis. The New Deal coalition had three organizational pillars within it: the labor-liberal 
alliance; northern political machines; and southern party-states. Below, I will examine 
each major player of the Democratic coalition in isolation before exploring their relations 
and the contradictory dynamics they produced. 
 
The Labor-Liberal Alliance 
As I stated above, the Great Depression was the pivotal moment in the history of the 
American labor movement and in its approach to national politics. An upsurge of labor 
organizing and militancy resulted in and flowed from favorable legislation such as the 
National Industrial Recovery Act and later the National Labor Relations Act (the Wagner 
Act) of 1935, recognizing the right of workers to form unions and institutionalizing their 
authority in systems of collective bargaining. The growth of industrial unionism through 
the breakaway CIO eclipsed the anti-statism of prior forms of solidarity organized 
through the AFL. Consequently, as the voluntarism of craft unionism was overtaken by 
the success of the CIO, a durable relationship took shape between American unions, New 
Deal administrators, and the Democratic Party.23  
However, because the Democratic Party was not an internally uniform party, it is 
misleading to pose the labor-Democratic partnership in such general terms. Rather, as 
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Andrew Battista has insisted, labor established an alliance with a part of the Democratic 
Party, namely its northern liberal wing.24  Drawing liberals and labor together was a 
shared commitment to the expansion of federal capacities to restore stability to the 
political economy and an ideological discourse that emphasized a capacious notion of 
citizenship rights, especially the collective rights of industrial workers. The severity of 
the economic depression and the broader electoral realignment spanning the 1928 and 
1936 election cycles provided liberals and labor unions with a common social and 
regional basis on which to come together, as well as a shared set of commitments and 
goals orienting their political strategy.  
Crucial to this change was the launching of the CIO and its distinct mode of 
organizing workers. While the craft-based AFL had pursued a tenuous alliance with 
progressive Democrats earlier in the century, it had proved unstable and short-lived due 
to its narrow base in organizing white, skilled, male, and mostly native labor. The AFL’s 
own skepticism toward partisan alliance, embodied in founder Samuel Gompers’s 
pragmatic doctrine of “rewarding friends and punishing enemies,” along with its very 
narrow policy demands (establishing a legal basis for private business unionism), had 
foreclosed the possibility that its leadership could plausibly speak on behalf of a wider 
class constituency. This lack of political vision on the part of the labor federation was 
mirrored in the Wilson administration’s relatively disinterested perspective on the labor 
movement, for which it provided only limited protections, since most of the party’s 
electoral support and congressional power came from southern and western states.  
The CIO’s break from this model included the creation of mass union 
organizations composed of semi- and unskilled workers across industrial sectors, such as 
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auto, steel, electrical, and rubber. Because they attempted to organize all workers within 
these mass producing industries, CIO unions tended to have heterogeneous memberships, 
ranging across multiple skill levels, immigrant and ethnic groups, racial lines and gender 
divides. While far from always successful, such a diverse social base created the 
incentive for CIO unions to orient their political strategy toward broad-based, inclusive 
social policies that could establish an egalitarian framework necessary to pull divergent 
interests within the union federation together. The resultant “social unionism” of the CIO 
created, in the words of federation president Philip Murray, “a national movement 
devoted to the general welfare just as much as to the particular interests of labor 
groups.”25 The interests of labor and liberals therefore aligned along a progressive policy 
agenda that required enhancing federal capacities to regulate labor-management relations 
and provide social welfare benefits to those hardest hit by the Depression. 
The labor-liberal alliance within the Democratic Party, far from being a “barren 
marriage,” proved to be mutually beneficial, the latter supplying legitimacy and legal 
protections, the former providing enormous organizational resources to electoral 
activity.26 Together, labor-liberals played a leading role in the formation and passage of 
key New Deal legislative milestones, including the National Recovery Act, the National 
Labor Relations Act, the Social Security Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act. In 
exchange for policy victories, the labor movement had come to function by 1936 as a 
fully-fledged electoral organization for the party in many major industrial states (with a 
large share of the Electoral College). Through official bodies, such as Labor’s 
Nonpartisan League, as well as through unofficial channels, labor performed a variety of 
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functions for the Democrats, including registering and mobilizing voters, collecting 
campaign contributions, distributing literature, and even aggregating diverse interests 
across Democratic constituencies such as civil rights groups. After Republican victories 
in the 1942 midterm elections, the CIO launched its Political Action Committee (PAC) as 
a permanent campaign apparatus. In establishing a network of state organizations, the 
CIO-PAC sought “to create a new ‘CIO voter’ whose adherence to the New Deal wing of 
the Democratic Party would become as natural and reliable as that of a British laborite or 
European social democrat.”27 As J. David Greenstone concluded in his study of American 
labor politics, “organized labor functioned as the most important nationwide electoral 
organization for the Democratic party.” 28 
While the CIO (and later, after 1955, the merged AFL-CIO) was a relatively 
successful force in getting out the vote for Democratic candidates in some large industrial 
states, the nature of the labor federation’s political activity did not effectively encourage 
the formation of a collective identity of liberal Democratic worker-voters. On the 
contrary, for all its electoral success, labor’s Committee on Political Education (COPE) 
had ironically little educational capacity when it came to engaging rank-and-file workers 
around the federation’s social-democratic agenda being pursued in Washington.29 With a 
decentralized organizational structure, liberal labor leaders could not compel State 
Federations of Labor and municipal Central Labor Councils to engage in coordinated 
political activity at state and local levels. This resulted in a bifurcated labor movement 
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that was simultaneously in the vanguard of progressive action at the national level and an 
unreliably liberal force at subnational levels.30  
These divisions within the labor movement reinforced the leadership’s reliance on 
the national level of political power, especially the presidency, as a conduit to public 
policy influence. As an important source of electoral support, labor’s point of leverage 
was on the selection of presidential nominees. This is confirmed by COPE’s own records. 
Long-time treasury secretary and eventual president of the AFL-CIO, Lane Kirkland, 
once described it as “a tacit, invisible but real arrangement” between top trade union 
officials and leaders of the Democratic Party.31 But labor, he continued,  
 
didn’t go out and seek delegates [for the national convention]. That wasn’t 
the instrument through which we influenced events. … We had a 
bargaining relationship with the leadership of the party. …[T]he party 
leaders knew that, in the general election, they needed labor to draw some 
of the water and hew some of the wood. The leaders of the party wanted to 
win. They wouldn’t nominate anyone who was too offensive to the trade 
union movement. So, we would hold discussions, and our wishes would be 
made known to those who were particularly active in party affairs.32 
 
 
As we will see, labor’s institutional embeddedness within the a pattern of elite brokerage 
with the party leadership would place top trade union officials in a precarious position 
vis-à-vis the New Politics movement’s participatory reforms. 
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Northern Political Machines 
Prior to the New Deal, the Democrats’ base of electoral strength stretched across the 
southern states. However, the party also had important bastions of partisan support north 
of the Mason-Dixon line. Throughout the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth 
century these bastions took the characteristic organizational form of American politics: 
the political machine. While most typically associated with urban governance due to 
high-profile machines such as New York’s Tammany Hall, Frank Hague’s New Jersey 
organization, or the famous Chicago Democratic Party under Mayor Richard Daley, 
machine organizations dotted the American electoral landscape, stretching past city limits 
into suburban and rural communities as well.33 Powered by patronage, these hierarchical 
local party structures mobilized electoral coalitions through armies of party activists, 
campaign workers, ward and precinct captains, and partisan voters. Due to the high ratio 
of elective to appointive positions at the local level, government jobs were the most 
common currency transacted (one out of three New York Democratic voters held a 
Tammany job in the 1910s; Chicago’s Cook Country Democratic Party distributed as 
many as 30,000 jobs as late as the 1970s), but material rewards for partisan loyalty also 
included immigration and naturalization assistance, public service provision, shots of 
whiskey or the famed Christmas turkey.34 
 Aside from its impressively robust mobilizing capacities, another vital function of 
any political machine was to control the local or state nominating processes. As one 
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infamous Tammany boss is reputed to have said, “I don’t care who does the electing, just 
so [as] I can do the nominating.”35 Machine control was especially easy when local 
nominating contests were conducted through caucus-conventions, where machines could 
handily provide the majority of participants. Turn of the century Progressive reformers 
who attempted to supplant machine power with the direct primary had greater success in 
regions not already monopolized by machine bosses, such as the western and mountain 
states. 36  However, even in those places, “good government” reform coalitions often 
constructed machines of their own, reshaping electoral institutions and public policy to 
bias incumbent reform administrations.37 When introduced in the Northeast and Midwest, 
primaries proved ineffective in the face of the machines, which could heavily influence 
voter turnout and delegate slate making. Once tamed, primaries posed no real threat to 
machines bosses who, by the 1940s and 1950s, had become what Leon Epstein calls their 
“masters.”38 
While on the eve of the Great Depression political control of America’s largest 
cities was roughly split between Republican and Democratic Party organizations, with the 
success of Roosevelt’s New Deal, the largest political machines across the nation 
“became an entirely Democratic phenomenon.”39 Where it was once thought that the 
coming of the New Deal and the strengthening of federal welfare provisioning signaled 
the “last hurrah” of machine politics, the New Deal’s actual relationship with big city 
bosses is much more complex. As Lyle Dorsett pointed out in his now-classic study, New 
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Deal programs financed from Washington continued to be “directed at the local level,” 
making the local machines of continuing relevance to the New Deal administration.40 
Roosevelt showed himself willing to ally with city bosses that accepted and worked to 
implement New Deal goals, even when those goals served to reinforce the stability of the 
machine. 
However, if the New Deal did not sweep away most of the political machines of 
an earlier era, it did transform the conditions under which they operated, which in turn 
had dramatic effects on their form and operation. From the perspective of America’s 
cities and their governing regimes, nothing about the New Deal was as revolutionary as 
its urban policy – the first sustained federal effort of its kind. Creating a series of 
agencies, such as the Civil Works Administration, the Public Works Administration, and 
the Work Progress Administration to address the pressing issues of relief, infrastructure, 
and public housing, the New Deal not only “presented no great threat” to local machines, 
but actually offered a promising opportunity for local political entrepreneurs to pull 
together a wide-ranging coalition, ranging from mayors to business to professional 
planners to city bureaucrats, all of whom had an interest in the expansion of federal urban 
programs.41 As John Mollenkopf has shown, Democrats made two discoveries in this 
moment, each of which transcended some of the limitations of the earlier machine era: 
“that they could bring together formerly feuding urban constituencies,” such as machines 
and reformers, big business and labor, blue collar ethnics as well as minorities, in which 
“each could find reasons to be united behind a program for growth and development.” 
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Secondly, federal urban programs not only brought together a coalition of interests but 
also united them organizationally under the banner of the party and linked them directly 
to Washington. Thus, “they could augment and ultimately replace the particularism and 
uncertainty of the old-fashioned machine with a new kind characterized by bureaucratic 
certainty and funded by the US Treasury.” Ultimately, urban Democrats and their 
partners in Washington discovered that “government programs could solidify national 
political power” by knitting together a patchwork network of urban power centers.42  
Urban political machines and their city bosses were therefore not displaced by the 
New Deal state so much as they were transformed into “pro-growth regimes” and came to 
serve as the local representatives of the New Deal’s state-sponsored development 
agenda.43 New Deal urban policy provided the material basis for a massive quantitative 
expansion of this coalition around a program of redevelopment. This was especially 
important because many large industrial cities continued to receive waves of African 
American in-migration from the South and rural areas generally. Shrewd political bosses 
used New Deal resources as a means to integrate these new populations with impressive 
success. As Nancy Weiss has shown, blacks in the urban North made a dramatic leap into 
the Democratic column between 1932 and 1936. Such a transformation was due to the 
fact that African Americans, as a group that was predominantly working class, 
overwhelmingly approved of and benefited from New Deal relief programs, despite all 
the racial barriers in New Deal public policy (see below). Republican opposition to 
FDR’s agenda, especially those agencies that most directly benefited African Americans 
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such as the Works Progress Administration, sharply accelerated blacks’ conversion from 
the party of Lincoln to the party of Roosevelt.44 
 In the short run, then, New Deal relief money helped sustain Democratic 
machines, if in modified form. In the long run, however, the transformation of America’s 
cities wrought by federal policy ultimately weakened local party structures. New Deal era 
programs and their postwar counterparts helped spur greater geographic mobility on the 
part of many populations, including those ethnic constituencies mobilized by the older 
vintage of Democratic machines, who began leaving urban centers for the relatively new 
suburban zones in larger and larger numbers after World War II.45 This was not only a 
result of the federal subsidization of suburban development, which acted as a positive 
draw on urban ethnics, but equally the disruptive and displacing effects of urban renewal 
programs, which most often subsidized the construction of downtown redevelopment 
schemes rather than the creation of affordable public housing. 46  The resulting 
demographic recomposition of northern cities consequently disrupted patronage networks 
that had developed and sustained ethnically homogenous neighborhoods of an earlier 
era.47  
 Even if the pervasiveness of machines in American electoral politics was on the 
wane by the late 1960s, their legacy appeared alive and well for New Politics activists in 
the figure of Chicago mayor Richard Daley, who had overseen the violent police 
crackdown on convention protesters in 1968. For them, Daley typified, if in exaggerated 
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form, the undemocratic influence of party leaders on the selection of presidential 
nominees and, by extension, the content of party program that extended all the way down 
to the grassroots. Democratizing the Democratic Party would set it sights on removing 
these leaders’ influence in the national party. 
 
Southern Democratic Party-States 
In the South, state Democratic parties were integral components of the racialized social 
order known as Jim Crow. Indeed, southern state Democratic parties had been 
instrumental in coordinating resistance to Reconstruction after the withdrawal of federal 
troops in 1877, ultimately overseeing the consolidation of what Robert Mickey has called 
“enclaves of authoritarian rule.” 48  Over the ensuing three decades, Democrats 
spearheaded the southern campaign for white supremacy and the defense of states’ rights. 
Through the disfranchisement of freedpersons and poor whites, as well as extensive voter 
fraud, corruption, and paramilitary violence, anti-Democratic sources of partisan 
competition, whether Republican or Populist, were eliminated, leaving all public offices, 
government appointments, and state resources at the exclusive command of Democratic 
elites. It is no exaggeration to say that by the turn of the twentieth century southern 
Democratic parties and the states of the former Confederacy had become so deeply 
integrated they constituted one-party authoritarian regimes. As one prominent southern 
judge put it at the time, “The State … is the Democratic party. …[And] the interests of 
the party … are the interests of the State.”49 On the eve of the New Deal, southern 
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Democratic party-states presided over a reconstituted racialized political economy based 
on sharecropping and tenancy in agriculture, with a residual low-wage labor market 
centered on southern industry. Jim Crow and the one-party Democratic South were born 
together and remained inextricably linked.50  
Within each of these authoritarian enclaves, organized political conflict became 
deinstitutionalized from anything resembling a genuine party system, building little in the 
way of vote-mobilizing machinery. As V.O. Key once observed, the one-party South was 
really a no-party South.51 In place of a competitive party system stood the all-white 
primary election. Because all politicians were Democrats, southern politics took on 
especially intense forms of factional competition for party nominations. Southern 
elections therefore emphasized candidates’ individual personalities and reputations, and 
entailed the continual building and rebuilding of personalized campaign organizations, 
often on the basis of patronage promises and accords with local economic elites.52  
In national bodies such as Congress, southern Democrats were the face of the Jim 
Crow order and sought to defend local arrangements from federal intervention 
accordingly. While this may seem to suggest an inherent antipathy between Dixie 
Democrats and the liberal New Deal administration of Franklin Roosevelt, the two 
groups found grounds on which to cooperate. Indeed, southern Democrats – governors, 
state legislators, members of Congress, and intellectuals – were, with few exceptions, 
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eager New Dealers from the start. There were several reasons for this. On the one hand, 
as home to most of those that were “ill-housed, ill-clad, and ill-nourished,” the South was 
in desperate need of federal assistance. With a regional economy predominately geared to 
cash crops, the South was especially vulnerable to market fluctuations. Southern poverty, 
as bad as it was prior to the New Deal, had deepened dramatically during the Great 
Depression. By 1933 state and local relief systems as well as charity organizations had 
been stretched to the breaking point. On the other hand, the New Deal administration was 
in desperate need of southern support. New Deal legislation required southern votes if it 
was to pass successfully through Congress. The continuing influence of Herbert Hoover 
and Robert Taft in the Republican Party guaranteed a high degree of partisan hostility to 
Roosevelt in Congress, making the solid Democratic South even more important as a 
dependable New Deal bloc. Thus, as Ira Katznelson and his coauthors have put it, “even 
at the height of the New Deal, the Democratic party required the acquiescence of 
southern representatives, who as potential coalition partners for Republicans could, if 
they chose, block the national program.”53 
The New Deal’s dependence on the southern wing of the party, however, came at 
a price. As the political representatives of Jim Crow, southern Democrats, whether liberal 
New Dealers or reactionary racists at heart, made the maintenance of the region’s 
racialized political economy the key condition for their political support. More than just 
congressional votes were on the line. The power of the region within the New Deal 
coalition was the result of specific institutional arrangements that gave disproportionate 
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influence over the shape and content of federal policy to southern public officials. Within 
Congress, committee appointments were distributed according to seniority. Southern 
congressmen, hailing from the safe districts shielded by the authoritarian party-states of 
the South, accumulated lengths of service that secured their hold over powerful 
committee chairs. Between 1933 and 1952, they held nearly 50 percent of all such Senate 
and House positions. From these seats of power they exercised control over the 
scheduling of hearings, the terms of debate and deliberation, and whether proposed 
legislation would come to the floor for a vote. This provided them with not just the veto 
power of obstruction but also the capacity to positively shape the New Deal’s legislative 
agenda.54  
The paramount economic concern motivating southern legislators, however, was 
to preserve the significant wage differential that existed between the northern and 
southern regions of the American economy. Southern agriculture and industry were 
labor-intensive sectors that depended for their viability on a cheap, tractable workforce. 
Racial segregation and the relative absence of unions, by disciplining black and white 
workers alike, facilitated the South’s development strategy. As Nelson Lichtenstein has 
noted, “no set of politicians was more sophisticated in understanding the extent to which 
the New Deal’s legitimization of the union movement and its orientation toward a 
rationalized, national labor market subverted the power of the old oligarchy and 
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threatened the region’s low-wage advantage.”55 Southern Democrats thus used the variety 
of institutional tools at their disposal to filter apparent threats to Jim Crow from New 
Deal legislation. These included securing occupational exemptions for domestic and 
agricultural workers – the vast bulk of whom were black – from the National Recovery 
Act, the National Labor Relations Act, the Social Security Act, and the Federal Labor 
Standards Act. Additionally, Federal Economic Relief and Works Progress 
Administration officials routinely purged southern clients from the relief rolls when 
harvest season approached, assuring planters of a plentiful supply of cheap wage 
laborers.56 
The southern bloc also exercised its power in the Democratic Party at the 
quadrennial nominating conventions, where the two-thirds supermajority rule in place for 
nearly a century gave southern states a de facto veto over the party’s national ticket. This 
had made southern party leaders the key convention powerbrokers in 1920 and 1924 
when the region gave the party some 90 percent of its Electoral College votes. Indeed, the 
1928 Democratic platform had affirmed the “Rights of the States” when it declared that 
“the constitutional rights and powers of the states shall be preserved in their full vigor 
and virtue. These constitute a bulwark against centralization and the destructive 
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tendencies of the Republican Party.”57 However, as we will see below, southern leverage 
at the convention had been swept away in the Roosevelt landslide of 1932, when the 
region’s share of the Democratic vote fell to 26 percent.58  
Most of the time President Roosevelt’s pragmatism militated against 
confrontations that would be politically costly. Generally speaking, his administration 
accepted the prevailing distribution of power and sought to work with it. For instance, a 
number of bills were introduced in Congress throughout the Depression to address the 
rise in racial violence across the nation. But anti-lynching legislation received no direct 
support from the Oval Office. Walter White, head of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), recounted Roosevelt to have said: “If I come 
out for an anti-lynching bill now, they [southern Democrats] will block every bill I ask 
Congress to pass to keep America from collapsing. I just can’t take that risk.”59  
There were, however, instances when the president did attempt a high-profile 
political intervention in the structure and operation of the New Deal coalition. Roosevelt, 
while harboring reservations about angering southern Democrats during his first term, 
gave private support to Democratic National Committee chair James Farley to organize 
convention delegate votes for the repeal of the two-thirds supermajority rule governing 
Democratic nominations. Southern delegations to the 1936 convention were almost 
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unanimously opposed to repeal. However, in their newfound status as a minority in the 
party, they were unable to block the rule change.60 The 1936 convention was also the first 
in the party’s history to welcome African American delegates as well as the first black 
Democratic member of Congress. Roosevelt also invited a black minister to deliver the 
opening ceremonial address, so offending South Carolina’s Senator “Cotton Ed” Smith 
that he walked out of the convention hall, declaring, “that ain’t my kind of democracy.”61 
The president also convened an advisory “black cabinet” of New Deal staffers, and 
established a Colored Division at the Democratic National Committee to better integrate 
northern black voters into the party.62 However, Roosevelt’s 1938 attempt to “purge” 
several southern Democratic opponents from Congress by publicly supporting their 
primary challengers was largely unsuccessful, and signaled the beginning of sustained 
congressional opposition to the national party leader from the southern party-states.63 
In response to southern demands to respect “local conditions” or “states’ rights” 
New Deal federal programs were administered by local and state officials, placing 
discretionary authority in the hands of southern Democrats to implement federal policies 
in ways that reinforced the color line. However, it was not simply a lack of political will 
to challenge southern Democrats that resulted in the compromises of the New Deal. A far 
more imposing obstacle was a lack of institutional capacity. For all the capacities built 
during the New Deal period, the federal government lacked ability to design and 
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implement universal, standardized programs. 64  The early twentieth century had seen 
significant growth of the federal government, but, as Thomas J. Sugrue has observed, 
“when it came to the question of race relations, the United States was still a nation of 
courts and parties.”65 
In sum, it is not hard to understand why the democratizing goals of the New 
Politics movement would object to these kinds of political arrangements. As we will see, 
its project to democratize the Democratic Party originated in the civil rights movement 
that struggled against southern party-states in the 1950s and 1960s. While the federal 
government had delivered the deathblows to the Jim Crow regimes of the South by 1965, 
the practices (and abuses) of Democratic party-states would feature prominently in 
shaping the contours of reform proposed by New Politics activists in the wake of the 
1968 party crisis. 
 
The Contradictions of the New Deal Coalition  
The New Deal coalition brought to life one of longest lasting regimes in American 
political history. However, its internal contradictions, centering primarily on African 
American civil rights, would eventually drive the coalition apart by the mid-1960s. 
Claiming that the New Deal coalition was internally contradictory is not simply to assert 
that, like any governing regime in a large republic, it combined “in the same orbit 
interests and ambitions that in other circumstances could be expected to be regularly at 
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loggerheads.”66 While it is true that Democratic administrations of the 1930s, 1940s, and 
early 1960s welded together an impressively stable political coalition of strange 
bedfellows, what was truly contradictory was the way the coalition’s success undermined 
the conditions necessary for continued alliance. 
While the primary conflict in the New Deal regime centered on the struggle for 
African American civil rights, it is not the case, as is often asserted, that the New Deal 
coalition was internally divided by the “unresolved issue of race.”67 Such a claim posits 
an ahistorical, static conception of race that fails to account for why what was apparently 
unresolved in the 1930s, when the coalition was built, became a deal breaker later in the 
1960s, when it fell apart. Such a pat characterization also implies that interests supporting 
or opposing civil rights for black Americans were exogenously given, providing little 
room for politics to play any significant role in the formation of interests. On the 
contrary, it was the dynamics produced by the success of the New Deal regime that 
simultaneously promoted the cause of African-Americans’ civil rights while also stifling 
its realization.  
First, at a discursive level, the aggressively interventionist New Deal agenda had 
renewed hope that the federal government might act boldly on behalf of the poor and 
insecure – and by extension, African Americans – while the subsequent mobilization for 
WWII infused that hope with the concept of universal democratic rights. Wartime 
rhetoric and government propaganda vilified the racist ideologies of European and 
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Japanese fascism and depicted the worldwide military conflict as the struggle “between 
human freedom and human slavery.”68 Roosevelt himself defined the goals of Allied 
victory as the protection of the Four Freedoms – freedom of religion and speech, freedom 
from fear and want – which were the “rights of men of every creed and every race, 
wherever they live.”69 By uniting black and white soldiers and members of the public 
against a common enemy, such a capacious doctrine of rights, and the government 
activism to defend and secure it, had a galvanizing effect on advocates of racial justice. 
Second, for all the effort by southern congressional Democrats to preserve the Jim 
Crow order, federal New Deal and wartime policies could not help but restructure the 
southern political economy and consequently destabilize the region’s racial hierarchy. 
Federal agencies such as the National Recovery Administration (NRA) and the 
Agriculture Adjustment Administration (AAA) wrought sweeping changes in southern 
agriculture and industry. Labor-saving technology, however, came mostly at the expense 
of unskilled, black labor. Among the many black southerners displaced, the NRA came to 
be known as the “Negro Removal Act.”70 Mobilization for WWII brought even greater 
federal presence to the region, sharply accelerating the industrial and urban development 
processes already underway. Almost half of all federal expenditures for military base 
construction were directed to the South, creating boomtown conditions that drew in the 
rural population. The rapid installation of military bases and defense-related 
infrastructure initiated “a sort of agricultural enclosure movement across the South” as 
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“farms and forests became factories and arsenals.”71 The resultant dislocation of tenants 
and sharecroppers fed the growing out-migration of African Americans, initiated after 
World War I, toward large industrial cities of the North.72 
Third, as black Americans arrived in northern cities in greater numbers, the 
calculus of electoral politics began to shift. Democratic politicians and political machines 
began to make inroads with a population that, when they were not barred from exercising 
their right to vote, had been overwhelmingly committed to the party of Lincoln. While 
the Republicans had turned away from protecting the rights of African American citizens 
after 1876, GOP platforms continued to draw on the legacy of the Great Emancipator. 
The national Democratic Party, in contrast, featured no such rhetoric, and while some 
northern state party platforms began advocating for African American’ civil rights, its 
southern party-states often continued to explicitly endorse the cause of white supremacy 
and states’ rights. Nonetheless, the New Deal’s appeal and the Republican’s hostile 
response shifted African Americans’ partisan loyalties to the Democrats, linking the 
party, as both ally and antagonist, to the nascent civil rights movement.73 
Finally, while the labor-liberal alliance had fully committed itself to working 
within the New Deal Democratic Party, labor-liberals were not content with the party as 
it was. In fact, labor-liberals viewed the southern wing of the party as the primary 
obstacle standing in the way of advancing the New Deal agenda, especially after the 1947 
Taft-Hartley Act, passed over President Harry Truman’s veto with the full support of 
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southern Democrats, established an effective firewall against significant unionization 
below the Mason-Dixon line.74 Formulating a strategy of “realignment,” labor-liberals 
sought to consolidate a range of progressive forces inside the Democratic Party while 
simultaneously pushing political conservatives into the Republican fold. Jack Kroll, head 
of the CIO-PAC and later COPE, best diagnosed the problem when he wrote in a 
confidential memo to the United Auto Workers president Walter Reuther after the 
disastrous 1952 election that the party status quo was “intolerable.”75  Articulating a 
perspective that would become commonplace among New Politics activists after 1968, 
Kroll bemoaned the decentralized power structure confronting labor-liberals inside the 
party, which, he said, resulted in an incoherent policy agenda that would continually 
frustrate the interests of the union movement. “The congressional branch of the party 
could be completely opposed to pro-union legislation, even though the national 
convention, the democratically-chosen voice of the party, had gone on record as favoring 
such legislation.”76 The proposed target of labor-liberals’ realignment strategy was the 
“solid South” of Democratic conservatism. If the conservative monopoly over 
Democratic party-states could be broken, the enemies of the labor movement in Congress 
could be replaced with union-friendly liberals. However, after the failure of Operation 
Dixie, the CIO’s major postwar effort at organizing the South, COPE looked to the 
growing activist movement of southern blacks, seeing the overthrow of Jim Crow as the 
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surest way to realign southern Democratic parties.77 By the early 1960s, the AFL-CIO 
leadership in Washington was transferring funds to civil rights organizations in the South, 
often covertly so as to not inflame the racial prejudices of local members.78 
Thus, the very operation of the New Deal coalition seemed to push in multiple, 
mutually incompatible directions at once and had deleterious effects on the party’s 
organizational infrastructure. The democratic rhetoric of the Roosevelt administration 
seemed flexible enough to extend to African Americans (and later, many others) the full 
citizenship status traditionally accorded only to white males. The party-states of the 
South sought simultaneously to modernize their political economy while also retaining its 
racial order. Meanwhile, black voters began figuring as a larger factor in the electoral 
setting of large industrial cities, and labor-liberals looked to shift the balance of party 
power in Congress by extruding the long-standing bastion of solid Democratic support, 
the southern party-states, from its halls altogether. To be sure, there were policies and 
perspectives that drew the contradictory coalition together. Regime leaders, especially 
those in the executive, crafted durable coalitional links around a policy framework of 
economic growth, liberal internationalism, and cold war anticommunism.79 Nevertheless, 
in this context civil rights for black Americans came to reflect of the balance of power in 
the New Deal regime as a whole. Progress or retrenchment on this terrain would be 
determined by the struggle inside the party. 
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Civil Rights, Party Federalism, and the Limits of New Deal Liberalism 
Because the major political conflicts of the New Deal era unfolded mainly within the 
Democratic coalition rather than between Democrats and Republicans, it is not surprising 
that such struggles were most visible at the only time the national party could be said to 
exist: the quadrennial nominating conventions.80 Given the growing importance of the 
president in setting the national political agenda, shaping the public perception of the 
party, and defining the meaning of the party’s identity and ideology, the selection of 
presidential nominees – always the focus of America’s national parties – had, by the early 
postwar years, only grown in significance. For these reasons the institutions and rules 
structuring the party’s selection of a nominee had come to be objects of political 
contestation in their own right.  
Underlying these rules was the controversial question concerning the authority of 
the national party, as embodied by the convention, over state party affiliates. Minneapolis 
mayor Hubert Humphrey had drawn the conclusion that the party’s federal structure had 
become a stumbling block for the civil rights agenda when he addressed the 1948 
Democratic national convention, declaring “the time has arrived for the Democratic party 
to get out of the shadow of states’ rights and walk forthrightly into the bright sunshine of 
human rights.”81 Humphrey’s impassioned intervention led to the adoption of a strongly 
worded civil rights plank in the party platform, triggering a walkout of the Mississippi 
and South Carolina delegations and the formation of the States’ Rights (or Dixiecrat) 
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Party. But rather than effecting the realignment labor-liberals like Humphrey and Kroll 
had hoped for, the Dixiecrat revolt demonstrated the incapacity of the national party to 
exercise its supreme authority over its state affiliates, even when they openly defied the 
national platform and attempted to sabotage the election of its presidential nominee.  
While the Dixiecrat revolt began with a southern walkout from the 1948 
convention over the platform, more was at stake than just words. As V.O. Key noted at 
the time, “a basic doctrine of the Dixiecrat rebellion was that the Democratic party of 
each state was an independent entity, not bound by the actions of the national 
convention.”82 In fact, the Dixiecrat revolt was the climax of a process years in the 
making. As the meeting place of state parties, national party conventions had witnessed 
increasing tensions over questions of intraparty power since the beginning of the New 
Deal. As we have seen, the first bellwether event had been in 1936 when the convention 
delegates voted to abolish the two-thirds supermajority rule governing presidential 
nominations. President Roosevelt had also made efforts to integrate African Americans 
into the party apparatus.  
The greatest challenge, however, came from black activists themselves in the 
aftermath of the 1944 Supreme Court decision in Smith v. Allwright, outlawing the white 
primary, “Dixie’s most powerful legal tool of suffrage restriction.”83 In 1944, African 
Americans in South Carolina launched the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP) to mount 
a credentials challenge against South Carolina’s regular state delegation during Franklin 
Roosevelt’s fourth nomination proceedings. The creation of a black political party in the 
midst of the Jim Crow South was, in the words of political scientist Robert Mickey, “a 
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remarkable, unprecedented development in the twentieth century.”84 Under the leadership 
of John Henry McCray, editor of South Carolina’s foremost black newspaper, the PDP 
pointed to the Supreme Court’s recent Smith v. Allwright decision and claimed to be the 
sole legitimate representative of South Carolina at the party’s national convention. The 
DNC, already overburdened with the controversial replacement of Roosevelt’s running 
mate Henry Wallace with Harry Truman, greeted the credentials challenge against South 
Carolina with irritation. Conjuring up the potential electoral costs of disunity in the party, 
DNC vice chair Oscar Ewing warned McCray that the PDP’s challenge, if brought to the 
convention floor, would harm Roosevelt’s chances for a fourth term and hobble the cause 
of civil rights. DNC chair Robert Hannegan also intervened, placating PDP activists by 
dangling the carrot that if a floor fight could be avoided the Justice Department would put 
its weight behind racial integration in the party. The Credentials Committee, composed of 
two delegates from each state party and thus over-representing the power of the South, 
voted against the challenge. Acceding to the national party leaders, the PDP leadership 
did not press for a floor fight.85 
In 1947, confrontations with the doctrine of states’ rights continued after 
Roosevelt’s death when President Harry Truman outlined his view of the government as 
an instrument for advancing civil rights: “The extension of civil rights today means, not 
protection of the people against the Government, but protection of the people by the 
Government. We must make the Federal Government a friendly, vigilant defender of the 
rights and equality of all Americans.”86 Truman’s rhetoric on civil rights had several 
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motivations. On the one hand, former vice president Henry Wallace’s third-party 
challenge sought to outflank the Democrats on the left. Bold action on civil rights could 
deprive Wallace’s Progressive Party of some of its political oxygen. On the other hand, 
Truman was motivated by the belief that the South had nowhere else to turn. Such a 
perspective had been advanced by his aides Clark Clifford and James Rowe, who wrote 
in a lengthy election strategy memo that “it is inconceivable that any policy initiated by 
the Truman administration no matter how ‘liberal’ could so alienate the South in the next 
year that it would revolt. As always, the South can be considered safely Democratic. And 
in formulating national policy, it can safely be ignored.”87  
At the 1948 Democratic convention, the South Carolina PDP again sent a rival 
delegation, which framed its appeal to the Credentials Committee using the wartime 
language of democratic rights, comparing the racially exclusive practices of their rivals 
with the totalitarian regimes of the Axis powers. Unlike their segregationist counterparts, 
the PDP had held party conventions at the precinct, county, and state levels, “open to all 
races, and all people.”88 Conscious of the growing attention paid to black ballots by the 
national party, the Progressive Democrats held out the promise of wedding the loyalty of 
African Americans to the Democratic presidential ticket, precisely at the time when the 
nascent states’ rights movement was publicly foreswearing their support for President 
Truman. In a letter sent to the Democratic National Committee chair, McCray asked, 
“Are we … to believe that the party of our choice was only kidding about a square deal 
for every human being everywhere? Are we not to be told that our party would prefer to 
boot lick at the toes of whose who deliver to it hefty kicks, turning its backs upon those 
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who do everything possible for its success?”89 McCray warned the DNC chair that “if the 
Democratic party does not want the votes of Negroes … it can say so and have its wishes 
on the record.”90 Governor Strom Thurmond, soon-to-be leader of the Dixiecrat revolt, 
headed the regular South Carolina delegation in the credentials contest, seeking to 
discredit the PDP before the Credentials Committee by undermining the technicalities of 
the their formal procedures and organization. When Thurmond’s colleague tried to 
disqualify the black party because it had not held open meetings in all state precincts, 
McCray responded that “if the Senator read his own hometown [news]papers, he would 
find … that some 200 clubs or more of your own Party didn’t have any meetings at all.”91 
As in 1944, the Credentials Committee ruled against the PDP. This time, however, the 
plaintiffs filed a minority report challenging the Credentials Committee decision. But 
when it arrived for discussion on the convention floor it was drowned out by southern 
protests. 
Southern Democrats, feeling increasingly under threat by the national party 
leadership, had anticipated a showdown at the 1948 Democratic convention and planned 
accordingly. Throughout the spring, southern state Democratic conventions had 
registered their dissatisfaction with Truman’s civil rights actions loudly and clearly, 
passing resolutions affirming racial segregation and vowing to defect from any national 
party that would nominate Truman for president. At a large gathering of southern 
Democrats in Birmingham, Alabama, Thurmond vowed to “preserve our civilization in 
the South,” proclaiming that “not all the laws of Washington, or all the bayonets of the 
Army, can force the Negro into our homes, our churches, and our schools, or into our 
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places of recreation and amusement.”92 The attendees passed a resolution that if Truman 
were nominated at the national convention that summer, they would hold their own rump 
convention in defiance. As Clark Clifford, Truman’s reelection strategist, later reflected, 
“we badly underestimated the reaction of the South to the civil rights message.”93 
 As we have seen, in normal political times party platforms are devices constructed 
to placate diverse party stakeholders with vaguely worded affirmations of principle that 
amount to little more than campaign rhetoric. But as Jo Freeman has pointed out, under 
heightened political tension platforms act “as a window through which to view factional 
fights and a means to assess relative strength” inside a party.94 The 1948 Democratic 
national convention appeared to many participants and observers as a crossroads in the 
struggle to shape the identity of the party. Would the Democrats continue, as Hubert 
Humphrey put it, to live in the shadow of states’ rights or would it embrace the cause of 
civil rights for African Americans?  
Inside the convention’s preliminary Platform Committee hearings, members of 
the liberal advocacy organization Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) introduced a 
plank drafted by CIO secretary treasurer James Carey, the main proposals of which 
committed the party to “continuing its efforts to eradicate all racial, religious, and 
economic discrimination,” while asserting the universal “right to live … to work … [and] 
to vote.” It also called upon Congress to support President Truman in “guaranteeing” the 
fundamental rights of “full and equal political participation,” “equal opportunity of 
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employment,” personal security, and equality in national defense.95 The White House 
however, initially so confident that southern interests could be safely ignored, balked due 
to fear of a costly southern defection in the general election. At Truman’s direction, 
Clifford sought out a middle ground compromise, offering equivocal language that 
affirmed “the Federal Government will exercise its full constitutional power to assure that 
due process, the right to vote, the right to live and the right to work shall not turn on any 
consideration of race, religion, color or national origin.”96  However, even this tepid 
version was rejected by the southern contingent on the Platform Committee, who offered 
their own alternative stating that the federal government “shall not encroach upon the 
reserved powers of the states by centralization of the government or otherwise.” After ten 
hours of continuous debate, the Committee produced a party platform in conformity with 
the White House draft, calling upon Congress “to exercise full authority to the limits of 
its constitutional power to protect these rights,” but no more.97 
Defeated in the Platform Committee, where states had equal representation, labor-
liberals turned their strategy to the convention floor where, due to preponderance of non-
southern delegates, the CIO-ADA civil rights plank faced better odds at adoption. With 
the support of a small liberal contingent on the Platform Committee, a minority report 
containing the CIO-ADA plank was sent to the floor. After Humphrey’s barn-burning 
speech swung the convention in its favor, delegates from South Carolina and Mississippi 
walked out of the convention and launched the States’ Rights Democratic Party with 
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South Carolina governor Strom Thurmond and Mississippi governor Fielding Wright as a 
rival presidential ticket.  
The Democrats’ civil rights plank represented a symbolic commitment far 
exceeding anything from either party in the decades since Reconstruction. For labor-
liberals, the potential to permanently realign the party and its policy agenda seemed to be 
at hand. Jack Kroll, director of the CIO’s political action committee, greeted the southern 
bolt from the convention with great fanfare, saying the Democratic platform 
 
will go a long way to separate the sheep from the goats. … I think that the 
basis may have been laid for transforming the Democratic party as a whole 
into a genuine instrument for expressing the will of the vast majority of 
the people, unencumbered by civil war hangovers, unburdened by the 
magnolia and mint julep mentality, unhampered by sectional prejudices.98 
 
 The 1948 election results seemed to confirm this optimism further still. Upon 
hearing of his upset victory over his Republican challenger, President Truman proclaimed 
that “labor did it.”99 However, black voters, who had cast 69 percent of their ballots for 
the president, made Truman’s slim victory in Ohio, California, and Illinois possible. The 
Dixiecrats, on the other hand, had failed in their immediate aim of denying any major 
candidate a majority of the Electoral College, thus throwing the decision to the House of 
Representatives where southern congressmen could exert greater leverage over the 
nominees. In fact, Thurmond only carried the four southern states where the States’ 
Rights Party had managed to colonize the state Democratic Party, placing his name on 
the ballot in place of Truman’s. In all instances where both appeared – that is, where the 
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Dixiecrats actually constituted a genuine third party force – Democratic loyalty carried 
the day.100 
But labor-liberals who saw their political strategy of realignment at work in the 
1948 election results were soon disappointed. While Truman temporarily withheld 
patronage from a few southern congressmen and dismissed several renegades from the 
Democratic National Committee for their support of the Dixiecrats, intraparty reprisals 
for defection were tame and eventually abandoned.101 The DNC instituted a loyalty oath 
for all delegates at the 1952 convention, pledging the state delegations to support the 
national party’s nominee. When this triggered conflict on the convention floor as 
Louisiana, South Carolina, and Virginia refused to make the formal pledge, the powerful 
Illinois delegation, hesitant to damage governor Adlai Stevenson’s presidential prospects, 
successfully modified the resolution to free delegates from pledges that conflicted with 
their state laws or party rules. By the 1956 convention the loyalty oath was dropped all 
together.102 
Instead of responding to the Dixiecrat rebellion with the stick, the national party 
leadership chose the carrot in its relations with the prickly southern wing. This meant 
navigating a cautious retreat on civil rights. As the party’s presidential nominee in both 
1952 and 1956, Stevenson quickly sought détente with the southern rebels and placated 
the region as a whole. He publicly distanced himself from the loyalty pledge, saying that 
“it isn’t in the nature of a party structure that covers a nation to have total discipline and 
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total conformity of views.”103 Stevenson also chose Alabama senator John Sparkman, a 
supporter of the Dixiecrats and author of the subsequent convention’s watered down civil 
rights platform plank, as his running mate in 1952.  
The titular party leader’s approach to reunifying the party through appeasement of 
the southern party-states was complemented by the party’s congressional leadership, 
which fell to Texans Sam Rayburn and Lyndon Johnson during the 1950s. Taking 
advantage of the attacks of the Taft wing of the GOP on the “me-too” moderate 
Republicanism of the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration, the Rayburn-Johnson 
leadership sought to co-opt the popularity of the president, throwing their weight behind 
his agenda and marginalizing those Johnson called the “bomb-throwing liberals” in 
Congress.104 
It is tempting, as many historians and political scientists have done, to read the 
present back into the history of the Dixiecrat rebellion and portray its failed third party 
attempt as an early antecedent of George Wallace’s racial populism of the 1960s and the 
eventual partisan realignment of the southern states into the Republican column.105 But 
this tendency, while insightful, too often fails to see that the Dixiecrat movement, as a 
rebellion carried out in the name of states’ rights against national party authority, was in 
its proximate goals quite successful.106 Rather than portending the growth of national 
party power, the Dixiecrat revolt is a clear indication that the distribution of party power 
ran the other way, and offers a dramatic illustration of party discipline being applied to 
the national party by defiant state parties. While the Dixiecrats did not ruin Truman’s 
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election in 1948 as they had intended, they sent a clear message to the national leadership 
of the attendant risks in aggressively pursuing civil rights. The power of states’ rights 
within the national party organization therefore limited the extent of New Deal liberalism 
by foreclosing the possibility of imposing the party’s national agenda on its state level 
affiliates. While Hubert Humphrey’s biographer may rightly claim that his speech at the 
1948 Democratic convention “nailed civil rights to the masthead of the Democratic 
party,” it was the forces steering the ship that mattered more than its words.107 
 
Conclusion 
The nature of labor-liberals’ incorporation into the Democratic Party structure would 
come to have significant influence on both their orientation to the politics of the late 
1960s and the post-1968 demands to democratize the party. On the one hand, President 
Lyndon Johnson’s escalation of the Vietnam War in 1965 drove a wedge through liberal-
labor circles. Liberal doves, who became increasingly skeptical of the war and came to 
favor negotiated withdrawal, were conflicted over publicly confronting a Democratic 
president who was also pressing forward the most liberal domestic agenda since Franklin 
Roosevelt. Top union officials, when they were not committed anticommunists, balked at 
voicing their opposition to the war for fear of jeopardizing their access to the president, 
on whom they were reliant for policy influence. This put most labor-liberals on the 
Johnson administration’s side as its foreign policy became the target of New Left 
criticism.  
On the other hand, labor’s insertion into a system of elite brokerage over 
presidential nominees placed a valuable source of its political power in the “smoke-filled 
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backrooms” the New Politics movement would seek to dismantle. While this promised to 
disrupt the principal channel of labor’s policy influence, it created greater uncertainty 
over labor’s future role in party politics. Labor’s historical shortcomings as a politically 
engaged rank-and-file movement posed daunting limitations on how effectively it would 
be able to adapt to more participatory party organs. As we will see, the ability to engage 
union membership as convention delegates was not distributed equally within the trade 
union movement, and democratizing the Democratic Party offered to shift the balance of 
forces inside the national union hierarchy. 
Additionally, the New Deal regime eventually had detrimental effects on the 
organizational capacity of the Democratic Party to serve as a competitive electoral 
vehicle. As mentioned in Chapter 1, postwar Democratic presidents, especially Lyndon 
Johnson, took for granted the durability of partisan majorities in Congress and in the 
electorate, and tended to see policy victories instead of investments in organization 
building as the primary means of attracting votes. While national leadership on party 
building was sorely lacking, its costs were temporarily compensated by the efforts of the 
labor movement in the large industrial states. But reliance on state Democratic parties and 
labor to get out the vote on election day had its limits, which began to be felt by the mid-
1960s. In 1966, California’s representative on the DNC raised concerns by describing the 
national committee as “basically a shell,” and further warned that unless trends were 
reversed “there may be a general disintegration of Democratic Party organization 
throughout the country.”108 In advance of Johnson’s own reelection bid in 1968, his party 
liaison Lawrence O’Brien informed the White House:  
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Nationally, the Democratic Party faces serious organizational problems. 
Many of the state organizations are flabby and wedded to techniques 
which are conventional and outmoded. …The Democratic National 
Committee is not staffed or equipped to conduct a successful Presidential 
election. The Democratic Party, to a greater or lesser extent, has lost 
contact with the voters.109 
 
As we will see, the consequences of failing to heed these warnings would become acutely 
felt in 1968, when the party’s loss of the presidential contest granted additional 
legitimacy to the reform movement. At that moment the crisis of American liberalism 
became intertwined with the party’s organizational crisis, opening a window of 
opportunity for the reform movement, but also posing serious obstacles to its intention of 
transforming the Democratic Party. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
TOWARD A MORE RESPONSIBLE PARTY? 
DEMOCRATIC PARTY FEDERALISM AND CIVIL RIGHTS  
IN THE 1950s AND 1960s 
 
The previous chapter has shown that the New Deal Democratic Party, while dedicated to 
increasing the power of the central state and using that power in the name of universal 
rights, was still structurally a party of states’ rights. State parties were autonomous 
participants in a national federation whose reason for being was to coordinate their 
activity around an agreeable presidential candidate and support his campaign in the 
general election. This form of organization was no mere relic of the past. Rather, 
Democratic Party federalism was itself an essential mechanism in the reproduction of the 
contradictory coalition undergirding the New Deal regime. State parties could defy the 
will of the convention or the national leadership with relative impunity, placing continual 
pressure on the Democratic leadership to placate the diverse interests underpinning the 
party coalition. As I have argued, the party leadership’s response to the Dixiecrat revolt 
of 1948 exemplified the capacity of the state parties to discipline the national party and 
curtail the policy agenda of Democratic leaders, especially regarding the pursuit of 
African Americans’ civil rights. 
 It was this decentralized national party structure, and the power it gave to state 
party leaders, that reform activists confronted and aimed to transform in the late 1960s. 
Their demand for meaningful access and programmatic, issue-driven politics was a 
response to this structure and the perceived injustice of a nationally liberal party 
tolerating the participation of white supremacists within its party councils. As would be 
heard in the New Politics reform proposals that followed in the wake of the 1968 party 
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crisis, such a “glaring discrepancy” between “stated ideals” and practices was denounced 
as “immoral” and countered with the proposal that the national party be equipped to 
discipline state affiliates or party members that failed to conform to the party’s basic 
principles, even by sponsoring the creation of rival Democratic organizations.1 Thus, 
from its inception, one of the essential components of the New Politics movement was 
establishing the supremacy of the national party and terminating the institutional legacy 
of states’ rights. 
 This chapter will profile two critical moments in the development of the New 
Politics movement following the 1948 Dixiecrat revolt. I will argue that these 
confrontations with party federalism revealed that the intraparty forces favoring racial 
equality could not become predominant without substantially rebalancing power relations 
within the party. As I have already argued, this period saw a cautious retreat on the 
politics of civil rights by the pragmatic leadership of the Democratic Party. The 
Dixiecrats’ act of defiance reinforced the moderating inclinations of national leaders such 
as two-time presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson, Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn, 
and Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson over the course of the 1950s, even as 
Washington liberals in the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), as well as many 
southern racial justice activists, made concerted efforts to shift the struggle for civil rights 
on to the terrain of party organization. These precedents, while all unsuccessful in their 
immediate aims, paved the way for the reforms advanced by the New Politics movement 
in the aftermath of the 1968 party crisis. These battles continued to weigh on the minds of 
reformers as they drew up their agenda in the post-1968 period. Efforts to develop 
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policymaking capability within the Democratic National Committee (DNC) during the 
1950s were a response to the perceived defects of party structure that the post-1972 
struggle over the party charter would later take up. The credentials challenges posed by 
black Mississippi Freedom activists against the state’s all-white delegation at the 1964 
Democratic national convention, which recognized “the right of political participation for 
all,” would provide the wedge with which reform activists would later pry open the party. 
Indeed, as The Nation observed, by 1968 “the Southern black strategy of challenging 
racist and restrictive Democratic Party processes had become a national strategy for 
reform.”2 
 
The Democratic Advisory Council and the “New Politics” of Principle 
The first major effort to mount an organizational response to party federalism was 
overseen by an unlikely agent in the second half of the 1950s: the chair of the Democratic 
National Committee, Paul Butler. As former chair of the Indiana state Democratic Party, 
Butler rose to the head of the DNC with a reputation as an able “organization man,” 
securing the support of southern committee members by pledging that he did “not 
consider the question of segregation a political issue” and saw “no reason for any 
chairman at any level to project segregation into our political discussions.”3 However, 
once installed, Butler made an about-face and pursued a range of bold party reform 
initiatives. His reform initiatives were shaped in response to two important developments 
affecting the Democratic Party at that moment. On the one hand, the political context and 
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public opinion had shifted considerably on racial politics during the first half of the 
decade, providing racial justice advocates both inside and outside the party with greater 
leverage to press for meaningful civil rights legislation. This was mostly the result of the 
success of civil rights organizing and agitation over the intervening years, as well as the 
gradual but decisive alliance of the federal government with forces within the black 
freedom movement, represented most dramatically in the historic Brown v. Board of 
Education decision of the Supreme Court in 1954. On the other hand, Democratic Party 
leaders such as Butler were confronted with the paradox of large defeats in presidential 
elections alongside increasing liberal Democratic majorities in Congress. In this context 
liberals inside and outside public office fashioned a discourse that emphasized the 
success of issue-oriented partisan opposition and placed blame for Democratic losses at 
the presidential level on conservative southern Democrats, the institutional advantages 
they exploited in Congress, and their détente with pragmatic party moderates.4  
As we have seen, the Dixiecrat revolt had exerted a chilling effect on the political 
agenda of the Democratic Party, especially regarding its pursuit of civil rights. For all that 
the platform battle in 1948 signified about the orientation of postwar liberalism toward 
explicitly embracing racial justice, its aftermath revealed the weakness of the party’s 
liberal forces to advance their agenda over the resistance of the South and the objections 
of moderates who feared the electoral and legislative consequences of intraparty division 
and conflict. Indeed, President Harry Truman’s executive orders desegregating the army 
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and barring discrimination in federal employment proved to be the last gasps rather than 
the opening salvos of a renewed push for labor-liberalism and racial justice. Legislative 
obstruction by the coalition of southern Democrats and Republicans in Congress 
tightened, choking off nearly all of the president’s 21-point Fair Deal proposals. The 
wider political climate of anticommunism also diminished liberals in the public sphere, 
marginalizing them within the Democratic Party as its leaders sought to dodge 
accusations of communist sympathies that their opponents could exploit in the next 
election. 
Through the 1950s, liberal Democrats argued that the party’s indecisive action on 
civil rights was costing them at the polls. The preexisting congressional obstacles and, by 
1953, the loss of the White House deprived liberal Democrats and activists of the national 
channels through which they had mobilized for government action in the past. President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s own brand of moderate Republicanism left the door open to 
courting black votes. With Truman’s retirement, the Democratic leadership passed to 
Adlai Stevenson who, despite his willingness to press liberal issues as governor of 
Illinois, walked a cautious route on race in his successive presidential bids, hoping to 
reunite the disaffected South with northern liberals. Eisenhower had already carried the 
majority vote of African Americans in a host of large cities in 1952, and in 1956 Harlem 
representative Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. bolted to the Republican president in protest of 
Democratic indecision on civil rights. That same year Attorney General Herbert Brownell 
pushed for a civil rights bill to be introduced in Congress, hoping to exacerbate the split 
inside the Democratic Party and take the credit for civil rights action, especially if 
southern Democrats blocked its passage. Democratic leaders in Congress, such as Senate 
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Majority Leader Johnson and Speaker of the House Rayburn, sometimes indicated they 
favored such a bill as well, if only to mitigate the loss of civil rights supporters to the 
GOP and establish liberal credentials for Johnson’s own presidential ambitions.5  
With the Democrats out of power in the executive branch and an 
accommodationist congressional leadership, labor-liberals intertwined their policy agenda 
with demands for party reform, specifically regarding the location of policymaking 
leadership in the absence of a sitting Democratic president. While Stevenson himself had 
the reputation of a brainy, rather aloof party leader, the same was not true of the liberals 
drawn to his candidacy. In fact, it was in response to his relatively detached leadership 
style in the wake of his first electoral defeat that a correspondence committee developed 
among Stevenson supporters, linking together a network of liberal intellectuals and 
Democratic officeholders with a desire to promote a powerful liberal agenda in the party. 
The group’s membership overlapped with those Arthur Schlesinger famously described 
as “vital center” liberals of the ADA, and included newly elected officials of the House 
and Senate such as Eugene McCarthy and Hubert Humphrey, journalist Norman Cousins, 
and political scientists E.E. Schattschneider and James MacGregor Burns. 6 
Schattschneider himself had recently chaired a famous study undertaken by the American 
Political Science Association (APSA) in 1950, which had lamented the non-
programmatic, decentralized structure of the American party system and proposed as an 
alternative the development of what its authors called “responsible party government” 
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through articulating policy positions, enforcing intraparty discipline, and centralizing 
power at the national level.7  
The Stevenson group found a key ally in Butler, who had been elected chair of the 
DNC in December 1954, and soon took up with increasing urgency the need for a strong, 
ideologically coherent Democratic Party, which could offer distinct policy alternatives to 
Republicans. For Butler and other liberal reformers, the problem was that the national 
Democratic Party was not liberal enough to distinguish itself adequately from 
Eisenhower’s moderate Republicanism. Having been quite taken with the analysis and 
recommendations laid out in the APSA’s 1950 report on responsible parties, Butler 
argued that if the Democrats wanted to retake the White House, they would have to 
engage in institutional reform both inside the party as well as in Congress.8 In his public 
statements the DNC chair criticized the “loose organization in the relationship of the state 
group to the national level,” the “loosely organized national conventions and national 
committees,” as well as “the lack of mechanics to provide statements of official policy.” 
Butler reserved his major criticism, however, for the “total lack of disciplinary authority 
in implementing the provisions of the party platform.”9  
The outcome of the 1956 elections hardened liberals’ resolve and emboldened 
Butler’s leadership on the party reform issue. Stevenson’s second failure to capture the 
presidency was offset by increasing numbers of liberal Democrats in Congress, whose 
ranks increased yet again in the 1958 midterms. However, despite these gains, legislative 
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agenda-setting power remained concentrated in the hands of conservative southern 
committee chairs and the pragmatic leadership of Rayburn and Johnson. To counter this, 
Butler proposed the creation of an alternative policymaking body within the DNC, the 
Democratic Advisory Council (DAC), composed of liberal members of Congress as well 
as Democratic mayors and governors, public intellectuals, and honorary party figureheads 
such as Eleanor Roosevelt and Harry Truman. Its function would be “to coordinate and 
advance” coherent and compelling policy proposals according to what Butler called 
“Democratic principles.” 10  Such a body inside the party would serve to keep the 
Democrats apace with what he called the “new politics,” which were “increasing the 
emphasis on the power of issues, principles, and ideas” in American public life. “Party 
leaders are fast discovering,” Butler argued, “that political organizations based solely on 
patronage, personal favors, and the power and prestige of public office no longer enjoy 
the tremendous effectiveness they once possessed.”11 In addition to the DAC, Butler 
outlined a plan to make party platform development as open and participatory a process 
as possible, tapping the director of the party’s youth organization and the party’s 
publicity director to organize platform meetings in ten cities, each dedicated to a different 
policy issue, and convening in a midterm policy platform conference, a proposal 
borrowed directly from the APSA report. 
Proposing to relocate agenda-setting power to an issue-oriented party council met 
with fierce criticism and opposition from congressional leaders Rayburn and Johnson, 
who had premised their legislative strategy on minimizing intraparty divisions and 
supporting the initiatives of the enormously popular President Eisenhower. Such 
                                                
10 Butler, quoted in Klinkner, The Losing Parties, 22. 
11 Butler, quoted in Rosenfeld, “A Choice, Not an Echo,” 63. 
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bipartisanship necessitated pursuing racial equality at a glacial pace – precisely the 
approach Butler and others diagnosed as the main obstacle to the Democrats retaking the 
White House.12 However, Rayburn and Johnson’s objections reflected more than just 
guarded defense of their privileges. Indeed, Johnson and Rayburn opposed Butler’s 
vision of political parties as principled agents of social change. For Johnson, “the biggest 
danger to American stability is the politics of principle, which brings out the masses in 
irrational fights for unlimited goals.”13 He attacked the DAC as “open[ing] up a real 
hornet’s nest” because it was “completely powerless to produce any votes” in Congress 
and was only capable of “deepening divisions in the Democratic Party.”14 From the 
perspective of the party’s legislative leaders, any policymaking body outside the House 
or Senate could have no practical understanding of the actual mechanics of lawmaking – 
brokering, deal making, compromising – and could only have counterproductive effects 
on the party and its success. 
That such wrangling over policy and party organization had at its core the issue of 
civil rights was clarified once the DAC was established and started issuing policy 
statements in defiance of the vocal intraparty opposition. (The DAC had a budget 
independent of the DNC, financed by liberal party patrons, limiting the extent to which 
party regulars or conservatives on the national committee could discontinue its activities.) 
Statements that criticized Eisenhower on foreign policy from the right, typically authored 
                                                
12 The apparent exception was the 1957 Civil Rights Act, the first of its kind passed since Reconstruction. 
However, as Lyndon Johnson’s biographer makes clear, the Act’s passage was the result of Johnson’s 
presidential ambitions for 1960, and he stripped it of all enforcement mechanisms to retain the support of 
the southern bloc. See Caro, Master of the Senate. 
13 Johnson, quoted in Klinkner, The Losing Parties, 24. See also, Robert Caro, The Passage of Power: The 
Years of Lyndon Johnson IV (New York: Vintage, 2012), xviii, where he sums up the modus operandi of 
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14 Johnson, quoted in Klinkner, The Losing Parties, 23. 
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by former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, generally went over smoothly with southern 
state party officials and congressional Democrats. However, statements concerning 
domestic policy were often to the left of the 1956 Democratic platform and drew 
recrimination and retribution from southern conservatives. During the crisis at Little 
Rock Central High School in September 1957, the DAC issued a statement deriding 
Arkansas’s Democratic governor Orval Faubus’s decision to defy the Supreme Court’s 
desegregation order in its 1954 Brown decision. “It need hardly be said,” the DAC 
statement read, “that the action of Governor Faubus does not represent the position or the 
policy of the Democratic Party.”15 The statement received front-page coverage in the 
New York Times. In protest, Louisiana’s Democratic state committee recalled their DNC 
representative who sat on the DAC, even though he often vocally dissented with the 
council’s policy statements concerning civil rights. Publicly, Rayburn distanced himself 
from Butler, while in private he was more aggressive, recommending to one party donor 
that he temporarily withhold any contributions to the DNC to avoid any “endorsement of 
[Butler’s] criticism of Congress.”16 
The DAC continued to hammer away at the party’s civil rights moderation 
through public statements and policy proposals until the 1960 presidential race assumed 
overpowering attention. Though these policy alternatives did not gain traction as 
legislative initiatives in Congress due to the intractable opposition of Democratic leaders, 
the DAC represented a significant force in shifting the dynamic of intraparty conflict over 
racial equality onto the terrain of party organization. After John Bailey replaced Butler as 
DNC chair when John F. Kennedy won the party’s presidential nomination, the DAC was 
                                                
15 DAC press release, quoted in Klinkner, The Losing Parties, 35. 
16 Rayburn, quoted in Rosenfeld, “A Choice, Not an Echo,” 94. 
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discontinued. Butler’s creative approach to institutional power in the party did not 
succeed in its ambition to build a responsible, programmatically liberal party in the 
1950s. But, as we will see, the intertwining of liberalism and party reform had only been 
temporarily defeated. 
 
States’ Rights or Civil Rights? Mississippi Freedom in Atlantic City 
The second major effort to challenge Democratic Party federalism came not from elite 
politics in Washington, DC, but from the grassroots politics of the southern civil rights 
movement. The Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP) mounted a formidable 
challenge in the midst of the 1964 Democratic national convention in Atlantic City, New 
Jersey, seeking to unseat the regular, all-white Mississippi state delegation on the grounds 
of the state party’s racially discriminatory practices. The MFDP had emerged from the 
creative tactics in use by the southern civil rights movement. During the previous summer 
of 1963, an array of civil rights groups, including the Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee (SNCC), the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE), the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference (SCLC), and the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP), had joined forces in Mississippi under the umbrella of the 
Council of Federated Organizations (COFO) in a project called Freedom Vote. While 
these organizations, especially SNCC, had been engaged in painstaking grassroots voter 
registration for several years, the gradualism inherent in such a strategy had been met 
with overwhelming obstruction and violent resistance at the hands of both public officials 
as well as private vigilante defenders of segregation and disfranchisement. Rather than 
risk trying to cast a ballot in a Mississippi county courthouse, the Freedom Voters held a 
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statewide mock election, not only to offer black voters a greater modicum of physical 
safety by placing polling stations inside grocery stores, churches, and beauty parlors, but 
also to provide irrefutable evidence to national Democratic Party leaders that southern 
blacks were eager to exercise their right to vote, if only they were permitted. 
By launching their own racially integrated, rival party organization, the MFDP 
challenged the Democratic national convention to employ its power as the supreme party 
authority to recognize the legitimacy of their cause and grant them the credentials to 
represent the state of Mississippi at the Atlantic City convention. Even though this 
immediate goal was not achieved in the compromise that eventually ended the dispute, 
the antidiscrimination clause approved by the convention to be included in the official 
Call to the 1968 convention four years later would have massive ramifications for the 
course of party reform. 
While the MFDP’s credentials challenge at the 1964 convention marked an 
especially important turning point in the course of party reform and the black freedom 
movement, the action was not totally unprecedented. As we have seen in Chapter 2, there 
had been several sporadic attempts that employed similar tactics and strategy as those of 
the MFDP at past Democratic national conventions. But credentials challenges by rival 
party organizations had subsided as the national party distanced itself from civil rights 
throughout the 1950s. By 1964, however, the context had changed dramatically, 
providing new leverage to black party insurgents. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s 
African American insurgencies had produced new organizations, such as the SCLC, 
SNCC, and CORE. These brought to national attention a new crop of black leaders, such 
as Martin Luther King, Jr., Robert Moses, and Ella Baker, as well as new tactics, such as 
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sit-ins, freedom rides, and voter registration drives that sought to confront directly the 
power of authoritarian rule in the Jim Crow South. In 1962 the Supreme Court’s Baker v. 
Carr decision reapportioned southern congressional districts according to a doctrine of 
one-person, one-vote, dismantling the malapportionment that had favored rural 
representatives over their metropolitan counterparts, further weakening conservatives’ 
power in Congress.17 The massive 1963 March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, 
organized by labor-oriented civil rights leaders Bayard Rustin and A. Philip Randolph, 
helped spur President John F. Kennedy to introduce a new civil rights bill into Congress.  
The enactment of the Civil Rights Act in July 1964, outlawing discrimination 
based on race or sex, unequal voter registration requirements, and segregation in public 
accommodations, took place only the month before the convention in Atlantic City. As 
the most sweeping civil rights bill since Reconstruction, southern Democrats had resisted 
it bitterly, delaying the Senate for a historic eighty-three days, but eventually succumbing 
to a filibuster override vote engineered by the newly installed President Lyndon Johnson.  
With the force of the federal government behind them, and with the foundations 
of southern conservatives’ power shaken, civil rights and liberal activists planned a 
frontal assault on Jim Crow by dismantling the institutional power of white supremacy 
inside the national Democratic Party. By mounting a public challenge to the Democratic 
                                                
17 Robert Mickey, Paths Out of Dixie: The Democratization of Authoritarian Enclaves in America’s Deep 
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leadership in the midst of the 1964 national convention in Atlantic City, the coalition 
hoped to expel the segregationist Mississippi delegation and force the party to commit to 
racial equality within its own organization. From their perspective, the Democratic 
administration’s historic achievement in the pursuit of racial justice created new leverage 
with which a credentials challenge could goad the national convention into disciplining 
southern state parties that continued to exclude blacks from political life. Tolerating the 
participation of racially exclusive state delegations in a national party that had just 
embraced the cause of racial justice was an incongruity that the Freedom Democrats 
pressured the convention to reconcile.  
 The plan to bring the Mississippi Freedom movement to Atlantic City in August 
1964 had developed out of the limits COFO’s 1963 mock election had confronted in 
terms of effecting actual change in the structure of southern racial politics. Freedom Vote 
had convinced organizers to continue mobilizing sensational demonstrations of black 
citizenship across Mississippi to draw the attention of national media. Prominent ADA 
liberal and Democratic Party activist Allard Lowenstein, who had been instrumental in 
recruiting white college students from Stanford and Yale to travel to Mississippi during 
Freedom Vote, spearheaded such a strategy on a larger scale during the 1964 Freedom 
Summer project.18 At the center of Freedom Summer was the newly created Mississippi 
Freedom Democratic Party. Animating COFO’s creation of a new political party was not 
just the immediate goal of breaking the monopoly of white supremacists on the local 
Democratic party-state, but also the desire to push their grievances into the national 
spotlight by publicly confronting the Democratic leadership at the party’s forthcoming 
                                                
18  William H. Chafe, Never Stop Running: Allard Lowenstein and the Struggle to Save American 
Liberalism (New York: Basic Books, 1993), 180-6. 
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national convention. Their overall strategy embraced a process that civil rights organizer 
Bayard Rustin later called shifting “from protest to politics.” The MFDP sought to make 
“a conscious bid for political power” by moving beyond a grassroots social struggle and 
“translat[ing] itself into a political movement” to realign the Democratic Party.19 Like 
Freedom Vote, the MFDP would demonstrate the capacity of black Mississippians to 
organize politically when freed from the constraints of white intimidation and electoral 
fraud. Unlike the mock election, however, the MFDP would take seriously its claim to 
represent all Mississippians at the national Democratic convention and challenge the 
legitimacy of the regular delegation in Atlantic City.20  
Officially established in April 1964, the MFDP elected NAACP organizer Aaron 
Henry as chair of the party and sharecropper-turned-activist Fannie Lou Hamer as vice-
chair. The Freedom Democrats held precinct meetings and county conventions in thirty-
five of eighty-five counties, a state convention with more than 250 delegates, and elected 
sixty-eight delegates to represent the MFDP in Atlantic City. Ella Baker, an organizer 
with SNCC and the SCLC, established the party’s Washington office to mobilize 
northern support, and Joseph Rauh, a member of ADA and legal counsel to the United 
Auto Workers (UAW), offered his services to lead the Freedom Democrats’ challenge 
before the Credentials Committee. In July, a month before the convention, Mississippi 
Freedom delegates announced the Atlantic City challenge at a press conference outside 
their state convention in Jackson, where they accused the national party as having “stood 
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silent while the all-white delegations from the Magnolia State have come to party 
conventions with no thought of contributing to the solidarity of the party behind a 
common platform.”21 
At first glance, the Freedom Democrats appeared to have a good case against the 
Mississippi regulars. Not only had the press coverage of Freedom Vote and Freedom 
Summer brought to national attention the widespread exclusion of African Americans 
from political participation in the South, but the state party itself had strained relations 
with national party leaders. In addition to having bolted the party in protest in 1948, 
Mississippi Democrats had continually opposed the domestic programs of the Kennedy 
and Johnson administrations. Moreover, the Mississippi regulars continued to affirm in 
their party platform their commitment to “the separation of the races” as “necessary for 
the peace and tranquility of all the people of Mississippi.”22 Such a flagrant endorsement 
of racial segregation stood in such sharp contrast with the national party leadership’s 
recent embrace of racial equality. It was inconceivable to the MFDP and many other 
observers that the balance of forces at Atlantic City would favor the regular 
segregationists.  
Indeed, optimism seemed justified as messages of support began filtering in, 
including from nine state Democratic delegations as well as twenty-five Democratic 
members of Congress. These sentiments echoed the nods of support from important 
Democratic-oriented actors that Freedom activists had received even before officially 
forming the MFDP. Back in March, at the UAW’s convention, Moses, Baker, and Rauh 
                                                
21 Kay Mills, This Little Light of Mine: The Life of Fannie Lou Hamer (New York: Plume, 1993), 110. It is 
unclear what relationship, if any, MFDP organizers and activists had to the by-then-defunct South Carolina 
Progressive Democratic Party, which launched similar credentials challenges in 1944 and 1948. 
22 Mills, This Little Light of Mine, 106. 
  118 
had met with Mildred Jeffrey, head of the union’s Community Relations department, 
about their plans to form a rival party organization and bring it to the upcoming 
Democratic convention. She and the other top UAW political operatives – Bill Dodds, 
Roy Reuther, and Jack Conway – agreed that the challenge was a defensible one, 
especially if it produced the result they expected: the seating of both delegations, 
triggering a walkout of the regulars. A few weeks later, ADA chair John Roche sent a 
letter to all state Democratic Party chairs, urging them “to select as a member of the 
Credentials Committee a delegate who will vote against seating the segregated 
Mississippi delegation,” whose “ugly racism stands in sharp contrast” to the Freedom 
Democrats and the national Democratic Party. For Roche, the entire future of the national 
party was contained in embryo within the seemingly small Mississippi credentials 
dispute. 
 
Support of the Freedom Democratic Party will be consistent with the 
principles of the platforms adopted for many years by the Democratic 
National Conventions. The Democratic Party started the modern drive for 
equal political rights for Negroes in 1948. The seating of the Freedom 
Democratic Party delegation in 1964 will make the Party’s position clear 
and will strengthen its claim to the votes of all who recognize the drive for 
full equality as the great moral issue facing America today.23 
 
By July, with the convention scheduled for the following month, the position of 
the national party on the great moral issue of civil rights could not have been clearer. The 
final passage of the Civil Rights Act into law and the political commitment it represented 
was itself reflected in the 1964 party platform, written mostly by the White House, in a 
section dedicated to the “democracy of opportunity,” mentioning the Civil Rights Act by 
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name and calling for its “full observance by every American and fair, effective 
enforcement.” The same party platform denounced the activities of the Ku Klux Klan and 
pledged the Johnson administration “to continue the Nation’s march towards the goals of 
equal opportunity and equal treatment for all Americans regardless of race, creed, color, 
or national origin.”24  
As their legal counsel, Rauh crafted the MFDP’s challenge before the Credentials 
Committee in light of the specific rules governing the party convention and its committee 
process. The Credentials Committee was composed of two members from each state and 
territorial delegation, totaling 110 members. Equal representation of each state gave 
disproportionate influence to rural and often conservative delegates. Rauh anticipated that 
the MFDP, like South Carolina’s Progressive Democratic Party in the 1940s, would not 
receive a majority vote from the Credentials Committee. However, while convention 
rules gave each state equal representation on the Credentials Committee, state delegations 
on the convention floor reflected each state’s share of the Electoral College, giving 
greater influence to large industrial states, who were more likely supportive of African 
American’s civil rights. According to the regulations set by the Rules Committee, if Rauh 
could get one-tenth of the Credentials Committee – eleven members – to vote in support 
of the challenge, a minority report could be sent to the convention floor, where Rauh was 
confident they would win in a roll call vote. “When states like New York, New Jersey, 
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California, and Illinois and many others have to put it on the line before those national 
television cameras,” he said, “there’s no doubt in my mind that they will go with us.”25 
However, while Rauh’s shrewd strategy reflected a keen understanding of 
convention rules and norms, it also revealed the shakiness of the challenge’s basis in law. 
After all, as we have seen, aside from state-run primary elections, which had come under 
federal scrutiny after the 1944 Supreme Court’s Allwright decision outlawing the white 
primary, party governance was a realm of political action which parties regulated 
themselves. State parties determined their own rules in accordance with existing state 
law, if any. At the national level, the DNC simply prepared a set of “temporary rules” for 
convention proceedings, usually modeled off the previous convention’s operations, to be 
ratified during the perfunctory preliminary proceedings at the start of each nominating 
convention. The convention, as the embodiment of the national party, was not in the 
business of instructing state parties how to conduct their internal affairs, nor how they 
should select their delegates to the national conventions. While the Credentials 
Committee was charged with adjudicating occasional accusations that a state’s delegates 
were not in fact duly selected according to state law or the state party’s own rules, it was 
not clear what should be done in cases alleging systematic racial discrimination in the 
delegate selection process.  
In light of this legal vacuum, Rauh’s strategy before the Credentials Committee 
drew on the contemporaneous embrace of racial justice by the national Democratic 
leadership, and cast the MFDP challenge as a test case of the party’s moral commitment 
to that cause. “In the final analysis,” he argued during the Credentials Committee hearing, 
“the issue is one of principle[:] … whether the National Democratic Party takes its place 
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with the oppressed Negroes of Mississippi or their white oppressors, with those loyal to 
the National Democratic Party or those who have spewed hatred [toward] President 
Kennedy and President Johnson.” 26  In the hearings that followed, the Freedom 
Democrats offered their own testimony to the Committee, including from Aaron Henry, 
CORE’s James Farmer, white Mississippi chaplain Edwin King, Fannie Lou Hamer, the 
NAACP’s Roy Wilkins, and Martin Luther King, Jr., each relying on moral suasion to 
build their case. In front of the Committee and a live television audience, Hamer 
delivered a moving account of the violence she experienced at the hands of police and 
white vigilantes when she attempted to register to vote, while Martin Luther King 
underscored the ramifications of hypocrisy for the legitimacy of the Democratic 
administration should the party continue to choose what was politically expedient over 
what was morally right: “Can we preach freedom and democracy in Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America if we refuse to give voice and vote to the only democratically constituted 
delegation from Mississippi?”27  
Mississippi regulars countered with their own arguments on legal grounds that 
painted the MFDP as a rump collection of “foreign” activists who engaged in secret 
meetings that were not representative of registered voters in the state. Mississippi DNC 
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committee member E.K. Collins denounced the Freedom Democrats as “power-hungry 
soreheads,” and denied that there were any racial barriers to political participation in his 
state party. In addition to procedural disputes, he issued an ominous threat to the 
Credentials Committee that portended a southern walkout greater than that witnessed in 
1948. “You will kill our party if you do not seat the lawful delegation from Mississippi,” 
he warned.28  
The fatal flaw in the MFDP’s credentials contest strategy, however, was the 
assumption that President Lyndon Johnson would remain effectively neutral in the 
dispute. While black Mississippi activists and their liberal allies knew that the pressure to 
unify the party for the November elections would prevent the sitting president and titular 
party leader from publicly supporting such a polarizing intraparty gambit, they 
anticipated an official ambivalence from the White House that would provide them the 
space to whip together a majority of delegates on the convention floor.29 The anticipated 
adoption of the Credentials Committee minority report and the seating of the MFDP, 
then, could be chalked up as an action taken by the supreme body of the national party, 
one that even the party leader in the White House would be compelled to honor. Such an 
assumption, however, drastically underestimated Johnson’s anxiety concerning his first 
official presidential nomination and his grand ambition to score an FDR-sized electoral 
victory in November.  
These concerns had played an important role in the convention planning process 
itself, an activity over which Johnson had “established complete control,” according to 
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one of his closest aides.30 In fact, DNC chair John Bailey, top convention staff, and 
several important state party leaders had been in continuous contact with the White 
House since the MFDP’s public announcement of the challenge in July. After a lengthy 
strategy session with his top personnel and allies, Johnson decided to avoid a floor fight 
at all costs. Texas governor John Connally warned the president that if he “let those black 
buggers march in … the whole South will march out.” Georgia governor Carl Sanders 
reflected the concerns of many southern Democratic Party leaders when he told the 
president, “it looks like we’re turning the Democratic Party over to the nigras.” Johnson, 
seeing before him the real possibility of an avalanche, told UAW president Walter 
Reuther, “I am going to lose the election because of the fact that I’m going to lose the 
South.”31  
Raising Johnson’s anxieties about his electoral prospects was the insurgent 
candidacy of Alabama governor George Wallace in the Democratic primary elections. 
Wallace, who had famously pledged to maintain “segregation today, segregation 
tomorrow, and segregation forever” in his 1963 inaugural address, had vowed to defend 
the Democratic Party’s tradition of states’ rights against the overreaching federal 
government. 32  That Johnson had angered his southern supporters and risked their 
defection by prioritizing – and indeed, expanding – Kennedy’s civil rights bill was not a 
surprise to anyone. As Johnson himself is reported to have said to his aide Bill Moyers 
only hours after signing the historic 1964 Civil Rights Act: “I think we just delivered the 
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South to the Republican party for a long time to come.”33 However, more troubling than 
the specter of southern defection was the popularity of Wallace’s message outside the 
South, where he scored considerable support in the Wisconsin, Indiana, and Maryland 
primaries. Johnson sensed he was facing insurrections on two fronts. While publicly he 
remained impassive, the president privately commissioned a confidential poll which 
confirmed that “backlash was a potential threat, [though] not yet a real threat.”34 And 
while Wallace withdrew his name from the Democratic race after Republicans nominated 
the conservative Arizona senator Barry Goldwater, Johnson prioritized preventing the 
potential backlash from become real. 
But if Johnson felt pressure to placate the South and other conservatives from the 
right, he also faced pressure to live up to the moral and political commitments that those 
on his left felt were inherent in the Civil Rights Act. In the less than twelve months since 
being sworn in following the assassination of President Kennedy, LBJ, considered by 
many liberals to be a typical southern Democrat, had moved quickly to win over liberal 
skeptics and Kennedy loyalists by embracing his fallen predecessor’s stalled legislative 
agenda. As he told Kennedy’s chair of the Council of Economic Advisors, Walter Heller, 
only days after assuming office:  
 
Now I want to say something about all this talk that I’m a conservative 
who is likely to go back to the Eisenhower ways. … It’s not so, and I want 
you to tell your friends – Arthur Schlesinger, [John Kenneth] Galbraith, 
and other liberals – that it is not so. … I am a Roosevelt New Dealer. As a 
matter of fact, to tell the truth, John F. Kennedy was a little too 
conservative to suit my taste.35 
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Strong as they were, Johnson’s actions spoke louder than his words. His willingness to 
wait-out the southern filibuster, the historic stumbling block of civil rights legislation, 
won him the respect of even his most acerbic liberal critics. However, as the Democratic 
convention approached, the New York Times editorialized that unless the president 
worked out a settlement that recognized the legitimacy of the MFDP’s complaints, “he 
will stand open to the charge that he chose silence in order to compete more effectively 
with the Republican opponent for Southern white racist votes.”36 With his Republican 
challenger artfully exploiting the feelings of betrayal throughout the South and 
Democratic Party liberals throwing their support behind the Mississippi challenge, 
Johnson and his aides were stuck on the horns of a dilemma.  
The president used all the resources at his disposal to chart a middle course and 
resolve the Mississippi challenge off the convention floor and away from the public eye. 
He instructed the FBI to wiretap the phones of the MFDP’s Atlantic City office and the 
phones of its principal supporters, including the hotel rooms of Bayard Rustin and Martin 
Luther King. He reached out to the governor of Mississippi personally, assuring him that 
the MFDP would not be seated. After rejecting a proposal that would have recognized 
and seated both Mississippi delegations, Johnson assigned vice-presidential hopeful 
Hubert Humphrey and UAW president Walter Reuther to defuse the situation, saying to 
the latter, “if you and Hubert Humphrey have got any leadership, you’d get Joe Rauh off 
that damn television.”37 As the Senate floor manager who overcame the filibuster of the 
Civil Rights Act barely two months before and the liberal firebrand who had pressed the 
civil rights plank on the southern wing in 1948, Humphrey had impressive credentials as 
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a civil rights fighter and could act as interlocutor between the MFDP and the White 
House. Reuther, as the leader of the most progressive union in the American Federation 
of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), had close relationships with 
Rauh, Rustin, and King, whose SCLC organization depended on UAW financial support. 
While Reuther’s instincts had probably initially been supportive of the challenge, he 
fiercely embraced the president’s perspective, breaking off contract negotiations with 
General Motors and chartering a private jet from Detroit to Atlantic City in the middle of 
the night.  
At the convention Humphrey and Reuther urged Rauh and the MFDP to accept a 
White House-approved compromise, which offered the MFDP two at-large seats for 
Aaron Henry and Edwin King, guest status for the remaining Freedom delegates, and the 
promise to establish an investigatory commission that would aid the states in eliminating 
racial discrimination in the delegate selection procedures by the 1968 convention. It 
further offered to seat the regular Mississippi delegates so long as they swear loyalty to 
the national party. Raising the specter of white voter defection, Reuther warned Rauh that 
“either we’re going to lose the Negro vote if you go through with this and don’t win, or if 
you do win, the picture of your all-black delegation going on the floor to replace the 
white one is going to add to the backlash.”38 Reuther also made it clear to Rauh that the 
vice-presidential opportunity for Humphrey, their mutual friend and ally, was on the line.  
When Rauh proved unmovable, other arms were twisted. California governor 
Edmund Brown, whose delegation had already come out in favor of the Mississippi 
challengers, attempted to pressure his fellow California Democrats into quietly 
withdrawing their support. Inside the Credentials Committee, one California delegate was 
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warned that her support for the MFDP might jeopardize the federal judgeship her 
husband, president of the Sacramento NAACP, was in line to receive. Reuther, too, 
delivered a sharp ultimatum to Martin Luther King, telling him that “your funding is on 
the line. …The kind of money you got from us in Birmingham is there again for 
Mississippi, but you’ve got to help us and we’ve got to help Johnson.”39 With word 
spreading about Johnson’s desire to resolve the Mississippi challenge by compromise, 
non-southern black convention delegates held a closed-door meeting without the 
members of the MFDP to express anxiety over their dependence on party patronage and 
the imperative to reelect the president. Rauh, seeing the tide turn against the Freedom 
Democrats’ challenge on the convention floor, scoured in vain for liberals from northern 
delegations willing to speak on behalf of the minority report the following night. Senator 
Paul Douglas, a champion of civil rights from Illinois, begged Rauh to look elsewhere, 
fearing to appear to betray the wishes of the president. “Don’t ask me to do this,” he said. 
“I’m up for reelection in ’66.”40 
When the convention officially opened Monday evening, the Credentials 
Committee begged for additional time to consider the Mississippi challenge. As 
negotiations had stretched on over the weekend, Committee chair David Lawrence had 
appointed a subcommittee headed by Humphrey protégé and Minnesota delegate Walter 
Mondale to come up with an acceptable compromise. Aware that Humphrey’s vice-
presidency was hanging in the balance, Mondale had a powerful incentive to reach a 
settlement that did not embarrass the president.41 One suggestion included deeming all 
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the Freedom Democrats honored guests of the convention and offering to seat them in the 
balcony as observers. All MFDP members rejected the proposal. Aaron Henry denounced 
the offer as commensurate to the second class citizenship of Jim Crow. During a rally on 
Atlantic City’s boardwalk Sunday evening, he told the demonstrators, “we can sit in the 
balcony and look on back in Mississippi.” 42  Televised vigils and demonstrations 
continued outside the convention hall as Mondale held round the clock discussions in the 
Credentials Subcommittee and Rustin and King pressured the MFDP leaders to accept the 
compromise. 
In the early hours of Tuesday morning, a new White House-approved deal was 
sent to Mondale through Humphrey. Fearing further MFDP intransigence, the full 
Credentials Committee quickly reconvened before Rauh had time to consult with Henry 
on the terms of the compromise. Presenting the deal before the committee Mondale 
acknowledged that there was a “clear pattern of discrimination and intimidation” in 
Mississippi, but held that the MFDP was nevertheless “a protest movement, not a 
political party.” 43  With the subcommittee’s endorsement, the Credentials Committee 
approved the compromise without the MFDP. The following night, Credentials 
Committee chair Lawrence presented the final report to the full convention, resolving to 
seat the regular party delegation so long as they “formally assure the Convention of 
[their] intention to support [its] nominees” in the general election. Further, in the same 
language as the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the report instructed the DNC to include in its 
official Call to the 1968 convention the requirement that state Democratic parties select 
their delegates “regardless of race, color, creed or national origin,” guaranteeing all 
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voters the “opportunity to participate fully in Party affairs.” Lawrence went on to request 
the creation of a special party committee “to aid the State Democratic Parties in fully 
meeting the responsibilities and assurances required for inclusion” and for the special 
committee to report its findings to 1968 convention.44 At the president’s request the 
report was approved by the convention in a voice vote, avoiding the possibility of a 
narrow roll call.45 
While the Atlantic City compromise prevented a minority report from reaching 
the floor, it satisfied neither delegation from Mississippi. The MFDP’s Fannie Lou 
Hamer responded to the deal with anger: “we didn’t come all this way for no two 
seats!”46 For Aaron Henry, what was worse than only receiving two seats was that the 
selection of who would sit in those seats was dictated to them from above.47 The MFDP 
dismissed such a maneuver as tokenism: “this kind of dictation is what Negroes in 
Mississippi … have always faced, and it is precisely this that they are learning to stand up 
against.” Pointing to “the most massive pressure” from the White House, Humphrey, and 
the party leadership, the MFDP rejected the compromise after the fact, saying that they 
“did not come to Atlantic City begging for crumbs” but to demand their full democratic 
rights “in Mississippi and in the Democratic Party.” Their challenge had been a test to 
gauge the commitment to the civil rights movement, and “the convention and the national 
Democratic Party failed that test.”48 Nor was the compromise palatable to the Mississippi 
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regulars, who nearly all walked out of the convention, refusing to sign the loyalty oath 
the compromise required. 
While disappointment and disillusionment was the prevailing mood of many civil 
rights activists in the immediate aftermath of the Atlantic City showdown, the president 
and the press correctly anticipated how awesome a tectonic shift was underway. As 
Johnson told Reuther, “they [the MFDP] don’t know what victory they got. Next time no 
one can discriminate against Negroes.” Newspapers that had supported the challenge, 
such as the New York Times and the Washington Post, greeted the settlement as 
“spectacular” and a “remarkable victory.” The Denver Post congratulated the MFDP for 
“penetrating to the heart of the Democratic party.”49  
 
Conclusion: Party Incapacity and the Deferral of Reform 
But just how the racial politics of the southern Democratic parties would be transformed 
was unclear. By early 1965, in light of the terms of the Atlantic City compromise set out 
in the Credentials Committee report approved by the convention, the DNC created the 
Special Equal Rights Committee (SERC) to “aid the State Democratic Parties in fully 
meeting the responsibilities and assurances required for inclusion.” 50  That the body 
intended to live up to its mandate was evident in its membership and activities. The 
official committee was composed of a liberal-leaning crop of DNC members; Joseph 
Rauh served as associate counsel. The SERC held open hearings in Washington, DC, on 
minority participation in party affairs, hearing the testimony of the Urban League, the 
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NAACP, CORE, SNCC, the MFDP, as well as a host of academic experts. Committee 
staff collected information regarding how southern state parties conducted delegate 
selection procedures, piecing together a partial database that was the first of its kind for a 
national party committee. By the summer of 1967, in an interim report to the DNC and all 
state party chairs, the Special Equal Rights Committee issued what it called the “six basic 
elements” necessary to implement its mandate. These reform measures reiterated the call 
for opening the party “at all levels” to members of the Democratic Party, regardless of 
race; holding party meetings in publicly disclosed and accessible locations; registering 
the “broadest possible” amount of voters, at all levels; as well as publicizing transparent 
delegate selection procedures and the qualifications necessary to participate.51  
However, despite the apparent confidence in a smooth transition evinced by the 
president and the press, the potential fractiousness contained in the antidiscrimination 
mandate was not lost on those in the SERC itself. Its chairman, New Jersey governor 
Richard Hughes, who had served as a member of the Credentials Committee in Atlantic 
City, reflected this in his correspondence with the US Civil Rights Commission, where he 
underscored that “the relationship of the various State parties to the National [party] is a 
matter of consequence in all [our] efforts.”52 He went on: 
 
State parties operate in accordance to State law and party rules. Such laws 
and rules are not subject to review or approval of the National parties. 
…[T]here are at least 18 different procedures for the selection of delegates 
to the Democratic National Convention, ranging from direct election of all 
delegates and alternates to the appointment of the entire delegation by a 
State Committee. The supreme governing bodies of the National parties 
are the quadrennial conventions which can, and at times do, set forth 
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certain requirements for party operation and conduct. …[T]he 
Convention’s 1964 mandate on voter participation has been interpreted by 
the Special Equal Rights Committee to be of such importance that failure 
on the part of a State delegation to meet this requirement could lead to the 
sitting of another delegation. …[T]he ultimate penalty thus would be not 
simply refusal to seat a delegation but its replacement by a legitimate 
delegation which does meet the conditions of the Call.53 
 
But the right to refuse to seat a noncompliant delegation did not rest with the 
SERC, whose charge was to “aid the state parties” in meeting the antidiscrimination 
mandate, not enforce discipline on them. Even if the Committee interpreted its charge as 
“not only to assure the right of political participation [for] all, but [to] facilitate and 
encourage it,” it had little authority or capacity to pressure state Democratic parties to 
reform.54 Its records acknowledge this much when they report that “State Party officers, 
along with National Committee members, have [had to be] reminded periodically … of 
the [Special Equal Rights] Committee’s existence and mission.”55 While the SERC felt 
“honor-bound” to see that its six basic elements were adhered to “in fact as well as in 
principle,” in preparation of its final report for the 1968 convention chairman Hughes had 
to send requests to state party chairs imploring their cooperation: “it is of the utmost 
importance that the Special Equal Rights Committee be informed on the actions taken or 
contemplated by the various State parties. …May I ask, therefore, that you send me a 
summary of activities your State organization has engaged in to facilitate and encourage 
voter participation?”56 
 In recognition of the disparity between their own interpretation of the 1964 
mandate and their ability to enforce it, the SERC fell back upon the authority of the 
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national convention, specifically its Credentials Committee, to decertify delegations that 
are not “broadly representative of the Democrats of the State.”57 Moreover, in its final 
report the Committee recommended the creation of a permanent equal rights committee, 
“especially in states where the party controls election machinery and procedures,” as well 
as a new commission on party structure “to study the relationship between the National 
Democratic Party and its constituent State Democratic Parties, in order that full 
participation of all Democrats without regard to race may be facilitated by uniform 
minimum standards for structure and operation.”58  
Evidence that others in the national party leadership were inclined to take the 
Atlantic City mandate seriously was also manifest in Congress, where after the 1964 
elections the House Democratic caucus voted to strip Mississippi representative John Bell 
Williams and South Carolina’s Albert Watson of their seniority for openly supporting 
Republican presidential nominee Barry Goldwater. Such an assertion of party discipline 
on its unruly members suggested that the independence of the state parties to set their 
own rules and define their own platforms might soon be at an end. 
However, neither the attempts of DNC chairman Butler in the 1950s nor the 
credentials challenge of the MFDP at the 1964 convention proved able to overturn the 
structural power of state party leaders to defy the national party. While the Atlantic City 
compromise included an antidiscrimination resolution banning racially motivated 
exclusion in state party practices, the Special Equal Rights Committee recognized that 
effective implementation of that mandate would have required confronting the 
institutional legacy of states’ rights in the party. Even though antidiscrimination language 
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had been inserted into the formal Call to the 1968 Convention, neither the DNC nor the 
SERC had the authority or capacity to intervene in and restructure state party governance. 
If the precedent set down in Atlantic City constituted a decisive step in the 
direction of democratizing the party, it was far from sufficient. Rather, as the first link in 
a chain of events, the drive to reform the party would be carried forward by subsequent 
developments. The consensus built around black enfranchisement and desegregation in 
the South would fracture both the liberal community in the North as well as the broader 
civil rights movement as the Watts rebellion of 1965 initiated a seemingly continual 
string of “hot summer” urban riots. The invasion of the Dominican Republic and the 
escalation of the Vietnam War that same year energized the student movement already in 
motion, alienating many young antiwar activists from liberalism in general and the 
Democratic Party in particular. At the same time, average American workers were not 
immune to the anti-authoritarian ethos permeating the political culture of the late 1960s, 
evident in the spread of rank-and-file militancy across workplaces, including in defiance 
of trade union officials. As we will see in the next chapter, the party’s handling of the 
1964 MFDP controversy and the fairly capacious language of rights to participation 
adopted in response provided the basis for further intraparty struggles as the political 
disputes polarizing the New Deal coalition continued to deepen. The party leadership’s 
inability to manage these dynamics helped precipitate a crisis, one that was seen as a 
window of opportunity for those reformers calling for a new politics. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE UNDEMOCRATIC PARTY: 
ANTIWAR INSURGENCY, PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION, 
AND THE PARTY CRISIS OF 1968 
 
State systems for selecting delegates to the National Convention, and the 
procedures of the Convention itself, display considerably less fidelity to 
basic democratic principles than a nation which claims to govern itself 
can safely tolerate. 
--Commission on the Democratic Selection of Presidential 
Nominees (1968)1 
 
The previous chapter has shown how social and political actors inside and outside the 
Democratic Party challenged the limitations party federalism imposed on the reach of 
postwar liberalism through the 1950s and 1960s. However, when party federalism was 
again under scrutiny in 1968, it was not the limits of liberalism that were under challenge, 
it was the very nature of the liberal project. The explosions of the late 1960s – campus 
occupations, street demonstrations, urban riots, and rank-and-file worker revolts – 
effectively unraveled the liberal consensus that had been at the ideological core of the 
New Deal regime and the Democratic Party leadership since the 1930s and 1940s. The 
formation of Black Power and the National Organization for Women in 1966 indicated 
the further splintering of the social movements pushing forward the liberal agenda. The 
depth of confusion and chaos engulfing liberal politics in the United States immobilized 
even the paragons of postwar liberalism, such as the United Auto Workers’ Walter 
Reuther, who recognized that there was a “new breed of workers” fueling the upsurge in 
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industrial militancy, but could formulate no compelling response to their grievances.2 
These insurgent energies created a political atmosphere in which the common sense of 
New Deal liberalism was susceptible to challenge. As the party of the New Deal, the 
Democrats become a focal target of criticism and struggle. 
 The Atlantic City compromise of 1964 provided grassroots activists with a new 
tool to challenge the exclusionary practices of state and local Democratic organizations. 
Indeed, thanks to the official requirement that voters in each state be granted “the right to 
participate fully in party affairs” irrespective of their “race, color, creed or national 
origin,” the 1968 Democratic national convention witnessed the greatest single surge in 
credentials challenges in the history of the party – seventeen challenges involving fifteen 
state delegations – a development that exacerbated already turbulent proceedings. But 
crucially, not all of the credentials challenges involved charges of racial discrimination, 
nor did bulk of challenges even come out of the South. Anti-Vietnam War activists, 
entering the party through the insurgent primary campaigns of senators Eugene McCarthy 
and Robert Kennedy, seized on the “right to participate” in the Atlantic City compromise 
and expanded it into a far-reaching critique of the perceived undemocratic character of 
the party’s nominating and convention procedures.  
  This chapter will examine the role of the turbulent 1968 presidential nominating 
contest in giving shape, direction, and urgency to the New Politics movement for party 
reform. Throughout the insurgents’ primary campaigns, activists trying to enter the 
Democratic Party found themselves marginalized, excluded, and outflanked by local and 
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state party leaders and their almost autocratic exercise of authority. In this chapter I will 
argue that the structure and operation of Democratic Party institutions frustrated the 
ability of insurgent activists to gain access and exert what they considered to be 
meaningful influence on party decisionmaking. As a result of their frustration with trying 
to “work within the system,” insurgents launched an attack on the national Democratic 
Party in order to contest its nomination process. That attack was sustained by the chaotic 
events of the 1968 Democratic national convention in Chicago, where Vice President 
Hubert Humphrey was awarded the nomination without having entered any of the 
primaries, while McCarthy and Kennedy had swept up major victories. The exclusionary 
treatment of party insurgents in the nomination battle, as well as their repression in 
Chicago, drew together a coalition of interests that would drive forward the process of 
party reform in the aftermath of the 1968 convention. 
 
“Dump Johnson”: The Fracturing of Labor-Liberalism 
The nature and scope of the New Politics reform movement was so profoundly shaped by 
the 1968 crisis from which it emerged that it is worth retracing the stages of development 
that culminated in the turbulent Chicago convention. In retrospect, the origins of the 1968 
party crisis are evident on the margins of the liberal left in 1967, where the idea of 
unseating a Democratic president from the leadership of his own party by denying him 
renomination first appeared. Foremost among those trying to carve out such a possibility 
were Allard Lowenstein, a leader of the 1964 Freedom Summer project, and Curtis Gans, 
formerly of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and a new member of the liberal 
organization, Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). Initially, after their idea of 
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running an independent third party ticket with Martin Luther King and antiwar 
pediatrician Benjamin Spock had failed to gain traction at a conference calling for a “new 
politics” in September, Lowenstein and Gans had sought a base of support in the ADA 
for their strategy to dump President Lyndon Johnson.3  
Americans for Democratic Action, the foremost organization of cold war labor-
liberalism, had since 1966 become increasingly frustrated with President Johnson, whom 
they criticized as being insufficiently committed to his domestic War on Poverty policy 
agenda and whose Vietnam foreign policy raised considerable doubts among the more 
dovish members of the liberal community. Such friction had opened fault lines within 
ADA itself, pitting a traditional anticommunist wing against a growing minority that 
looked upon the antiwar protest movement as an opportunity to pull alienated youth into 
the political process while promoting the status of ADA within its ranks. In the middle, 
moderates like Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. raised concerns about opposing a president who 
had, in fact, enacted the kind of liberal program which ADAers had been advocating for 
twenty years, and who had selected the ADA’s own Hubert Humphrey as his running 
mate in 1964. But as the war escalated and prominent senators such as George 
McGovern, J. William Fulbright, and Robert Kennedy began voicing their skepticism in 
public, ADA moderates and reformers formed a united front within the organization. 
While acknowledging that most of what had been enacted as national policy by 1966 had 
been in the ADA platform in 1947, John Kenneth Galbraith insisted, “it cannot be the 
highest function of the modern liberal to work avidly to accomplish what has already 
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been done.”4 By the spring of 1967, the ADA officially went on record as  “willing to 
support a peace candidate from either party if Johnson did not change his [Vietnam] 
policy.”5 
 But the ADA’s willingness to break from LBJ was quickly revealed to be a bluff, 
meant only to apply public pressure for a policy change, not commit themselves to a 
quixotic adventure. They greeted Lowenstein’s Dump Johnson proposal with a heavy 
dose of skepticism. Joseph Rauh, exiled from the White House since the Mississippi 
Freedom Democratic Party controversy, rejected the idea on the grounds that “no 
responsible people inside the Democratic Party will allow their names to be connected 
with … so helpless a drive.” 6  Galbraith insisted that the ADA had to maintain its 
“longstanding commitment to political realities” and not put itself in a position where it 
could too easily be lumped together with the radical antiwar positions being advanced by 
the New Left.7 For all their criticism of the president’s foreign policy and its domestic 
costs for the Great Society, Lowenstein’s campaign to dump Johnson was too radical a 
strategy for the ADA in 1967.  
 After the ADA had balked, Lowenstein brought his Dump Johnson campaign to 
university campuses in a speaking tour to drum up support across the country. While the 
influence of SDS and other New Left organizations had a powerful pull on many antiwar 
student activists, the former’s increasingly inflammatory rhetoric had a polarizing effect 
on many who still considered themselves liberal Democrats. Drawing on networks forged 
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in the civil rights and antiwar mobilizations, as well as their contacts in the National 
Student Association, Lowenstein and Gans laid the groundwork for an anti-LBJ coalition, 
patching together an infrastructure of constituency groups who shared their vision for 
radical change through the political system.  
Coinciding with their campaign that September, former Johnson aide and 
speechwriter Richard Goodwin, credited with coining the phrase “the Great Society,” 
wrote a piece for The New Yorker (under a pseudonym) that questioned whether a sitting 
president could not be unseated by being denied his party’s nomination.8 “The rules of 
[politics],” Goodwin argued, “are only a summary of what’s happened before.”9 The 
options facing concerned Democrats, he suggested, were theirs to create. Following such 
an endorsement of Lowenstein’s basic political strategy, Democratic Party members 
began to sign on, including Wisconsin party chair and future New Politics reformer 
Donald O. Peterson, as well as antiwar Democrat Alpha Smaby of Minnesota. As press 
coverage began to grow, the Dump Johnson movement gained momentum and 
credibility. The tide seemed to be turning when the state party chair of Michigan – a state 
organization deeply integrated with the United Auto Workers (UAW) – embraced the 
idea, as did the party’s youth organizations in Iowa, Michigan, and Wisconsin. Dump 
Johnson affiliate organizations cropped up across the country, calling themselves the 
Coalition for a Democratic Alternative, the Conference for Concerned Democrats, and 
Concerned Democrats for America. At the end of September, The New Republic ran a 
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front-page editorial endorsing the campaign, writing, “we don’t know whether Lyndon 
Johnson can be denied. … [But] we do know the attempt must be made.”10  
The public opinion polls that fall confirmed that an alternative to Johnson had 
some popular basis, as the president’s approval rating continued its slide from 61 percent 
in January 1966 to 38 percent by October 1967. However, Lowenstein understood that 
without a rival candidate, the campaign to dump Johnson would remain a chimera. His 
first preference, Robert Kennedy, was the logical choice. Having served as attorney 
general in his brother’s administration, his criticisms of the Vietnam War from his newly 
acquired Senate seat lent an air of authority and respectability to the growing antiwar 
movement. However, despite several Lowenstein overtures, Kennedy demurred, fearing 
that his well-known animosity for the president (and LBJ’s animosity for him) would be a 
liability, casting him as a party-splitter for the sake of a personal vendetta. For the 
moment, Kennedy followed the advice of his seasoned advisors and refrained from taking 
Lowenstein up on his offer.11 
In November 1967, after Senator George McGovern also declined, Gans and 
Lowenstein finally found a figure willing to carry the Dump Johnson banner into battle in 
Minnesota’s Senator Eugene McCarthy. Dump Johnson partisans viewed McCarthy with 
a mix of emotions. Liberal doves were grateful to find any prominent Democrat willing 
to risk reputation and patronage by openly challenging an incumbent president and party 
leader. On the other hand, some of McCarthy’s political views, which were often opaque, 
gave liberals pause. His criticisms of executive power cut against the grain of postwar 
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labor-liberalism, which, for all the frustrations with Johnson’s “imperial presidency,” 
continued to view a Democratic White House as the bastion of progress in the face of 
congressional obstruction. Additionally, McCarthy’s views on the Great Society 
programs were, in the words of his biographer, “extremely ambiguous,” simultaneously 
decrying its lack of funding while portraying it as a bureaucratic imposition from above.12 
This ambivalence surrounding McCarthy’s role as the Dump Johnson standard-bearer 
was reflected by the candidate himself when he announced his intention to enter several 
of the party’s primary elections the following year. He expressed his concern that “the 
administration seems to have set no limits on the price that it is willing to pay for military 
victory,” but did not indicate that he thought he could defeat Johnson, nor did he ever say 
that he was intent on capturing the nomination or even the presidency.13 Rather than a 
serious campaign for the highest office, McCarthy saw his candidacy as a vehicle for 
protest against the war and a means by which the alienated and the frustrated could be 
drawn “back into the political process.”14  
 
I am hopeful that a challenge may alleviate the sense of political 
helplessness and restore to many people a belief in the processes of 
American politics and of American government. On college campuses 
especially, but among other thoughtful adult Americans, it may counter 
the growing sense of alienation from politics which is currently reflected 
in a tendency to withdraw in either frustration or cynicism, to talk of 
nonparticipation and to make threats of support for a third party or fourth 
party or other irregular political movements.15 
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While hardly the bold declaration of principled defiance that Lowenstein and Gans had 
been searching for, McCarthy’s announcement was greeted positively by prominent 
liberal publications like the New York Times, The Nation, and The New Republic, while 
the White House regarded it as simply a “joke.”16 
By early 1968, McCarthy’s plan to enter the primaries exacerbated the preexisting 
rifts in labor-liberalism over Vietnam, especially in the ADA, where a groundswell of 
antiwar sentiment was bubbling up through its local chapters on college and university 
campuses around the country and pushing for the organization to officially endorse the 
insurgent. After the Tet offensive, many ADA skeptics got off the fence and agreed that 
an insurgent gambit was not only the morally right thing to do but also the only way to 
channel the growing radicalism of the antiwar movement into responsible outlets. 
Meeting in Washington, DC, in February, Galbraith affirmed this view before the ADA 
national board when he said, “if one stands up for an idea one must stand up for the man 
who espouses it.”17 Having shed his initial skepticism of the Dump Johnson insurgency, 
Rauh, too, warned that because the ADA had already come out against the war, failure to 
support McCarthy would only confirm what the New Left had come to suspect: that 
liberals were “total and complete captives of any Democratic administration.”18  
While very strong, however, support for McCarthy was far from unanimous in the 
liberal organization. Opposing antiwar liberals at the February board meeting were 
moderate labor leaders who feared what endorsement might cost them in terms of 
legislative influence, access to the president, and public accusations concerning their 
                                                
16 Sandbrook, Eugene McCarthy, 174. 
17 John Kenneth Galbraith, quoted in Paul R. Wieck, “ADA Goes for McCarthy,” The New Republic, 24 
February 1968. 
18 Quoted in Gillon, Politics and Vision, 208. 
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patriotism. Rather than sweeping the antiwar movement into the liberal fold, they argued, 
the ADA’s embrace of the insurgent candidate promised to diminish their influence, 
splitting the organization down the middle by siding with a fringe movement out of step 
with the American mainstream. UAW president Walter Reuther voiced his concern that 
“a primary endorsement would almost certainly alienate and offend members,” while his 
brother Victor threatened that an ADA endorsement would put the UAW’s financial 
support for the organization in “serious jeopardy.”19 They were joined by Gus Tyler of 
the International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union (ILGWU), who called the Dump 
Johnson effort “unproductive,” and Bayard Rustin, who was “profoundly against” 
endorsing McCarthy because of the of single-issue nature of his campaign, which lacked 
appeal with people of color. Leon Keyserling, former economic advisor to President 
Harry Truman, chided ADA doves for their “overpowering obsession” with Vietnam, 
having “turned [their] back on progressive economic and social policies on the domestic 
front.”20  ADA endorsement, they threatened, would break the liberal-labor coalition, 
without which “America [could] be swept into a dismal abyss of prolonged reaction.”21 
These protestations notwithstanding, the ADA national board approved early 
endorsement of Eugene McCarthy 65 to 47, as three labor leaders – I.W. Abel of the 
Steelworkers, Joseph Beirne of the Communication Workers, and Louis Stulberg of the 
ILGWU – resigned in protest, taking their financial contributions with them. A Texas 
Democrat from the House of Representatives followed, as did Keyserling and White 
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House staff member John Roche, who stated that he “was not interested in a trip to 
political Disneyland.”22 Those who stayed, such as the Reuthers and the ILGWU’s David 
Dubinsky, issued a statement a week later which expressed that their disagreement over 
one issue could not be allowed to jeopardize the entire organization or the coalition of 
forces it represented. 
The ADA’s decision to endorse, however, was soon vindicated. On March 12th, 
1967, McCarthy achieved a surprisingly strong second place finish in the New 
Hampshire primary. Newsweek called it a “triumph of heroic magnitude” and raised the 
possibility that Lyndon Johnson “may be in real danger of being dumped by his own 
party.”23 New York Times columnist James Reston speculated on the capacity of machine 
politicians and labor leaders to block an insurgent challenge, noting that “the idea is 
getting around that politics is too serious a business to be left to politicians,” and if such a 
democratic ethos continues to spread “even the will of an incumbent president can be 
overcome.”24 Under intensifying criticism from the press and keenly sensitive to the 
shifting mood of the electorate, Johnson evaded the presidential primaries, sending stand-
in candidates when he could or failing to make any appearance at all in states where his 
own name appeared on the ballot. As one internal White House memo explained,  
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the presidential primaries are a totally valid testing ground for candidates 
in the party out of power. [However], an incumbent president who has to 
rely on being active [in] the presidential primaries for his nomination 
would be operating from a position of weakness and be risking the 
antagonism of the American people for involving himself in political 
campaign activity long before the November election. [This serves as] 
justification for not entering any primaries.25 
 
But Robert Kennedy’s eventual entry into the primaries presented a greater threat 
than the president was prepared to handle. As he later explained to historian Doris 
Kearns,  
 
The thing I feared from the first day of my presidency was actually 
coming true. Robert Kennedy had openly announced his intention to 
reclaim the throne in the memory of his brother. And the American 
people, swayed by the magic of the name, were dancing in the streets. The 
whole situation was unbearable for me. After thirty-seven years in public 
service, I deserved something more than being left alone in the middle of 
the plain, chased by stampedes on every side.26 
 
With the president’s poll numbers at a low of 36 percent by late March, Gallup surveys of 
Democratic voters released around the same time found a greater preference for Kennedy 
than Johnson or McCarthy as the party’s nominee. Before departing to oversee the 
president’s write-in campaign for Wisconsin’s April 2nd primary, Johnson’s party liaison 
Lawrence O’Brien warned the president of the “ever deepening disenchantment among 
many segments of the population which have heretofore supported our actions in 
Vietnam,” including among “our political friends and associates.”27 
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26 Lyndon Johnson, quoted in Jefferson Cowie, Stayin’ Alive: The 1970s and the Last Days of the Working 
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On March 31st, two days before the Wisconsin primary, where he was trailing in 
the polls, Johnson informed the nation in a primetime television address that he would 
temporarily halt the bombing of North Vietnam and enter into negotiations with Hanoi. 
Further, he announced that he would not seek nor accept the presidential nomination of 
the Democratic Party in 1968. 
 
Party Insurgency and the Politics of Presidential Nomination 
Even if the combined pressure of the McCarthy and Kennedy insurgencies, military 
setbacks abroad, and the social turmoil at home had knocked Johnson out of the race, 
neither insurgent candidate stood much of a chance of capturing the presidential 
nomination of a party that was organizationally and ideologically set against their 
campaigns. While animosity between McCarthyites and Kennedy supporters sharpened in 
the aftermath of Johnson’s withdrawal, their mutual experiences of party resistance to 
their participation led to a convergence of forces around the idea of party reform.  
Only seventeen states held presidential primaries in 1968, apportioning a total of 
just 38 percent of the national convention’s delegates when a majority was needed to win. 
Even if McCarthy or Kennedy swept the primaries, they would fall short of victory. Both 
candidates understood that while primary elections could help their final delegate counts, 
their real significance was in demonstrating their electoral viability to important party 
actors so that enough of the remaining 62 percent of delegates – or more accurately, the 
party leaders who controlled them – would come over to their side by the time of the 
convention. As Lawrence O’Brien, who had become Kennedy’s campaign manager after 
resigning his post in the Johnson administration, later put it, “our strategy was to use the 
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primaries to prove Bob was a winner. Conceivably, the convention delegates, seeking a 
winner or perhaps in a surge of Kennedy emotion, might have moved from Hubert 
[Humphrey] to Bob in sufficient numbers to give Bob the nomination.”28  
As the passage indicates, while Johnson had withdrawn from the presidential 
contest, Vice President Hubert Humphrey had taken his place, formally announcing his 
candidacy a month after Johnson’s withdrawal – a delay calculated to keep the vice 
president out of the primaries so as to avoid having to defend the increasingly unpopular 
war. While Humphrey’s decision to forgo the primaries risked drawing the charge that he 
had not tested himself “before the people,” skipping the remaining primaries after 
Johnson’s exit did not jeopardize his candidacy whatsoever. As we have seen, most 
convention delegates were selected through caucus-convention procedures undertaken at 
the state level or simply by state committee appointment. In fact, as the party reform 
commission would later reveal, a full one-third of the delegates to the 1968 Democratic 
convention had already been selected through these channels well before McCarthy had 
even announced his candidacy in November 1967. These delegates, who had been 
committed to reelecting President Johnson, transferred their allegiance to his heir 
apparent. Indeed, in the days between Johnson’s surprise withdrawal and Humphrey’s 
official announcement, calls from state party leaders, big city mayors, and the top 
officials of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(AFL-CIO) poured into the vice president’s office, pledging their support should he 
decide to enter the race. Two days after his official entry, the vice president’s campaign 
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staff estimated that 1,200 of the necessary 1,312 delegate votes were committed to 
Humphrey or leaning his way.29 
 
Robert Kennedy and the Making of a New Democratic Coalition 
Facing such a disadvantageous terrain in which it was clear that “Humphrey had the 
edge,” Kennedy’s team planned to demonstrate the extent of his popular, “street-level” 
appeal by knitting together an alternative Democratic coalition of the disaffected and 
marginalized. 30  This included not only bringing back in those who were becoming 
increasingly alienated from the political process, but also mobilizing those who had never 
been fully integrated, such as African Americans, Latinos, and low-income voters.31 
Thus, it was “essentially an organizational contest,” they said, “not one of public relations 
or mass media concentration.”32 As one campaign memo, written just prior to Johnson’s 
withdrawal, read: 
 
The existing and potential popular support for RFK’s positions and 
candidacy is located in places, communities, and individuals that do not 
normally select or affect the choice and positions of delegates – in youth, 
in the ghetto, in the poor, and in the great mass of idealistic people found 
in every stratum of society. The challenge they – and we – face is to forge 
this variegated potential into a cohesive force so powerful that it can 
perform the unprecedented feat of unseating a President from his party’s 
nomination, despite the fact that he has at his disposal the full power of 
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patronage of the traditional party structure, of political inertia, and of an 
appeal to unity in a time of war.33 
 
Meeting such an “extraordinary challenge,” the memo continued,  
will require extraordinary strategy, machinery, and risks. …It will require 
broad-based participation in the political process … offering the 
disenfranchised, the disheartened, the alienated, and the frustrated, as well 
as the disapproving and the dissatisfied, a chance to focus on the issues, a 
means of making the political establishment listen, and a hope of getting 
results and action.34  
 
Indeed, the visionary qualities of Kennedy’s campaign rhetoric drew on the 
popular frustrations being registered across the US, offering those who wanted “to build a 
new political community” a vehicle of expression. That range of social forces, who, 
Kennedy argued, are “helping to make participatory democracy a reality,” presented the 
nation with an opportunity for reform and renewal by channeling the energy of those 
alienated and marginalized inside the political process – not merely to contain them but to 
revitalize those structures themselves.35 
 
Labor, Vietnam, and the Democratic Party  
But while Kennedy hoped to peel party leaders and their delegates away from Humphrey 
by demonstrating the viability of his alternative coalition, the idea of a new Democratic 
Party gained little traction among the top officials of the trade union hierarchy. This was 
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as Kennedy anticipated. As the candidate had told journalist David Frost, “I think there 
has to be a new kind of coalition to keep the Democratic Party going. … We have to 
write off the unions and the South now … [and] replace them with Negroes, blue-collar 
whites, and the kids.”36 Another journalist close with the Kennedy campaign explained 
that “to Kennedy’s eyes, the AFL-CIO leadership was committed politically to Lyndon 
Johnson, committed emotionally to the Vietnam War, and not committed at all to 
organizing the new, invisible poor.”37 Indeed, while the labor leadership normally exerted 
their influence in presidential politics through channels of elite brokerage at the national 
convention, in 1968 AFL-CIO officials intervened directly in the nomination process to a 
greater extent than ever before. This had commenced the moment Johnson had 
announced his exit from the race. As labor federation president George Meany later said, 
“[after Johnson’s withdrawal] Lane [Kirkland] and I went over to see Hubert Humphrey 
and got him to agree he would run.”38 Then-AFL-CIO secretary-treasurer Lane Kirkland 
also later recalled, 
 
I was involved with others in putting together a committee – a labor 
committee – for Hubert Humphrey. It was an informal operation. …The 
members of our committee included every general officer of every affiliate 
of the AFL-CIO. …Labor, then, was instrumental in rounding up the 
delegate votes to get him nominated. We didn’t do that by participating in 
primary elections. …But in the non-primary states, we rounded up most of 
the votes.39 
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 That a committed anticommunist like George Meany put the full weight of his 
organizational strength behind the vice president to ensure the failure of the antiwar 
insurgents is unsurprising. However, even top labor officials who privately articulated 
their disagreements with the Johnson administration’s foreign policy hesitated to take any 
action that could jeopardize their access to the White House or Democratic members of 
Congress. A particularly poignant display of this dilemma involved Walter Reuther, 
president of the UAW (which had disaffiliated from the AFL-CIO in 1968), when Barry 
Bluestone and Leslie Woodcock, children of top UAW officials and members of SDS, 
confronted him at a family gathering. The two recited antiwar poetry from the WWI era 
and read aloud Martin Luther King’s condemnation of the war in Vietnam. When pressed 
to make a public statement of the UAW’s support for an end to the conflict, Reuther 
responded that the subject had been debated at length inside the union and that he 
personally believed the war to be wrong, but added that “we have major contract 
negotiations coming up … [and] this is not the time to break with the President on this 
issue.” Woodcock, shocked and appalled, responded, “What are you trying to do, maybe 
get eighty cents [more] an hour in the pay envelop, five cents here, five cents there? 
You’re telling me that you are unwilling to make a statement that may save fifty thousand 
lives or one hundred thousand lives or maybe a million lives because you want to get fifty 
more cents in your goddamn fucking contract?”40 Reuther, caught in the dilemma, kept 
the UAW neutral in the race. 
 But for all the apparent solidity of the labor leadership’s consensus on the 
Democratic administration’s war in Vietnam, the labor rank and file were not nearly as 
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homogenous – a weakness that Kennedy sought to exploit. Since the escalation of the war 
in 1965, significant subnational labor organizations had been speaking out. New York’s 
Health and Hospital Workers Local 1199 was the earliest, followed soon after by the 
Negro American Labor Council, the trade union division of SANE, and some of the top 
officials in the Amalgamated Clothing Workers. 41  By 1967, a group of nearly five 
hundred union leaders within the AFL-CIO mounted a challenge to the federation’s 
official pro-war position.42 As opposed to any simplistic depiction of hawkish working 
class “hard hats,” the dissension within the ranks of organized labor reflected the 
complex dynamics of workers’ political attitudes at the end of the New Deal order, a 
moment in which American workers moved left, right, and center.43 In her detailed study 
of working class attitudes in the Vietnam era, Penny Lewis has shown that “working-
class people were never more likely than their middle-class counterparts to support the 
war, and in many instances, they were more likely to oppose it.”44 While such opposition 
did not typically result in participation in the student-led antiwar movement, which many 
workers found unpatriotic, elitist, and distasteful, it did represent a liability for the labor 
and party leadership. The UAW lost top staffers Jack Conway and Paul Schrade who 
went to work for Kennedy over the objections of Reuther, while ADA liberals such as 
Joseph Rauh, Arthur Schlesinger, and John Kenneth Galbraith broke from the vice 
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president – their former friend and ally – over his obstinate defense of Johnson’s Vietnam 
policy.45  
 
“The pressure of legitimacy” 
Most importantly, while Kennedy’s strategy centered on demonstrating the breadth and 
depth of his popular support among his new Democratic coalition, his team planned for a 
direct confrontation with the structure and operation of the national party convention. In 
case party leaders remained impassive regarding his primary victories, Kennedy’s team 
developed a multipronged convention strategy designed to implicate the party’s 
nominating procedures as unfair, unresponsive, and undemocratic. This included a 
suggestion to hold “counter primaries” in caucus-convention states as an MFDP-type 
demonstration of popular support. 46  While this tactic was ultimately rejected, the 
Kennedy team did plan to file credentials challenges against southern delegations on the 
grounds that “any black representation they may have is purely formal tokenism.” 
Kennedy had already been in touch with black Mississippi activists planning to employ 
the Atlantic City compromise in a second attack on the regular party, as they had done in 
1964. If successful, these credentials contests would have the effect of “cracking one leg 
of Humphrey’s support.”47 
 More significant, however, was that Kennedy’s team also planned on bringing 
credentials challenges against delegations from outside the South, against northern state 
party organizations that “have effectively prevented any expression of popular will.” To 
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be successful, these challenges would require utilizing more “unorthodox means” 
because these state delegations largely complied with the antidiscrimination mandate 
spelled out by the Special Equal Rights Committee (SERC).48 To expand the reach of the 
SERC’s “right to participate,” Kennedy’s people targeted the unit rule, a procedural 
device used by party leaders to cast a delegation’s votes as a bloc, binding those in the 
minority to the will of the majority. 49  In the judgment of veteran Kennedy advisor 
Theodore Sorensen, “we are not going to get any votes [at the convention] if [the] unit 
rule is in effect.” 50  From his perspective, Kennedy’s level of support was grossly 
diminished by the unit rule’s distortions, which silenced minority dissent from the 
precinct level up, giving the false appearance of a pro-Humphrey consensus among 
delegates at the national level. In fact, Kennedy had received a large volume of 
correspondence from supporters during the campaign, which reported the turmoil within 
state conventions and county Democratic caucuses and the crackdown on rank-and-file 
dissent by the “Democratic Establishment.”51 
 By bringing what they called “the pressure of legitimacy” to bear on delegate 
selection processes affected by racial discrimination as well as the unit rule, Kennedy’s 
convention strategy picked up and substantially expanded the Mississippi challenge in 
Atlantic City four years earlier.52 No longer an issue confined to allegations of racial 
prejudice exercised by southern party elites, or even the hypocrisy of the national party’s 
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tolerance of such practices, Kennedy’s critique of the party implicated the lawful 
functioning of Democratic procedure on the basis of its undemocratic and 
unrepresentative character.53  The accusations would not be about “vote-stealing,” his 
aides said, but the more substantive problem of failing to accurately represent popular 
preferences. The solution, one memo indicated, required nothing less than 
“democratizing the party.”54  
 
The Miscounted McCarthy Campaign: Frustrating the “Democratic Choice” 
Within the McCarthy campaign, a strategy that pointed toward “democratizing the party” 
emerged at the grassroots level as campaign activists experienced systematic exclusion, 
marginalization, and victimization at the hands of the party’s delegate selection 
procedures and the party regulars overseeing them. Initially having made common cause 
through Allard Lowenstein’s Dump Johnson movement and its crop of organizational 
vehicles around the country, Joseph Duffey, an assistant professor at Hartford Seminary, 
and about a dozen other concerned Connecticut Democrats made the decision to 
spearhead the McCarthy effort in their home state. The group had set about investigating 
local party structures and procedures to better orient their strategy, resulting in a 
document, written by Geoffrey Cowan, a Yale law student and McCarthy coordinator for 
the state, entitled, “The System: You Have to Know It to Beat It.”55  
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 The system to beat was formidable indeed. Connecticut was home to a fairly 
robust Democratic Party machine run by state chairman John Bailey, in place since 1948  
(locals called him King John), and who had served as chair of the Democratic National 
Committee (DNC) since 1961. As a traditional, loyal Democrat, Bailey cast himself as an 
instrument in service to the party leader. In early January 1968, in light of McCarthy’s 
nomination challenge, Bailey had already publicly declared, “the Democratic National 
Convention is as good as over. …It’ll be Lyndon Johnson and that’s that.”56 If local 
McCarthyites were to succeed in beating the system, they were going to have to confront 
one of the most powerfully positioned actors in that system, and that power was felt 
almost immediately. While they encountered relatively few problems participating in 
party caucuses in small towns around the state, Connecticut McCarthyites confronted 
more serious obstacles to participation in larger towns and cities, where local committees 
selected state convention delegates. The only method of challenging them was to propose 
a rival slate of delegates, endorsed by at least 5 percent of local residents, and payment of 
a filing fee. The total cost of filing fees for mounting a statewide challenge was $14,000. 
(Filing as a party-endorsed slate, however, was free of charge.)57  
These obstacles notwithstanding, the McCarthy insurgents managed to win about 
30 percent of the delegates to Connecticut’s state convention in June. But when Bailey 
summoned Joseph Duffey to the negotiating table, the party chair told him, “if you 
behave responsibly, we might have no objection to giving you one or two seats on the 
[national convention] delegation.” 58  Of the forty-four delegate seats allotted to 
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Connecticut by the DNC, McCarthy forces claimed no less than thirteen to reflect a 
proportionate representation of their strength in the state convention.59 Failing to come to 
an agreement, the McCarthy forces filed a credentials challenge with the DNC against the 
Connecticut delegation and walked out of the convention.60 
The experience of the Connecticut McCarthyites, however, was no outlier. In 
locales across the country, pro-McCarthy and Kennedy activists found themselves subject 
to the arbitrary power of the local or state Democratic Party officials, who 
overwhelmingly favored Lyndon Johnson, and subsequently Hubert Humphrey, as the 
presidential nominee. In Washington State, insurgents protested the “steamroller” and 
“dictatorial” tactics employed by regular party officials, and charged the state committee 
with “den[ying] voters the opportunity to participate fully in party affairs” by appointing 
twelve ex-officio or automatic delegates to the national delegation without ratification by 
the state convention.61 In Minnesota, McCarthy activists denounced a rotten boroughs 
system that distributed national delegates evenly across the state’s counties, claiming it 
violated the Supreme Court’s recent principle of one-person, one-vote, which favored 
representation according to population rather than geography. The results, they 
contended, diluted the strength of McCarthy support, which was strongest in large 
population centers like Minneapolis-St. Paul. In New York, insurgents challenged the 
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state committee’s authority to appoint at-large members to the national delegation 
without having to take into consideration the relative proportions of candidate support in 
the state primary. In Michigan, district level caucuses with pro-Humphrey majorities had 
invoked use of the unit rule to bind the minority to the majority’s decision, but restricted 
the use of the same mechanism in districts where caucus majorities favored McCarthy. In 
Indiana, the caucus chairs had simply violated standard parliamentary procedure, refusing 
to recognize insurgent participants, removing their names from nomination, denying their 
motions, and in some cases wrapping up the entire proceedings in only two or three 
minutes.62 
The most egregious instance of abuse came in Pennsylvania, the fourth largest 
state in the Union and possessor of 130 delegate votes. There, in its April primary 
election, held before Hubert Humphrey had officially announced his candidacy, 
McCarthy finished with a major victory, bringing in close to 430,000 votes compared to 
Robert Kennedy’s 65,500 and Lyndon Johnson’s 73,000. However, following the 
primary, the state Democratic committee, controlled by the mayors of Pittsburg and 
Philadelphia and top Steelworkers officials, appointed an additional 52 members to the 
state’s delegation, only one of which was a McCarthy supporter. Having registered over 
70 percent support in the state primary, McCarthy’s support subsequently was diluted or 
erased. The Pennsylvania delegation cast 80 percent of their votes for Humphrey on the 
first ballot in Chicago.63 
In late June, after having walked out the Connecticut state convention in protest, 
McCarthy partisans began organizing a strategic response at the forthcoming Chicago 
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convention. At the core of their grievances was the perception that their exclusion from 
the party had been unfair because it was undemocratic. 64  This raised questions 
concerning the rules and practices of the state parties, specifically regarding their 
delegate selection processes. But such procedures were often opaque, a fact that local 
party leaders were not often eager to correct. (As the reform commission would later 
reveal, ten state parties did not even possess written rules in 1968.) And even when the 
organization’s rules and procedures could be discerned in advance, as with Cowan’s 
pamphlet on how to beat “The System” in Connecticut, they often revealed the degree to 
which party affairs were conducted “at the discretion of the chairman.”65  With only two 
months left before the national convention, members of the Connecticut McCarthy 
leadership set about planning to mount a comprehensive challenge to the party’s 
nominating system, which made the case for reform. 
 The main problem facing the McCarthy reformers was that there was little legal 
basis upon which to mount their challenge. There was, as Cowan put it, “no law to go 
on.” 66  Nor was there any comprehensive record of state parties’ delegate selection 
procedures. The proposed solution was to put together an investigative commission 
outside the party that could produce a study documenting the processes by which state 
delegations were composed and how presidential candidates won the nomination. With 
the Mississippi Freedom Democrats experience in mind, they figured this would provide 
a basis for contesting what the McCarthy insurgents considered to be unfair practices and 
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a vehicle for galvanizing support for their credentials challenge inside the Chicago 
convention.67 
By early August, only three weeks before the Chicago convention began, Cowan 
had put together what became known as the Commission on the Democratic Selection of 
Presidential Nominees. Soliciting a modest grant from a McCarthy supporter and 
publisher in New York, and tapping Thomas Alder, a veteran of the civil rights 
movement, as commission director, the two filled out the commission with Eli Segal as 
liaison with the McCarthy campaign; Anne Wexler, vice chair of the Connecticut 
McCarthy committee; Harold Hughes, governor of Iowa, who agreed to chair the 
commission; Representative Donald Fraser of Minnesota, a Humphrey supporter despite 
his own opposition to the Vietnam War; Kennedy confidant Frederick Dutton; former 
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee activist and current Georgia state 
representative, Julian Bond; Washington Star political columnist Doris Kimball; and 
academics Harry Ashmore of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, and 
Alexander Bickel, a law professor at Yale. Hughes and Wexler announced the creation of 
the commission in early August, telling a Chicago press conference that the group would 
“greatly alleviate” the strain of the upcoming convention by providing a “comprehensive, 
factual, and up-to-date reference work” which would offer “some guidelines of a 
somewhat permanent nature” to be of assistance in considering how to improve the 
party’s convention and delegate selection procedures.68 
 The quickly improvised team (informally called the Hughes Commission) had its 
first and only formal meeting in mid-August just outside Chicago. The product of that 
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meeting and the staff’s research was a report which for the first time drew together a 
comprehensive guide to the delegate selection practices of every state Democratic Party 
as well as a history of the national convention’s operating procedures. The report, The 
Democratic Choice, began with a dramatic assessment of the historical conjuncture 
facing America’s majority party: “this convention is on trial,” it announced.69 Its authors 
interpreted the party’s recent electoral downturn not as a mere temporary aberration in 
Democratic strength but as the manifestation of deeper structural changes in the political 
environment, ranging from the emergence of issue-oriented voters and black militancy to 
the appearance of new communications technologies, amounting to nothing less than the 
“break-up of the New Deal coalition” itself.70 These underlying processes had manifested 
in a crisis for the Democrats because the party was incapable of “accommodat[ing] the 
aspirations of emergent social forces,” giving rise to “widespread cynicism” among the 
“many millions of voters … [who] feel themselves unrepresented by either of the … 
major parties in this presidential election.” 71  Abuses, irregularities, and a lack of 
transparency had diminished popular participation in nomination process, which in turn 
cast doubt on the representativeness of the national convention. Referencing the 
Mississippi Freedom Democrats before them, the authors underscored the hypocrisy of 
undemocratic practices in the Democratic Party: “State systems for the selecting of 
delegates to the National Convention and the procedures of the Convention itself display 
considerably less fidelity to basic democratic principles than a nation which claims to 
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govern itself can safely tolerate.”72 Moreover, they argued, “the crisis of the Democratic 
Party [represents] a genuine crisis for democracy in America,” as both parties are 
increasingly perceived as “parochial strongholds of narrowly based interests” and 
threaten to be “supplanted” by figures like George Wallace or a left-wing break from the 
Democrats. “With the demise of that [two-party] structure, a powerful force for stability 
will disappear from the fabric of American politics.”73 If the Democrats wanted to save 
themselves and restore the viability of the American political system, the party would 
have to respond quickly. 
 After diagnosing the magnitude of the crisis, The Democratic Choice went on to 
offer a set of proposals for party reform designed to “purify – and hopefully to preserve – 
the power” of the national convention as a representative political institution.74  The 
authors recommended some relatively uncontroversial measures, such as selecting all 
convention delegates within the same calendar year of the election or allowing only those 
members of the DNC who had been elected the same year as the presidential election to 
serve as convention delegates. This, they argued, would introduce greater responsiveness 
to the relevant political issues concerning the electorate. Other recommendations were 
meant to encourage popular participation, such as providing adequate public notice of 
party meetings, imposing quorum provisions, and placing ceilings on the financial 
burdens associated with participation. 
 Some recommendations, however, were as aggressive as they were far reaching, 
such as abolishing the unit rule, drastically restricting the privilege of automatic delegate 
status for party officials and Democratic officeholders, reapportioning delegate allocation 
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according to the principle of one-person, one-vote, and substituting proportional 
representation of voters’ presidential preferences for winner-take-all mechanisms at every 
stage in the delegate selection process.  
In a sign of the convention disputes to come, the report also referenced the 
Atlantic City compromise reached at the Democratic national convention four years 
earlier, assuring voters that they will have “the opportunity to participate fully in Party 
affairs,” regardless of race. The Democratic Choice fully endorsed such a mandate and 
went further, advocating the imposition of an “affirmative obligation” on state parties to 
encourage the “full and meaningful” participation of African Americans and shifting the 
burden of proof of racial discrimination to the state parties in cases where there was a 
gross disparity between the proportion of minority delegates and that found in the state.75 
By using the Atlantic City resolution, the national party convention, “with the 
accompanying power to reject delegate certification, can be the instrument that completes 
the racial integration of the Democratic Party.”76 
Lastly, the report concluded with an entreaty directed to the DNC to integrate 
these recommendations directly into the official Call to the 1972 convention, formally 
imposing them on state parties as national party law. Acknowledging the unprecedented 
assertion of national party authority this course of action required, the authors proposed a 
more moderate alternative: the creation of a new investigative committee modeled on the 
Special Equal Rights Committee that was born from the Atlantic City compromise. As 
we will see, in the course of events that followed, reformers managed to achieve both. 
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The Party in Crisis: Chicago 
The violent crackdown of Chicago’s riot police as well as the National Guard on the 
assembled demonstrators outside the Democratic national convention mirrored the 
disarray among activists, delegates, and party leaders inside the convention itself. 
Following the recent assassinations of Martin Luther King in April and Robert Kennedy 
in June, it was as much with the events inside the convention in mind as those outside in 
the streets that presumptive nominee Hubert Humphrey bleakly observed, “the whole 
environment of politics had come apart.”77 Never before had a televised party convention, 
which traditionally functioned as the launching pad for the nominee’s general election 
campaign, full of pomp and circumstance, been so visibly fractious and disorderly. 
 The turbulent proceedings in Chicago were themselves the result of well-planned, 
strategically organized insurgent activity by an array of actors that collectively mounted a 
frontal assault on the institutional foundations of the national party.78 The main site of 
struggle was within the national convention’s Credentials Committee, the body that had 
been at the center of the MFDP challenge four years earlier in Atlantic City. Aside from 
its unusually high profile during MFDP controversy, the Credentials Committee was 
normally a fairly sleepy body concerned with routine matters of delegate certification, 
wrapping up their final report after only several short meetings ahead of the convention. 
As we have seen, credentials challenges, especially those involving racial discrimination, 
had traditionally been contained by party leaders and convention managers and settled 
behind the scenes. The 1968 convention, however, was host to an avalanche it was 
unprepared to manage: an unprecedented seventeen separate challenges involving fifteen 
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state delegations were formally filed with the Credentials Committee in the weeks prior 
to the opening of proceedings, adding another layer of tension to an already strained 
political environment. 79  The tidal wave of credentials challenges was itself partly a 
product of the resolution of the MFDP controversy, when the Atlantic City convention 
resolved to insert the antidiscrimination provision, including its prerogative to unseat 
noncompliant delegations, into the DNC’s official Call to the 1968 Chicago convention. 
With that precedent set in the annals of party law and the significant increase in black 
(and Latino) voter registration since the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, the 
Chicago convention saw challenges based on racial discrimination lodged from an 
assortment of grassroots actors against Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North 
Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Texas.80  
But what made the Chicago credentials fights truly unprecedented was the 
number of briefs filed against northern state delegations. 81  As expected, McCarthy 
partisans from Connecticut and Pennsylvania followed through with formally filing their 
grievances against local party abuses and irregularities, as did other insurgents in Indiana, 
Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Washington, and Wisconsin. However, despite the fact 
that none of the plaintiffs alleged any discrimination on the basis of race, they did invoke 
the SERC’s antidiscrimination principle asserting the right “to participate fully in Party 
affairs.” Arguing before the Credentials Committee in marathon-long hearings 
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coordinated by Joseph Rauh, the assorted state challengers pointed to the SERC’s 
concept of the right to participate as well as the Supreme Court’s dictum of one-person, 
one-vote to make the case that the party’s delegate selection procedures were 
undemocratic.82  
 All told, with credentials challenges coming from both North and South, the 
Credential Committee was asked to rule on the legitimacy of no less than 40 percent of 
Chicago’s delegates. Having assiduously cultivated the support of party leaders and trade 
union officials in dozens of non-primary states, the Humphrey camp took the set of 
challenges seriously. While their own internal estimates reassured them that the balance 
of the 110-member committee was overwhelmingly weighted in their favor, Humphrey’s 
convention managers issued a press release charging McCarthy activists with attempting 
to “lock out” convention delegates “on the grounds that most of them are Humphrey 
supporters.”83  
 
Unable to convince the voters or the delegates on the issues and unable to 
win the nomination by accepted means, the supporters of Senator 
McCarthy have mounted a huge new offensive which is aimed at the 
Convention itself. …The McCarthy forces, by their tactics, plan to 
paralyze the Convention and hope to block hundreds of Humphrey 
delegates from exercising their right to participate. …[They] have turned 
to sideshow tactics in a last-ditch maneuver against majority rule.84 
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In an effort to placate the challengers, Michigan representative James O’Hara, one of 
Humphrey’s top campaign aides, suggested incorporating some language in the 
Credentials Committee’s final report that would endorse the reformers’ recommendations 
for dealing with “future delegate selection methods.”85  
 
My own feeling is that something of this sort – that looks to the future – 
would be a useful addition to the [Credentials] Committee Report, but it 
should be done in such a way that no cloud is cast upon the representative 
nature of the delegations to this Convention. To permit such an inference 
would lend credence to the McCarthy claim that he is really the popular 
choice but may not win at the Convention because the delegates do not 
represent the people.86 
 
Like those who negotiated the Atlantic City compromise four years earlier, Humphrey’s 
team surmised that such a course of action could placate the challengers in the short-run 
while avoiding any resolution that could be politically costly at the convention. 
But how could Humphrey simultaneously accept the basis of the challengers’ 
allegations concerning the lack of democratic participation in the delegation selection 
process while also insisting on the representational legitimacy of the Chicago 
convention? Indeed, Humphrey’s dilemma reflected the contradiction exposed in the 
proceedings of the credentials challenges themselves. As veteran political journalist 
Theodore White observed, what was at issue was “not so much that delegates in some 
states are clandestinely or mechanically selected. It is that no over-all governing principle 
determines the frame in which delegates are selected.”87  
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This was magnified by the findings of the Credentials Committee itself: in all but 
one case (Mississippi), the Committee voted down the challengers. Their reasoning was 
straightforward, if bewildering. The Call to the 1968 convention had established two 
grounds on which a state’s delegation could be questioned and scrutinized: 1) that 
members of the delegation were not duly selected in accordance with state law or party 
rules; or 2) that delegates were certified by a state Democratic Party organization that has 
failed to undertake the antidiscrimination provisions established by the Special Equal 
Rights Commission.88  
The problem for the challengers was that no matter how egregious some of the 
tactics of party exclusion had been, they did not constitute a violation of state law or 
party rules, especially when they did not concern an evident racial bias. This was true in 
Washington State, where the appointment of party officials and officeholders as 
automatic (and unelected) delegates by the state committee was well within their rights. 
And it held true for Pennsylvania, where the charge that the state delegation was 
“constructed from the top down” by committee appointments was not even disputed as 
fact, but was dismissed as irrelevant and perfectly legal by its defenders.89 Even in the 
case of Georgia, where state law and party rules placed the power to appoint all 
delegation members in the hands of the state chairman, who in turn needed only the 
approval of the governor (who had appointed the state party chairman in the first place), 
the committee could not find legitimate grounds upon which to unseat the regular 
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delegates. Even though the SERC’s final report had called for the creation of a permanent 
body to investigate instances “where the party controls election machinery and 
procedures,” Georgia’s party-state did not violate party law or, necessarily, the 
antidiscrimination mandate.90  
While the results of the Credentials Committee’s lengthy deliberations shored up 
Humphrey’s chances for the nomination, a second insurgent front was attacking the unit 
rule in hearings before the convention’s Rules Committee. While the authors of The 
Democratic Choice had filed credentials challenges of their own, they singled out the 
Rules Committee and the unit rule as their principal target of organized action. Anne 
Wexler had obtained a spot on the Rules Committee and organized support among 
sympathetic delegates from the inside, distributing copies of The Democratic Choice to 
all Rules Committee members. They heard the testimony of Harold Hughes at their first 
session, beginning only several days before the convention opened. Sticking closely to 
the argument laid out in his commission’s booklet, Hughes made the case for reform that 
“will help to preserve not only the good name of this Convention, but the integrity of the 
Democratic Party. …[I]ndeed, [it] may save the two-party system itself.” This included 
rectifying “undemocratic aspects” of state organizations’ delegate selection procedures, 
reapportioning voting power among state delegations at the 1972 convention to reflect 
Democratic electoral strength, and outlawing use of the unit rule “at this very 
convention.”91  
Hughes was followed by more reform partisans, including Eugene McCarthy, 
who had already reframed the remainder of his presidential campaign as a battle for party 
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reform.92 McCarthy proposed reworking the party structure, including holding biennial 
party conventions, instituting a more democratically accountable DNC, and empowering 
the party chair to become an independent actor in presidential and congressional policy 
councils. Additionally, members of Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) submitted a 
brief holding that no delegate could justifiably be bound by the unit rule. “The unit rule is 
undemocratic,” the brief declared.93 
 
The rule prevents the minority members of a delegation from casting their 
votes in the convention in accordance with their preferences. To deprive a 
minority of its right to expression in this manner – whether the minority is 
a racial one, a group of liberals in a conservative state, or simply 
Democrats who disagree with the majority in a state about who should be 
the presidential nominee – is a patent violation of democratic principles.94 
 
Like many of the arguments heard in the insurgent campaigns, The Democratic 
Choice, and the Credentials Committee, the ADA drew on the antidiscrimination 
precedent achieved four years earlier and expanded its reach. By blurring the distinction 
between racial discrimination and political marginalization, insurgents sought out 
grounds upon which democratic principle could be made the standard by which to assess 
internal party practices. 
 The Rules Committee engaged in several days of protracted debate and political 
wrangling over the legitimacy of the unit rule and the means of its abolition. Again, the 
typical refrain of Humphrey supporters was to recognize the problem while 
recommending delaying any amelioration. Frank Erwin, a DNC member and 
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spokesperson for conservative Texas governor John Connally, expressed his “keen sense 
of outrage” at the “unfair” proposal to ban the unit rule at “this late date.” He threatened 
that elimination of the unit rule for 1968 would “destroy any chance of unity” in the 
Texas Democratic Party, hurting the vice president’s chances of carrying the state in the 
general election. Expressing incredulity at the insurgent challengers’ expansive 
interpretation of the Atlantic City compromise, he complained that “there is a lot of loose 
use of the word ‘minority’ [here].”95Another Texan questioned the purported neutrality of 
the Hughes Commission, suggesting that its appeals to democratic principle veiled a 
narrow, partisan project. 
 
An unofficial, largely self-appointed group under the chairmanship of 
Governor Hughes of Iowa, composed principally of McCarthy supporters, 
has prepared a lengthy document embodying a long series of quite radical 
changes in the convention rules. Some of these changes may indeed merit 
careful and sympathetic consideration for the future. If made applicable at 
this late date to the 1968 Convention, they would seem designed expressly 
to alter the outcome of the convention by disfranchising large numbers of 
duly elected delegates.96 
 
While only several states imposed the unit rule down to the precinct level, those that did 
– Texas, Missouri, and Illinois – were powerful players in elite brokerage politics (not to 
mention the fact that Illinois was represented by machine politician Richard Daley, and 
Texas’s governor John Connally was a stand-in for the absent president Lyndon 
Johnson).  
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In light of the discourse developing in both the Rules and Credentials 
Committees, internal memos show that top staffers on the Humphrey team took note of 
“the widespread desire for changes in overall Democratic Party rules” and suggested that 
“necessity might be turned into opportunity” for the vice president. Under pressure to 
keep the bulk of his delegates together and retain the support of the South, who already 
looked upon the liberal vice president with suspicion, Humphrey aides seized on the idea 
of an official commission to study party organization modeled on the Special Equal 
Rights Committee as a means of defusing the tension tearing through the convention. 
Such a commission, they argued, if confined only to fact-finding and nonbinding 
recommendations, “could anticipate all or most of the broad reforms” suggested by the 
McCarthy campaign or the Hughes Commission and remove major policy disagreements 
from “the heat of controversy over nominations.” They proposed appointing prominent 
reformers like Wexler and Hughes as commissioners, along with many Humphrey 
supporters to “extend the hand of unity … [and] show that the convention will take 
McCarthy-McGovern complainers seriously.”97 As Max Kampelman, a chief strategist 
for the vice president, later confirmed, 
 
Our objective was to get a nominee. This [Rules Committee dispute] was 
unimportant, except as it might have some effect on the nomination. We 
said to ourselves, if you’re going to study it, you can control it. If you get 
the nomination, you’ll have control of the DNC. If you have the DNC, 
then you’ll control any study. A study commission could be a way of 
harmonizing the issue. …We didn’t want to do anything to upset the main 
job.98 
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Humphrey outlined his pro-reform position in a memo to the Rules Committee 
chair Illinois governor Samuel Shapiro, a Daley associate, endorsing biennial regional 
party conventions, expanded methods of registration and voting, a new committee on 
political participation, and abolition of the unit rule. However, the vice president again 
tried to square the circle of admitting an immediate problem while delaying its resolution: 
“If you want to abolish the unit rule, well and good. But let’s pass a resolution here at this 
convention that is effective in 1972,” adding “I don’t want to try to abolish what I think is 
an undemocratic rule by [an] undemocratic procedure.”99 But after two days of debate 
Shapiro announced the decision to adopt a “freedom of conscience” resolution, 
effectively suspending, though not banning, enforcement of the unit rule for the Chicago 
convention.100 In his public statement, chairman Shapiro pointed to the precedent of the 
1936 abolition of the two-thirds supermajority threshold for presidential nominations as 
well as the MFDP compromise in Atlantic City, branding the unit rule decision as another 
historic advance in the “democratization of our party.”101  
At the direction of the Humphrey team, the final reports sent by the Credentials 
and Rules Committees for perfunctory approval on the convention floor endorsed the 
need for party reform at future national conventions. In the Credentials Committee, the 
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task of drafting the final report was handed to Philip Stern, a confidant of Hughes 
Commissioners Alder, Cowan, and Wexler. Stern included in the report a resolution 
calling for the creation of a new SERC-type special investigative commission to study the 
delegate selection processes in each state and make recommendations that would ensure 
“broader citizen participation” in the 1972 Democratic national convention. The final 
language spoke in broad, sweeping terms, instructing the DNC to include in its Call to the 
1972 convention the encouragement that state parties ensure that all Democrats “have 
meaningful and timely opportunities to participate fully” in the party’s delegate selection 
procedures. 102  Stern’s party reform commission resolution, embedded within the 
Credentials Committee report, was passed by a convention voice vote with no objections 
or controversy.  
Reformers on the Rules Committee, however, responded to Humphrey’s co-
optation and dilution of their demands with a minority report of their own. Drafted by 
Wexler and endorsed by thirty-three members of the Rules Committee, the report 
amended the Humphrey position by 1) extending the ban on the unit rule in 1972 to all 
stages of the delegate selection process, from the precinct level up; and 2) adding 
language to the official Call to the 1972 convention mandating that state parties to 
undertake “all feasible efforts” to “open” party procedures and guarantee that all 
Democrats have “a full and timely opportunity to participate” in party affairs. 
Congressmen Brock Adams and Donald Fraser as well as Governor Harold Hughes spoke 
in support of the minority report, contending “it would be a follow-through consistent 
with the convention’s action” suspending the unit rule.103 Hughes emphasized the larger, 
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symbolic significance of voting to end all uses of the undemocratic practice as “a step in 
the direction of the new politics,” which will increase “grass roots participation” in the 
Democratic Party to levels “not seen in a hundred years.”104 The minority report passed 
narrowly, 1,350 to 1,206.  
 
Conclusion 
While few understood it at the time, in the hands of the New Politics reformers who 
served on the party reform commission created by the Chicago convention, the two 
resolutions of the Rules and Credentials Committee would be combined and interpreted 
as a mandate for sweeping alterations in the structure and operation of the Democratic 
Party. While many of the interests motivating the reformers bore a clear lineage with the 
challenges against party federalism in the 1940s, 1950s, and in 1964, this time they 
would have the interest as well as the authority to institutionalize a party of a different 
type. As Theodore White later reflected, whether due to “innocence or inattention, 
[Chicago delegates] had voted for the most fundamental change in the party’s long 
history.”105 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
“THE CURE FOR THE ILLS OF DEMOCRACY”: 
OPENNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND THE CONTOURS OF PARTY 
REFORM 
 
Political parties must serve as more than just conduits by which people 
secure public office. They must address themselves seriously to the social 
problems and major issues of public policy which face our nation. But, as 
a first step, we must immediately open the door to all those people who 
are or may be inclined to use political parties to serve the ends they seek. 
This is what reform of the Democratic Party is all about. 
  --George McGovern (1970)1 
 
The purpose of party reform is to move the Democratic Party toward 
becoming a more accountable, responsible, and democratic party; in brief 
… to transform the Democratic Party into a genuinely progressive 
people’s party. 
 --Donald Fraser (c. 1978)2 
 
As the previous chapter has shown, the 1968 Democratic Party crisis was marked by the 
evolution of an attack on the racially exclusive practices of southern state Democratic 
organizations into a far-reaching indictment of the national party’s undemocratic 
presidential nominating process. This chapter will examine the content of the reforms that 
followed in the wake of the 1968 party crisis. These initiatives and their astoundingly 
quick implementation were the combined product of circumstance and agency as party 
and movement actors developed dynamic relations that pushed reform forward. In the 
immediate aftermath of the disappointing loss in the 1968 presidential election, the 
question for nearly all concerned actors became not whether to reform the party, but 
rather on whose terms reform would proceed. Using the 1968 convention resolutions 
empowering the Democratic National Committee (DNC) to create two new reform 
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commissions, New Politics reformers decisively shaped those commissions’ activities, 
promulgating a narrative that diagnosed the party crisis in terms of barriers to 
participation, lack of representation, and the absence of democratic accountability. Acting 
with the authority of the national party, reformers developed and implemented an agenda 
to incorporate the social movement forces demanding entry by curtailing state party 
autonomy, open delegate selection procedures, and restructure national convention 
operations. By 1972 the combined effects of opening the party and the mobilization of 
new party entrants through the antiwar, feminist, and black freedom movements, as well 
as the labor left, resulted in a representatively transformed national party convention. 
 The party reforms of the 1969-72 period have been extensively researched and 
analyzed.3 However, most accounts focus solely on the reforms made to the presidential 
nominating process, neglecting those made to the party structure.4 While it could be 
argued that because the New Politics’ structural reform agenda had a less lasting impact 
than those made to the nominating process, devoting analytical attention to the latter is 
justified. Such an argument, however, reads the outcome of the reform struggle back into 
the past, and results in a misleading and one-sided account of the New Politics movement 
in the Democratic Party. As will be shown below, democratizing the party was from the 
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outset a project that intertwined the goals of “opening the party” to greater movement 
influence through the delegate selection process as well as strengthening the national 
party’s policymaking capacities and mechanisms of accountability. Bringing both 
dimensions of reform into the picture makes clear that the New Politics movement was 
not about reform “as an end in itself.”5 Rather, New Politics advocates saw party reform 
and political realignment as interconnected goals that went hand in hand: party reform 
aimed at realignment, and realignment required reform. While the implementation of 
structural reform was delayed until after the 1972 convention, reformers drew up an 
ambitious blueprint to radically redesign the party of states’ rights and replace it with a 
truly national mass organization. However, the decision to delay, when combined with 
the anti-reform backlash developing to the changes already made, fated the structural 
phase of party reform to confront a level of resistance it could not surmount. 
 
No More Chicagos: Diagnosing the Crisis, Defining Reform 
At first it may appear puzzling why the 1968 party crisis resulted in such major 
institutional alterations as soon as 1972. After all, as we have seen, in past intraparty 
disputes national Democratic officials and party leaders had been loath to meddle in the 
affairs of state organizations or undertake procedural changes that risked splitting the 
coalition. The 1968 party crisis proved to be different, however, not only because of the 
magnitude of the chaos and violence in Chicago viewed by millions of television viewers 
around the country, but also due to the sustained intervention of an array of organized 
actors who saw reform as the means to enhance their influence in the party and achieve 
their policy goals more generally. This coalition demanding a new politics capitalized on 
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the window of opportunity during which party leaders were eager to resolve the crisis and 
their opponents, particularly those in the labor leadership, were relatively disorganized. 
 
The Party Leadership: “Unity Through Reform” 
While several important developments in the aftermath of the Chicago crisis coalesced to 
promote the profile of reform within the party leadership, the most significant was Hubert 
Humphrey’s narrow loss of the presidential election to Republican challenger Richard 
Nixon, who polled a 0.7 percent margin in the popular vote (though a 110 point margin in 
the Electoral College). While George Wallace’s third party candidacy had pulled 13 
percent of the popular vote and carried the electoral votes of the Deep South, most 
observers chalked up the vice president’s defeat to the unresolved schism between 
antiwar Democrats and party regulars. In a post-election report sent to DNC chair 
Lawrence O’Brien, Meat Cutters Union political education director Helmuth Kern – no 
ally of the party insurgents – fingered the “disunity” plaguing the party as the culprit, 
adding that “a great share of the responsibility for this defeat goes … to those who 
prevented the compromise Vietnam plank in the Democratic Platform.” 6  Kern was 
referring to a particularly bitter fight at the Chicago convention following Humphrey’s 
official nomination, when antiwar delegates made a last ditch effort to insert a peace 
plank into the party platform, only to be met with intransigence from the Humphrey team, 
who, while privately recognizing they were “drifting badly” on the Vietnam issue, were 
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unprepared to break openly with the titular party leader, President Lyndon Johnson.7 The 
repudiation sent many away from Chicago with unhealed wounds. While antiwar 
candidate George McGovern embraced Humphrey as the Democratic nominee, Eugene 
McCarthy announced that his support for the vice president was “still an open question.”8 
In the interim before the general election, liberal doves in Americans for Democratic 
Action (ADA) had pressured Humphrey to shift on Vietnam, and even debated whether 
the ADA should “remain neutral” if he did not distinguish himself from his predecessor 
and his Republican opponent with a “clear and unequivocal policy statement” for peace 
in Southeast Asia.9 While Humphrey did eventual break with LBJ in a speech at the end 
of September, an internal campaign survey of liberal opinion makers suggested that his 
belated dovishness was “too little, too late.”10 
 If Humphrey had been late to embrace the Democratic left before the election and 
had paid the price for it, he pursued the cause of party unity with alacrity thereafter. 
Having already made the shift toward the dovish side of the internal party dispute over 
Vietnam, the project of party reform appeared to offer the most reliable means by which 
to draw the insurgents back into the mainstream. With the role of party leader passing to 
him following Johnson’s departure from the White House, Humphrey publicly embraced 
reform as the prescription to the party’s future return to power. In the first post-election 
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issue of the official party newsletter, The Democrat, Humphrey published an open letter 
to all Democrats, where he made reference to the important steps toward reform taken in 
1964 and 1968, and argued that the path forward required “opening the party to the fullest 
public participation [possible].”11 He suggested serious consideration of some specific 
proposals that had been voiced by the party insurgents in Chicago, such as a midterm 
party conference in 1970, and recommended the party reposition itself as an engine of 
progressive reform more generally.12  
The consensus on reform in the party leadership was evident in other statements 
printed and circulated by the Democratic National Committee in early 1969. But if the 
leaders had converged on the idea of reform as a palliative for disunity, their statements 
tended to downplay the seriousness of the crisis and dismiss the possibility of any 
profound departure from past practices. Vice-presidential nominee Edmund Muskie, for 
instance, echoed Humphrey’s call for reform by reminding party members that “a viable, 
responsive political party” must engage in “a constant process of reform.” DNC vice 
chair Geri Joseph also endorsed the reform idea, but couched her statement in timeless 
generalities, saying “we all know that the party needs reform. It always has. It always 
will.” Lyndon Johnson, in his outgoing message as party leader, acknowledged that the 
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politics of the late 1960s had proven difficult to manage, but asserted that the Democrats 
should “continue acting like a majority party.”13 
The Democratic leadership’s efforts to dismiss the depth of the party crisis, and 
therefore downplay the extent of reform required, was itself a result of their hands being 
tied over whether or not there would be an official reform commission at all. As we saw 
in the previous chapter, reform-minded insurgents inside the Chicago convention 
successfully crafted and passed convention resolutions instructing the DNC to create an 
official investigative commission to study the state delegate selection process. This 
mandate as well as the post-election atmosphere of defeat was interpreted as a watershed 
from which there was no turning back. In this context the question was who would shape 
the contours of the reform process. 
DNC chair O’Brien, chosen by Humphrey for his ability to bridge the intraparty 
divide, had pushed the unity-through-reform agenda forward without much delay, waiting 
only several weeks after the election before announcing his plans to create two reform 
commissions to jointly undertake a “far-reaching organizational program … with prime 
emphasis on grass roots activities.”14 However, if some party leaders viewed reform as 
mostly a cosmetic operation, O’Brien, saddled with the institutional responsibility to 
rebuild a competitive national party, saw the need for more than surface level changes. 
As he later put it: “If a significant number of young people, women, minorities, and 
others alienated by traditional political institutions are actively involved in the 
nominating process, a revitalized and recharged Democratic Party almost surely will 
emerge in the general election campaign. I have no doubt that these votes – when 
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combined with more traditional sources of Democratic strength – could spell the 
difference between victory and defeat in November 1972.” 15  Reform, O’Brien 
envisioned, could be an integrative process, not only healing the wounds left over from 
1968, but even extending the party’s strength to new constituent groups.  
While O’Brien resigned from the DNC in January of 1969, his replacement, 
Oklahoma senator Fred Harris (whom Humphrey had shortlisted for vice president in 
1968), vowed to honor his predecessor’s unity agenda by filling the commission 
appointments with party members committed to the reform consensus.  
 
The 1968 Democratic National Convention laid down a mandate for 
reform and modernization of party structure, delegate selection and 
Convention rules. …I want this to be an open party, encouraging the 
widest possible participation in all its decision making processes, made 
fully democratic. …[T]hose appointed [to the reform commissions] 
believe in the mandate of the Convention.16 
 
Harris navigated a resolution through the DNC establishing the Commission on Rules to 
study and recommend reforms for national convention procedures as well as the 
Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, which would devote itself to 
problems of representation and transparency in the presidential nominating process. He 
appointed Michigan representative James O’Hara, a Humphrey confidant very close to 
organized labor and a skilled parliamentarian, to chair the Rules Commission (know as 
the O’Hara Commission), as well as antiwar South Dakota senator George McGovern to 
head up the Party Structure and Delegate Selection Commission (know as the McGovern-
Fraser Commission for its two chairmen).  
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 However, while nearly all party members, public officials, and interest group 
representatives appointed to the official reform commissions were reformers, they were 
not all of a kind, nor did they envision their task in the same way. Consider several of the 
most prominent members. McGovern, by standing in for the late Robert Kennedy at the 
Chicago convention, had established himself as a leader of the movement demanding 
change in the Democratic Party and in American politics more generally, and, having 
already toyed with the idea of a future presidential run, embraced the opportunity that 
could satisfy both objectives. O’Hara, on the other hand, had nominated himself for the 
role of reform leader, sending a post-election letter to then-DNC chairman O’Brien 
expressing his desire to be involved with the reform commissions, saying, “it is essential 
that those selected be reform-minded but also that they understand convention politics 
and have their feet on the ground.”17 As we will see, while O’Hara judged his feet to be 
on the ground in comparison to what he sometimes referred to as “new left bull shit” in 
his personal diary, his involvement in reform came to strain his relations with the 
majority faction of the AFL-CIO leadership, nearly costing him reelection in 1972.18 
While McGovern would go on to lead the New Politics movement to victory in capturing 
the party nomination, O’Hara joined the leadership of the anti-reform Coalition for a 
Democratic Majority after McGovern’s landslide defeat.  
 
 
 
                                                
17 James O’Hara to Lawrence O’Brien, 22 November 1968, Box 44, Folder: 1968 Democratic Convention 
Credentials Committee, O’Hara Collection. 
18 See entries for James O’Hara Diary, 17 May 1969, Box 48, Folder: O’Hara Diary April-May 1969; and 8 
July 1969, Box 48, Folder: June 2 – August 6, 1969, O’Hara Collection. See also, Crotty, Decision for the 
Democrats, 302, n. 6. 
  186 
The New Politics Coalition: “Transform the Party” 
While the party crisis had made the Democratic leadership at least receptive to the idea of 
reform as a means of intraparty reconciliation, the insurgents also saw reform as the most 
promising tool to prevent any recurrence of their experience in Chicago: marginalization 
at the hands of a corrupt, undemocratic system. The shared experiences of those who had 
been drawn into the Dump Johnson movement and the McCarthy-Kennedy campaigns 
had forged a distinct political consciousness among party insurgents. Despite having 
successfully maneuvered their calls for reform through the Chicago convention, deep-
seated distrust of party officials, both reasoned and otherwise, motivated the insurgents to 
organize sustained pressure for meaningful implementation of the convention mandate in 
the wake of Chicago.19 
 Accordingly, the period of 1968-72 witnessed a flowering of pro-reform groups 
and organizations alongside the official party commissions, which often had overlapping 
memberships and an interlocking directorate of movement leaders and mid-level 
operatives who moved back and forth across networks. Critical to the scope and direction 
of the reform movement was the formation of the New Democratic Coalition (NDC) out 
of the existing McCarthy and Kennedy campaign infrastructure. Gathering together 
prominent Dump Johnson insurgents such as Allard Lowenstein and Curtis Gans, labor-
oriented reformers like the United Auto Workers’ Paul Schrade and Michael Harrington 
of the Young People’s Socialist League, civil rights leaders such as Julian Bond and John 
Conyers, feminist activist Bella Abzug of the National Organization for Women (NOW), 
and Wisconsin Democratic leader Donald O. Peterson, the NDC centralized and gave 
coherence to the multiple and crisscrossing currents demanding a new kind of politics in 
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the late 1960s. In the wake of Kennedy’s assassination and the routing of McCarthyites in 
Chicago, Schrade had written to United Auto Workers (UAW) president Walter Reuther 
that the NDC offered some “hope for the desperately needed reform of the Party.”20 In its 
Statement of Political Purpose, the NDC announced its intention to navigate a path 
between subordination within the Democratic Party and the impossibility of launching a 
successful third party. Instead they sought “to transform the Democratic Party into a 
means of basic change” in society by practicing “creative independence” from its 
officeholders. “We will not be locked into an electoral strategy based on the principle of 
the lesser evil,” they said, nor “a strategy of loyalty to a party that betrays our deepest 
moral commitments.”21 While it never developed sufficient capacities for fundraising or 
outreach, and would eventually become little more than a letterhead organization, the 
NDC did provide “a meeting place for dissent within the party,” and made a decisive, if 
short-lived, intervention in the shaping of the reform movement.22 
 The freshly minted NDC was joined in their push for reform by more traditional 
liberal advocacy organizations such as the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), 
which, since its alignment with the insurgent McCarthy campaign, had been host to a 
internal split that mirrored the widening divisions within “vital center” liberalism as a 
whole. What had in the 1950s and early 1960s been a relatively cohesive consensus on 
the New Deal at home and anticommunism abroad had by 1970 broken into polarized 
camps of cold war liberals on the one hand and New Politics liberals on the other, who 
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sought to extend New Deal economic citizenship beyond the core of white male 
breadwinners and reevaluate America’s cold war commitments. Within the ADA, the 
split developed through a significant recomposition of its membership as campus 
chapters swelled and many traditional vital center liberals such as John Roche, Leon 
Keyserling, and Gus Tyler resigned.23 Those liberals that remained, such as John Kenneth 
Galbraith, Arthur Schlesinger, and Allard Lowenstein, embraced the New Politics 
movement. In the wake of Humphrey’s defeat in November 1968, the ADA’s national 
board members studied and debated the recommendations contained in the reform 
booklet The Democratic Choice, produced by the Hughes Commission ahead of the 
Chicago convention. From their perspective, “the job at hand is to take the sentiment for 
political and electoral reforms that has grown throughout the country and mold it into 
positive, constructive proposals that will afford greater access to our political system.” 
While such a project would necessarily involve eliminating “outmoded, outdated 
regulations … which tend to thwart instead of encourage political participation,” ADA 
members also recognized the need to curtail “professional power centers … to permit a 
flexibility [that] will encourage new ideas and foster a greater responsiveness to the needs 
of the people.” The moment had arrived, they argued, “for liberals in each state across the 
country to formulate their objectives, project their viewpoints, and mount the attack for 
reform.”24 Accordingly, national director Leon Shull issued an “urgent” memorandum to 
all ADA chapters informing them of the DNC’s creation of the two reform commissions 
and the decision of the national board “to make political and electoral reform a priority 
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campaign for the ADA.” “Our objective,” he emphasized, “is a set of proposals which, if 
adopted, could produce a more responsive, representative, and democratic political 
system.”25 Shull also sent letters directly to commission chairs McGovern and O’Hara, as 
well as the other commissioners, passing on to them the ADA’s notes on The Democratic 
Choice and conveying the organization’s support and encouragement: “I cannot think of a 
more important job that needs to be done in our political system.”26 
 The prospect for far-reaching reform was also shaped by the core cadre of party 
insurgents responsible for producing The Democratic Choice and extracting an official 
commitment to party reform from the convention, who continued their organizing efforts 
after the events in Chicago. Beginning as early as September 1968, Thomas Alder, 
Geoffrey Cowan, Anne Wexler, Eli Segal, and others patched together a lobbying 
campaign to pressure then-DNC chair O’Brien to announce plans to create an official 
reform commission, no matter the outcome of the election in November. The party 
leadership’s convergence on a “unity through reform” consensus following Humphrey’s 
narrow loss increased the reformers’ leverage to lobby for representation on the two 
announced commissions themselves. Newly installed DNC chair Fred Harris, arriving in 
January 1969, eventually approved commissioner or staff positions for Wexler and Segal, 
as well as for Hughes Commission members Donald Fraser, Alexander Bickel, Frederick 
Dutton, and Harold Hughes. Aaron Henry, leader of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic 
Party in its 1964 convention challenge was also appointed, as were academic 
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professionals Richard Wade, Austin Ranney, and Samuel Beer after expressing their 
scholarly and partisan interests in the process of Democratic Party reform.27 
 Lastly, newly developing organized groups and movement networks, appearing 
midway through the reform process, also devoted themselves to promoting party reform 
and constituted something like a para-party network. As we will see, Common Cause, the 
Congressional Black Caucus, the Center for Political Reform, and the National Women’s 
Political Caucus – all formed between 1970 and 1971 – made crucial interventions in the 
reform process, often by creating their own party reform task forces to perform 
“watchdog operations” monitoring state and local compliance measures and then 
communicating valuable information back to the official reform commission staff. 
Access to and use of media outlets such as The Nation and The New Republic was 
supplemented with The New Democrat, the reform coalition’s own monthly magazine 
launched by Stephen Schlesinger, son of the ADA’s Arthur Schlesinger, which dedicated 
itself to providing activists with “a platform to enunciate ideas, with an arena to voice 
discontents, and with a bullhorn to attack old politics.”28 
 
Labor’s Visions of Party Reform 
If a vague consensus on reform congealed within the upper ranks of the official party 
leadership, providing a window of opportunity for reformers pushing from below, a 
sharply contrasting perspective took shape among key figures of the trade union 
leadership, who sought to close that window and return to the old ways. Those at the top 
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of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), 
especially Committee on Political Education (COPE) director Alexander Barkan, saw a 
need for change in the party, but in the direction of restricting access of “outsider” 
groups. 
 Several important factors conditioned COPE’s hostility to the New Politics reform 
movement. On the one hand, by the late 1960s organized labor had never been a more 
significant force in the Democratic Party. As we have seen, the AFL-CIO leadership had 
been more directly involved in the presidential nominating campaign of 1968 than ever 
before, urging Humphrey to enter the race after Johnson’s withdrawal, and even 
establishing a nationwide labor committee to round up pro-Humphrey delegates in the 
non-primary states. Such an unprecedented effort on the part of labor for a Democratic 
candidate went well beyond the nominating process. While labor’s mobilization for 
election season had been institutionalized since the New Deal, 1968 saw this party-
movement relationship reach new heights. As political journalist Theodore White 
observed: 
 
The [COPE] strategy was homely and time-honored: to register working 
people, then get them out to vote. But the results, effort, and technique 
were staggering. Volunteers card-punched names of union members 
across the country, by state, county, and precinct. Computers in 
Washington digested names, spewed them out broken down by walking 
lists, arranged by street numbers; volunteers, trained by the 
Communications Workers Union, manned telephones; others rang 
doorbells. Appalled at the official Party’s disarray, the AFL-CIO assumed 
responsibility for grinding out special literature and special appeals in the 
thirty-one black communities across the nation. 
 The dimension of the AFL-CIO effort, unprecedented in American 
history, can be caught only by its final summary figures: the ultimate 
registration, by labor’s efforts, of 4.6 million voters; the printing and 
distribution of 55 million pamphlets and leaflets out of Washington and 60 
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million more from local unions; telephone banks in 638 localities, using 
8,055 telephones, manned by 24,511 union men and women and their 
families; some 72,255 house-to-house canvassers; and, on election day, 
94,457 volunteers serving as car-poolers, materials distributors, baby-
sitters, poll-watchers, telephoners.29 
 
 Such an unprecedented effort on the part of labor had been a necessary response 
to the Democratic Party’s own organizational atrophy.30 Throughout the late summer and 
early fall of 1968 field reports from COPE and other union political operatives had 
poured into the AFL-CIO’s Executive Council as well as the DNC decrying the 
“disorganization” and “financial chaos” plaguing state and local party bodies.31 The party 
organizations, the reports detailed, had been found in most places to be “non-functioning, 
non-existent, or feuding,” requiring “the political organization, abilities, and capacities of 
the trade union’s political arm (COPE) to bear the brunt of this year’s election 
campaign.”32 While the results of such an undertaking had been disappointed by Richard 
Nixon’s election, Barkan reflected positively on labor’s 1968 performance, calling it “the 
best political effort by labor since the founding of COPE” in 1955.33 Not only had the 
AFL-CIO improved its technical capacity to mobilize, they had equally demonstrated 
their centrality to Democratic presidential prospects. As federation president George 
Meany put it, “after the shambles of the Democratic convention, we were all Humphrey 
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had.”34 While the contours of reform were not yet clear at the outset of 1969, when it 
came to the prospects of reforming the party, most of the trade union leadership saw little 
reason for an overhaul and had never had more at stake in the outcome of such a process.  
 These same labor leaders, however, were in favor of a kind of reform, one that 
differed sharply from that held by advocates of the New Politics as well as most party 
leaders. A second factor conditioning COPE’s hostile response to the New Politics 
movement was the pervasive interpretation that the party insurgents were to blame for the 
disastrous Chicago convention and the subsequent loss in November. In his election post-
mortem, in addition to the dysfunctional regular party organization, Barkan identified 
“the inaction of the McCarthyites and other hold-outs” as “primarily responsible for the 
defeat” at the polls. 35  While this interpretation was at odds with the findings of a 
prominent group of political scientists, it was for many a foregone conclusion that 
because McCarthy had initially withheld his endorsement of Humphrey in the aftermath 
of Chicago, and that party insurgents were self-evidently more devoted to “issues” like 
ending the war in Vietnam than the electoral success of the party as such, their 
intransigence had paved the way for Richard Nixon to enter the White House.36 Having 
gone “all out” for Humphrey in the general election, enmity for the “party wreckers” ran 
deep among many top labor officials.37 Reform, in their eyes, meant rebuilding the party 
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organization to shore up the power of the same bosses the insurgents were denouncing in 
Chicago. For Barkan, “the so-called political bosses were smart enough to pick 
candidates who could win. These ‘bosses’ gave us a Truman, a Stevenson, a Kennedy, a 
Humphrey, you name it.”38  
The pro-Humphrey labor leadership had lined up behind their candidate in 
Chicago to support the reform resolutions as a means to “pacify the radicals,” never 
imagining that much of any substance would emerge from their proceedings.39 As it 
became clear that meaningful change was not only desired but within reach for the 
“radicals,” Barkan and other labor operatives moved to undermine the legitimacy of the 
reform project. In seeking to reunify the party, DNC chairs O’Brien and Harris eagerly 
solicited labor’s participation in the reform process. However, when provided with a list 
of proposed reform commission members and staff, Barkan protested that it “was so 
overloaded with ‘new politics’ people” he dismissed the entire project as “stacked” and 
“hopeless.”40 After conferring with Meany and Steelworkers president I.W. Abel, who 
had been named to the McGovern-Fraser Commission, the AFL-CIO leaders agreed to 
withdraw from the reform proceedings altogether in hopes of depriving its findings of 
labor’s implicit stamp of approval.41 James O’Hara, chair of the Commission on Rules, a 
close ally of Barkan, and a future member of the anti-reform Coalition for a Democratic 
Majority, tried in vain to pull him back into the reform process, if only to mitigate the 
public relations problems that could develop if labor was viewed as attacking the reform 
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process after having sat it out. As O’Hara recorded in his diary, he told Barkan that “the 
time to move in on the McGovern-Fraser Commission was before it made its 
recommendations rather than trying to operate on these recommendations after they were 
made.” Barkan, however, demurred, insisting on a “hands off” approach.42 Abel did not 
contribute to future commission meetings. 
It is important to stress that labor was not monolithic on the issue of party reform. 
In fact, the reform of the Democratic Party exposed and exacerbated tectonic frictions 
already present within the trade union movement by the late 1960s, not only between 
conservative craft union leaders and their more liberal industrial counterparts, but also 
between established union leaders – often white middle-aged men – and their rank and 
file members, whose demographic shift toward young people, people of color, and 
women was stressing unions’ representative structures to the breaking point. Any 
simplistic rendering of this political dynamic as a conflict between white collar reformers 
and blue collar unionists fails to capture how party reform was “complexly entangled” 
with the struggles within the labor union hierarchy. 43  While COPE’s Barkan was 
intractably opposed to the New Politics, the UAW, who disaffiliated with the AFL-CIO 
in 1968 due to irreconcilable political visions for American unionism, were supportive of 
the reform movement from the start, becoming one of its principal supporters, promoters, 
and drivers through the 1970s.44 In an autopsy on the 1968 elections, an internal UAW 
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document reported the existence of “a great big new political constituency out there 
waiting for political parties to understand, to organize, and to weave into the 
organizational fabric.” 45  Bill Dodds, political director of the UAW and an active 
participant of the McGovern-Fraser Commission, wasted no time in congratulating DNC 
chair O’Brien for his “practical organizing steps” in establishing the commissions so soon 
after the 1968 election, ensuring that something substantive would come of the 
convention resolutions “rather than just talk.” 46  The UAW went further when Sam 
Fishman, director of the union’s Community Action Program, publicly testified the 
following year that the Auto Workers “have a deep interest in and a desire to see the 
Democratic Party make meaningful changes that would democratize the political process 
and political relationships in this country.”47 While the UAW was the lone union to get 
behind the New Politics movement at the outset, as we will see, many unions within the 
AFL-CIO such as the Communication Workers, the Electrical Workers, the Machinists, 
the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, and many others 
would come to support it through the controversial presidential candidacy of George 
McGovern in 1972. 
 
The New Politics Project: Opening the Party, Strengthening the Party 
Whether meant as a positive evaluation or a criticism, the New Politics movement is 
often said to have “opened the party” through the reform process. While this is accurate 
in the sense of removing barriers to participation that many insurgents had encountered 
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through the campaigns of 1968, the phrase should not obscure the more fundamental 
project at work in the New Politics movement: transforming the Democratic Party into a 
programmatic, left-liberal party by going beyond the structural limitations of the New 
Deal coalition. George McGovern himself underscored the connection between reform 
and realignment when we told his fellow commissioners that 
 
the heart and soul of the political party is its philosophy, its policies, and 
its approach that it takes to the great issues of our domestic society. …No 
procedural reform can ever serve as a substitute for these essential matters 
of policy, philosophy, and substance. …[But] responsive, effective 
political procedure is the handmaiden of responsive policy formation.48 
 
Reformers not only wanted to open the party for the newly mobilized social movements, 
but also explicitly sought to exclude others, such as conservative southern Democrats, 
from that coalition. This goal of the reform agenda is understandable in light of the long-
perceived shortcomings of an ideologically bifurcated, structurally decentralized national 
party organization, which could simultaneously contain race liberals, southern 
conservatives, foreign policy hawks, and liberal doves in the same coalition. In this sense, 
the New Politics movement represented a crescendo in the long struggle to resolve the 
contradictions of the New Deal Democratic Party. 
 
Surveying the Grassroots 
That reforming the party to transform the coalition was the main objective of the New 
Politics movement is clear from the proceedings of the Commission on Party Structure 
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and Delegation Selection itself.49 The reformers wasted no time in getting to work in 
drawing up an ambitious agenda. With all commission members and staff finalized by 
March 1969, the Commission initiated a series of seventeen regional hearings by the end 
of April, lasting through mid-summer, to “elicit grass roots sentiment” from over 500 
officeholders, interest group representatives, and members of the public who provided 
testimony on the issue of party reform.50 That the Commission hearings were more likely 
to provide a venue for the airing of grievances rather than endorsement of the status quo 
was established by the DNC chair himself, when he gaveled to order the initial session in 
Washington, DC, with the declaration that “undemocratic processes are obvious and 
glaring” and must be resolved through the “all-out reform of our party.”51 Harris’s bold 
iteration of the reform consensus among party leaders not only gave the stamp of national 
authority to the newly created Commission – an authority surpassing that of a merely 
investigative body like the Special Equal Rights Committee – but also foreshadowed the 
tone taken by the avalanche of criticisms and recommendations that followed in its wake. 
 While the Commission’s regional hearings solicited unsurprising attacks on the 
mechanics of the presidential nominating process – the unit rule, malapportionment, 
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unrepresentative committees, abuses of party chairs and proxy voting – as well as the 
marginalization of dissent in Chicago and the party leadership’s belated reversal in 
support for the Vietnam War, the hearings also revealed a penetrating critique of the New 
Deal coalition and the party structure undergirding it. Senator Harold Hughes testified 
that incorporating the “practical idealists of the New Politics” into the party would 
require more than procedural openness, but must “involve losing some of the allegiances” 
of the past.52 Others pointed to the same problem of recomposing the coalition, including 
the Reverend Channing Phillips, who insisted that “we must discard the old mold of 
alliances that have proven themselves ineffective and dysfunctional.”53 The UAW’s Paul 
Schrade put a finer point on it when he testified: 
 
A policy of inclusion of the party’s major constituencies is in order, but 
there must be exclusions, too. There are certain Southern Democrats who 
ought to leave the party. …That’s one of the problems with the old 
politics. …Most Southern Democrats are allowed to scab on us at the 
ballot box and in Congress. …[T]he old Democrats of the South must go. 
We must find a way to exclude people who interests are contrary to the 
Party’s.54 
 
Georgia state representative Julian Bond echoed the same point, attesting that “there will 
always be diversity” among Democrats, but those with “diametrically opposed” positions 
should not “be able to find shelter under the same umbrella.” “The party has to have 
some kind of ideology,” he insisted.55 
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 The lack of a coherent ideological consensus in the party was itself connected to 
the absence of any institutional mechanisms for building that consensus or enforcing 
programmatic coherence among elected officeholders. Veteran Kennedy advisor 
Theodore Sorensen criticized the national party platform as a “hodgepodge of platitudes,” 
while a top staffer in the New Jersey UAW called the platforms “meaningless exercises 
in rhetoric, the primary objective of which is to hide every controversial plank under of a 
morass of verbiage and bombast.” 56  The use of such ineffective venues of activity 
“further discourages participation in the party” because “after overcoming all of these 
obstacles and fighting through for adopting of platforms and promises … large numbers 
of elected public and party officials [tend] to go their own way” once in office.57 Thomas 
Bradley, soon to be the first black mayor of Los Angeles, complained that “our National 
Platform may say one thing but you find candidates who go off in a hundred and eighty 
degrees different directions in too many cases.”58 
 As the transcripts of Commission testimony attest, there was much more at issue 
than the technical aspects of delegate selection systems. By asking the question of what 
barriers – “legal or otherwise” – were preventing “meaningful participation” in the 
Democratic Party, the McGovern-Fraser Commission churned up penetrating critiques of 
the nature of American party politics in general, the parties’ relationship to society, and 
the functions parties perform in the formulation of public policy.59 Florida Democrat and 
commission member Leroy Collins had raised how far-reaching the Commission’s 
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activity may go in a letter to his fellow commissioners prior to the beginning of the 
regional hearings. 
 
It seems obvious to me that we must consider all legitimate questions 
concerning the structure of our Party. No area should be sacrosanct. …It 
may well be that a new kind of structure is required to meet the needs of 
our time and the years beyond.60 
 
The Commission was told that participation in the Democratic Party could no 
longer mean “just ratifying someone else’s choice of a candidate,” and that the very idea 
of a political party had to be rethought.61 This was reflected in the testimony of William 
Haber, chairman of the state reform commission in Michigan, who reported that he and 
his fellow reformers “are not thinking of our role as … purely procedural in character.”62 
Indeed, Joseph Duffey, an important figure among the Connecticut Democrats who 
penned The Democratic Choice, told the Commission, “We don’t feel that the prime 
purpose of political parties in today’s system can be to have the ability under all 
circumstances to win elections. …[T]he political party best functions as lobbyist for the 
people who are its members.”63  California Democrat Jesse Unruh (the prototype for 
James Q. Wilson’s Amateur Democrat) echoed the sentiment, holding that “the time has 
passed where the chief function of a political party is to win elections.”64 
The idea of transforming the party into a new type of organization was most 
clearly explicated by members of the New Democratic Coalition (NDC), who sent 
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representatives to nearly every single commission hearing. “The party must serve the 
people between elections years,” they asserted.  
 
The party, as opposed to the candidate or the officeholder, should be 
involved in issues which are vital to the people of the state. The party 
itself, through the state central committee, must lead the way to bring 
political solutions to pressing problems. The party must be concerned, in a 
democratic way, with issues and must act to support the principles its 
claims.65  
 
What was needed was “a new kind of political service organization,” one that was 
“activist” in orientation. 66  It was recommended that such a transformation be 
accomplished by altering the party structure to include “antipoverty boards, 
representatives from the grassroots poor, the black, and the brown,” integrating these 
constituents not only as voters but as participants “in the highest levels of decision 
making.”67  
But if notions of participatory democracy informed many of the perceived 
deficiencies of Democratic Party organization, procedural openness was seen as having 
limits in effecting the kind of transformation many advocates of the New Politics had in 
mind. “Opening the door to the party may not be enough,” a NDC activist warned the 
Commission. “If we are to develop a broad base, representing the best interests of 
Americans and thus winning elections, we may have to pull people inside.”68 Eugene 
O’Grady, chair of the Ohio Democratic Party, proposed that the project will “take more 
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than what we may do by reforming the party structure. …We’ve got to find something in 
the way of an educational system … of getting people specifically involved in politics.”69 
Schrade saw such an effort as essential if a new majoritarian political project was to be 
launched: 
 
I am proposing that our new coalition develop a new politics for the 
Democratic Party. …In building and developing that majority, we must 
carry on an intensive effort of political education and community 
organizing. We have to go to the poor communities, to the minority 
communities and offer our help, not thrust it upon them, but offer our help 
in bringing about community organization among … those who are 
alienated and discontented.70 
 
 In sum, the McGovern-Fraser Commission’s regional hearings served as a 
galvanizing space, where a shared vision of a reformed Democratic Party was able to take 
shape. That vision, while necessarily vague in its institutional design, depicted a party 
that was both more open to the mobilized social forces of the late 1960s but also less 
ideologically eclectic and decentralized, suggesting that the motives animating the New 
Politics movement were not primarily anti-party in nature. On the contrary, New Politics 
testimonials promulgated a reinvigorated role of party organization in political life, one 
that was “activist” in nature and not merely a passive vehicle for the filling of public 
office.  
However, to the extent that the New Politics vision reached beyond dismantling 
procedural barriers to entry and pointed to the need for the party to take responsibility for 
educating, mobilizing, and politicizing sections of American society normally shut out of 
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traditional forms of politics, it foreshadowed the limits of the New Politics movement as 
a whole. While many of the recommendations proposed in public testimony concerned 
improving access to the ballot box, such as early voting, easing registration and residency 
requirements, precious few devoted attention to the non-political barriers such as 
childcare, transportation, or work schedules. Pointing to $100 to $250-a-plate party 
fundraisers, members of the UAW were exceptional when they asked rhetorically, “how 
do you give everybody in this country a chance to participate fully in American political 
life when it is so costly?” and “how many of the young, black, working class Democrats 
can afford to buy even one ticket for … one of these?”71 That the commissioners had 
agreed among themselves that their reforms should function to “attract the interest and 
enthusiasm of the concerned citizen” reflects the extent to which the New Politics project 
was oriented toward opening the party for those already demanding access.72  While 
recognizing that “the party structure cannot be reformed in a vacuum,” the Commission 
also accepted that they were constrained practically in their ability to transform the wider 
sociopolitical environment.73 This was not a bias of the reformers’ own “new class,” 
white collar elitism, but a reflection of the obstacles to transforming the organizational 
basis of American party politics. 
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Restricting the “Mandate for Reform”: Prioritizing Delegate Selection 
But if the public testimony solicited through the many commission hearings throughout 
the spring and summer of 1969 pointed toward a wholesale transformation of the 
Democratic Party, actual Commission activities quickly ran up against the limits of 
pursing so far-reaching a reform agenda. The McGovern-Fraser Commission’s original 
embrace of such a broad program, including subdividing its activities between three 
committees specializing on delegate selection, grassroots participation, and party 
structure, was soon jettisoned in favor of prioritizing delegate selection reform. While the 
hearings had outlined a transformative vision for the New Politics in the Democratic 
Party, they also suggested the magnitude such an undertaking would entail, outstripping 
the practical capacities of the Commission, its funding, and its convention mandate. Even 
though most of the Commission staff members were sympathetic to the broadest 
interpretation of that mandate, they still recognized that biting off a more manageable 
subset of reforms would enhance the likelihood of success, especially because they 
anticipated delays in implementation. As commission consultant Richard Wade informed 
chairman McGovern in June, mid-way through the hearing process: 
 
The scope of the project is so large and the resources available to us so 
modest that the establishment of priorities is obviously essential to make 
certain that the first commitment of the commission be met this summer. 
…This means that the initial emphasis should be placed on informing 
states which are out of compliance that they must change their procedures 
before the next convention. Since in many states this would require a 
change in legislation, that information should be presented to the state 
chairmen early this fall.74 
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By the conclusion of the public hearings in August 1969 the prioritization of 
delegate selection had been finalized, reabsorbing the activities of the three 
subcommittees into the central commission and deferring their research for later 
consideration (see below). After several months of analysis, debate, and deliberation, the 
full Commission approved a list of eighteen binding guidelines for state parties’ delegate 
selection systems in November 1969 and distributed the final product to all state parties 
at the end of the year.75 When the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection 
published its findings in April 1970 as Mandate for Reform, it framed its intervention as a 
response to a crisis of internal party democracy and representation. “After a lengthy 
examination of the structures and processes used to select delegates to the National 
Convention in 1968, this is our basic conclusion: meaningful participation of Democratic 
voters in the choice of their presidential nominee was often difficult or costly, sometimes 
completely illusory, and, in not a few instances, impossible.” 76  The use of “secret 
caucuses, closed slate-making, widespread proxy voting – and a host of other procedural 
irregularities – were all too common,” it reported.77 The official document made positive 
reference to the pioneering work of the Hughes Commission and endorsed a phrase 
appearing in The Democratic Choice (originally attributed to 1928 Democratic nominee 
Al Smith): “The cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy.”78 And while the 
Commission had the authority of the national convention behind it, and very little 
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resistance was forthcoming at the time, Mandate for Reform concluded with a dire 
warning should the party resist the changes therein. 
 
We believe that popular control of the Democratic Party is necessary for 
its survival. …[O]ur Party is the only major vehicle for peaceful, 
progressive change in the United States. If we are not an open party; if we 
do not represent the demands for change, then the danger is not that people 
will go to the Republican Party; it is that there will no longer be a way for 
people committed to orderly change to fulfill their needs and desires 
within our traditional political system. It is that they will turn to third or 
fourth party politics or the anti-politics of the street.79 
 
 The binding guidelines that followed did not specify what form delegate selection 
had to take, but did outline a set of “reasonable standards” meant to guarantee all rank-
and-file Democratic activists and voters a “full, meaningful, and timely opportunity to 
participate,” which ruled out many widely used methods and practices.80 These included 
some relatively uncontroversial modernizing reforms such as selecting all delegates in the 
same calendar year as the convention, requiring state parties to provide written rules for 
party procedures, and to provide adequate public notice of party meetings with uniform 
dates and times. Combined with the ban on proxy voting – a practice frequently abused 
by county party chairs in 1968 – these reforms effectively eliminated the ability of party 
organizations to hold the closed caucus meetings so frequently encountered by the 
antiwar insurgents in non-primary states.  
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The guidelines also reaffirmed the prohibition of the unit rule passed by the 1968 
Chicago convention, clarifying that it was impermissible at any stage of the delegate 
selection process. This also banned the practice of favorite son candidates, where caucus-
convention systems could award all state delegates to a nominal presidential candidate to 
increase the state’s bargaining power with the eventual nominee. In light of the Supreme 
Court’s 1962 Baker v. Carr decision, requiring a one-person, one-vote standard of 
legislative apportionment, the Commission sought to protect the representation of 
minority political views by mandating that delegates be awarded in proportion to the 
results of all subnational contests, so long as the presidential candidate clears a certain 
threshold of support. (An internal Commission disagreement over whether California’s 
long-standing practice of a winner-take-all primary constituted a violation of the 
proportional representation guideline resulted in the “recommendation” that the issue be 
settled by the 1972 convention.) However, this required that all potential delegates 
competing for a seat indicate which candidate they intended to support at the convention, 
even if this meant specifying an “uncommitted” status. Such a provision effectively 
eliminated the frequent use of the delegate primary, where party members selected from a 
list of potential delegates without any formal statement indicating which candidate they 
supported. 
 More controversially, the guidelines stripped Democratic Party officials and 
officeholders of their ex-officio or automatic delegate status, which had traditionally 
granted them the prerogative to attend national conventions as voting delegates. While 
the Commission was aware of the outcry this would provoke among Democratic 
politicians, automatic delegate status violated all three key criteria on which the 
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Commission was operating: automatic delegates denied grassroots participants a “full” 
and “meaningful” opportunity to participate in party affairs by excluding them from a 
certain number of delegate spots; nor were automatic delegates selected in a “timely” 
fashion, as most had been elected to their official post well before the calendar year of the 
convention. Even aside from the absence of any convincing rationale for their retention, 
most of the New Politics members of the Commission and its staff saw these figures as 
unduly influential on convention decision making, effectively commanding delegate 
loyalty through disingenuous calls for party unity or promises of patronage.81 
 Moreover, while the reformers in the McGovern-Fraser Commission revoked the 
privileges of party and public officials to function as unelected delegates, they also 
drastically curtailed the authority of state party committees to fill delegate seats through 
committee appointment, limiting its extent to no more than 10 percent of a state 
delegation. This was complemented with the Commission’s extension of the right to run 
as a delegate to anyone, effectively ending the monopoly of state and local party 
committees on slate-making processes. Party committees were still free to make and 
endorse a slate of delegates – whether they identified with a candidate or as uncommitted 
– but could no longer deny ballot or caucus access to other rival slates or charge them 
onerous filing fees. 
 Most controversial, however, both in terms of internal Commission deliberations 
as well as in terms of their long-term implications, were the affirmative action guidelines. 
In making their case that the party was facing a crisis of representation, the authors of 
Mandate for Reform had observed that “the delegates to the 1968 Democratic National 
Convention … were predominately white, male, middle-aged, and at least middle 
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class.”82 In response, they sought to “overcome the effects of past discrimination” by 
encouraging state parties to take “affirmative steps” to represent “minority groups, young 
people, and women in reasonable relationship to their presence in the population of the 
State.”83 Reflecting the roots of the New Politics reform movement in the Mississippi 
Freedom struggle at the 1964 Atlantic City convention, as well as the youth and women’s 
movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the affirmative action mandate was the 
clearest item signaling the intention of the reformers to transform the Democratic Party 
into a vehicle for political realignment. 
 The combined impact of the reform package contained in Mandate for Reform 
effectively eliminated two of the most frequently used delegate selection methods – 
closed caucuses and delegate primaries – while placing significant limitations on a third:  
committee appointments. This, when added to the prohibition of automatic delegates, 
amounted to a dramatic weakening of the capacity of state party officials to control the 
nomination process. Stipulations for affirmative action for the three most mobilized 
social groups of the era provided a mechanism to aid activists outside the party to enter. 
These new party rules reflected the intention of the reformers to prevent a recurrence of 
their experience in 1968. As commission member Anne Wexler later reflected, “We 
knew all the time what this meant. We knew that we were going to change the face of 
American politics.”84 
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The Movement-Party Dynamic: Implementing the Mandate from Above and Below 
When the McGovern-Fraser Commission finalized, published, and disseminated 25,000 
copies of its guidelines for delegate selection reform in the spring of 1970 (with 
important financial assistance from the UAW), its staff sent notice to the DNC that it was 
“clearly evident” that all fifty state Democratic parties were “substantially out of 
compliance” with the new rules.85 However, by the date of their final report, just prior to 
the 1972 Democratic convention, the Commission could claim that the vast majority of 
the state organizations were in “full compliance,” while the few remainders satisfied 
“substantial compliance.”86 In the two years between the reports, the reform package 
contained in Mandate for Reform had become party law and been implemented in all 
state parties. Indeed, in twenty-two instances, state law had needed to be altered to satisfy 
the reform guidelines. As radical as the guidelines produced by the Commission 
reformers were, what is more remarkable is the success they had in enforcing them – an 
undertaking, according to one prominent party scholar, “unparalleled in the history of 
American party politics.”87 This was the result of a confluence of forces, acting from 
above and below, but which converged on the assertion of national party power over its 
state level affiliates. While it is in one sense true that the reformers were attacking the 
power of regular state party officials to dominate party governance, it was more the case 
that reformers were attempting to empower what had always been formally the highest 
authority in the party: the national convention. Those who protested this transformation 
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in party authority, as did, for example, the Illinois state chair when he “question[ed] the 
right of the previous convention to set the rules of the 1972 Convention,” had precious 
few intellectual rationales to justify the old ways.88 
 At the center of the implementation phase was the McGovern-Fraser Commission 
itself, particularly its leaders and staff, who began issuing individually tailored reports of 
compliance status to state party chairs in February of 1970. Through the spring and 
summer, the reformers engaged in continual communication with state and local party 
officials, local reformers, activist organizations, as well as the national party chair. The 
team acted as a coordination hub for a host of interested actors operating at multiple 
levels of the party. The promotion of Minnesota representative Donald Fraser to the 
Commission chair in January 1971 to replace George McGovern, who vacated to pursue 
an early bid for the presidency, reinforced this dynamic. Fraser’s own background in the 
unique Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party of his home state gave him a long-abiding 
interest in party reform, especially in building a strong, progressive national structure that 
was more than just a “pawn” of the presidential nominee.89  
 In addition to the actions of the Commission itself, the implementation and 
enforcement of the reform guidelines occurred at three levels, all of which interacted with 
and complemented the sustained activity of the McGovern-Fraser Commission. At the 
top level, in the Democratic National Committee, Lawrence O’Brien returned to serve as 
party chair, filling the vacancy left by the outgoing Fred Harris, who also departed in 
February of 1970 to plan an ultimately ill-fated bid for the 1972 presidential nomination. 
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O’Brien, one of original architects of the “unity through reform” consensus, had not 
changed his tune during his short absence. In fact, on his return to the chairmanship he 
found the intraparty divisions to have grown “even more serious” in the interim.  
 
The problem encompassed far more than our loss of the 1968 election. We 
had lost in 1952 and 1956 and remained reasonably united. But in 1970 
the bitter divisions of 1968 still existed – hawk versus dove, liberal versus 
conservative, reformer versus regular – and no reconciliation was in 
sight.90 
 
In response, O’Brien doubled down on this original unity strategy, viewing a 
smooth, uncontroversial reform process as the most viable means of rebuilding a 
competitive party for 1972 and beyond. Given the imminent publication of Mandate for 
Reform, O’Brien’s pragmatism and institutional responsibility led him to embrace the 
reform movement, becoming one of its most vocal spokespersons, despite the continual 
suspicion of many reform activists. Such efforts included soliciting and widely 
circulating the expert opinion of the party’s chief counsel, former LBJ aide Joseph 
Califano, who concluded that the McGovern-Fraser guidelines had the binding effect of 
party law. The Califano memo also raised “the ultimate penalty for the failure of a State 
Party to comply with the requirements … is to deny seating to [their] delegation” at the 
1972 convention.91 If there was any doubt remaining about where the party chairman 
stood on the question of the reforms’ binding status, O’Brien moved a compliant national 
committee in February 1971 to insert without amendment the guidelines into the 
preliminary Call to the 1972 Convention issued to the state organizations. These 
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maneuvers created an air of inevitability to the reforms, and whittled away the grounds 
upon which the rule changes might be challenged. 
 The DNC chairman’s authoritative endorsement of the findings of the McGovern-
Fraser Commission not only legitimized their past activities and created additional space 
for reformers inside and outside the party to make subsequent interventions, but also 
foreclosed any chance that the party chair might act as leader and coordinator of an anti-
reform movement inside the party. Ironically, the decentralized federal structure of the 
Democratic Party, which had been at the core of New Deal liberals’ frustrations since the 
1940s, now worked against the anti-New Politics forces within the party coalition. A 
states’ rights party structure militated against the formation of any cohesive, organized 
resistance movement in the face of the New Politics. The undemocratic operation of the 
DNC – something the reformers were preparing to change – presented an unmovable 
obstacle for those state party chairs upset by the imposition of the new Commission 
guidelines from above. As O’Brien proudly announced to the DNC: “We have taken the 
’68 mandate and implemented it …There will be no turning back.”92 Once the chair was 
on board with the reforms, anti-reformers had no vehicle through which to mobilize.93 
 At the middle level, implementation of reform was overseen by “little McGovern 
Commissions” set up within each state party, which tailored each guideline to local 
conditions while coordinating their activity with the “big” Commission’s chair and 
staff.94 By early 1971, more than one thousand party members and officials were at work 
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in these state reform commissions nationwide.95 Initially, their progress had been uneven, 
encountering ambivalence about the reform project in many states, especially those with 
more highly integrated organizations, who first reacted to reports of their noncompliance 
with neglect, expecting the annoyance to go away.96 While such annoyances continued to 
come from McGovern-Fraser staff and their state level counterparts, the critical inflection 
point in the reform process came with the 1970 midterm elections, which swept 
seventeen new Democrats, many of them self-styled reformers, into governors mansions 
across the country. Whether for principled or pragmatic reasons, the new crop of reform 
Democrats elected to office had the interest and the means to spur state and local officials 
to comply with the new delegate selection regulations.97 
From the bottom, an array of pro-reform groups, networks, and organizations 
constituted something akin to a para-party grassroots army, assisting the implementation 
process as promoters, data collectors, watchdog monitors, lobbyists, courtroom plaintiffs, 
and outside agitators. Newly formed good government organizations such as John 
Gardner’s Common Cause and the Center for Political Reform, founded by former 
McGovern-Fraser consultant Ken Bode, took an officially nonpartisan position, yet their 
project of promoting active citizen participation in political life dovetailed with the 
reforms being engineered in the Democratic Party. In February 1971, Common Cause 
launched a special task force to advance the twin goals of party reform and participation, 
appointing New Politics reformer Anne Wexler to head it. Meanwhile, the ADA 
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announced the formation of its own special Convention Task Force to “oversee the 
delegate selection and Convention processes,” offering to “assist in legal tests of those 
procedures” if necessary. As Allard Lowenstein, then-ADA national chair, wrote in a 
press release,  
 
In 1968, there was more grassroots participation in the presidential 
nominating process than ever before. …As a result, our party procedures 
were put to a severe test – which they did not pass. In too many states, the 
official party structures remained closed and unresponsive to increased 
rank-and-file participation. …American for Democratic Action has long 
been committed to party reform. Through our National Convention Task 
Force, we are undertaking an action program which we hope will speed 
and ensure its implementation.98 
 
 Others, such as the National Women’s Political Caucus (NWPC), became 
involved not only in enforcing the guidelines but in their effective interpretation as well. 
Establishing themselves as the “political arm” of the women’s movement in July 1971, 
founders Bella Abzug, Gloria Steinem, Betty Friedan, Arvonne Fraser, Mildred Jeffrey, 
Shirley Chisholm, and Fannie Lou Hamer outlined a national strategy to “channel” the 
new feminism into “a political movement” that could secure “women’s participation in 
political power.”99 They made it their first priority to “get into existing decision making 
positions within the parties” to influence the 1972 nominating conventions. 100 
Accordingly, the NWPC created a delegate selection task force to pressure the 
Democratic Party to comply with the reform guidelines, especially its affirmative action 
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mandate for women’s representation on state delegations. NWPC activists, they said, 
“should be prepared within each district to raise money … to go to the political 
conventions and challenge the seating of a delegation if they are not proportionally 
representative of women.”101  
The NWPC leadership not only began laying the groundwork for a grassroots 
mobilization of women into the party, they also pressed the party chair and the reform 
Commission to strengthen the affirmative action mandate. In October 1971, reform 
Commission chair Donald Fraser sent a long memo to all state party leaders, detailing 
what state level compliance with the affirmative action guidelines looked like, including 
the development of publicity, educational, and organizational campaigns “to encourage 
widespread participation.”102 However, after a meeting between Commission chair Fraser 
and members of the NWPC in November 1971, O’Brien issued at the Commission’s 
request a notice to all party chairs, vice chairs, national committee members, and 
governors that the “standard” by which “full compliance” with the affirmative action 
mandate could be assessed at the 1972 convention would be drawn from the “reasonable 
relationship” language of the guideline. The missive stated: 
 
State parties should be on notice that whenever the proportion of women, 
minorities, and young people in a delegation … is less than the proportion 
of these groups in the total population, and the delegation is challenged on 
[these] grounds … such a challenge will constitute a prima facie showing 
of violation of the guidelines, and the state Democratic Party, along with 
                                                
101 Transcript of First Organizing Session, NWPC Records. 
102  Memo from Donald Fraser to Democratic State Party Leaders, 18 October 1971, Box 48, Folder: 
Democratic Party; Coalition for a Democratic Majority, Correspondence, November 1972-September 1973, 
O’Hara Collection. 
  218 
the challenged delegation, has the burden of showing that the state party 
took full and affirmative action to achieve such representation.103 
 
The strengthening of the affirmative action mandate by inserting the prima facie 
evidence clause and shifting the burden of proof to the challenged delegation would have 
enormous ramifications for the 1972 Democratic convention and the ongoing course of 
party reform. Not only would the number of formal credentials challenges skyrocket past 
the historic precedent set in 1968, but successful use of demographic representational 
mechanisms by new party entrants, when combined with the 1972 election outcome, 
would prove to be a potent weapon in the hands of anti-reformers, who turned to the 
“quota system” as a wedge to attack the reforms as undemocratic and unrepresentative 
amidst an atmosphere of backlash. 
However, the interaction between the NWPC, the Commission, and the DNC was 
itself indicative of the general dynamic of the New Politics reform movement, one that 
flowed through and connected the multiple levels of activity that together would produce 
the most dramatic assertion of national party power in the name participatory democracy. 
George McGovern himself indicated that such a dynamic had been on the minds of some 
of the reform leaders when he told the readers of Stephen Schlesinger’s reform magazine 
The New Democrat that “the most effective pressure incentive for party officials to act 
[on implementing the guidelines] would be rank-and-file pressure for elective reform. … 
Democratization of America’s political institutions has always depended upon a grass 
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roots effort by those most directly affected.”104 When addressing public audiences about 
the Commission’s activities McGovern was also quick to remind his fellow reform 
enthusiasts that “all these changes … are only reforms. They give our institutions a new 
and more responsive shape, but they do not guarantee new directions. The new directions 
will come from how we use our institutions.”105 
Nor was McGovern the only party leader to goad reform groups into action. The 
marital ties between Commission counselor Eli Segal and NWPC staffer Phyllis Segal, as 
well as between the NWPC’s Arvonne Fraser and Commission chair Donald Fraser, only 
reinforced the overlapping goals and interests linking together the various constituent 
members of the reform movement. Almost immediately after the founding of the new 
“political arm” of the feminist movement, Donald Fraser wrote to Bella Abzug, saying 
“any encouragement which your organization or state affiliated groups can give to party 
officials to complete their reform efforts will be in our mutual interest.”106 DNC chair 
O’Brien, in his mission to relaunch a viable reformed party, encouraged the Democratic 
Women’s Leadership Conference “to take full advantage of the opportunities brought 
about by the reform of our party,” by “seek[ing] election as delegates to our national 
convention” and “to seek elective office and to urge those that share your interests and 
concerns to do the same.” 107  He offered the same encouragement to a meeting of 
prominent African American leaders and politicians, who, he argued, “have an equal 
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obligation with the party leadership in stimulating and urging direct participation by 
individual voters.”108  
These interactive movement-party dynamics that characterized the New Politics 
made the 1968-72 reform initiatives vastly more successful than previous efforts to 
challenge the structure and operation of the Democratic Party. Moreover, the tacit 
alliance linking together reform Democrats, pragmatic party officials, office-seeking 
politicians, social justice entrepreneurs, and rank-and-file movement activists helped 
prevent the rise of any coordinated resistance. Had the formal party apparatus, whether 
through the Commission or the DNC, attempted to wrangle recalcitrant state party 
officials alone, without the aid of a grassroots para-party network, the implementation of 
reform would likely have been far less effective and transformative. Instead, the 
transformation of the party proceeded surprisingly smoothly for most of the initial reform 
years, sometimes spurring sporadic acts of defiance, but never creating a national 
atmosphere of crisis, which could have encouraged a more widespread insurrection. As 
Donald Fraser told his Commission upon being installed as chair midway through the 
implementation phase: “there is a quiet revolution going on in the Democratic Party.”109 
 
Conclusion: The Belated Return to the Problem of Party Structure 
While the McGovern-Fraser Commission continued to monitor and confirm state level 
compliance with the new delegate selection guidelines, leading reformers turned their 
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attention to items set aside in the making of Mandate for Reform. What had originally 
begun in 1969 as a project with three foci on delegate selection, grassroots participation, 
and party structure, had, under the pressure of events and limited funding, been 
reprioritized to the logically prior and practically most feasible task of opening the party. 
Now, in early 1971, with delegate selection reform more or less underway, the 
Commissioners used their remaining time before the body’s scheduled expiration at the 
1972 convention to revamp Democratic Party federalism. If this compressed window of 
opportunity imposed limits on developing the requisite support for such a radical 
proposal, the success of the delegate selection reforms increased the likelihood that the 
forthcoming national convention – composed of many new party entrants – would be 
amenable to a proposal for a new party structure.110 After a letter to O’Brien in March in 
which Fraser communicated “we are prepared to move ahead with consideration of 
structural changes which we might recommend to the 1972 convention,” the DNC chair 
readily agreed: “we have an opportunity unique in the history of this party to bring about 
significant changes.”111 
 The supremacy of the national Democratic Party over its state level affiliates had 
always been implied in the reformers’ concerns about grassroots participation and 
influence. The Special Equal Rights Committee formed in the aftermath of the 
Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party challenge at the 1964 convention had 
recommended in its final report the creation of a commission on party structure “to study 
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the relationship between the National Democratic Party and its constituent State 
Democratic Parties” in order to achieve some “uniform minimum standards” that would 
facilitate full and equal participation in the party.112  As we have seen, drawing the 
connection between participation and party structure was a frequent theme in the 
McGovern-Fraser regional hearings. Awareness of this connection was equally reflected 
in the Commission’s proposed remedies and the limited effects that opening the party 
was likely to have. As the final report of the Grassroots Subcommittee noted: 
 
These hearings [have] revealed that reform goes much further than simply 
reforming internal structures. Making the party “open” is only a first step 
to reform, for even if the doors of the party are opened wider to the grass 
roots, it is not at all certain that the grass roots will rush in to seize the 
opportunity. … It is not enough to “democratize” party procedures if large 
numbers of people are not interested in participation.113 
 
Indeed, reform commission records reveal other keen observations that the problem the 
commission was meant to address went beyond the operation of the party’s nominating 
process: “The entire thrust of reformist thought stems from the premise that the trouble is 
primarily mechanical, and that it can therefore be cured by redesigning the mechanism. 
An alternative perspective holds that the trouble is not mechanical, but rather 
intellectual.”114 
 By reconceptualizing the problem of participation, not in terms of procedural 
obstacles or corrupt practices but as the need to draw people in with ideas and program, 
the New Politics reformers had come full circle to the concerns that had animated former 
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DNC chair Paul Butler in his struggle for a “responsible” Democratic Party in the late 
1950s. Then, as in the early 1970s, reformers confronted a party structure that militated 
against coherent, disciplined, and programmatic parties responsive to the great national 
issues of the day. Such a structure had twice cost Democratic presidential candidate Adlai 
Stevenson the White House in the 1950s; it had resulted in a full-blown party crisis in 
1968. Thus, New Politics reformers returned to the question of responsible parties in a 
context more fluid and potentially more favorable than that which Butler had faced. As 
Fraser put it, “political parties need to be reasonable, disciplined operations even though 
there needs to be free entry into the party, and an opportunity for insurgency.”115  
The first detailed proposal for a reorganized national Democratic Party emerged 
from a joint meeting of the McGovern-Fraser and O’Hara Commissions in Washington, 
DC, in November 1971. Chairman O’Brien addressed the members of the joint session, 
giving them his blessing to “define the next reform goals,” which, he said, may lead to 
the “historic and fundamental reshaping of the Democratic Party.”116 The session heard 
testimony from expert witnesses, many drawn from the two reform commissions 
themselves, such as Anne Wexler, Bill Dodds, Austin Ranney, Samuel Beer, and James 
MacGregor Burns, but also including figures like Neil Staebler, a Michigan state party 
official and former confidant of Butler’s. The discussions addressed fundamental 
questions about the nature of political parties in American society, their internal 
structures, their role in policymaking, and the accountability of officeholders to party 
members. The product, a “Charter for the Democratic Party of the United States,” posed 
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the question of “how a national party – or a national ‘in-between-conventions-
organization’ – should be structured and what its responsibilities ought to be.”117 O’Hara 
and Fraser circulated the 17-page draft proposal at the end of March 1972.   
The charter’s stated aim was reorganize the national party so as “to permit more 
direct participation by members in national party policy-making” by “adding a new 
dimension of grassroots interest to complement that of state organizations and elected 
officials,” and thereby “bringing new vitality to the party as a whole.”118 This was to be 
accomplished by introducing seven regional party organizations between the national and 
state levels, which would hold conferences in odd-numbered years that would bring 
together party officials, officeholders, and rank-and-file party members to promote 
organization, education, and training while also formulating policy recommendations for 
the national party. These meetings would feed into national policy conferences held in 
even-numbered years between nominating conventions, where the representatives of all 
party stakeholders could address issues of national policy and elect a national committee 
chair without the added pressure of selecting a presidential nominee. At the apex of the 
party, the Democratic National Committee would be recomposed to include all 310 
members of the seven regional committees, while a DNC executive council of twenty-
two would oversee day-to-day organizational responsibilities. The executive would 
include the ranking party leaders from the House and Senate, as well as the regional 
committee chairs, thus facilitating greater coordination between the extra-governmental 
and governmental wings of the party. The added expenses associated with such a 
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revamped party structure would be partially offset by a dues-paying annual membership 
enrollment program, alleviating somewhat the party’s fundraising reliance on “fat cat 
contributors.”119  
The authors of the proposed party charter foresaw the new Democratic Party 
functioning as “an active and creative force in American politics … which can respond 
intelligently to the problems and needs of modern America.”120 Their efforts thus tried to 
marry the twin concerns of providing greater opportunity for participation as well as 
producing the motivation to do so. However, as we will see, despite their efforts to frame 
the charter as a logical next step in the modernization of the Democratic Party, the 
ambitious ideas contained in the O’Hara-Fraser proposal met with stiff and, after a 
protracted struggle, ultimately insurmountable opposition. Its delayed formulation and 
rollout during an election year did it no favors; nor did the disastrous outcome of the 
1972 election. Still, the charter’s aim to dismantle the decentralized power structure of 
the party helped galvanize a formidable anti-reform backlash, concentrated against 
McGovern’s presidential candidacy, into the Coalition for a Democratic Majority. The 
reforms to delegate selection had asserted national party authority over the states as never 
before, but it had left the states in place as the constituent units of the national party. The 
charter threatened the power of the state parties and their leaders in a way delegate 
selection restructuring did not, but both aspects of reform would come under intense 
attack during the anti-reform backlash. 
                                                
119 Fraser Interview Transcript, Fraser Papers. 
120 Charter Proposal, Box 44, Folder: Democratic Party; O’Hara Rules Commission; Charter Proposal 2, 
O’Hara Collection. 
  226 
CHAPTER 6 
 
A “NEW CLASS” STRUGGLE? 
THE STOP McGOVERN MOVEMENT  
AND THE BACKLASH AGAINST REFORM 
 
Uprooting old, entrenched customs of the past and replacing them with 
new and different procedures is not easy. Shifting … to open participation 
by party rank-and-file members constitutes a virtual political revolution. 
Including large numbers of women, young people, and minorities in 
National Convention delegations means turning years of tradition around. 
  -- Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection (1972)1 
 
There is too much hair and not enough cigars at this convention. 
 -- Unidentified AFL-CIO official (1972)2 
 
As we have seen, during the initial phase of reform between 1969-72, as binding changes 
to state parties’ delegate selection procedures were implemented and enforced from 
above and below, the reformers’ actions seemed to spur surprisingly little organized 
resistance on the part of actors with vested interests in the old ways of Democratic Party 
governance: state party officials, elected officeholders, and labor leaders. Due to the 
absence of a coordinating body, such as the Democratic National Committee (DNC) 
chair, to help foment an anti-reform movement, as well as the incredulity of many state 
chairs to the prospects of radical institutional change, such resistance as was offered was 
tepid, sporadic, and ultimately ineffective. However, as this chapter will show, a nascent 
anti-reform coalition took shape during the Stop McGovern movement at the 1972 
Democratic national convention, when the political effects of party reform could no 
longer be ignored or dismissed. Senator George McGovern’s capture of the Democratic 
                                                
1 The Party Reformed: The Final Report of the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, 
Box 53, Folder: Democratic Convention, July 10-13, 1972, UAW President’s Office: Douglas Fraser 
Collection, Walter Reuther Library, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI. 
2  AFL-CIO official, quoted in William J. Crotty, Decision for the Democrats: Reforming the Party 
Structure (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 148. 
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nomination was made possible by the reforms and the movements mobilized behind 
them. His role as a spokesperson for the New Politics helped galvanize the diffuse 
backlash against reform into a formidable intraparty force against his candidacy.  
This was nowhere as apparent as within the official leadership of the American 
Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO). The labor 
leadership’s unprecedented decision to remain neutral in the 1972 presidential contest 
anticipated and partly contributed to the landslide electoral defeat of McGovern in 
November. That decision, however, was not an action taken in defense of traditional 
“blue collar” Democrats against the “new class” of white collar reformers. Rather, as we 
will see, this “class struggle” narrative, which frames so much of the critics’ scholarship, 
was developed by those most intractably opposed to McGovern’s nomination. Their 
claims are, in fact, belied by the splits within labor caused by the neutrality decision – 
splits which did not align along a white collar-blue collar axis, but rather reflected 
distinct interests within the labor leadership over retaining its traditional mode of party 
influence through the smoke-filled backrooms of elite brokerage. As we will see, the 
political cleavages opened up by McGovern’s candidacy came to define the contours of 
the second phase of the reform movement and foreshadowed its limitations. 
 
“Come Home, America”: McGovern for President 
When Senator George McGovern resigned from his chairmanship of the Commission on 
Party Structure and Delegate Selection in January 1971 to make a run for the Democratic 
nomination he was judged by a well-know Las Vegas odds-maker to have no better than 
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a 200 to 1 shot at succeeding.3 His time as Commission chair had not done much to raise 
his public profile outside circles of concerned Democrats, party activists, or state party 
officials who were compelled to acknowledge the Commission’s existence. Moreover, he 
faced tough competition from Eugene McCarthy, who still commanded loyal partisans 
from 1968, as well as Edmund Muskie, who had been Hubert Humphrey’s vice-
presidential running mate, Washington State’s Senator Henry Jackson, New York 
congresswoman Shirley Chisholm, the first black woman to run for the Democratic 
nomination, not to mention Alabama governor George Wallace, who had been persuaded 
by the Nixon administration to run as a Democrat rather than an Independent as he had in 
1968.4 Before long, Humphrey would also join the race, eventually becoming one of 
McGovern’s fiercest critics. By the time he won the nomination in the summer of 1972, 
McGovern and his team wore the “long shot” appellation with pride.5  
McGovern’s victory in the race for the Democratic nomination was facilitated by 
the party reforms his Commission had designed and implemented for the delegate 
selection system. They did not privilege him personally in the sense that McGovern had 
“rigged the system” for his own benefit, but they did make possible an insurgent 
campaign that otherwise would have been shut out, as in 1968. By disempowering the 
mid-level party actors who had marginalized or excluded party insurgents from 
influencing the nomination process in 1968, the McGovern-Fraser reforms had paved the 
way for new entrants to reshape the party. The reform guidelines, however – even those 
dealing with affirmative action – were no more than tools to be used by mobilized 
                                                
3  Bruce Miroff, The Liberals’ Moment: The McGovern Insurgency and the Identity Crisis of the 
Democratic Party (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 2007), 41. 
4 On Nixon’s efforts to ensure a two-party contest in 1972, see Miroff, The Liberals’ Moment, 50. 
5 See, for instance, Gordon Weil, The Long Shot: George McGovern Runs for President (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1973). 
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political actors. They could offer greater access to those who wanted to participate in 
Democratic Party politics, but could not educate, organize, and mobilize participants on 
their own. Thus, McGovern’s nomination was not only a product of reform, it was a 
product of the New Politics movement, drawing on the networks and consciousness 
already in formation through a process stretching back to the Mississippi Freedom 
Democrats and the insurgencies of McCarthy and Robert Kennedy. It was this 
combination of procedural reform and political insurgency that more than doubled the 
number of participants in the Democratic nomination process from 8.4 million in 1968 to 
17.5 million in 1972.6 
Additionally, the first term of President Richard Nixon had kept many of those 
mobilized in the late 1960s attuned to movement politics, even if the movements 
themselves were experiencing fatigue. Despite having run in 1968 with a secret plan to 
extract the United States from the war in Vietnam, the president had extended the conflict 
into Cambodia and Laos, igniting widespread campus protests until the Kent State 
shootings in May 1970. His 1968 “law and order” platform had also failed to have the 
promised effect, as the rate of violent crime continued to increase through 1972. 
Additionally, news of the burglary of DNC headquarters at the Watergate hotel that 
spread in the summer of 1972 implicated high-level members of the administration in a 
criminal scandal, which would eventually force the president from office. Meanwhile, 
unemployment and inflation grew steadily, while Nixon’s delinking the dollar from gold 
in 1971 dismantled the Bretton Woods system and ushered in a period of uncertainty for 
international economic regulation. Whatever political capital the GOP had harvested 
from the Democrats’ 1968 debacle had been exhausted. As Gallup polls began to show 
                                                
6 William Crotty, Party Reform (New York: Longman, 1983), 142. 
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by early 1972, the public considered the Democrats to be the party best able to cope with 
the challenges of the 1970s.7 
But if the political atmosphere of the early 1970s seemed favorable for limiting 
Nixon to a one-term presidency, a long shot campaign like McGovern’s still needed a 
powerful social base on which to run. At the top, many former Kennedy and McCarthy 
people, as well as some staff members of the reform Commission, joined McGovern’s 
campaign operation, including Ted Van Dyk, Frank Mankiewicz, Gary Hart, Eli Segal, 
and Anne Wexler. Many mid-level staffers were under thirty-five years old. Richard 
Sterns, who had interned for the Commission, saw in the public opinion polls the 
opportunity to cultivate an activist base around “hostility to the war in Vietnam.” “This 
constituency,” he said, “could very well be a vehicle to give McGovern the early victories 
[he needs] to eventually consolidate a leading position.”8 Sterns’s strategy was put to 
effective use in the early primary states of New Hampshire and Wisconsin, where nearly 
a year of quiet, face-to-face canvassing by armies of local grassroots organizers recruited 
by the McGovern campaign paid off in a surprise second-finish and an outright victory, 
respectively, launching the senator’s profile as an early antiwar insurgent into the 
national spotlight. His frequently intoned invitation – to “Come Home, America” – began 
to gain traction. 
The McGovern campaign ran what they called a “left-center strategy,” one which 
strategist Gary Hart said was designed to “co-opt the left, precluding the possibility of 
other liberal candidates, and, at the same time, make the campaign open and acceptable to 
                                                
7 See Miller et al., “A Majority Party in Disarray: Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election,” American 
Political Science Review 70 (1976). 
8 Richard Sterns, quoted in Miroff, The Liberals’ Moment, 45. 
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party regulars.”9 While McGovern’s long association with the antiwar movement risked 
casting him as a single-issue candidate, his campaign slogan, “Right from the Start,” was 
meant to convey the only belated transformation of his most formidable liberal rival, 
Senator Hubert Humphrey, from a Lyndon Johnson loyalist to a critic of the Nixon 
administration’s war policies in Southeast Asia. The McGovern campaign also developed 
a much wider liberal platform, including qualified support for the controversial practice 
of busing to achieve racial integration in public education, an ultimately ill-fated proposal 
for universal basic income, as well as massive cuts to the defense budget and the 
conversion of defense-related industries to environmental and infrastructure spending.10 
With Wallace taking the votes of most racially conservative Democrats, and Humphrey, 
Muskie, and Jackson splitting the center, McGovern’s courting of the party left to win the 
nomination was only challenged by Chisholm, who, while drawing significant support 
from her own National Women’s Political Caucus (NWPC), failed to line up support of 
major civil rights blocs such as Black Power organizations or the newly formed 
Congressional Black Caucus.11  
The reforms had also reshaped the political terrain of the nomination contest 
itself. Many state parties, frustrated with adjusting their caucus and convention 
procedures to comply with the McGovern-Fraser Commission guidelines, opted to switch 
to a state-run presidential primary.12 From seventeen primaries, selecting only a minority 
of convention delegates in 1968, twenty-three states held primaries in 1972, which not 
                                                
9 Quoted in Miroff, The Liberals’ Moment, 42. 
10 For the appeal of McGovern’s defense reconversion plan on suburban knowledge workers, see Lily 
Geismer, Don’t Blame Us: Suburban Liberals and the Transformation of the Democratic Party (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2015). 
11 On Chisholm’s candidacy, see Miroff, The Liberals’ Moment, 219. 
12 Jeffrey S. Walz and John Comer, “State Responses to National Democratic Party Reform,” Political 
Research Quarterly 52 (1999). 
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only elected over 50 percent of convention delegates but, with one exception, bound them 
to cast their convention ballots proportionally according to the outcome of those contests. 
However, the greater number of primaries was not the exclusive source of the great swell 
in participation witnessed that year. While the total amount of primary voters more than 
doubled between 1968 and 1972, caucus-goers rose by over 250 percent in the same 
period.13 In fact, McGovern performed best in non-primary states, where his enthusiastic 
supporters had the superior grassroots organization to out-mobilize his rivals in the 
Democratic caucuses. There is evidence to suggest that this may have been an additional 
factor motivating state party officials to switch from caucuses to primaries: to dilute the 
influence of McGovernites in the reformed nomination process. In the words of Geri 
Joseph, former vice chair of the DNC, “Many who opposed [reform] and didn’t know 
how to express themselves said, ‘We can’t possible do this. We’ll just have a primary. 
What can be more democratic than that?’”14 
Ironically, however, McGovern’s victory over his Democratic rivals ultimately 
came down to the final contest in California, whose traditional winner-take-all primary 
had been a source of such contention in the McGovern-Fraser Commission proceedings 
that the final decision regarding its status had been deferred to the 1972 convention. The 
outcome of that primary – 44 percent for McGovern, 39 percent for Humphrey – gave all 
271 California delegates to McGovern, putting him over the threshold for the nomination. 
Had proportional representation been in effect as the Commission guidelines had required 
in all other states, neither McGovern nor Humphrey would have arrived at the 1972 
                                                
13 The raw numbers, rounded to the nearest thousand, for 1972 are 16,715,000 for primaries, 771,000 for 
caucuses. See Crotty, Party Reform, 142. 
14 Quoted in Byron E. Shafer, Quiet Revolution: The Struggle for the Democratic Party and the Shaping of 
Post-Reform Politics (New York: Russell Sage, 1983), 312. See also, Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in 
the American Mold (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1986), 376, n. 46. 
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convention as the presumptive nominee. But while McGovernites celebrated their 
victory, Humphrey stayed in the race, determined to bring his fight for the nomination 
into the convention. As we will see, the challenge against the California results would 
become a focal issue in the Stop McGovern movement at the convention. 
 
The Old Politics in the New Party 
While McGovern’s campaign followed a familiar path to that of McCarthy and Kennedy 
in 1968, the effects were dramatically different. With new delegate selection rules in 
place, early commanding victories in state primaries were no longer meant to simply 
demonstrate the candidate’s electability to powerful party powerbrokers. Rather, with 
proportional representation of candidate strength (except in California) among pledged 
delegates, presidential aspirants accumulated convention support through primaries and 
caucuses where party voters cast their ballot for their preferred candidate. State and local 
party organizations had no choice but to facilitate this process, one which they could no 
longer control. 
 That the new system held important ramifications for traditional methods of party 
governance and coalition building was not lost on party stakeholders. While the top 
officials of the AFL-CIO preferred to respond to this changed environment by informally 
boycotting the reform process itself, DNC chair Lawrence O’Brien did not let the issue 
rest. As DNC records demonstrate, O’Brien and his staff were at pains to pull labor into 
the reformed nominating system, repeatedly soliciting their input and participation to help 
them adapt to the new rules. As one report to the chair read: 
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The extent of the understanding of the impact of these facts [delegate 
selection reforms] and the timetable is quite limited. …Most of the labor 
movement has ignored the process and with notable exceptions has not 
participated in the decision steps. This is a luxury that neither the labor 
movement nor the Democratic Party can afford. If substantial involvement 
by state labor leadership, working down into the lower levels of the party, 
and … union leadership at the national level is not evident in the weeks 
immediately ahead, there is a serious question as to the ability of the labor 
movement to influence and affect the selection of the party’s nominee in 
1972.15 
 
For O’Brien and others at the DNC, the belief that reform would restore unity to 
the Democratic Party was at risk of faltering on account of labor’s unwillingness to 
embrace the reforms and get involved in delegate selection early. They recognized that 
“trade unions are the most stable elements” in the coalition. “It is essential that the 
leadership of the trade union movement understand and be involved in such critical 
activities as implementation of party delegate selection reform, selection of delegates to 
the convention, and avoiding the kind of self-defeating episodes we had at the Chicago 
Convention.”16 
However, when the DNC’s warnings to labor that the rules of the political game 
were changing were met with more than just silence, they were accompanied by vitriolic 
attacks on the reformers and pressure to roll back the clock on the reform project 
altogether. In one such meeting with George Meany, O’Brien told the AFL-CIO 
president,  
 
                                                
15 Memo from Bill Welsh to Lawrence O’Brien, “The Labor Movement and the Reform Activities of the 
State Democratic Parties,” 9 December 1970, Box 225, Folder: Labor 1970, Lawrence O’Brien Personal 
Papers, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, MA (emphasis added). 
16 Memo from Bill Welsh to Lawrence O’Brien, 20 September 1971, Box 235, Folder: Labor 1971 (1 of 2), 
O’Brien Papers (emphasis in original). 
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The rules have been adopted. …It’s too late to debate whether they’re 
good or bad. You have your people well organized all over the country. 
You should study the new rules and use them to your advantage, just like 
everyone else.17 
 
As he later reflected in his memoir, requests that he use his authority as party chair to 
somehow mitigate the effect of the new rules “wasn’t what I had been working toward 
for a year and a half.” “The people who wanted to stop McGovern,” he continued, “could 
have stopped him in the primaries, if they had planned their strategies more intelligently. 
I certainly had no intention of pulling their chestnuts out of the fire.”18 
 But for all of O’Brien’s pleading with the labor leadership to adapt to the new 
institutional conditions produced by the reform movement, no amount of intelligent 
planning by the officials at the AFL-CIO’s Committee on Political Education (COPE) 
could have overcome the historic limitations of the trade union movement in such a short 
timespan. As we have seen, the nature of labor’s integration into the national Democratic 
Party’s system of elite brokerage placed its greatest source of leverage in the smoke-filled 
backrooms of the convention hall, where presidential nominees had to meet the approval 
of top union officials in order for labor’s organizational muscle to be put to work on the 
party’s behalf during the election. This institutional arrangement only reinforced 
American labor’s incapacity to effectively engage its mass membership in political 
education. While they could perform valuable services in terms of voter registration and 
turnout – and not only for union members – unions had little ability to affect workers’ 
hearts and minds. Yet this was precisely the imperative the newly reformed nominating 
system imposed on them. With their powerbroker role effectively abolished, labor would 
                                                
17 Lawrence O’Brien, No Final Victories: A Life in Politics from John F. Kennedy to Watergate (New 
York: Ballantine Books, 1975), 296. 
18 O’Brien, No Final Victories, 297. 
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have to mobilize its members not only to participate in primaries and caucuses but to cast 
their ballots for the leadership’s preferred candidate. As the surprising surge in union 
members’ support for George Wallace’s racial populism had painful reminded AFL-CIO 
and UAW officials in 1964, 1968, and again in 1972, this was not a degree of influence 
labor officials were used to or adept at exerting.  
The new system also meant taking the risk of publicly supporting a candidate, as 
COPE did in 1972 with Henry Jackson, who failed to survive the primary process. This 
put labor in a strategic conundrum: either they could transfer their support from the loser 
to the winner after the fact, which could relegate them to the bottom of the candidate’s 
coalition; or, hypothetically, labor could remain uninvolved during the primary process 
until a de facto nominee emerged. However, the latter option left open the possibility that 
the nominee could be indifferent or even hostile to labor’s interests, and, even in the best 
case scenario, would implicitly confirm that labor’s support was irrelevant for capturing 
the Democratic nomination.  
Meany and COPE did make a rather belated effort to back Washington senator 
Henry Jackson, known for his pro-labor record and his hawkish anticommunism, in the 
primaries. When his campaign fizzled, AFL-CIO leaders attempted in vain to regain 
some brokerage power at the convention by running “uncommitted” slates of pro-labor 
delegates in state primaries. But in a political moment when it appeared to many 
observers that the presidential campaign was becoming a proxy war for the soul of the 
Democratic Party such tactics “never worked anywhere,” according to secretary-treasurer 
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Lane Kirkland.19 Labor, due primarily to its own actions and inactions over the course of 
its history of political involvement, found itself in an impossible position. With its veto 
power over the Democratic candidate removed by the reformers, its influence in the 
Democratic Party appeared to evaporate after seeming, in 1968, to be reaching new 
heights. 
 
The Labor-Left and the New Politics 
But if labor’s role in Democratic Party politics had been forcibly altered by the reform 
movement, this was a development not everyone in the labor leadership greeted with 
hostility. Indeed, some large industrial, service, and public sector unions viewed the new 
participatory nomination system as offering them their own window of opportunity to 
gain greater influence in party affairs. Historically subordinated to the dominance of 
Meany’s conservative ex-AFL wing of the federation, which also held authority over 
COPE and the AFL-CIO’s legislative activity, was the American Federation of State, 
Country, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME); the Machinists; the Clothing and Textile 
Workers; the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers; the Communication Workers (CWA); 
and the United Farm Workers – all of whom not only held less of a stake in the old 
brokerage relationship with the Democratic Party leadership but also had larger, more 
diverse memberships that more closely resembled the New Politics than did the 
memberships of the craft unions. When combined with those industrial and public service 
unions outside the AFL-CIO, such as the UAW, the National Education Association, and 
the United Electrical Workers, it seemed the New Politics reform movement had a 
                                                
19 Remarks of AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland at Meeting of State Federation Officers, 29 September 
1982, “Labor in Partisan Politics,” COPE Files (unprocessed), AFL-CIO Records, George Meany 
Memorial Archives, University of Maryland, Silver Springs, MD. 
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potentially powerful ally in very important parts of the labor movement, George Meany 
notwithstanding.20 
In fact, the hostile actions taken by Meany in response to the New Politics 
movement threatened to transform labor’s nascent fissures into profound splits. At the 
AFL-CIO president’s invitation, Senator Henry Jackson delivered his anti-New Politics 
stump speech before the federation’s Executive Council in August 1970. From the 
podium, Jackson – whose advisor Ben Wattenberg would lead the anti-reform Coalition 
for a Democratic Majority (CDM) after the election – denounced “the intellectual elite” 
and the “silk stocking liberals” who were “trying to use ‘party reform’ as a device to take 
over the party.”21 AFL-CIO Executive Council member and president of AFSCME, Jerry 
Wurf, who, following the death of the UAW’s Walter Reuther in May 1970 had assumed 
the leadership of the labor-left, communicated to DNC chair O’Brien his “concern with 
the comments on ‘extremists’ in the Democratic Party” that were being spread through 
labor’s highest councils. “Meany is so hung up on the war,” Wurf reported, “that he 
would, if he could, try and seal a Nixon endorsement in 1972.” Top Democratic officials 
concluded among themselves that “there is very real resentment” against Meany within 
the house of labor.22 
However, the tensions potentially cleaving the trade union leadership were not 
about the Vietnam War as such, nor even the reform of the Democratic Party. While it is 
true that few were as virulently anticommunist as George Meany or his ex-Communist 
director of International Affairs Jay Lovestone (who had ties with the CIA), what truly 
                                                
20 Andrew Battista, The Revival of Labor Liberalism (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2008), 65-6. 
21 Address of Senator Henry Jackson, 3-5 August 1970, Box 40, Minutes of the AFL-CIO Executive 
Council Meetings, AFL-CIO Records. 
22 Quoted in Memo from Bill Welsh to Lawrence O’Brien, 11 September 1970, Box 225, Folder: Labor 
1970, O’Brien Papers. 
  239 
fueled the resentments of Wurf and other liberal labor leaders in the AFL-CIO was its 
undemocratic – almost autocratic – system of governance. Unwavering commitment to 
the war in Vietnam, even under an anti-labor Republican administration, was indicative 
of a pattern of decisionmaking that since 1955 had vested almost total authority in the 
now 77-year-old Meany and his top lieutenants. “Unilateral positions [are] taken without 
consultation,” Wurf later told The New Republic.23 By the late 1960s and early 1970s, as 
union density began falling from its postwar high, many, especially those on the margins 
of the trade union hierarchy, had come to see such unilateralism as a growing liability for 
the fate of American unionism as a whole. It had been Meany’s failure to launch what the 
late Walter Reuther had described as “a comprehensive program to modernize and 
revitalize the AFL-CIO and make it into an effective instrument for creative and 
constructive social change” that had motivated the UAW president to disaffiliate from the 
labor federation in 1968. 24  Reuther’s protest, however, had fallen on deaf ears. For 
example, when Meany was asked during a 1972 interview about the state of the labor 
movement, he answered, “I don’t know. I don’t care.” When asked if the AFL-CIO 
should organize the unorganized, Meany asked, “why should we worry about organizing 
groups of people who do not appear to want to be organized?”25  
Party reform, therefore, represented to some unions more than a chance to break 
the old cold war political mold or embrace a more open Democratic Party as a matter of 
principle. Reform presented an opportunity to refashion the labor-liberal alliance and 
shift the balance of power within the union hierarchy itself. As one cautionary note sent 
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25 Quoted in B.J. Widick, “George Meany’s Last Hurrah,” The Nation, 4 September 1972 (emphasis in 
original). 
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from the vice president of the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers, Howard 
Samuels, to COPE’s director Al Barkan put it: if the union leadership continues to lump 
together the “nuts and kooks” (as Barkan often labeled the New Politics) with “legitimate 
reform elements (or women, blacks, youth),” then “labor will become the symbol of the 
status quo and the enemy of legitimate reform or minority or youth aspirations.”26 As we 
will see, many labor leaders were keen to avoid this. 
 
The Convention Turned Upside Down 
The impact of the delegate selection reforms was visibly on display at the 1972 
Democratic national convention, convened in Miami Beach in July. Due to the 
strengthened affirmative action guidelines pushed by the National Women’s Political 
Caucus as well as the use of such rules by the mobilized social forces entering the party’s 
nomination process through the McGovern candidacy, “the complexion of Democratic 
politics had changed” – indeed, one veteran journalist called it a “rupture.”27 As shown in 
Figure 6.1 below, when compared with the 1968 convention in Chicago, women 
delegates had increased their proportion of seats from 13 to 40 percent; African American 
delegates had increased from 7 to 15 percent; and people under the age of thirty had 
increased from 4 to 22 percent. Additionally, those with annual incomes of less than 
$10,000 a year (70 percent of the country according to the 1970 census) increased from 
13 to 27 percent. An unprecedented 83 percent of convention participants were attending 
their first convention, compared to 67 percent in 1968. There could be little doubt that 
                                                
26 Memo from Howard D. Samuels to Al Barkan, 22 February 1971, Box 235, Folder: Labor 1971 (2 of 2), 
O’Brien Papers. 
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“compared to the total population, the 1972 convention was in most respects more 
representative than was the 1968 convention.”28  
 
FIGURE 6.1: Proportion of Women, African Americans, and Youth Delegates at 
Democratic National Conventions, 1968 and 1972 
 
Source: CBS News Report, “The Delegates of ’72,” Box 48, Folder: Democratic Party: Coalition for a 
Democratic Majority, October 1973-November 1974, O’Hara Collection. 
 
While there were many new faces populating the convention in Miami Beach, 
there were conspicuous absences as well. Despite the increase in the aggregate number of 
Democrats in the House, the Senate, and in governors mansions across the United States 
over the initial phase of party reform, the proportion of these attending the national 
convention fell dramatically. As shown in Table 6.1 below, the number of Democratic 
governors attending national conventions across this period declined significantly, falling 
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from an attendance rate of 88 percent in 1968 to 53 percent in 1972. Senators’ fall in the 
rate of attendance was even more pronounced, from nearly 63 percent in 1968 to 28 
percent in 1972. And members of the Democratic House Caucus, while never attending 
conventions in high proportions, dropped precipitously from 31.5 percent in 1968 to a 
mere 12 percent in 1972.  
 
TABLE 6.1: Number of Party Officeholders In Office and Attending Democratic 
National Conventions, 1968 and 1972 
 
Source: CBS News Report, “The Delegates of ’72,” Box 48, Folder: Democratic Party: Coalition for a 
Democratic Majority, October 1973-November 1974, O’Hara Collection; Crotty, Party Reform, 136. 
 
The McGovern-Fraser Commission’s abolition of automatic delegate status for 
party officials and public officeholders had required those who used to enjoy the 
prerogative of being an uncommitted voting delegate at the national convention, and very 
often a leading figure within their state delegation, to declare their preferred candidate (or 
at least declare themselves “uncommitted”), compete for a delegate seat in their state’s 
primary or convention, and vote accordingly if selected to be that candidate’s supporter at 
the convention. Whether due to the embarrassment of having to compete against rank-
and-file party activists for a position many felt they were entitled to by right of office or, 
as happened in several cases, having lost in such a competition, top Democratic officials 
 In Office 1968 Chicago 1968 In Office 1972 Miami 1972 
Governors 26 23 30 16 
Senators 62 39 54 15 
Representatives 247 78 255 31 
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attended the 1972 convention in much smaller numbers than ever before.29 Without the 
guarantee of influence or the freedom to maneuver, some party leaders found few 
compelling reasons to participate at all. “I do not plan to go,” reported Boston Mayor 
Kevin White. “There is nothing for me to do there.”30  
This is not to say, as many anti-reformers later charged in their effort to reinstate 
automatic delegate status, that Democratic public and party officials had been excluded 
from the reformed party convention. In fact, there were many party officials and 
officeholders at the 1972 national convention: almost 20 percent of the delegates in 
Miami Beach held public office at the time; another 6 percent had held public office in 
the past; and 38 percent held some party office aside from serving as a delegate.31 The 
difference, however, was that they were lower ranking public officials and party 
members, who had not usually been extended automatic delegate status in the past. 
Moreover, the lower ranks of the Democratic Party were less likely than their top-ranking 
Washington counterparts to be white men and may well have benefited from the 
affirmative action guidelines of the reforms.32 
Also in contrast to the charges of reform opponents was the fact that union 
members dramatically increased their proportion of delegate seats from 4 to 16 percent 
between 1968 and 1972. According to the available estimates, including COPE’s, labor 
had somewhere been 300 and 488 delegates in Miami Beach.33 The number of union 
                                                
29  CBS News Report, “The Delegates of ’72,” Box 48, Folder: Democratic Party: Coalition for a 
Democratic Majority, October 1973-November 1974, O’Hara Collection; Crotty, Party Reform, 136. 
30 John Herbers, “Hearings on the Platform Set the Stage,” New York Times, 10 June 1972. 
31  CBS News Report, “The Delegates of ’72,” Box 48, Folder: Democratic Party: Coalition for a 
Democratic Majority, October 1973-November 1974, O’Hara Collection. 
32 Crotty, Party Reform, 99, 135. 
33 See CBS News Report, “The Delegates of ’72,” Box 48, Folder: Democratic Party: Coalition for a 
Democratic Majority, October 1973-November 1974, O’Hara Collection; as well as Memo from Dick 
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officials – 145 – had increased as well.34 DNC memos indicate that convention planners 
provided union officials with more box seats and floor passes than even the presidential 
candidates were allotted, a direct phone line linking Meany’s hotel suite with chairman 
O’Brien’s, and premium hotel accommodations next door to top party leaders. 35 
However, despite the privileges accorded to top trade union officials and the large 
number of attendees carrying union cards, labor faced a transformed political institution 
where its former channels of influence in the smoke-filled backrooms of the convention 
hall no longer existed. The increase in the number of trade union delegates had more to 
do with their partisan attachments to the presidential candidates – Humphrey and 
McGovern especially – than their union affiliations. Thus, while the open delegate 
selection rules and the fiercely combative nomination contest had drawn far greater 
numbers of union members into the party, they were creatures of the candidates rather 
than the labor bosses. As Robert Keefe, political consultant for the AFL-CIO, put it: 
“Labor had more delegates and less influence than ever before.”36  
 
The New Politics of National Party Governance 
The changes made to the party’s delegate selection process by the McGovern-Fraser 
Commission, and their attendant effects on the composition of the convention, were 
complemented by the work of the less prominent Commission on Rules, which during the 
same period promulgated fairly uncontroversial guidelines for modernizing the 
                                                                                                                                            
Murphy to Lawrence O’Brien, “Labor and the Democratic National Convention,” Box 240, Folder: Labor 
1972, O’Brien Papers. 
34 Crotty, Party Reform, 136, Table 12.7. 
35 Murphy to O’Brien, O’Brien Papers. 
36 Quoted in David S. Broder, “Labor Exerting New Muscle in Democratic Party,” Washington Post, 2 
September 1973. 
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Democratic national conventions. Chaired by Michigan congressman James O’Hara, the 
Rules Commission altered 150 years of party tradition by codifying permanent rules for 
convention procedures, many of which were meant to prevent the chaos that had attended 
the 1968 convention in Chicago. In addition to introducing greater transparency and 
stability to convention operations, the O’Hara Commission sought to enhance the 
representativeness of the convention by revising state delegate allocation from the 
Electoral College to a mixed formula that reflected population and Democratic Party 
strength, diminishing the number of delegates apportioned to southern and rural states. 
The O’Hara Commission also applied similar changes to convention governance by 
restructuring the three standing convention committees – the Credentials Committee, the 
Platform Committee, and the Rules Committee – to no longer reflect equal voice between 
the states but rather to reflect the size of each state’s delegation. All three committees 
were enlarged from 110 to 150 members, requiring equal division between men and 
women. While all states were entitled to at least one seat on each of the three committees, 
smaller states’ influence was diminished in favor of the more populous, reliably 
Democratic states. All committee members had to be elected by their fellow state 
delegates rather than appointed by political bosses, and committee deliberations had to 
begin well in advance of the opening of the convention and transmit their deliberations 
and reports to all convention attendees upon conclusion. 
 
The Credentials Committee and the Stop McGovern Coalition 
In the context of the mobilization of so many new party entrants in the 1972 presidential 
campaign, the O’Hara Commission reforms facilitated the integration and representation 
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of the new social forces while avoiding any repeat of the catastrophe in Chicago. This 
was especially true of the Credentials Committee, which, while overloaded with a record-
breaking seventeen credentials challenges involving fifteen state delegations in 1968, saw 
in 1972 an astounding 118 challenges involving thirty-one states. Just as the 1964 
compromise of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party challenge in Atlantic City had 
provided the grounds upon which party insurgents launched a more far-reaching set of 
challenges in 1968, so had the McGovern-Fraser guidelines, especially those concerning 
the representation of women, racial minorities, and young people in “reasonable 
relationship” to their presence in the state, paved the way for new party activists to mount 
new challenges. As the final report of the Credentials Committee acknowledged, 
“because in 1972 our reform is unprecedented in American political history, our 
credentials contests are likewise unprecedented.”37 While many initial challenges were 
withdrawn or settled without significant dispute in the weeks before the official 
commencement of the Credential Committee hearings in June, several of the remaining 
twenty-eight cases constituted a showdown between the reformers and their opponents 
over the most controversial aspects of reform. Of the remaining challenges, 80 percent 
dealt with the affirmative action guidelines.38 While most were decided in favor of the 
reformers, often by topping up state delegations with more women, minority, or youth 
activists, several cases became fraught with political tension.39 
The labor leaders most aggrieved by the party reforms and McGovern’s 
candidacy converged on the Credentials Committee as the first front in the Stop 
                                                
37 The Official Proceedings of the 1972 Democratic National Convention, eds, Sheila Hixon and Ruth Rose 
(Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1972), 154. 
38 Crotty, Decision for the Democrats, 138. 
39 For a state by state breakdown of the credentials challenges and their resolutions, see Crotty, Decision for 
the Democrats, 140-2, Tables 4.2 and 4.3. 
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McGovern movement. COPE’s Al Barkan had already put his weight behind a lobbying 
operation for the selection of former Howard University law school dean Patricia Roberts 
Harris as chair of the Committee. While she was a relatively unknown entity, she was in 
his eyes infinitely more preferable to the passionate New Politics reformer Harold 
Hughes, vice chair of the McGovern-Fraser Commission, who had also nominated 
himself for the position. After leaning on many DNC members, Barkan’s preference for 
Credentials Committee chair prevailed.40 AFL-CIO political consultant and executive 
director of the DNC Robert Keefe also ran a behind the scenes lobbying campaign to get 
anti-McGovern delegates elected to the Credentials Committee. This was most 
effectively pulled off in states such as Minnesota, Ohio, and Texas, where McGovern had 
polled very low levels of support in the primaries and caucuses. Inside the Credentials 
Committee hearings the Stop McGovern forces, led by the AFL-CIO but including 
Humphrey, Jackson, Muskie, and Wallace supporters, focused the bulk of their energies 
on the controversial case of California.  
Ironically, the Stop McGovern coalition modeled itself as being more consistent 
with the reforms than the reformers, filing a credentials challenge alleging the use of the 
banned unit rule, binding all delegates to cast their votes with the majority, in the state’s 
winner-take-all primary. How could McGovern claim all 271 delegates when he only 
won 44 percent of the primary votes? Since the McGovern-Fraser Commission had come 
to a stalemate on the question of California’s primary and had explicitly deferred how to 
resolve it until the 1972 convention, the results of the California primary were in line 
with party and state law. However, new convention rules required that delegates whose 
credentials were in question could not vote on their own case. With the ten California 
                                                
40 Shafer, Quiet Revolution, 438. 
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representatives having recused themselves, the Stop McGovern forces held the balance of 
power on the Credentials Committee, and the majority ruled to overturn the California 
results 72-66, redistributing the delegates proportionally among the candidates. 
The Credentials Committee decision temporarily threw McGovern’s nomination 
into doubt. Without all 271 California delegates, McGovern would not reach the majority 
threshold necessary on the first ballot, potentially unbinding his delegates to shift their 
support to Humphrey. McGovernites on the Credentials Committee retaliated the next 
day by organizing a majority of 71-61 to invalidate the credentials of Richard Daley’s 
Illinois delegation for failing to comply with the guidelines against closed slate making as 
well as adequate representation for women, minorities, and youth. Daley’s fifty-eight 
delegates were replaced by a rival delegation led by Jesse Jackson. In the case of 
California, McGovern filed a lawsuit with the US Court of Appeals, which reinstated the 
results of the winner-take-all primary. Subsequently, however, in an emergency session 
the US Supreme Court struck down the appellate court decision 6-3 only days before the 
convention began in July, on the grounds that the federal judiciary cannot intervene in the 
internal affairs of party governance and that the final authority rested in the convention. 
On the opening day of the proceedings in Miami Beach the McGovern team sent a 
minority report from the Credentials Committee to the convention floor and, with a 
difficult behind-the-scenes agreement to forfeit their support for an affirmative action 
challenge against South Carolina, won approval of upholding the California results.41 
                                                
41 Interview with Donald Fowler (phone), 4 April 2016; Women’s Education for Delegate Selection, “South 
Carolina Challenge,” Box 282, Folder 4: Delegate Selection, National Women’s Political Caucus Records, 
Arthur and Elizabeth Schlesinger Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. See also, Miroff, The 
Liberals’ Moment, 72-81; White, The Making of the President 1972, 214-5. 
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While McGovern’s success in the California challenge won him the Democratic 
nomination, the symbolic effect of his partisans unceremoniously unseating the former 
powerbroker of the old politics, Richard Daley, did much to hurt his chances of winning 
the presidency. Daley rejected a compromise position offered by the McGovern team to 
seat both Illinois delegations and dilute their votes accordingly. As New Politics reformer 
and McGovern operative Eli Segal later reflected, “humiliating Daley with Jesse Jackson 
and all that he was identified with was very bad.”42 Moreover, it sent a shockwave 
through the party that persuaded many outside observers that reform was going too far. 
Anticipating the contours of the counter-reform movement to come, Chicago Sun-Times 
columnist Mike Royko put his objections in an open letter to the Chicago credentials 
challengers: 
 
I just don’t see where your delegation is representative of Chicago’s 
Democrats. … About half of your delegates are women. About a third of 
your delegates are black. Many of them are young people. You even have 
a few Latin Americans. But as I looked over the names of your delegates, I 
saw something peculiar. … There’s only one Italian there. … And only 
three of your 59 [delegates] have Polish names. … Your reforms have 
disenfranchised Chicago’s white ethnic Democrats, which is a strange 
reform. … Anybody who would reform Chicago’s Democratic Party by 
dropping the white ethnic would probably begin a diet by shooting himself 
in the stomach.43 
 
 
The Platform Committee and the New Politics’ Social Democratic Vision 
The O’Hara Commission’s reforms also affected the operation and outcome of the 
convention’s Platform Committee. Its expansion of the committee to 150 members, the 
                                                
42 Segal, quoted in Miroff, The Liberals’ Moment, 81. 
43 Royko, quoted in White, The Making of the President 1972, 219 (emphasis added). An in-depth account 
of the Chicago credentials challenge can be found in Crotty, Party Reform, 155-202. 
  250 
early beginning of its deliberations, as well as its twelve-city regional hearings soliciting 
public testimony were all changes designed to respond to the turmoil of 1968 and a 
means of reunifying the party. Indeed, as we have seen, the crafting and meaning of the 
party platform had been a frequent target of criticism in the regional hearings of the 
McGovern-Fraser Commission, where it was attacked as an ineffective political 
statement, both in the sense of being a vaguely worded, meaningless document or, when 
containing firm statements of policy or principle, a document officeholders felt free to 
distance themselves from once in office. The new Platform Committee thus sought to 
“open up” the process. As Harvard University professor Richard Neustadt, chair of the 
Committee said, “the old image of a small group sequestering itself to hurriedly produce 
a platform following one week’s hearings just before the convention no longer reflects 
the needs of the party.”44 
 The final product, New Directions: 1972-76, was in many ways a unique 
document. At ninety-three pages, it was much longer than the 1968 platform. It was also 
much more directly policy focused, specifying constituent groups by name and citing 
concrete numbers, than was typical for the party’s statement of principles. This not only 
reflected the general issue orientation of the New Politics movement, but also its specific 
institutionalization in the party. As noted in the previous chapter, the Democratic Policy 
Council (DPC), a less prominent initiative of the party leadership in the aftermath of the 
1968 crisis, had served as an incubator for New Politics partisans since 1969, bringing 
together an array of party insurgents with pragmatic “reform consensus” liberals to 
produce alternative policy statements critical of the Nixon administration. The DPC had 
been an important instrument for formally shifting the Democratic Party as a whole to the 
                                                
44 “Democratic Panel Opens 1972 Platform Hearings,” New York Times, 16 May 1972. 
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dovish side of the Vietnam debate after the conflict became the responsibility of the 
GOP. Like its predecessor organization in the late 1950s, the DPC ultimately had very 
little impact on public policy, having no institutional mechanism formally linking its 
policy statements with the activity of Democratic legislators. Between 1969 and 1971, its 
primary function was as a public relations body within the DNC. However, its years of 
work found a more politically relevant outlet in the formation of the 1972 Democratic 
platform. Indeed, many of the items found in New Directions were lifted in full from the 
DPC’s 184-page policy recommendations booklet, Alternatives ’72.  
 While the DPC’s influence in the Platform Committee was significant, the open 
process facilitated the input of many other party and interest group actors. These included 
elements of the old coalition such as the AFL-CIO leadership who, while refusing to sit 
on the Committee, did forward a list of proposals for consideration, as well as more 
recently mobilized groups such as the United Farm Workers, Common Cause, the Gay 
Activist Alliance, the National Women’s Political Caucus (NWPC), Americans for 
Democratic Action (ADA), the New Democratic Coalition, and a range of others who 
provided testimony throughout the hearings and drafting sessions. 
 Meeting as a full committee in June 1972, the actual drafting session witnessed a 
committee rebellion when the chair proposed setting up a fifteen-member subcommittee 
to produce the final platform for their approval. Instead, with the acquiescence of the 
chair, the entire 150-member committee hashed out the final version in a surprisingly 
smooth process, which, according to one party scholar, was “a feat considered an 
impossibility up to [that] point.”45 Another set of analysts observed that “it was the first 
                                                
45 Crotty, Decision for the Democrats, 206. 
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time in memory that a national party platform had been written through participatory 
democracy.”46  
For some, however, such an open, participatory process raised concerns about the 
likely outcome. Considering that McGovern held a plurality of convention delegates 
elected to the Platform Committee, many expected the platform to be radical in content 
and inflammatory in tone. As Ben Wattenberg, sitting on the Committee as a 
representative for Senator Henry Jackson, said,  “there won’t be any riots in Miami 
because the people who rioted in Chicago are on the Platform Committee.”47  
 But contrary to the dire predictions of Wattenberg, and much to the chagrin of 
some pro-McGovern members of the New Politics, the final platform was far from 
radical in the sense of a sharp break from past Democratic platforms. In fact, reflecting a 
mix of continuity and change, the platform reproduced much of what the New Deal 
Democratic mainstream had taken for granted in previous years, yet explicitly extended 
these citizenship rights to newly mobilized groups and into new policy areas. The most 
radical revision of Democratic Party practice was, of course, the section on foreign 
policy, where the influence of the McGovern campaign was unmistakable. 
 
We pledge, as the first order of business, an immediate and complete 
withdrawal of all US forces in Indochina. All US military action in 
Southeast Asia will cease. After the end of US direct combat preparation, 
military aid to the Saigon government, and elsewhere in Indochina, will be 
terminated.48 
  
                                                
46 Denis G. Sullivan et al., The Politics of Representation: The Democratic Convention 1972 (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1974), 99. 
47 Quoted in White, The Making of the President 1972, 213. 
48  New Directions: 1972-76, Democratic Party Platform of 1972, 10 July 1972, available at 
www.presidency.ecsb.edu. All references to the party platform below are drawn from this source. A more 
moderate version of the Vietnam plank, calling for negotiations and mutual withdrawal of American and 
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However, the document was far from proposing a new “isolationism,” as was frequently 
charged. While it did echo the McGovern campaign’s call for a massive reduction in 
defense spending, it doubled down on a humanitarian foreign policy, including expanding 
economic aid to Africa, promoting United Nations peacekeeping in the third world, 
imposing sanctions against Rhodesia and South Africa, promoting economic 
development in Asia, and extending humanitarian aid to Vietnam. Foreign policy making 
itself, the “real decisions on issues of war and peace,” should include greater 
congressional participation and public transparency, including reform of classification 
standards. 
 In domestic policy, the platform rehashed standard Democratic proposals for tax 
reform, increasing social security transfers, expanding benefits for Medicare and access 
to quality housing, and repealing section 14b of the Taft-Hartley Act prohibiting the 
union closed shop. Indeed, as one set of observers put it, “the platform satisfied all of 
labor’s traditional bread-and-butter demands.”49 Reflecting the new social forces inside 
the party, the platform also endorsed lowering the age of adulthood to eighteen, 
extending full citizenship to Native Americans, especially regarding land rights, and 
making the ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment to the US Constitution a “priority 
effort.” However, McGovern aides also led successful efforts to quell minority planks 
that they felt would compromise their candidate’s appeal in the general election, such as 
the feminist plank holding that abortion was a “matter between [a woman] and her 
doctor,” as well as the youth plank calling for the legalization of marijuana.50  
                                                
49 Sullivan et al., The Politics of Representation, 96. 
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Most interesting, however, was the first plank that appeared in the 1972 
Democratic platform, which defined “full employment – a guaranteed job for all” as “the 
primary economic objective of the Democratic Party.” While full employment had been a 
staple of the national Democratic Party platform since 1944, the more ambitious phrase, 
emphasizing guaranteed full employment, had subsequently been dropped from the 
party’s statement of principles as early as 1948. Echoing President Franklin Roosevelt’s 
1944 State of the Union Address, the 1972 platform dedicated the party to make 
“economic security a matter of right,” which meant “a job with decent pay and good 
working conditions for everyone willing and able to work.” The means to achieve such a 
“right to work” included not only job retraining for those dislocated through automation 
and deindustrialization but the creation of “millions of jobs” through the expansion of 
public sector employment, “mak[ing] the government the employer of last resort.” The 
platform pointed to America’s desperate need for public works and infrastructure 
spending, defense reconversion, and environmental cleanup, as well as for the need for 
affirmative action in all dimensions of public and private life to correct systematic social 
hierarchies produced by discrimination. 
 The foregrounding of guaranteed full employment in the 1972 platform was taken 
almost word for word from the Democratic Policy Council’s “Economic Charter for 
Modern Democrats,” which had been authored by New Politics veterans Joseph Duffey, 
Curtis Gans, as well as the ADA’s John Kenneth Galbraith and the NWPC’s Gloria 
Steinem.51 The call for guaranteed full employment itself was the centerpiece in a larger 
vision of a renewed social democratic agenda for the United States, one that went beyond 
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many cold war liberals’ accommodation with the domestic limits of New Deal policy. 
“This is an era of great change,” the platform announced in its section on Rights, Power, 
and Social Justice. 
 
The world is fast moving into a future for which the past has not prepared 
us well; a future where to survive, to find answers to the problems which 
threaten us as a people, we must create qualitatively new solutions. We 
can no longer rely on old systems of thought, the results of which were 
partially successful programs that were heralded as important social 
reforms in the past. It is now time to rethink and reorder the institutions of 
this country so that everyone – women, blacks, Spanish-speaking, Puerto 
Ricans, Indians, the young and the old – can participate in the decision-
making process inherent in the democratic heritage to which we aspire. 
We must restructure the social, political, and economic relationships 
throughout the entire society in order to ensure the equitable distribution 
of wealth and power. 
 
As the New York Times recognized, such a vision was less a radical break from 
the past than it was “a return to the initial thrust of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal,” 
one that also expressed “recent disillusionment with the fruits of postwar economic 
growth.” However, the Times joined the Wall Street Journal in criticizing the platform’s 
“sudden and drastic lurch toward income redistribution,” which made the platform as a 
whole “unfriendly to big business.”52  
 In the end, as the Committee chair wrote in the document’s preface, the 1972 
Democratic Party platform “reflect[ed] the reformed procedures under which it was 
produced.” DNC chair O’Brien agreed, hailing the document as the result of “the most 
open” drafting process in the party’s history.53 But those who hailed the platform as 
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merely an output of the new system risked placing too much emphasis on formal 
processes than on political power. The platform was more than an experiment in 
“participatory democracy.” It was a vision statement of the social forces empowered by 
the reforms. After all, procedural openness also prevented party leaders from shutting out 
the supporters of George Wallace, who, despite his own absence from the convention due 
to an assassination attempt, had significant partisan representation on the Platform 
Committee. However, the fact that party reform had always been linked to the New 
Politics’ political vision was reflected in the defeat of every single “law and order” 
platform proposal offered up by the Wallacites.54 Rather than producing a new potpourri 
of party principles and policy planks, the New Politics movement crafted a coherent 
program that sought to extend the promises of the New Deal Democratic Party beyond 
the limitations of its former coalition. McGovern hailed it as carving out a “new center” 
in American politics.55 
 
 The Rules Committee and the Question of the Party Charter 
The Rules Committee also served as an important site of the New Politics’ transformation 
of the party in 1972. However, this was not so much because of what happened inside its 
proceedings, but what its proceedings indicated about the contours of the second phase of 
the reform movement. As we have seen, the necessarily belated turn of the McGovern-
Fraser and O’Hara reform commissions to the issue of strengthening the national party 
structure resulted in an ambitious proposal to construct what chairs James O’Hara and 
                                                
54 See Sullivan et al., The Politics of Representation, 101-2. 
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Donald Fraser called an “in-between-conventions-organization.” 56  Breaking with 150 
years of tradition in which the national party only “assumed reality” once every four 
years to nominate and help elect a candidate for president, the charter proposed creating a 
continuous, active national organization in Democratic Party politics, which would 
feature a restructured DNC, a new regional set of organizations, biennial national 
conferences to determine party program and policy, a mass dues-paying membership, and 
a semi-autonomous educational and training arm to organize the party rank and file, 
cultivate new voters, and recruit party candidates. In response to many of the New 
Politics advocates who criticized the power of officeholders to dominate party affairs, the 
commissioners intended to “build the party as an institution [that was] bigger than any of 
its officeholders, bigger than any of its candidates.”57 Indeed, even the party chair would 
be liberated from its traditional subordination to the White House, instead being elected 
to a four-year term, overlapping with presidential nominations, by the national policy 
conference.  
The proposal, the Democratic Party Charter, was disseminated throughout the 
party for feedback in March 1972. Unsurprisingly, its promise to “discard the frustrating 
weaknesses of the present system and usher in a new and vastly strengthened structure, 
based on broad grassroots support,” quickly ran into severe opposition from party 
stakeholders.58  
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 Unlike the relative absence of coordinated protest during the implementation of 
delegate selection reform, the charter proposal hit a wall of organized opposition almost 
immediately. This was partly a matter of timing. State party officials who had willfully 
ignored or simply neglected the proceedings of the McGovern-Fraser Commission over 
its three years of operation had little opportunity to resist effectively by the time they 
found themselves bound to comply with its set of directives. By early 1972, however, 
when the effects of those changes were palpable, resistance to a new front in the reform 
struggle was readily at hand. Opposition to the charter was also a matter of substance. For 
all the novel features of the McGovern-Fraser reform guidelines, their changes for 
procedural standards of fairness and due process were very difficult to oppose in 
principle. The utter mess of unwritten rules, local customs, and folk traditions that had 
governed internal party affairs for well over a century found very few defenders as 
such. 59  As we have seen, nearly all stakeholders agreed that some kind of party 
modernization project was called for in the wake of the 1968 crisis. The same was not 
true of the party structure, whose decentralized federal organization had been a point of 
praise in many academic texts and a source of power for many state party actors. To 
propose what O’Hara and Fraser themselves described as a “sharp break with the past” 
was sure to galvanize greater opposition than delegate selection reform.60  
 The reaction of Al Barkan and the labor operatives in COPE did not involve the 
details of the charter proposal as such, but instead dismissed the entire project as a 
distraction. In reaction to the DNC’s solicitation of their comments in March 1972, 
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COPE representatives asked, “why are you guys trying to load this on us at a time when 
we can hardly salvage your party and get a candidate that can beat Nixon?” Barkan’s 
staff tabled the possibility of holding a kind of “constitutional convention” for the party 
following the 1972 elections, but as a DNC staff member observed, “we have a long way 
to go” in bringing labor on board.61 
 In late June, as the convention’s Rules Committee was considering what to do 
with the party structure proposal, Democratic members of the House of Representatives, 
many of whom were frustrated with having their automatic delegate privileges rescinded, 
engaged in a vocal display of protest over the charter, voting 105-50 to denounce the 
proposal as “not in the best interests of the Democratic party.” Led by an Illinois 
representative closely associated with Chicago mayor Richard Daley, and in defiance of 
the Democratic leadership in the House, who feared the effects of such an outburst on the 
eve of the national convention, caucus members angrily announced their opposition to 
what they saw as another vehicle for “activists and militants to take over the party.”62 By 
stripping away automatic delegate status, Ohio representative Wayne Hays said, “the 
McGovern-O’Hara-Fraser commissions reformed us out of the presidency, and now 
they’re trying to reform us out of a party.”63 In addition to attacking what they called the 
“quotas” for women, racial minorities, and young people, House Democrats focused their 
criticisms on the proposed midterm policy conferences, alleging such gatherings would 
be unrepresentative and unreflective of the party mainstream. Hays objected that “you 
can’t have a 3,000-member committee setting policy for the party. That’s the job of 
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Congress and elected officials.” He advised “every House member to run for Congress on 
his own and try to survive.”64 
The greatest source of opposition to the substance of the proposed party charter, 
however, came from the newly formed Association of State Democratic Chairs (ASDC), 
an organization whose formation was, in the words of former South Carolina state chair 
Donald Fowler, a “causal and direct” reaction to the reform movement.65 In response to 
the unprecedented assertion of national party authority exercised through the reform 
process, state party leaders, sensing acutely the loss of their former autonomy, joined 
together against a national committee they criticized as disconnected and insufficiently 
concerned with the day-to-day mechanics of running the state organizations – 
traditionally considered the constituent units of the party. As for the charter, by planning 
to introduce a regional layer to better interface state and national party levels, state chairs 
had the most at stake in the fate of the proposal. Adding a middle tier of committee 
organization and participatory policy conferences would only restrict further the capacity 
of state parties to govern their own affairs and, they feared, win elections.  
Accordingly, the ASDC took note of the plan for structural reform even before the 
charter proposal was drafted and circulated.66 After studying the circulated proposal in 
March 1972, chair of the ASDC and leader of Minnesota’s Democratic-Farmer-Labor 
Party, Richard Moe, sent a cautionary note to the charter authors warning them that their 
proposal “will be interpreted as an effort to dictate state party structure.” Indeed, the 
commission staff acknowledged as much among themselves: “As I understand it,” one 
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wrote, “we decided to dictate state party structure.”67 During testimony offered to the 
Rules Committee in June, ASDC executive director Spencer Oliver communicated that 
the Association “objected … most strenuously” to the “regional concept” introduced by 
the charter. “Any kind of workable system” linking the national party to the grassroots 
level, he argued, “should come from some political jurisdiction – that is, the state, the 
city, or county,” rather than a regional structure that has no clear jurisdictional referent in 
the American political system.68 For his part, South Carolina’s Donald Fowler attacked 
the charter’s dues-based membership scheme as “the most reprehensible and dangerous” 
innovation yet suggested by the reformers. It “plays into the hands of … those who are 
highly motivated because of special interests or extreme ideological commitments,” and 
would have the consequence of disenfranchising average Democratic voters.69 
There were notable exceptions to this chorus of opposition, however. President of 
the Communications Workers Joseph Beirne forwarded a note of appreciation to the 
commissioners, identifying the expansion of the “right” to “help make party policy” as 
“the most important and far-reaching” change for the Democratic Party.70 Support for a 
strong, disciplined party came from other, more surprising quarters as well. The party’s 
own Finance Committee, normally concerned with issues related to fundraising, noted the 
financial liability that had attended some Democrats’ obdurate stance on the Vietnam 
War in 1968. While acknowledging that “the country has now united overwhelmingly in 
opposition to the war,” the Committee went on to underscore the “inseparable 
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connection” between fundraising and “the principles and programs” of the party. The 
Committee concluded the charter “will contribute significantly to the development of one 
national Democratic Party, as distinguished from the balkanized Party which now exists 
and which often finds Democratic officials opposing programs overwhelmingly adopted 
by our Party.”71  
Still, there were significant defections within the New Politics coalition regarding 
the charter. Despite their generally supportive role in pushing for party reform since 
1968, the ADA’s Charter Study Committee balked at O’Hara and Fraser’s proposal for a 
regional substructure for the Democratic Party. The regional organization, the committee 
chair reported to the DNC, “serves no functional purpose,” and “the effort and energy 
expended in organizing regional conferences would be better spent in statewide 
conventions and conferences which will actually affect the activities and programs of the 
state parties.”72 While the ADA offered the sharpest rebuke to the charter within the New 
Politics fold, many other reform groups and organizations, consumed with the 
presidential race and convention planning, simply failed to rally behind the original 
proposal.  
Interestingly, however, the members of the ASDC who so opposed some of the 
charter’s proposals did not seek to turn back the clock on the reforms by scrapping the 
charter altogether. On the contrary, having become painfully aware of the new capacities 
of the national party, state chairs became “reformers” of a kind themselves and seized on 
the charter proposal as a vehicle for restraining the autonomy of the national committee 
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to run roughshod over its state affiliates, as it had with the McGovern-Fraser reforms.73 
For the price of their support, the ASDC demanded that all state party chairs be formally 
integrated into the restructured DNC, a significant modification of the existing proposal. 
While not a majority, party chairs would now be able to exert power as a voting bloc 
within the national party, foreclosing the likelihood that the national party would ever 
again be able to impose binding regulations on state parties without their consent. 
In response to this compromise proposal, as well as the volume of opposition 
against the charter and the relative absence of pressure for its passage, Fraser and O’Hara 
heavily revised their proposal to restructure the Democratic Party, resubmitting to the 
convention Rules Committee a version without regional organizations or a dues-paying 
membership, and agreeing to the inclusion of all state chairs (plus the highest ranking 
state party member of the opposite sex) into an expanded, more representative DNC.74 
However, while the Rules Committee agreed to approve the immediate reform of the 
DNC, so far reaching were the remaining alternations to party structure and governance, 
especially mandatory midterm policy conferences and the election of the party chair, that 
it recommended the full convention approve a new party reform commission to study the 
O’Hara-Fraser draft as well as a midterm party conference to consider the approval of the 
party’s first constitution in 1974. O’Hara, Fraser, and the ASDC agreed to the terms, and 
the compromise Rules Committee report was approved overwhelmingly by the 
convention, with the few speaking against it in favor of its original, stronger version. 
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Stop McGovern Versus Labor for McGovern 
With the California credentials dispute settled on the first day of the convention, the Stop 
McGovern movement appeared to lose momentum as the coalition fractured under the 
inevitability of the New Politics nominee. McGovern’s main challengers, Muskie and 
Humphrey, formally withdrew from the race after their failure in the California contest. 
Only Washington senator Henry Jackson, a committed cold war liberal, made a last stand 
in the face of McGovern’s imminent victory. While seconding Georgia governor Jimmy 
Carter’s nomination of Jackson for president, Steelworkers president I.W. Abel, who had 
refused his role on the McGovern-Fraser Commission, set the tone of the post-convention 
conflict to come. Echoing the rhetoric that Jackson and his advisor Ben Wattenberg had 
been crafting throughout the campaign, depicting the struggle over the shape and nature 
of the Democratic Party as a conflict between liberal, white collar elites and the blue 
collar “common man,” Abel denounced the “self-styled liberals, the anti-labor snobs,” 
and all those “who call themselves advocates of new politics.” What the party needed 
was “a candidate who speaks for the vital progressive center – where the people are.”75  
 Abel’s attack on the New Politics, however, was not the final shot in the battle for 
a lost cause. On the contrary, it proved to be the opening salvo in a months long battle of 
anti-reform, labor-liberal cold warriors against the presidential candidacy of George 
McGovern. The Democratic nominee’s advisors, who naively expected labor bosses such 
as George Meany to eventually be forced into the McGovern fold by rank-and-file 
pressure from below, were sorely disappointed.76 
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Curiously, the centerpiece of the post-convention Stop McGovern movement was 
a discourse of class struggle – a framework which, as we have seen, became the basis for 
many of the critics’ subsequent scholarship.77 Over the succeeding months between the 
July convention and the November election, labor leaders and liberal commentators 
within the Stop McGovern camp engaged in a vigorous publicity campaign against the 
New Politics movement responsible for McGovern’s nomination. Writing in the 
Washington Post, John Roche, former Johnson aide and former national chair of the 
ADA, depicted the controversy over McGovern’s candidacy as representing “a class 
struggle within the Democratic Party,” pitting the labor movement against “the 
intelligentsia, the ‘limousine liberals,’ the upper-class ladies in sandals who live in the 
city but send their children to private schools and spend their spare time condemning the 
‘racism’ of the ethnics who resent busing.” 78  COPE’s Al Barkan echoed the same 
inflammatory rhetoric of class struggle when he vowed that “we aren’t going to let these 
Harvards-Berkeleys-Camelots take over our party.” 79  George Meany, in an address 
before the Steelworkers biennial gathering in September, construed the Miami Beach 
convention as elitist, emphasizing that large numbers of attendees held college degrees 
and had incomes of over $25,000. “It was a classy convention of the elite,” he said. And 
while he acknowledged that there had been hundreds of new labor delegates in 
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attendance, there had also been “gay liberation activists and people who want to liberalize 
abortion. … We [working people] will not be shunted aside by an elite.”80 
 As Meany’s words indicated, while the class struggle between McGovern liberals 
and the working class was the dominant theme uniting the Stop McGovern movement, an 
additional irony was its appropriation and co-optation of the New Politics’ rhetoric of 
exclusion. In language reminiscent of 1968 and the McGovern-Fraser Commission 
hearings thereafter, Meany’s unwillingness to be “shunted aside” by a new “elite” 
indicted the undemocratic or at least unrepresentative nature of the New Politics 
movement and their newfound power in the Democratic Party. Another former LBJ aide 
and future member of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, Peter Rosenblatt, 
underscored this parallel explicitly, writing in the New York Times that “like the 
dissenters in Chicago, I feel that I have been shut out and that my views were 
substantially under-represented” in Miami Beach. “The loudly trumpeted reform of party 
institutions achieved by the 1968 protesters,” he said, “produced a convention this year 
which was no less unrepresentative,” although “the identity of the victims and the means 
used to achieve the result did change.” Rosenblatt warned that the new undemocratic 
party built by the reformers would produce defeat in November: “Those who feel as I do 
this year do not express themselves in demonstrations. On the contrary, in the customary 
fashion of moderates everywhere, they register their disapproval by silently withdrawing 
their support.”81 
If some “moderates” were withdrawing their support silently, as Rosenblatt 
predicted, others did so quite loudly, as when George Meany hastily called a special 
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meeting of the AFL-CIO Executive Council, reportedly “only hours after the Democratic 
convention ended,” to extract a unanimous vote announcing an officially “neutral” policy 
stance for the labor federation in the 1972 presidential election.82 (The actual vote was 27 
to 3 with 5 abstentions.) “We don’t think this man is good for labor,” Meany said in a 
press conference.83 Al Barkan put it more bluntly: “You so-called responsible leaders of 
this party seem to think the kids and the kooks and the Bella Abzugs can win you some 
elections. Well, we’re going to let them try to do it for you this year.”84 In fact, Meany’s 
efforts to undermine the Democratic nominee had begun even before the convention let 
out, when the AFL-CIO president circulated an anonymous fifty-five page white paper 
among the delegates attacking McGovern’s record on labor legislation.85 While it was 
accurate that McGovern had in 1966 voted against the repeal of Taft-Hartley’s section 
14b when it was clear that it would not pass the Senate anyway, factually the charge of 
being an anti-labor politician was difficult to make stick. By COPE’s own rating system 
McGovern scored a 95 percent “right” voting record – an important factor in securing 
union funding for his reelection in 1968. Compared with Nixon’s 13 percent COPE score, 
or even Lyndon Johnson’s 60 percent rating, the New Politics nominee’s pro-labor record 
was only exceeded by Hubert Humphrey.86 
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Meany rationalized the unprecedented move of the AFL-CIO Executive Council 
taking a neutral position in a presidential race by restating the founding philosophy of 
nonpartisanship characteristic of the American Federation of Labor under its founder 
Samuel Gompers. When asked about labor’s apparently strained relationship with the 
Democratic Party, Meany told the audience of Face the Nation:  
 
I have no interest in parties. Parties don’t mean anything. … I have 
nothing to do with the internal workings of the Democratic Party. This is a 
myth. … I’ve been characterized as one of the big wheels in the 
Democratic Party, and this is completely and absolutely untrue. … My 
party is the trade union movement.87 
 
That such a post hoc rationalization was anything more than posturing was not lost on 
other top labor leaders in the trade union hierarchy. As the UAW’s Paul Schrade said 
incredulously, the claim of nonpartisanship “is strange coming from the President of the 
AFL-CIO who sits in his hotel room at Democratic conventions trying to dictate on 
candidates, platform, and credentials.” 88  Even Meany’s long-time lieutenant Lane 
Kirkland later observed that “anybody who knew George Meany knew he was up to his 
ears in partisan politics.”89 Indeed, only a week after securing the neutrality vote, Meany 
spent a day golfing with President Nixon and his top aides.90 
 But if Meany’s attempts to smear McGovern’s legislative record or fall back on 
an ostensibly nonpartisan policy failed to offer compelling reasons for his opposition, 
                                                
87 Transcript, George Meany on Face the Nation, 3 September 1972, Box 47, Folder: George McGovern: 
Labor Movement, 1972, Civil Rights Department, AFL-CIO Records. 
88 Quoted in Taylor E. Dark, The Unions and the Democrats: An Enduring Alliance (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1999), 86. 
89 Remarks of AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland at Meeting of State Federation Officers, 29 September 
1982, “Labor in Partisan Politics,” COPE Files (unprocessed), AFL-CIO Records. 
90 John Herling, “Mr. Meany Runs Into Some Sharp Questioning,” Washington Post, 14 August 1972; 
Widick, “Meany’s Last Hurrah,” 138. 
  269 
others saw through the rhetoric. While Meany was no doubt personally affronted by 
members of the counterculture (“those who look like Jacks, act like Jills, and have the 
odor of johns about them”) and despised McGovern for being “soft” on foreign policy 
(“he has become an apologist for the communist world”), his fundamental objection was 
to his own loss of powerbroker status in the reformed Democratic Party as well as the 
general threat democratization posed for the labor union hierarchy.91 AFSCME’s Jerry 
Wurf saw the first point clearly when he observed in The New Republic, “the Executive 
Council vote has more to do with how McGovern won the nomination than with his 
record before or during the campaign.” 92  He recognized that “the real concern was 
participation and access.” However, Wurf’s belief that “the AFL-CIO’s vested interest … 
ignored the rich opportunities for workers and their unions” to be part of a “more open, 
‘new’ party” overestimated the flexibility of labor’s institutional position. His 
observation that “reform presented an opportunity [for labor] to say goodbye to the 
bosses and to mobilize the membership” applied much more to his own upstart public 
employees union – by then adding 1,000 members a week – than it did George Meany’s 
position, which relied on those bosses for party influence.93  
As Wurf’s language suggests, if Meany’s AFL-CIO lacked the interest and the 
capacity to adapt to the reformed party, that did not hold true throughout the trade union 
movement. The loss of veto power over the Democratic nomination portended a new 
relationship between labor and the party, one whose channel of influence ran through 
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primaries and caucuses and issue-oriented politics rather than the networks of elite 
brokerage. Some even speculated that the rift between McGovern and Meany could 
“cause [an] internal realignment in the labor movement” through an alliance with the 
New Politics.94 Indeed, this was what journalist James Wechsler identified as the “more 
profound” threat embedded in the reform project: not that it deinstitutionalized labor 
leaders from the smoke-filled rooms of the party but that it demonstrated the potential 
power of democratizing unrepresentative institutions. 
 
If the Democratic Party can successfully execute this process of 
democratization, the idea could become infectious. It might even invite 
emulation by those trade unions whose conventions resemble Soviet party 
congresses. Imagine what would happen to the life-style of some ancient 
labor bodies if they were required to consider adequate representation for 
the young, and the black, and to admit women to their higher councils.95 
 
 In the aftermath of Meany’s neutrality vote, few had to try very hard to “imagine” 
such a scenario at all, as the decision to effectively boycott the presidential election, and 
the heavy-handed way in which that decision was reached, triggered an explosion within 
the labor movement. In August 1972, following a meeting of African American 
representatives of the UAW, the Meat Cutters, the American Federation of Teachers, 
Hotel Workers, AFSCME, the Communication Workers (CWA), and others, the group – 
which would soon formally become the Coalition of Black Trade Unionists (CBTU) – 
wrote an open letter to George Meany, disavowing the neutrality position, which “in no 
way” reflected their views and “ran counter to the interests of Blacks, other minorities, 
and workers in general.” The neutrality decision, they argued, reflected the undemocratic 
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nature of the AFL-CIO, within which “Black labor officials must move to exert more 
influence.”96 Indeed, in 1974, the Coalition of Labor Union Women (CLUW) would form 
around very similar demands, aligning closely with the New Politics.97 
 The black trade unionists’ statement was only the most dramatic instance of the 
rebellion set in train by Meany’s unilateral move of the AFL-CIO into the vanguard of 
the Stop McGovern movement. Indeed, as the Washington Post observed, “Mr. Meany 
has created the conditions that invite defiance from within labor’s ranks of his authority 
and judgment.”98 While the AFL-CIO president had managed to swing twenty-seven 
votes in the emergency session of the Executive Council after the convention in Miami 
Beach, many of the union officials that had backed him then subsequently joined the 
revolt by endorsing the Democratic nominee. AFSCME, the International Union of 
Electricians, and the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers had all originally voted against 
the neutrality decision, but the CWA, the Machinists (IAM), the Retail Clerks, and the 
Graphic Arts International Union soon joined them with McGovern endorsements. By the 
end of August, over forty international unions, including the unaffiliated UAW, had 
openly defied the stated preference of the president of the union federation. Even those 
union leaders, such as the Steelworkers’ Abel, who backed Meany by approving 
neutrality policies within their own executive councils, soon faced defiant union locals 
endorsing McGovern.99 
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 Moreover, some of the unions backing McGovern took the further step of cutting 
off their financial contributions to COPE. The CWA, IAM, AFSCME and others were 
among the largest in the federation, and their withdrawal of support deprived the AFL-
CIO’s political arm of significant funds. 100  As CWA president Joseph Beirne’s 
explanation for his withdrawal from COPE shows, the McGovern-Meany split had 
galvanized a far-reaching attack on the very nature of the trade union federation. 
 
I withdrew from COPE because it was out of touch with what was 
happening in the political process – with the reforms which I think were a 
natural evolution in the Democratic Party, and with McGovern who was 
the candidate who had done the most for the working man. COPE must be 
changed. We who contribute to it have no control over it or participation 
in its policy decisions. The COPE leaders live in the dreams of the past, 
where they wheeled and dealed in politics. The Executive Council of the 
AFL-CIO should be reformed, too. All we do there is endorse candidates 
and nothing else. Our union now feels we can make our own political 
decisions and spend our money more fruitfully by going it alone.101 
 
While Beirne and other labor leaders defied Meany and withdrew from COPE, they did 
not in fact “go it alone.” On the contrary, the forty unions and dozens of locals that had 
broken with Meany’s neutrality position formed the Labor for McGovern Committee 
alongside the UAW under the leadership of Joseph Keenan (International Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers), Howard Samuel (Amalgamated Clothing Workers), and Beirne.102 
 In response to the upsurge of open defiance, Meany cracked down in the few 
ways he could. Because the AFL-CIO was a trade union federation of 117 international 
unions, the neutrality decision did not prevent any of those affiliated unions from making 
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their own endorsements, however untypical was the behavior. In response to those AFL-
CIO members who did break from Meany’s neutrality, the federation president could 
only threaten them with shifting from his position of neutrality in the 1972 election to 
open endorsement of Nixon. When overwhelmed by a wave of criticism from the 
audience during an address to COPE operatives in August, Meany warned, “I am trying 
to stay neutral. But I am being pushed. If you push me too hard, I may take action you’ll 
regret.”103  
While Meany could not sanction the defiant union leaders inside the AFL-CIO, 
who were formally his equals, he displayed punitive action against labor councils that 
came out for McGovern because they were accountable to the union federation directly. 
After their endorsement of the Democratic candidate, Meany suspended the Colorado 
Labor Council’s charter as well as its top officers, and placed its funds under national 
control, all on the grounds that its endorsement was “detrimental to the best interests” of 
the AFL-CIO. Meany followed up with letters threatening similar actions to the state 
labor councils of California, Oklahoma, Minnesota, North Carolina, Nebraska, Iowa, and 
Texas. When these state labor bodies responded by rephrasing their endorsements of 
McGovern more obliquely – protesting the policies of the Nixon administration and 
warning their members against his reelection – Meany wrote an angry rebuke to a 
California state official, saying that “a call for the defeat of one candidate is equivalent to 
an endorsement of the other.” While a federal judge temporarily halted Meany’s attack on 
the Colorado Labor Council (CLC), its appeal to the AFL-CIO Executive Council to 
resolve the dispute and reinstate its officers was defeated. The CLC’s leaders, Meany 
charged, had “pursued a policy of deliberate defiance,” adding that “it is important that 
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we maintain authority over these bodies. …[It is not] a question of politics – it is a 
question of policy.”104  
 
Conclusion 
The splits within labor exposed and exasperated by McGovern’s nomination belie the 
surface level plausibility of the Stop McGovern coalition’s claims regarding the elitism 
and class dynamics of the New Politics movement and its reform of the Democratic 
Party. As we have seen, the delegate selection reforms engineered by the New Politics 
movement brought into the convention more women, racial minorities, young people, and 
union members than ever before, while also increasing the representation of those earning 
below the median income level. That convention produced a party platform that returned 
to, and extended, the reach of New Deal liberalism by prioritizing affirmative action, 
equal citizenship, and guaranteed full employment. It was, however, a decidedly New 
Politics rendition of American social democracy, shorn of vital center liberalism’s cold 
war foreign policy agenda and its compromising coalition with southern conservatives. 
 McGovern went down to a historic landslide defeat in November by a margin of 
60.7 to 37.5 percent of the popular vote, losing every state to Nixon except Massachusetts 
and the District of Columbia in a lopsided Electoral College vote of 520 to 17. The 
grassroots army that had effectively organized state after state during the primaries was 
no match for a campaign that suffered a litany of problems, including bungling the 
replacement of vice-presidential nominee Senator Thomas Eagleton for mental health 
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reasons soon after the convention, failing to communicate the campaign’s economic 
platform for universal basic income that could counter the charge of ‘mass welfarism,’ 
and having so deep an association with the new social movements that many observers 
questioned who was leading whom.105 McGovern also faced open defection within party 
ranks, as former Texas governor John Connally (who would in 1973 officially switch to 
the GOP) led a “Democrats for Nixon” bolt from the nominee. As Connally and his 
supporters put in a full-page ad that ran in the New York Times in August, “We have 
nothing against Senator McGovern personally. But we feel strongly that many of his 
views could prove disastrous to the future of our country.”106 Lastly, despite both the 
rhetoric of and real increases in participation, voter turnout hit a new postwar low, 
dropping sharply from 60 to 55 percent between 1968 and 1972, notwithstanding the 
enactment of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment lowering the voting age from twenty-one to 
eighteen years old.  
 Meanwhile, the Republican administration waged a reelection campaign focused 
on exploiting suburban middle class anxieties and working class divisions and 
resentments. This was less the famed southern strategy of Wallace-esque racial populism 
than it was a “suburban strategy” aimed at articulating a new “silent majority” stretching 
across the entire country. As effective (and affective) as this strategy was, the Nixon 
campaign also engaged in criminal actions, agent provocateurism, and gross media 
manipulation. Added to this was the typical incumbent advantage of dominating the news 
                                                
105 For these problems and many more, see the campaign strategy memos collected in Box 241, Folder: 
McGovern/Shriver Campaign, 1972, O’Brien Papers. See also, Bruce Miroff, “Movement Activists and 
Partisan Insurgents,” Studies in American Political Development 21 (2007). 
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cycle and setting the political agenda, as with Nixon’s famous trip to China and his 
promises that “peace is at hand” in the Vietnam War negotiations.107 
Given these factors, it is difficult to weigh the exact importance of the split in the 
trade union leadership and the class warfare line promoted by the Stop McGovern 
coalition. But this certainly did hurt McGovern’s chances in the November election to 
some extent. Despite the best efforts of the Labor for McGovern Committee, their hastily 
put together apparatus was no match for the electoral capacities of COPE, which 
successfully focused its efforts on protecting the Democratic majorities in the House and 
Senate. The day after the election, George Meany issued a press release praising the 
American people for “overwhelmingly repudiating neo-isolationism as the basis for 
foreign policy.” He went on: “under these circumstances, we believe that the AFL-CIO 
truly reflected the feelings of our rank-and-file when we declined to endorse either 
candidate. That decision has been vindicated by events.”108 Labor-oriented civil rights 
leader Bayard Rustin went one step further than Meany, foreshadowing the conflicts to 
come, when in his post-election press release he criticized those trying to pin 
responsibility on McGovern personally as “superficial and self-serving.” As he 
concluded, “the problem lay not with McGovern, but with his supporters and the changes 
they made in the Democratic Party.”109 
McGovern’s presidential campaign, including the reforms that made such a 
phenomenon possible, signified the high water mark of the New Politics movement in the 
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Democratic Party. While its sharp rejection at the polls did not put an end to the 
movement, it did turn the tide against further progress. Not only did McGovern’s loss 
have a pronounced demobilizing effect on reform leaders and activists, it also provided 
anti-reformers with a persuasive counter-argument where no rationale had been available 
before. This intellectual void had been perfectly displayed in future CDM spokesperson 
Ben Wattenberg’s convoluted defense of the pre-reformed party in 1970: 
 
What can be said about the delegate selection system is this: Somehow it 
works. All the delegates are elected or, if not, are selected by people who 
were elected popularly or, in some cases, selected by people who were 
selected by people who were elected popularly at one time or another. 
There is, then, a democratic process, if far removed, behind each 
delegate.110 
 
It is indicative of the efficacy of the New Politics movement, and the broader New Left 
before them, that arguments in defense of undemocratic systems of political 
representation such as this galvanized little in the way of organized support or public 
endorsement in 1970. The New Politics movement powerfully shaped the interpretation 
of the 1968 party crisis, after which very few could come out against the reformers once 
the mainstream party leadership had accepted reform as the price for unity. However, 
McGovern’s devastating loss at the polls altered these circumstances. And while the 
principles of democratic inclusion and fair representation still could not be attacked 
directly, as we will see, the reformers’ institutional means to achieve these ends were 
targeted in the name of democratic representation, electoral success, and restoring a 
Democratic majority. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
AFTER THE LANDSLIDE: 
THE COALITION FOR A DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY  
AND THE REDIRECTION OF REFORM 
 
Why shouldn’t those of us who want to replace the de facto quota system 
enacted in 1971 with a truly democratic and open process of electing 
delegates now be entitled to be considered the “reformers”? 
-- The Coalition for a Democratic Majority (1974)1 
 
Senator George McGovern’s landslide defeat in the 1972 presidential election marked a 
turning point for the New Politics movement inside the Democratic Party. While such a 
decisive rebuke at the polls did not spell the end of reform as such, the dispiriting effect it 
had on reform advocates was palpable, as was its encouraging effect on their opponents. 
However, as the struggle between the New Politics and its antagonists played out in the 
aftermath of 1972, the anti-New Politics front, with a few important exceptions, did not 
seek to return the party to the status quo ante. Rather than uprooting the reform project as 
a whole, which would have risked reenergizing the fatiguing reform coalition and 
perpetuating intraparty conflict, opponents of the New Politics organized their attack on 
the terrain of reform itself, using the remaining momentum from 1972 to institutionalize a 
balance of intraparty power favorable to state party organizations and labor leaders. By 
exploiting the window of opportunity opened by McGovern’s defeat, anti-reformers 
successfully installed their own version of reform, codifying and constitutionalizing the 
existing system of party federalism in the new Democratic Party charter. 
 No agent was more important in redirecting reform than the Coalition for a 
Democratic Majority (CDM). Composed of moderate and conservative Democrats, 
                                                
1 CDM Notes, October 1974, Box 48, Folder: Democratic Party, Coalition for a Democratic Majority, 
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academic intellectuals, and labor leaders – many of whom had been active in the Stop 
McGovern movement – the CDM emerged from the ashes of the 1972 defeat with a self-
declared mission to root out the New Politics from the Democratic Party. While often 
supported by other organized intraparty groups, such as the Association of State 
Democratic Chairs (ASDC), the Democratic Governors Conference, and top officials in 
the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), the 
CDM was in the vanguard of the counter-reform movement. Over 1972-74, the CDM 
elaborated the “new class” arguments lodged against McGovernites by focusing its 
attacks on what it considered to be the undemocratic “quota system” mandated by the 
McGovern-Fraser guidelines, which it held responsible for producing an 
“unrepresentative” convention and an unpopular presidential nominee. By concentrating 
its efforts on the two reform commissions produced by the 1972 convention – the 
Commission on Delegate Selection and Party Structure (or Mikulski Commission, as it 
became known) and the Charter Commission (also known as the Sanford Commission) – 
the relatively small-sized CDM was able to capitalize on the McGovern defeat and 
prevent the realization of the reformers’ most ambitious agenda: building a truly national 
Democratic Party. 
 As we will see, the arguments laid out by the CDM and its coalition of anti-
reformers strike a familiar tone for those acquainted with the scholarly literature on party 
reform. In fact, not only did partisans of the CDM produce some of the most prominent 
academic studies of the reform process, but their ultimate conclusions became the 
guiding assumptions for subsequent analysis by non-participants.2 Thus, even while the 
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Presidential Elite: Men and Women in National Politics (New York: Russell Sage, 1976); Austin Ranney, 
  280 
CDM was not victorious in all its policy battles, it did succeed in shifting the general 
political atmosphere concerning democracy in the Democratic Party and putting the 
reformers on the defensive in a rearguard struggle to preserve what they had gained 
between 1968 and 1972. The result was a compromised reform process stalled midway 
through its transformation, a stalemate whose costs would only become clear in the fight 
for full employment in the second half of the 1970s. 
 
“Come Home, Democrats”: Launching the Coalition for a Democratic Majority 
On 7 December 1972, one month after McGovern’s defeat in the presidential election, 
full-page ads appeared in the New York Times and the Washington Post inviting 
“common-sense liberals” to reject the “blare of the New Politics.” Under the large 
headline “Come Home, Democrats” – a play on McGovern’s campaign theme of “Come 
Home, America” – its authors announced that “the ‘New Politics’ has failed.” In the short 
manifesto that followed, the newly formed Coalition for a Democratic Majority 
denounced the new, “unrepresentative” social forces that had come to exert “undue 
influence” within the Democratic Party, “driving [the labor movement] from its 
traditional place in the vanguard of the Democratic coalition.” The CDM enumerated a 
list of grievances against what it claimed were the core beliefs of the New Politics 
movement, including: that “the United States must withdraw from its international 
responsibilities”; that “American society is sick and guilty”; that “one small group 
[claims] that it knows what it best for others”; and that “porportionalism in accordance 
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with birth and group origin” trumps “the principle of individual merit.” However, in 
contrast to these values, “the voters have spoken,” they said, and “in repudiating the 
Democratic/‘New Politics’ presidential candidacy in this election while re-electing a 
Democratic Congress, the voters were speaking with precision and sophistication.” The 
task at hand, the manifesto concluded, was the formation of an “action group” with a 
“robust voice” that could take advantage of this “historic opportunity” to shift the 
“climate of opinion.”3 
 “Come Home, Democrats” ended with a short list of organizing committee 
members and an impressive list of sponsors. Among the organizers were former Lyndon 
Johnson and Henry Jackson advisor Ben Wattenberg, who, along with elections scholar 
Richard Scammon, had authored the 1970 best-selling anti-New Politics text, The Real 
Majority.4 Other members of the organizing committee included long-time civil rights 
and labor activist Bayard Rustin, director of the AFL-CIO sponsored A. Philip Randolph 
Institute; Penn Kemble, member of the Young People’s Socialist League (YPSL) and 
former chair of the AFL-CIO’s anti-Wallace organization Frontlash; and Committee on 
Political Education (COPE) operative Robert Keefe. The CDM leadership also featured 
Democratic officeholders, including Washington State representative and Jackson 
protégé Thomas Foley, Maryland Board of Education member Richard Schifter, former 
Hubert Humphrey advisor Max Kampleman, Georgetown professor Jeane Kirkpatrick, 
and well-known anti-feminist critic Midge Decter. Its long list of sponsors included a 
                                                
3 “Come Home, Democrats,” Box 48, Folder: Democratic Party, Coalition for a Democratic Majority, By-
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group of prominent academics, such as Nelson Polsby, Reinhard Bendix, Seymour 
Martin Lipset, Nathan Glazer, John Roche, Richard Pipes, and Adam Ulam, some of 
whom had been vocal critics of the “academic anarchy” of campus protest. The list also 
included prominent neoconservative intellectuals like Midge Decter’s husband Norman 
Podhoretz, editor of Commentary Magazine, and Daniel Bell, editor of The Public 
Interest.5 The list also hosted a number of labor leaders, including Barkan confidant 
William DuChessi of the Textile Workers, Walter Burke of the Steelworkers, Louis 
Stulberg of the International Ladies Garment Workers, and Albert Shanker of the 
American Federation of Teachers. While the names of Barkan or George Meany were not 
listed, AFL-CIO secretary treasurer Lane Kirkland had encouraged the formation of the 
Coalition, provided the group with the seed money for the full-page ads, and continued to 
serve as the CDM’s primary source of funding through the 1970s.6 As CDM operative 
Josh Muravchik later put it, “to achieve AFL-CIO dominance over the Democratic Party; 
that was our goal. And we saw our own role in the little group of [sic] being to help them 
in an intellectual or agitprop way.”7 
 Surprisingly, the CDM’s sponsorship list also included several erstwhile party 
reformers. Austin Ranney, a professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin, 
had been a very active member of the McGovern-Fraser Commission throughout the 
body’s lifetime, but had evidently turned against its guidelines by December 1972. In his 
Jefferson Memorial lectures, delivered at Berkeley at the invitation of Nelson Polsby in 
                                                
5 For a discussion of the academic neoconservatives, see Andrew Hartman, A War for the Soul of America: 
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early 1973 and later published as Curing the Mischiefs of Faction, Ranney criticized the 
reforms along the same lines as those of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, 
specifically regarding its implementation of a “quota” system. 8  And while Ranney 
frequently cited CDM material in his lectures, he failed to disclose his active participation 
in the anti-reform organization.  
In addition to Ranney, and more surprising, was Michigan representative James 
O’Hara, who had chaired the sibling Commission on Rules from 1969-72 and coauthored 
the original draft of the party charter with Donald Fraser. However, as a leading member 
of the CDM, O’Hara quickly became a sharp critic of the reform movement, denouncing 
the 1972 convention as the “most unrepresentative” in the last century of Democratic 
Party politics, one which he claimed was dominated by a “militant minority.”9 When 
Congress reconvened in January 1973 in the wake of McGovern’s defeat, O’Hara 
distributed copies of “Come Home, Democrats” to his all his party colleagues in the 
House. 10  O’Hara’s about-face is curious but not difficult to understand. As fellow 
reformer William Crotty has pointed out, O’Hara’s leadership role in the reform process 
severely strained his relationship with the AFL-CIO leadership, a major force in his home 
district in the heavily white ethnic suburbs of Detroit, and nearly cost him reelection in 
1972.11 (He scraped in with a razor-thin 51 to 49 percent victory.) O’Hara himself later 
indicated his own recoil from the counterculture associated with New Politics at the 1972 
convention: “Those who watched over television saw the women’s liberation movement, 
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the gay lib, intellectuals and college kids, pot smokers and others who didn’t represent 
the values most people adhere to.”12 Whatever the true motivation, his conversion from 
reform advocate to reform critic was a boon to the anti-reformers in the CDM, lending 
additionally legitimacy and expertise to their project from a source within the New 
Politics movement itself. 
 While “Come Home, Democrats” marked the public unveiling of the CDM as a 
political force inside the Democratic Party, its origins reached back to the pre-election 
period, when the efforts of the Stop McGovern movement had ended in failure at the 
1972 convention in Miami Beach. Throughout the following summer and fall the CDM 
organizing committee had held regular strategy meetings in Washington, DC. It had also 
clandestinely gathered its impressive list of sponsors, sensitive to the fact that any 
premature public knowledge of its project could compromise its post-election impact by 
appearing to contribute to McGovern’s defeat.13 The manifesto itself was prepared for 
publication well in advance of the election by Decter, Podhoretz, and the Kirkpatricks 
(Jeane Kirkpatrick’s husband Evron remained a silent member of the CDM’s Board of 
Directors due to his position as chair of the American Political Science Association).14 
The basic thrust of the ad had also received an elaborate treatment in Podhoretz’s 
Commentary the week before it ran in the New York Times and the Washington Post. 
There, in an article by Penn Kemble and fellow YPSL comrade Josh Muravchik, the 
authors hailed the “counterrevolution” at the polls that had removed the “sanctity which 
                                                
12 O’Hara quoted in “Moderate Demos Rework Delegate Selection Rules,” Dallas Times Herald, 27 April 
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so long sheltered [the reforms] from serious appraisal” and “made criticism all but 
impossible.” They continued: “But it is now evident that serious criticism is deserved. 
The reforms have left one of the major institutions of American democracy in a 
shambles.” Kemble and Muravchik went on to provide an entire account of the 
McGovern-Fraser reform commission from 1968 all the way up to McGovern’s victory at 
the convention – a reform project, they contended, which was meant “to favor the 
affluent liberals within the party and to diminish the influence of its lower-middle and 
working-class constituents.”15 
However, it was more than just the bitter taste of political defeat in Miami Beach 
that motivated the CDM initiators to lay the foundations for what Wattenberg called “a 
counterweight to the New Politics.”16 From its origins in the 1968 antiwar insurgencies to 
its reform of the party to the nomination of McGovern, the New Politics movement 
signified the ideological struggle for the very meaning of American liberalism – a 
struggle the signatories to the CDM manifesto feared they were losing. As we have seen, 
the liberalism espoused by the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) in the postwar 
period, defining itself as the “vital center” between anti-New Deal Republicanism on the 
one hand and Communist-sympathetic Popular Frontism on the other, had been torn apart 
by the mid-1960s as the contradictions of the New Deal regime became unsustainable. 
After Richard Scammon announced the need for a “new ADA” in 1972, CDM leaders 
self-consciously undertook an effort to “redefine liberalism for the 1970s” and, in a 
replay of the ADA’s purge of Communist sympathizers in the late 1940s, attempted “to 
                                                
15 Penn Kemble and Josh Muravchik, “The New Politics and the Democrats,” Commentary, 1 December 
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cleanse mainstream liberalism” of its left-wing elements.17 The scale of what was at stake 
was expressed in their newsletter CDM Notes: 
 
We now face a need to draw some distinctions between the two major 
strands of what used to be called liberalism. One strand, with which CDM 
is aligned, holds that the Democratic Party must rebuild a broad coalition 
to win back the blue-collar, Southern moderate, Catholic, and “middle-
American” voters who deserted the Democratic ticket in 1972. … The 
second strand seeks to strengthen the forces which came to dominate the 
party between 1968 and 1972 – an alliance of women, blacks, and youth, 
led by dissident elements of the affluent, educated middle class.18 
 
The CDM was “not looking for unity” between these strands, but intended “to draw 
bright, clear lines” between them so that they could make vital center liberalism’s internal 
splits “into a chasm.” “[C]ompromise,” Wattenberg said, “would come later.”19 
For members of the CDM, what they reductively labeled “McGovernism” was a 
threat pregnant with “the dangers in the broader current of political ideas” that had 
emerged from the 1960s New Left, including a “conception of democratic participation” 
which they claimed privileged “the demands of the political activist” over the “needs of 
the ordinary citizen.”20 One member went so far as to say, “grass roots politics is an 
upper middle class sport.”21 Seeing themselves as engaged in a battle to defend traditional 
cold war liberalism from the New Politics, members of the CDM defined their project as 
restoring “the disaffected and disenfranchised elements of the Democratic Party to 
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influence.”22 Indeed, by employing the “new class” discourse heard from those in the 
Stop McGovern movement who denounced the New Politics as “elitist,” the CDM 
effectively turned the politics of insurgency upside down, casting themselves as the 
embattled insurgents fighting for influence in an exclusive party. 
But the Coalition for a Democratic Majority was not, nor did it ever become, a 
mass organization, even on the modest scale of the ADA with its national network of 
local and campus chapters. In fact, despite all its accusations of unrepresentativeness and 
elitism directed at the New Politics, the CDM was itself a relatively small collection of 
Washington-based officeholders, lawyers, labor operatives, and intellectuals with no 
institutional relationship to the mass base for whom it claimed to speak.23 Indeed, the 
seductive logic of claiming to represent the voiceless, the uninvolved, and the “silent 
majority” who were threatened by the newfound power of liberal activists was a powerful 
discursive weapon in the wake of McGovern’s defeat. In his memoir, Ben Wattenberg, 
chair of the CDM, favorably compared the group to the British Fabian Society, saying 
that despite being small it had “enormous influence” on society.24 And like the Fabians, 
CDMers developed a project they believed would restore political power to, if not to the 
voiceless working class itself, than those it judged as most able to speak for them: elected 
officeholders and trade union officials.  
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Dislodging “McGovernism”: The Battle for the Party Leadership 
CDM members were keenly aware that the “cooperation of party professionals,” 
especially DNC chair Lawrence O’Brien, had been a “decisive” factor for the reformers’ 
success between 1968 and 1972.25 Accordingly, the first front in their battle to retake the 
party from the New Politics developed around the pivotal figure of the party chair. While 
no longer occupied by O’Brien, who had resigned after the Miami convention to run 
McGovern’s general election campaign, the position had been filled according to the 
traditional method of Democratic Party governance: appointment by the presidential 
nominee. By installing Jean Westwood as chair, McGovern had not only appointed one 
of his own team, but had appointed the Democratic Party’s first woman to the top of the 
leadership. Westwood had been elected as one of Utah’s DNC representatives in 1967 
before becoming an early supporter of McGovern’s nomination campaign in 1971. 
McGovern had been conscious of accommodating the demands for greater party 
representation from New Politics organizations such as the National Women’s Political 
Caucus (NWPC), especially after having failed to support their credentials challenge 
against the South Carolina delegation in Miami Beach in exchange for the latter’s support 
in the pivotal California contest.26 In addition to being an experienced member of the 
DNC, Westwood had also been a founding member of the NWPC and had functioned as 
a liaison between the reformers inside and those outside the party during the campaign.27 
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 As McGovern’s chair of the DNC and a symbol of the New Politics, Westwood 
presented an ideal target for the counter-reform movement to signal their commitment to 
restoring party professionals to power. “Gravel Gertie,” as Barkan referred to her, “must 
go,” he demanded.28 But while there were moderate state party chairs putting their names 
forward for consideration to run the national committee ahead of its first post-election 
meeting in December 1972, the CDM made a show of force by consolidating their 
influence behind Texas Democrat and DNC treasurer Robert Strauss. A protégé of Sam 
Rayburn and Lyndon Johnson, Strauss was the prototypical party official of the “old 
politics.” While he presented himself as non-ideological in orientation, Strauss’s 
pragmatism was deeply entwined with one of the most conservative strains of Democratic 
politics associated with former Texas governor John Connally, who had spearheaded the 
“Democrats for Nixon” defection in the fall of 1972. While publicly offering to heal 
wounds, mend fences, and move on, in private Strauss made it clear he shared a similar 
view to his Texas compatriot. On his return from the Miami convention he told his wife, 
“I’m going to get control of the Democratic Party, throw these bastards out, and put this 
party back together and elect a president.” Having spent several years trying to 
revolutionize the fundraising apparatus of the party, Strauss reported he was “angry” and 
wanted to become chair “to get even” with the McGovernites who were jeopardizing the 
fruits of his efforts.29 Convinced of McGovern’s inevitable failure in the general election, 
Strauss took over the Senate Campaign Committee as a vehicle through which he 
established contacts with public officeholders and labor leaders who could support his bid 
for the chairmanship. 
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 In the weeks between the November elections and the national committee 
meeting, CDM forces worked out of Henry Jackson’s Senate office, lining up the votes to 
support Westwood’s replacement with Strauss. Jackson, while abroad at the time, had 
personally pushed Meany and Barkan to back the Texan, who had few connections to 
organized labor. In exchange for their support, Strauss offered the labor leaders eight 
appointments to the newly expanded DNC should he win, including giving the executive 
directorship to COPE operative and CDM member Robert Keefe. Crucially, after an 
intensive lobbying campaign at the Democratic Governors Association meeting in early 
December, Strauss and AFL-CIO forces extracted eighteen out of thirty-one governors’ 
endorsements to unseat Westwood.30  
The atmosphere of electoral defeat had robbed Westwood of any significant 
sources of intraparty support, including from McGovern. As he later reflected, “since we 
lost so overwhelmingly … I didn’t want any Democrat to think we were going to cling to 
my appointment with Jean Westwood. It wasn’t that I was unhappy with her – I just 
didn’t think we ought to get into a battle to keep her on after my defeat.”31 When the 
DNC met on December 9th, two days after the CDM’s “Come Home, Democrats” ad had 
signaled the organization’s national debut, Westwood was deposed and replaced with 
Strauss by four-and-a-half votes.32 
But if the coalition of anti-reformers had scored a significant victory in deposing 
Westwood, some, such as Al Barkan, soon discovered that Strauss, while eager to 
provide labor with “a big seat at the table,” was not going to be an instrument to engineer 
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a coup against the New Politics or their reforms.33 As chair of the party in the absence of 
a sitting Democratic president, Strauss assumed full responsibility for healing a party 
whose divisions were as bad if not worse than in 1968. While in the aftermath of that 
disaster, then-chair O’Brien had felt compelled to seek unity through reform, Strauss 
approached the same problem in the spirit of pragmatism, which would seek out middle-
of-the-road compromises on virtually everything. From his perspective, to launch an 
intraparty campaign against all the reforms that had come in the wake of the 1968 crisis 
was sure to sabotage any hope of winning the White House in 1976. Ironically, while 
liberal reformers in and around the party had blanched at the election of a conservative 
“old pol” to the national leadership, it would be the inflexible anti-reformers like Barkan 
and Meany who would in their frustration come to rue the day they put Strauss in the 
DNC chair. According to his special assistant on party reform, Mark Siegel, Strauss’s 
middle-of-the-road strategy, which ultimately tempered the reform movement, was so 
effective precisely because of Barkan’s polarizing, “irrational” intransigence, quoting 
Strauss as having once said, “if Al Barkan didn’t exist, we would have had to invent 
him.”34 
 Still, with the overthrow of Westwood and the installation of a decidedly regular 
member of the party establishment in the leadership, the anti-reform forces represented 
by the Coalition for a Democratic Majority signaled to all observers that a new path was 
being charted for the party, one which even if not a return to the status quo ante was 
nonetheless a step back from the New Politics agenda. Some reformers, such as 
Westwood’s aide Alan Baron, attempted to sustain the reform movement by setting up a 
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shadow DNC staff operation called the Democratic Planning Group to monitor what 
many considered to be Strauss’s secret plan to scuttle the reforms. Such watchdog efforts 
did prove valuable to those reformers who still sought to extract a national party charter 
from the new reform commission mandated by the 1972 convention and appointed by 
Westwood before her departure. But the CDM’s victory in the battle for the party chair 
was “just the first skirmish” in their war against the New Politics.35 And the sudden shift 
in momentum away from the reformers portended further contests over the direction of 
reform. 
 
Reforming the Reforms: Delegate Selection Redux 
The battle for leadership of the national committee had been the first front in the CDM’s 
struggle to retake the party from the New Politics. The second and third fronts were the 
new reform commissions mandated by the Miami convention. These included, on the one 
hand, a charter commission to formulate the party’s first-ever constitution, codifying its 
rules and structure, to be offered for approval to a special midterm party conference 
scheduled for 1974. On the other hand, the convention had also approved a successor to 
the McGovern-Fraser Commission to make further changes to the delegate selection 
process. While both fronts in the intraparty battle unfolded simultaneously, the latter, 
which wrapped up its work first, will be discussed initially. 
Both intraparty groups, reformers and anti-reformers, had reasons to support the 
Rules Committee’s call, issued at the 1972 convention in Miami Beach, for revisiting the 
new delegate selection guidelines following the elections. Those who were opposed to 
the reform agenda were alarmed at the astronomical rise of credentials challenges seen 
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between 1968 and 1972. While the Credentials Committee had been adequately prepared 
to handle the workload, beginning their sessions well in advance of the convention’s 
scheduled opening of ceremonies, reform advocates and critics alike were keenly aware 
of the political and partisan nature of the credentials disputes. Competition for the 
nomination was seen as spilling over into the ostensibly neutral business of convention 
governance, jeopardizing the stability of the convention as well as the legitimacy of its 
proceedings. Under these conditions, party regulars strongly supported making further 
revisions to the delegate selection guidelines that could provide some semblance of a 
smooth and nonpartisan process in resolving qualification disputes. 
 On the other hand, reformers, while having scored many victories in their 
credentials challenges before the convention Committee in Miami Beach, were 
dissatisfied with having to bring the challenges at all. The process was for them also time 
consuming, fraught with difficulty, and distracting from the main task at hand in a 
nominating convention: supporting their candidate of choice. Reformers therefore 
favored reopening the delegate selection rules in order to strengthen affirmative action 
guidelines and foreclose future resistance or ignorance of its mandate. This implied 
creation of a new intraparty body akin to a judicial council to monitor state level 
compliance, which fit well with reformers’ emphasis on fair application of universal 
standards and due process of party law.36  
Reformers’ support for a new delegate selection reform commission was most 
clearly articulated in the position taken by the ADA, now under the leadership of 
prominent New Politics advocates Donald Fraser and Anne Wexler. In their August 1973 
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report Let Us Continue, the ADA’s Political Reform Task Force held that “the 
Democratic Party was well served by the McGovern-Fraser Commission.” Indeed, “we 
remain convinced,” the report affirmed, “that the cure for the defects of democracy is not 
return of power to the few; the cure for the defects of democracy is more democracy.” 
They advocated extending the “reasonable relationship” doctrine informing the 
affirmative action guidelines for women, youth, and racial minorities to “all party affairs” 
beyond those of the national convention, such as state and local party committees. The 
ADA also recommended changing the basis of the “reasonable relationship” criterion 
from “presence in the state’s population” to “presence in the state’s Democratic 
electorate” – a provision that would put the historic 1972 convention’s 15 percent 
representation of African Americans below their 20-25 percent composition of 
Democratic voters.37 
Unlike the appointment of the McGovern-Fraser Commission in the aftermath of 
the 1968 party crisis, the creation of the new Commission on Delegate Selection and 
Party Structure (named the Mikulski Commission for its chair, Baltimore city councilor 
Barbara Mikulski) drew the keen attention of all party actors. Because both reformers and 
their opponents had an interest in reworking the guidelines of Mandate for Reform, the 
balance of power inside the commission was a matter of great importance. In light of the 
convention mandate to appoint the new commission within sixty days, Jean Westwood, 
immediately after taking office at the helm of the Democratic National Committee, began 
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laying the groundwork with the help of Bill Dodds of the United Auto Workers (UAW), 
then-newly appointed executive director of the DNC, as well as Alan Baron. To counter 
accusations of pro-reform bias and to establish her legitimacy as a neutral arbiter, 
Westwood tried to balance the Commission with appointments from all party factions, 
including its two co-chairs Barbara Mikulski, whose Polish extraction was a gesture to 
the allegedly excluded white ethnics, and UAW president Leonard Woodcock, who was 
decidedly pro-reform but could counter accusations of anti-laborism. (Woodcock would 
subsequently resign as co-chair due to his union responsibilities.) However, following 
Westwood’s ouster, and under pressure from Barkan, Strauss appointed an additional 
twenty-five members to the already fifty-member Commission, including eight 
recommended by Barkan himself, diluting the strength of the New Politics bloc. In fact, 
according to internal AFL-CIO records, Barkan had identified the original composition of 
the Mikulski Commission as “our problem child,” and demanded that Strauss “increase 
its membership up to 100 or more.” “This addition will make them [the reformers] 
scream but we have to be prepared to take the heat.”38 
But Strauss was not interested in “taking the heat,” and Barkan’s desire to see the 
new Commission transformed into a vehicle for the outright abolition of the McGovern-
Fraser guidelines was soon frustrated. Over the course of 1973, the Mikulski Commission 
reexamined the delegate selection reforms, heard testimony from experts witnesses, party 
officials, and outside interest groups. And while intractable anti-reformers like Barkan 
were remarkably unsuccessful in influencing its outcome, those in the CDM, who were 
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able to frame their attack on the New Politics as a version of reform, had a significant 
impact on the process. 
The main vehicle through which the CDM influenced the Mikulski Commission 
was its Task Force on Democratic Rules and Structure, chaired by James O’Hara and 
Richard Schifter, but also including Ranney, Kemble, Kirkpatrick, Decter, and 
Wattenberg, among others. While the Task Force would produce many specific 
recommendations for altering delegate selection guidelines, they defined their purpose 
more broadly as correcting the “underlying mistake” in the “very goal of reform”: 
providing greater party representation “for those who participate.” 39  This goal, they 
argued, was problematic. 
 
In 1972, there were more Democrats who did not participate in delegate 
selection than there were who did. … Those who did participate were the 
more educated and the more affluent, the more motivated and the more 
animated – but they manifestly did not constitute an accurate cross-section 
of Democrats. This proved disastrous for the party.40 
 
To prevent a recurrence of McGovern’s landslide defeat in 1976, they argued, the 
party should either design new processes “in which most Democrats will indeed 
participate” or, instead, “assure inclusion” for “large numbers of elected officials and 
leaders of major constituent organizations” who “represent significant blocs of rank-and-
file voters.”41 That the CDM never seriously proposed or even considered the former 
option indicates which direction in which they preferred the party to move. From their 
perspective, the disempowerment of party leaders, especially those at the state and local 
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level, as well as labor leaders, had resulted in an unpopular and unrepresentative 
nominee. The logic was as follows: 
 
The function of the Democratic Party, beyond its usefulness as a 
mechanism to be periodically employed in political campaigns, is that of 
brokerage of the various interests which in successful times have made up 
the Democratic electorate. The party leaders, men with experience and a 
serious stake in winning elections, try to see that candidates and positions 
are put forward which are appealing to all elements. This process of 
compromise takes place at meetings of party bodies at which more or less 
sophisticated leaders of all blocs are present, and at which they are able to 
engage in give-and-take. Certain types of reformers are morally offended 
at this process, yet a case can be made that the smoke-filled rooms in 
which these crucial compromises have been hammered out can be 
[considered] among the most vital of America’s democratic institutions.42 
 
Leaders and officeholders, whether representatives of parties or trade unions, had the 
institutional incentive to represent the mainstream values of those who put them in office, 
so it followed that if it was impractical to have mass participation in presidential 
selection, the second best option was to have a process controlled by those who were 
charged with picking a consensus candidate to appeal to their own constituents. Their 
proposed solution was to re-empower those leaders. 
 In late April 1973, just after the Mikulski Commission’s deliberations had gotten 
underway, the CDM Task Force released a comprehensive report evaluating and 
critiquing the McGovern-Fraser guidelines. Fairness and Unity for ’76 claimed two 
“profound misconceptions” embedded in the delegate selection guidelines were 
responsible for the electoral disaster witnessed that past November. The first was that 
“democracy could rightfully be measured by the application of pre-set standards to the 
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outcome of a political process.” The second was the reforms’ “bias toward ‘participatory’ 
over ‘representative’ democracy,” which had resulted in the “over-representation” of 
activist participants of the “so-called grassroots.”43 The first misconception, they argued, 
amounted to “democracy by administrative fiat,” while the second lent itself to “serious 
abuses of democratic principles” such as caucus packing, endless meetings, and disloyal 
delegates.44  
In sharp contrast to the polarizing approach of Al Barkan, the CDM struck a more 
conciliating tone, with the very first sentence of their report declaring, “most of the 
reform must be kept.” Indeed, the Task Force hailed the work of the McGovern-Fraser 
Commission for making “sound improvements” to an at times opaque presidential 
nominating system. However, unlike those who made explicit arguments against the 
reforms in favor of “turning back the clock,” the CDM employed the same rhetoric of 
democratic participation used by the New Politics movement, and turned it against what 
they considered to be its unrepresentative consequences. The wedge issue deployed in 
their democratic critique of party democratization was demographic quotas.  
The CDM’s attack on the party’s affirmative action guidelines for women, racial 
minorities, and people under thirty reflected in microcosm the wider neoconservative 
reaction to the policy victories of the 1960s social movements. Since 1965, when 
President Lyndon Johnson, in issuing Executive Order 11246, had declared that “freedom 
is not enough” and urged US policymakers to pursue equality not only “as a right and a 
theory” but “as a fact and a result,” many vital center liberals had grown increasingly 
                                                
43  Coalition for a Democratic Majority Press Release, “CDM Calls for Changes in McGovern-Fraser 
Guidelines,” 26 April 1973, Box 48, Folder: Democratic Party, Coalition for a Democratic Majority, 
Correspondence November 1972 – September 1973, O’Hara Collection. 
44 Towards Fairness and Unity for ’76: A Review of the McGovern-Fraser Delegate Selection Guidelines, 
Box 149.C.12.3B, Folder: Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, 1971, Fraser Papers. 
  299 
skeptical and ultimately hostile to race- or gender-conscious policymaking, which they 
felt violated principles of equal opportunity and meritocratic achievement at the core of 
American political culture.45  Critiques such as these were especially popular among 
neoconservative Jewish intellectuals, for whom quotas had restricted access to Ivy 
League educations for generations. The American Jewish Committee-funded 
Commentary Magazine, under the editorial authority of CDMer Norman Podhoretz, 
became an important vehicle for disseminating increasingly hostile critiques of the 
welfare state, second-wave feminism, student activism, and Black Power. The 
polarization around race and gender-conscious discourse strained and often cleaved the 
New Deal alliance between Jews and African Americans. Urban sociologist Daniel 
Patrick Moynihan, a Catholic, but closely associated with the neoconservative crowd, put 
it bluntly in a 1968 Atlantic essay, when he wrote, “If ethnic quotas are to be imposed on 
American universities and similarly quasi-public institutions, it is Jews who will be 
almost driven out.”46 
 The New Politics reforms, Towards Fairness and Unity argued, were themselves 
a violation of basic principles of democratic process and equitable representation. While 
the authors were careful to stress that they were not opposed to increasing participation 
by women, blacks, or youth, they believed that “under-represented groups [will] win real 
victories only when they have organized themselves to win elections.” The affirmative 
action guidelines, with their extraordinarily strong prima facie, “reasonable relationship” 
language, in fact only benefited the “new class” of white collar elites. “Quota 
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representation and other forms of administered ‘democracy’ ultimately lead to greater 
influence for quota-makers, and not for the groups in whose interests they purport to 
speak.” Democracy inside the party can only mean “open and fair” processes, not a 
“guaranteed outcome” according to “rather arbitrary biological categories” of race, sex, 
and age. Why not also extend special provisions for labor, poor people, working class 
people, senior citizens, and others? “Democracy by demography” would not only be 
“absurdly unworkable,” it would “gravely undermine the democratic process itself.”47  
The quota guidelines, the report continued, should be abolished, along with the 
ban on automatic delegate status for Democratic officeholders and the prohibition of 
closed slate making. To better bring the party professionals back in, the report 
recommended raising the limit on party committee appointment from 10 to 30 percent of 
state delegations. The goal, they wrote, must be to “reconstitute” the “broad coalition” of 
“all Americans with an interest in progressive social change,” including the “newly 
awakened blacks and browns, the women, the young, and the intellectuals,” but also the 
blue collar workers, the southern moderates, the white ethnic, the business community, 
farmers, and many others. Such a “complex alliance” requires the “skilled and 
experienced leaders” who “know what it takes to bring the various groups together” and 
possess the “web of relationships which enables them to do so.” In the end, they 
concluded, “our proposals will restore the democratically chosen leaders to their proper 
place” in the Democratic Party. 
  The CDM distributed copies of Towards Fairness and Unity to all members of 
the Mikulski Commission and orchestrated supportive testimony from over forty CDM-
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affiliated experts at eight of the Commission’s regional hearings.48 O’Hara also circulated 
the report among members of the Democratic House Caucus, many of whom responded 
with enthusiasm. Unsurprisingly, House Democrats hailed the CDM’s proposed 
restoration of their automatic delegate status. As one appreciative colleague put it in a 
letter to the Task Force co-chair: 
 
I have never been able to understand why Members of Congress must 
compete in the political market place to be entitled to Convention 
membership. We fight the political battle day in and day out, year in and 
year out. That should qualify us to play a role in the Presidential selection 
system.49 
 
Restoration of automatic delegate status for elected officeholders also found traction 
among many reformers stung by the bite of defeat, such as Lawrence O’Brien who wrote 
a post-election memo to all Democratic officeholders and members of the DNC saying, 
“we must immediately give full attention to re-enlisting the confidence of traditional 
Democrats and others who did not support our national ticket.”50 But it was the CDM’s 
use of quotas as the wedge issue that was most effective. Indeed, quotas as such found 
virtually no public defenders. New Politics enthusiast Jack Newfield, for instance, 
accepted the reductio ad absurdum argument against the logic of affirmative action, 
writing in the Village Voice that “the McGovern reform guidelines created quotas for 
women, youths, and blacks but none for poor people, senior citizens or ethnic minorities 
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– Irish, Italian, Polish.”51 Even George McGovern, in an opening address to the sibling 
Charter Commission in April 1973, appeared to accept the arguments of the CDM when 
he said, “I believe delegates should represent people – not types of people.”52  
Reformers responded by defending the guidelines in question as affirmative 
action policies in contrast to quotas. In testimony before the Mikulski Commission, 
Donald Fraser said that the CDM’s “use of the word ‘quota’ is a deliberate attempt to 
mislead.”53  While the affirmative action guidelines did shift the burden of proof to 
accused delegations that failed to “reasonably reflect” the proportion of women, youth, 
and blacks in the state population, he pointed out that all state delegations had to do was 
show that meaningful, good faith efforts to recruit these groups made been made. In a 
sharp rebuke to McGovern, Frances Farenhold, chair of the NWPC, warned, “it is crucial 
that the Democratic Party not overreact to the defeat of its national ticket” by 
“retreat[ing] and abandon[ing] the substantial gains made in 1972.” “Fairness dictates 
that we be represented in proportion to our numbers in the population.”54 Bill Dodds 
echoed a similar sentiment in the wake of McGovern’s defeat, noting in a letter to UAW 
president Leonard Woodcock, 
 
the party would be committing a grave error in the hysteria of the moment 
to throw out the baby with the bath water. … [I]t is crucial at this point for 
the focus of discussion to turn to making the guidelines work better. The 
danger in merely attacking the existence of so-called “quotas” is that while 
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in reality only a myth is being destroyed, the clear impression is that 
reform is being rejected.55 
 
Still others, such as Eli Segal, pointed to what many New Politics advocates considered 
to be the hypocrisy of the CDM and its supporters in calling for the “abolition of so-
called quotas for some Democratic groups” only to replace them with “quotas for other 
Democratic groups,” namely party officials and officeholders.56  
Some New Politics supporters, however, sat on the fence, rejecting the logic of 
the anti-quota argument but sensing that sacrifices needed to be made to rebuild a viable 
political party. This was most pronounced among the progressive labor leaders who had 
backed the reform process as various stages. Communication Workers president and 
member of the Mikulski Commission Joseph Beirne, who had come to the aid of 
McGovern in 1972, said that the CDM’s attacks on “quotas” and “elitism” demonstrated 
a “lack of understanding” on their part.  But while he defended affirmative action from its 
attackers, Beirne did accept the need to bring party officials back into the process, and 
endorsed the CDM’s proposed increase from 10 to 30 percent in the proportion of state 
committee appointments to convention delegations.57 Even the UAW’s Bill Dodds saw 
the potential liabilities of pushing too hard for further reform in the aftermath of such a 
devastating defeat. As he told the Washington Post, 
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We haven’t fought as hard for every tactical advantage. … We have tried 
not to factionalize the party, and that may prove to be a fatal error on our 
part. …[But] to me, it seems dangerous for one segment of the labor 
movement to be as involved in one party as Barkan and COPE are today. 
There is no precedent for this. In a day and age when you’re trying to keep 
political structures open to the public, it leaves you open to retribution 
from those who are not sympathetic to labor. I am afraid that if any labor 
leader leans too hard on people, you will have a backlash.58 
 
In the fall of 1973, the Mikulski Commission issued its report, Democrats All, 
which issued new delegate selection guidelines binding on all state parties for the 1976 
national convention. From one perspective, its findings deepened the effect of the 
McGovern-Fraser reforms: it banned winner-take-all mechanisms, this time including 
California’s primary, and specified the use of proportional representation of candidate 
support in all caucuses and primaries. But from another perspective, it decisively 
weakened the McGovern-Fraser reforms: while the Commission retained affirmative 
action guidelines in name, it specified that such a goal “shall not be accomplished either 
directly or indirectly by the Party’s imposition of mandatory quotas.” It further shifted the 
burden of proof back to the plaintiffs in anti-discrimination credentials challenges and 
removed the prima facie clause from the guidelines. Thus, “if a State Party had adopted 
and implemented an approved Affirmative Action Program, the Party shall not be subject 
to challenge based solely on delegate composition or primary results.”59  Credentials 
contests would themselves be removed from the politicized environments of the national 
convention and be overseen by a 17-member Compliance Review Commission (CRC), to 
be appointed by the full DNC, its chair, and the chair of the Delegate Selection 
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Commission. Additionally, Democrats All increased state committee appointments from 
10 to 25 percent, reinstated automatic but not voting status for Democratic officeholders, 
and reinstated closed proceedings for slate making. The combined effects of the 
dissipation of the movements of the late 1960s on the one hand, and the greater room for 
maneuver given to state parties to balance their delegations through committee 
appointments on the other, would dramatically reduce the number of credentials contests 
at the 1976 convention, bringing the number of challenges down from 118 in 1972 to 
only fifty, with no minority reports – a result that CRC chair Robert Wagner later referred 
to as “a political miracle.”60 
 
FIGURE 7.1: Demographic Composition of Democratic National Conventions, 1968-
1980 (%) 
Source: Crotty, Party Reform, 136. 
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As Figure 7.1 shows, all three categories of affirmative action specified by the 
McGovern-Fraser Commission – women, African Americans, and people under thirty –
saw slight declines in the proportion of delegate seats at the national convention in 1976. 
While the Mikulski Commission’s scaling back of the prima facie clause and shifting the 
burden of credentials challenges back on to plaintiffs probably had some role in 
diminishing the participation of women, blacks, and youth in the national conventions, it 
is more likely the case that their diminished presence inside the party was a product of the 
ebb and flow of the social movements outside the party. This better explains the 
differential pattern evident across the three affirmative action groups: while the women’s 
movement continued to grow through the 1970s and elements of the civil rights 
movement became more deeply embedded with establishment politics, the youth 
movement of the late 1960s failed to sustain itself. 
In sum, the CDM’s influence on the final product of the Mikulski Commission 
was unmistakable and significant. While they did not win all concessions they felt were 
necessary – Barkan was especially incensed that the report banned “mandatory quotas” 
but not what he called “voluntary quotas” – Democrats All made special reference to the 
“quota controversy” in the explanation of its decisions. Indeed, the structure of the report 
even paralleled closely the structure of Towards Fairness and Unity in ’76.  
Many observers have interpreted the Mikulski Commission to have been as nearly 
pro-reform as the McGovern-Fraser Commission that preceded it, and therefore 
something of a failure for the CDM and other members of the anti-reform coalition. As 
party reformer and scholar William Crotty has put it, “the questions debated were on the 
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content of the rules, not their existence.”61 But aside from the rather exceptional case of 
Barkan, few anti-reforms attempted to question the “existence” of the rules as such. The 
genius of the CDM and the reason for its effectiveness was in not challenging the rules, 
but in modifying their content. This had an immediate, tactical effect in shifting the very 
terms of debate to issues that divided reformers. As New Politics advocate Lanny Davis 
wrote to a sympathetic Mikulski commissioner, “we’ve been given a bum wrap [sic] on 
the quota issue. We’ve let the CDM and Mr. Strauss shift the debate from the legitimate 
issue – the responsibility of state Party organizations to open up … to the issue of a 
numerical quota.”62 Moreover, rather than returning to the status quo ante, the CDM’s 
redirection of party reform employed the newfound authority of the national party, as 
embodied in the Mikulski Commission, to codify new rules favorable to party 
professionals and labor leaders, institutionalizing arrangements of intraparty power that 
weakened the New Politics movement. As we will see in the next section, the CDM 
effected a very similar outcome in the third venue of contestation: the battle over the 
party charter. 
  
Democratic Chartism and its Discontents 
Operating concurrently with the Mikulski Commission on Delegate Selection and Party 
Structure was the Charter Commission, chaired by former North Carolina, “New South” 
governor and Duke University president Terry Sanford. As mandated by the 1972 
convention, it was tasked with working out in detail a constitution for the Democratic 
Party that codified its governing structures, relations of authority, and operating 
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procedures, as well as planning a 1974 midterm national conference on Democratic Party 
organization and policy at which the charter would be presented for approval. As we have 
seen, the question of national party structure and authority had been a pressing concern of 
the New Politics reform movement from the outset. Indeed, many saw the need to 
strengthen the central authority of the national party as the natural complement of greater 
openness at the grassroots. While CDM-inspired critics of the New Politics have asserted 
an inherent antithesis between “opening the party” and “strengthening the party,” it was 
more often the case that reformers opposed what James MacGregor Burns called the “old 
personalismo politics” that party decentralization gave to local and state party chairs and 
officeholders. 63  In fact, outside several exceptional cities such as Chicago, party 
organization was almost nonexistent aside from the personalized apparatuses built by 
party candidates and officeholders. In many ways a return to the responsible party 
doctrine laid out by the American Political Science Association’s 1950 Party Committee 
report, the national party charter was the Democrats’ “opportunity of a lifetime” to build 
“a more coherent, unified, issue-minded, representative national party.”64  
 Unsurprisingly, as the most ambitious element within the New Politics imaginary, 
the proposal for a party charter aroused a significant amount of hostility from 
stakeholders with vested interests in the loose structure of party federalism. The Charter 
Commission’s very reason for being was due to the opposition led by the Association for 
State Democratic Chairs (ASDC) to the Fraser-O’Hara draft circulated in the run-up to 
the 1972 Miami convention. As a compromise within the Rules Committee, the charter 
had already been stripped of its proposals for a national dues-paying membership as well 
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as a new regional substructure to better integrate national and local party governance. 
Loath to see a new layer of distant administrators meddling in local affairs from 
Washington, members of the ASDC demanded the integration of all state party chairs and 
vice chairs in a vastly expanded DNC as the price for their support of a Charter 
Commission.65 
Still, the draft with which the Charter Commission began its deliberations in the 
spring of 1973 had a number of very controversial proposals in it, including: holding 
mandatory midterm policy conferences between presidential conventions; extending 
affirmative action programs to “all party affairs,” including in state and local party 
organizations; establishing a nine-member judicial council modeled on the Supreme 
Court to adjudicate intraparty rules disputes; and instating four-year terms of service for 
the DNC chair, to be elected by the party membership at midterm conferences.66 While 
many party actors were opposed to the charter’s intention to create a national, policy-
oriented party, there was no option to drop the proposal altogether, as they would have 
preferred. As Strauss liked to joke, “I am not the father” of the charter idea, “and I would 
admit to you that I’m not Catholic [but] I would have practiced a little more birth control 
if I were father to this child.”67 Upon inheriting the mandated Commission from the 
deposed Westwood, Strauss appointed an additional fifty-five members to the already 
large 105-member body, as he had done with the Mikulski Commission, to better 
“balance” its composition and dilute the strength of the reformers. He also assigned his 
special assistant Mark Siegel, a student of the McGovern-Fraser Commission, as staff 
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director on the Charter Commission and to function as Strauss’s “transmission agent” for 
his views within its proceedings.68  
In a related initiative, Strauss also moved to blunt the appeal of the New Politics’ 
emphasis on developing the national party’s policymaking capacities by reviving Paul 
Butler’s idea for a policy council inside the DNC. However, while Hubert Humphrey’s 
similar initiative in 1969 had incubated many of the New Politics planks that ended up in 
the 1972 party platform, Strauss explicitly closed the body to “outside” influence, naming 
his creation the Democratic Advisory Council of Elected Officials (DACEO). The 
Council included eleven senators, twenty-one House members, ten governors, nine 
mayors, and twenty state, county or local party officials.69 By insisting that “only the 
Democratic Advisory Council is authorized to make official policy declarations,” Strauss 
made a strong gesture of reassurance to those who feared that national party policy would 
become a vehicle for the New Politics forces, which they saw as an electoral liability.70 
As one AFL-CIO executive testified before the Charter Commission, “the only policy 
which makes any sense is that policy which wins elections.” 71  The DACEO held 
occasional meetings, often in the private residences of its members, producing so little in 
the way of public policy alternatives that journalist David Broder lamented the “almost 
comic futility” of its efforts.72 
 Strauss’s primary goal within the Charter Commission, to avoid any messy 
confrontation that could harm the party’s future electoral fortunes, was aided by events in 
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the wider political climate. The full Charter Commission met five times between April 
1973 and August 1974, while also conducting many state level hearings akin to the public 
events held by the McGovern-Fraser and Mikulski Commissions. However, due to the 
uniqueness of the issue at hand – an ongoing constitutional convention for America’s 
oldest party – as well as the spiraling Watergate controversy enveloping the Nixon 
administration, the charter drew far less public attention than had the McGovern-Fraser 
Commission in the wake of the 1968 Chicago crisis. Ironically, the very intention of the 
charter authors to construct an “in-between-conventions” national party organization, 
separate and distinguishable from its candidates and officeholders, contributed to the lack 
of popular interest. New Politics reformers could not compensate for the absence of any 
centralizing public figures, such as prospective presidential candidates, who could 
galvanize rank-and-file Democrats’ attention over a contest for office. The effect of this 
general disinterest toward the proceedings of the Charter Commission, no doubt due in 
part to the devastating McGovern loss in 1972, was not lost on reformer Anne Wexler, 
who noted the uphill terrain she and other New Politics advocates faced: “the fight is 
between doing nothing and [making] real substantive changes.”73  
 In this atmosphere the CDM spearheaded the charge to outflank the New Politics 
in the making of the party charter. Under the direction of Josh Muravchik, the CDM 
developed a second special task force, the Charter Conference Clearing House, to 
mobilize support for a modified party constitution that could “redirect and realign our 
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party” away from the New Politics.74 From the perspective of those on the Task Force, 
the mandated 1974 midterm party conference presented a potentially “constructive” 
opportunity, depending on whether the “responsible forces” in the Democratic Party 
could properly “influence the Charter debate.”75  
 Prior to the content of the charter becoming the central matter of dispute were the 
issues of the agenda, composition, and timing of the midterm party conference, which 
would meet in 1974 to ratify the final document. After the initial meeting in Washington, 
DC, in April 1973 had left many members of the New Politics feeling somewhat 
reassured of Strauss’s good faith efforts in playing a neutral role, the second Charter 
Commission meeting in Fort Collins in July proved that the anti-reformers held the 
balance of power.76 Leading a bloc of southern Democrats, AFL-CIO operatives, and 
traditional party leaders, CDM leader Representative Tom Foley narrowly passed a 
resolution 52-50 limiting the midterm conference to consider “only the recommendations 
for restructuring the Democratic Party,” prohibiting discussion of party program or public 
policy – the very rationale for which charter proponents had proposed holding regular 
midterm conferences in the first place. Foley, however, framed his resolution as 
eminently pro-charter, telling the Commission that because “the task of restructuring the 
party is enormously important,” permitting issues debates could open up the possibility of 
sabotage by those would attempt to divide the party.77 Evelyn Dubrow, another member 
of the CDM on the Charter Commission, concurred, telling the New York Times that “the 
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Democratic Party is not afraid to discuss issues,” it was simply a matter of getting the 
“vital work” of the charter complete before such discussion could commence.78 Chairman 
Sanford also agreed that the vote, while narrow, was a positive development in the 
Commission’s proceedings, saying that it was not a question of papering over differences, 
but “a question of the proper time and setting.”79  
But if there was a more appropriate time and place for discussing public policy 
within the party than at its official conference on party organization and policy, as the 
1972 convention mandate had called for, few New Politics liberals could locate it. 
Indeed, many saw a desperate need for intraparty deliberation on program, not simply to 
promote “issues” within party politics generally, but as a direct response to what Donald 
Fraser referred to as “a major crisis” of “erosion of public confidence in our political 
parties.”80 The twin crises in American presidential politics, from Lyndon Johnson’s 
“credibility gap” regarding Vietnam to Nixon’s unfolding Watergate scandal, had for 
many reformers renewed the impetus behind the need for a party organization that could 
function as an “instrument of accountability” between officeholders and the public.81 It 
was with this vision of the party’s future in mind that New York state Democratic chair 
Joseph Crangle, who had led the floor fight for the peace plank at the Chicago convention 
in 1968, told the Fort Collins meeting that they were “putting blinders on” the party by 
striking policy discussion from the conference agenda, preventing the party from 
speaking with a unified voice about national issues of public concern.82 Not only would 
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this policy of quietism not restore public confidence in the Democratic Party, argued a 
member of the New Democratic Coalition, it would reproduce the same party structure 
that contributed to the explosion in Chicago: “If you had a policy conference you could 
dissipate the frustration that builds up now in one day at the platform hearing at the 
national convention.”83 Patricia Derian, a DNC representative of Mississippi, emphasized 
the detrimental effects programmatic incoherence was having on partisan identification: 
“we’re losing 10 percent of our members to independents each year,” she said.84  
 
Our party is balkanized; each elected official stands on his own plank, 
works in his own area of interest. Our bill of complaints falls on the 
populace like handfuls of confetti. … What does it mean to anyone 
anymore to be a Democrat? If it only signifies that one is not a 
Republican, that is not enough. … A clear statement of intentions is 
needed.85 
 
These protests notwithstanding, a slim majority of the Commission, including 
Sanford and Strauss, favored scrapping any planned discussion of issues or platform 
debates for the midterm conference agenda. After the standing vote of 52-50, Sanford 
rejected calls for a roll call vote, which was sustained by a voice vote. Ironically, for its 
first-ever conference on party organization and policy, the Democratic Party had deemed 
all issues of public policy to be irrelevant. 
The composition and timing of the midterm conference also created tensions 
within the Charter Commission, however not along the same lines as those that developed 
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around the agenda fight. The dilemma facing reformers was that very purpose of midterm 
conferences was to bring together grassroots party activists with leading party and public 
officials to articulate responsive party policies and a programmatic agenda. Therefore, 
even reformers saw the need to suspend the use of the McGovern-Fraser guidelines’ ban 
on automatic delegates in selecting conference participants. The Final Call for the 1974 
Conference thus entitled all Democratic governors, senators, and representatives to attend 
as a right of office. 86  While the total proportion of automatic delegates would not 
constitute more than 17 percent of the 2,500-person gathering, the restoration of the 
prohibited practice to elicit the participation of Democratic politicians demonstrated that 
their conspicuous absence at the 1972 convention in Miami Beach had not gone 
unnoticed, and that their views, which tended to clash the most with charter enthusiasts, 
would have a guaranteed voice at the midterm ratification conference.  
As for the timing of the conference, upon arrival as DNC chair Strauss signaled 
his desire for it to be scheduled at the latest possible date within the convention mandate, 
providing additional time for the Commission to conduct its business but also placing the 
event after the 1974 midterm elections. For Strauss this was a common sense measure 
taken to insulate the Democrats’ performance at the polls from any possible Chicago-
style blowup that might occur at the party conference.87 Such a schedule, however, was 
likely to overshadow the charter in significance, leaving it as an afterthought squeezed 
between what was looking to be a victorious Democratic sweep of the elections and the 
vacation holidays that followed. For reformers such as Fraser, such a development cut 
against the intention and “understanding of those who drafted the [charter] proposal” in 
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the first place.88 While the decision to cut policy discussion from the conference agenda 
had already made the point somewhat moot, Fraser and other reformers looked askance at 
holding an ostensible “rallying function” for the declaration of party principles after the 
relevant elections had occurred.89 Holding a party conference before the elections, they 
argued, would provide the public with a clear sense of what the party stood for – a 
message they believed would improve the party’s electoral success.  
It was, of course, the preference of the state parties, who were the pivotal actors in 
those elections, to retain their autonomy to tailor their campaign messages as they saw fit, 
without the added interference of a novel party policy vehicle. As Robert Vance, 
president of the Association of State Democratic Chairs (ASDC), reported the sentiment 
of his organization to Strauss, “the overwhelming preference [regarding the charter 
conference] is for late November or December. Nearly all reject a summer conference.”90 
The Sanford Commission complied, voting to hold the midterm party conference in early 
December 1974. State party officials, however, were not alone in preferring a late 
midterm meeting. The Machinists’ union, for instance, while strong advocates of the 
party charter, expressed their fear that a pre-election conference “would take away from 
our general election efforts” as “many elements within the Party may be devoting more 
time to electing delegates to this conference … rather than electing Democrats to public 
office.”91 
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While New Politics reformers were dealt setbacks in terms of the charter 
conference’s agenda and timing, when it came to the actual content of the party charter it 
initially appeared they had the advantage. As we have seen, the CDM and other 
opponents of the New Politics had embraced the mantle of reform and aimed to redirect it 
toward institutionalizing arrangements more favorable to party officeholders and labor 
leaders. Strauss had been instrumental in placing many CDM representatives on the 
Charter Commission by padding it with a large number of additional appointments. The 
problem was, however, that as the Commission’s proceedings went on through 1973 and 
on into 1974, the rate of absenteeism among party regulars, many of whom were public 
officials with other pressing business, increased such that by the time the full 
Commission convened its March meeting in Washington, DC, the New Politics 
constituted a slightly dominant voting bloc. As the Commission finalized its first revised 
draft charter for circulation, New Politics advocates narrowly scored major upset 
victories codifying in the proposal mandatory midterm party conferences, an independent 
judicial council, and affirmative action programs “in all party affairs.”92 The trend of the 
meeting, reported one reformer, was “against Strauss (Keefe and Mark Siegel) and 
toward reform.”93  
The anti-New Politics opposition at the March meeting, led by Al Barkan, COPE 
operatives, and members of the CDM centered on the provision for mandatory midterm 
conferences. As Barkan later communicated to George Meany, “this is a mare’s nest that 
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can only provide a forum for the issues and persons who divide the party.”94 However, 
their alternative proposal, holding optional midterm policy conferences at the discretion 
of the DNC, failed to carry a majority. As one reformer responded, “those for mandatory 
conferences believe they must be [mandatory] because if it is left up to the discretion of 
the DNC they will never happen.”95 
The outcome of the March meeting, carried by the New Politics forces, pushed 
Barkan to the breaking point with the DNC chair, with whom he had become increasingly 
frustrated as all his efforts in orchestrating Strauss’s installation failed to produce the 
desired outcome. Feeling he had not been given the due he was owed, by the spring of 
1974 Barkan considered backing Strauss for DNC chair to have been “the worst political 
mistake” he had ever made.96 In May, the COPE director sent a list of grievances against 
the party chair to George Meany, alleging that Strauss “has turned his back on us” and 
that “if Strauss’s surrender to the new politics people goes unchallenged, 1976 will give 
us a repeat of Miami 1972.” He advised the AFL-CIO president that “there is no point in 
trying further to work with Strauss” and that AFL-CIO “should make independent, 
informal arrangements with friendly governors, senators, mayors, congressmen, state 
chairmen and others” instead.97 On Barkan’s recommendation, Meany refused a meeting 
request from Strauss, who downplayed their discord as merely “narrow bickering” and 
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promised he would do anything, including “crawl on my belly,” to win back the labor 
leaders’ trust.98 
The March meeting, however, while encouraging for members of the New 
Politics, was not decisive. The Commission would meet again in August to review the 
charter proposals agreed on in March for a final vote in December. Strauss, feeling frozen 
out by Barkan, and fearing that if a New Politics-influenced charter survived the August 
meeting and was sent to the December conference for ratification the gathering could be 
engulfed in controversy, moved to preclude such a possibility. He and his staff seized 
upon the final Commission meeting in August as the major front in the battle over the 
party charter. Weakening the New Politics version of the party constitution at the August 
meeting would not only present the midterm conference in December with a fait 
accompli – a charter already rendered safe whether it was voted up or down – but also, 
Strauss hoped, mend fences with the labor leadership.99 
Strauss approached the party regulars’ attendance problem by dispatching his 
special assistant Mark Siegel to pressure those who were unlikely to attend the August 
meeting to formally resign their Commission posts altogether, enabling Strauss to appoint 
new and more dependable commissioners.100 Strauss’s tactic raised an outcry of protest 
from inside and outside the Commission. In an open letter to all DNC executive 
members, Fraser charged the chairman with “stacking” the Commission ahead of the 
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August meeting “to maximize the vote for his point of view.”101 Surprisingly, Strauss 
responded to the charges by acknowledging their veracity, claiming that if the 
Commission staff had not “‘lobbied’ [for] the Chairman’s point of view … at my specific 
instruction … they would have been derelict in the execution of their responsibilities.”102 
The letter was followed by a number of disgruntled telegrams from other reformers on 
the Commission as well as a petition sent to Strauss containing the signatures of all major 
spokespersons of the New Politics movement alleging that “some members of the Charter 
Commission” were seeking to “overturn the mandates of the 1972 convention.”103 A legal 
challenge formally lodged against Strauss’s actions with the Charter Commission 
counsel, however, ruled to uphold the DNC chair’s power of appointment.104 
Nor was Strauss the only party official to be alarmed by the outcome of the March 
meeting. As the chairman worked to ensure a favorable outcome at the upcoming August 
meeting, the March draft of the charter received a stark rebuke from the Democratic 
Governors Conference meeting in June. By unanimous decision, the governors struck 
against the New Politics thrust toward national party supremacy, urging that the charter 
“not include specific provisions which may be inconsistent with state statutes.” The 
governors also held that due to “changing needs” and “the inability to mandate four years 
in advance,” the mandatory midterm conferences proposal should be altered to read, “the 
DNC may provide from time to time for such conferences on Democratic policy and 
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organization as it may deem in the interests of the Democratic Party and the people of the 
United States.” The governors’ resolution also bristled at the proposal for an independent 
judicial council to resolve intraparty disputes, instead preferring such power to be “vested 
in the DNC.” Lastly, the resolution recommended that all specifics regarding delegate 
selection, including proportional representation, be codified in the party’s by-laws rather 
than its constitution.105 A similar item-by-item attack on the March version of the charter 
was also sent from over 150 members of the House Democratic Caucus to Charter 
Commission chair Sanford in July.106 
The CDM also intervened in the chaotic interregnum between the March and 
August meetings of the Charter Commission, making a decisive contribution. In July, the 
CDM’s Charter Conference Clearing House released and circulated its critique of the 
proposed party constitution, entitled Unity Out of Diversity.107 Sensing that the balance of 
power was slipping back toward the reformers, the Clearing House, under the direction of 
Muravchik, sought to “orchestrate a scare” among complacent Democrats and labor 
leaders.108 The report attacked the New Politics’ effort to “centralize, ideologize, and 
‘Europeanize’ the Party in ways that run against the grain of American political tradition 
and the unique coalitional character of the Democratic Party.”109 Midterm conferences, it 
alleged, would “probably be unrepresentative and divisive, and could harm the party’s 
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electoral appeal.”110 Further, codifying affirmative action guidelines “in all party affairs” 
would “cast the current set of delegate selection rules into the iron of the charter,” making 
future changes or accommodations rigid and inflexible.111 Lastly, the CDM attacked the 
very basis of the New Politics position holding that a more liberal programmatic party 
would reverse the party’s electoral decline and the general distrust of party politics: 
 
It is unrealistic to talk of the desirability – even the possibility – of a 
united, liberal “national” party driving out the impure and arousing new 
converts by trumpeting a sweeping national program. … We should 
continue to build along the lines of a federative, pluralistic party, in 
keeping with the character of American politics. … [The charter] should 
not be seen as a blueprint for the creation of a wholly new party.”112 
 
 Given the increased mobilization of both reformers and their opponents, it is 
unsurprising that the final drafting session of the party charter exploded in acrimony. 
Meeting in a two-day session in Kansas City in August, the combined effect of Strauss’s 
ten new appointments, the widespread criticisms of the March charter from Democratic 
officeholders and the CDM, and a carefully orchestrated whip operation conducted by the 
CDM’s Tom Foley, COPE’s John Perkins, and the DNC’s Mark Siegel, resulted in 
decisive defeats for the New Politics: mandatory midterm conferences were revised as 
optional; delegate selection was removed from the purview of the judicial council, 
rendering the body largely irrelevant; and the power to select the chair of the DNC was 
retained by the party’s presidential nominee. However, in a surprise to most New Politics 
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commissioners, the CDM-led bloc also moved to strike the “all party affairs” language 
from the affirmative action provisions in the charter and restore the use of the 
majoritarian unit rule, triggering a walkout of the reformers.113  
 While the Mikulski Commission itself had recently adopted the “all party affairs” 
language for the 1976 delegation selection process, CDM member James O’Hara 
attacked its “reasonable reflection” clause as still effectively requiring “implied 
quotas.”114 Joining the CDM in its opposition to the “all party affairs” language was a 
bloc of state party officers, led by South Carolina chair Donald Fowler, who opposed 
what he saw as the overreaching of national party authority into the day-to-day 
mechanics of local party affairs.115 “The proposed article,” the CDM alleged, “would 
conscript local officials into an all-consuming national affirmative action crusade, 
eclipsing the role they should play in electing their candidates, raising money, and 
building party structure.”116 California assembly member Willie Brown, leading the black 
caucus on the Charter Commission, accused the Foley resolution of trying to “drive 
blacks and women out of the party.”117  
The additional resolution to lift the ban on the use of the unit rule and restore 
winner-take-all mechanisms in presidential selection processes – interpreted by New 
Politics members as an effort to undo the most important reforms since 1964 – had been 
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introduced by one of Strauss’s eleventh-hour appointments to the Commission, a spouse 
of an AFL-CIO operative. Fraser asked rhetorically “why anyone would want to revive 
the discredited unit rule … unless they are so obsessed with turning back the clock 
they’ve lost sight of everything else.”118  But for others, such as commissioner Tom 
Carroll of Kentucky, the alternative to winner-take-all mechanism – namely, proportional 
representation – would provide “extreme candidates a voice they otherwise would not 
have,” resulting in a replay of the 1972 disaster.119   
Coming on the heels of the attempt to revise the affirmative action provisions, the 
introduction of the resolution in favor of restoring the unit rule so inflamed the tensions 
within August charter meeting that it pushed it passed the tipping point. Mississippi’s 
Hodding Carter III attacked the CDM forces for “making what’s left of this charter a 
sham.”120 While the unit rule resolution was subsequently withdrawn, many observers 
felt the CDM had overreached. As the UAW’s Mildred Jeffrey incredulously observed, 
“these are party regulars who know that the art of politics is compromise. There was no 
willingness to engage in that art at the Kansas City meeting.”121 Together, Willie Brown 
and Yvonne Brathwaite Burke, vice chair of the Charter Commission, led the New 
Politics caucus out of the meeting, denying chairman Sanford a quorum. The meeting 
disbanded without a resolution on affirmative action in the charter, which would await 
debate and final resolution at the midterm conference in December. 
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Conclusion: Constitutionalizing Party Federalism 
When Strauss gaveled to order the Democrats’ first-ever midterm conference to ratify the 
party’s first official constitution four months after the Kansas City blow-up, he told the 
thousands of party activists and officeholders that “Tonight we see a party of pragmatic 
change that has learned a lesson from 1968 and 1972, and that lesson, my friends, is that 
division leads to defeat. …[T]he reformer and the regular, each attempting to exclude the 
other from the decision-making process, in the end exclude the Democratic Party from 
victory.” 122  While Strauss indulged in some self-congratulations on achieving this 
seemingly harmonious outcome, it was the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, of all the 
intraparty forces, that could take the most satisfaction from the document before them. In 
the interim since the August meeting, the CDM had been very active in recruiting 
delegates to run for the December conference, also meeting in Kansas City. The CDM 
had promoted its critique against the party reform through its newsletter, labor contacts, 
as well as its representatives on the Hill and within the DNC, framed not as a desire to 
return to the pre-1968 party structure, but as a return to the coalition of the party’s golden 
age by codifying what Wattenberg called “the peculiarly limited roles and duties of an 
American-style national political party.”123 As another CDM missive read: 
 
On the eve of the charter convention we are gratified to report that our 
view has prevailed. …The proposal for a party based on individual 
membership enrollment, at the heart of the concept of a disciplined, 
homogenous party, has all but vanished, and is not likely to even reach the 
floor at Kansas City. The corollary proposal for mandatory midterm 
conferences to write party policy has been overwhelmingly rejected. … 
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Proposals for a number of novel and largely autonomous national party 
bodies, each adding its own layer of sweeping national authority over the 
affairs of state and local parties, have been rejected. In short, the proposals 
to be set before the charter convention now no longer embody the 
Europeanization of the Democratic Party, but rather the institutionalization 
of our party’s uniquely American character.124 
 
 Having won the decisive battles before the December conference convened in 
Kansas City, the CDM felt assured of a moderate outcome for the party charter. By their 
own estimates, the balance of power among delegates attending the charter conference 
favored the charter as they had refashioned it.125 They had been assisted by Strauss’s 
efforts to boost attendance of party officeholders, who were invited as automatic 
delegates but not permitted to send alternates.126 Over the protestations of reformers such 
as Donald Fraser, Strauss had also imposed strict rules limiting floor amendments and 
requiring the entire charter to be approved, item-by-item, in a single session, with no 
allowance for any motions to adjourn. However, in the sanguine atmosphere following 
the Democrats’ sweep of the 1974 midterm elections, Strauss acted on the belief that 
Americans now expected legislative leadership from the party and added a day of “issues 
seminars” under the condition that no votes were taken. 127  He also enlisted the 
Democratic Advisory Council of Elected Officials to produce a brief party platform 
critical of President Gerald Ford’s economic policy to be passed perfunctorily as part of 
the conference’s opening ceremony.128 
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 The affirmative action provisions of the charter, which had been one of the sparks 
that ignited the August meeting explosion, were ultimately resolved on the conference 
floor after leaders of the progressive unions successfully pressured Democratic governors 
to intervene in favor of the “all party affairs” clause, so long as it included language 
specifically disallowing “mandatory” or “implied” quotas. 129  Some union delegates, 
especially those with the AFL-CIO, fought until the end, occasionally heckling Strauss 
from the conference floor and, in one case, announcing that “union labor will no longer 
suffer sophisticated denial and discrimination,” despite a warning from Meany “to play a 
low profile” in Kansas City.130 Indeed, Barkan’s rabid attacks on the New Politics had 
delivered so little in the way of results, and done so much to place himself and Meany on 
the fringes of respectable opinion within the party, that in the run up to the midterm 
conference the labor leaders began to talk vaguely of “disengagement” from the “internal 
affairs” of the Democratic Party altogether. On the eve of the conference Barkan 
confessed to the AFL-CIO affiliated delegates, of which there were about 200, that he 
had “no recommendations” for how to vote on the specific charter provisions.131  
 In the aftermath of the midterm convention, members of the New Politics 
movement did their best to salvage what they could from the hollow victory many of 
them felt it to be. Letters of thanks and congratulations among some of the most 
prominent reformers inevitably acknowledged that the charter was not “all that we 
wanted” but held out hope that it would provide “a more durable base” on which to 
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build.132 Those who were observers rather than participants were more blunt in their 
assessments: “The result in Kansas City is a piece of paper that, in effect, codifies the 
existing system – a loose coalition of state parties and interest groups … that unite when 
it suits their interests and divide when it doesn’t.”133 When compared to the original 
Fraser-O’Hara proposal introduced to the 1972 convention, the final version of the 
charter stood as “testimony to the anti-party power in national politics – to the primacy of 
candidates over structure, to the centrifugal strength of state and local chairmen.”134 More 
pessimistic was the view that, if anything, the outcome of the charter struggle seemed to 
prove that “without a presidential nomination or an election at stake, grassroots 
organizing is next to impossible” in Democratic Party politics.135 
 The struggle for the charter did indeed shine a revealing spotlight on the 
shortcomings of the New Politics movement in the Democratic Party. The reforms that 
had provided an entryway for the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s had not 
provided a means of sustaining that mobilization, and as a consequence had failed to 
withstand the devastating defeat of McGovern in 1972. With the decisive intervention of 
the CDM, the New Politics had been put on the defensive, pouring all their efforts into 
retaining as much of the McGovern-Fraser reforms as possible in the face of a 
sophisticated attack centered on an alleged quota system. The combination of these limits 
and challenges had dealt the New Politics a decisive if not quite fatal defeat. The costs of 
that defeat, however, would not be fully appreciated until the latter half of the 1970s. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
THE COSTS OF DEFEAT: 
THE STRUGGLE FOR FULL EMPLOYMENT AND THE FAILURE OF THE 
DEMOCRATIC AGENDA 
 
By the beginning of 1975 the forward momentum of the New Politics movement in the 
Democratic Party had been decisively halted. After the landslide defeat of George 
McGovern in 1972, what energy remained from the initial burst of reform following the 
1968 crisis had been commandeered by those in the Coalition for a Democratic Majority 
(CDM) to institutionalize a decentralized party structure centered around elite brokerage 
between party officials, officeholders, and interest group leaders. While the New Politics 
had been responsible for initiating such novel party institutions as the Democratic Party 
charter and the 1974 midterm conference, the movement had been unable to control their 
proceedings, opening an opportunity for the anti-reform wing of the party to assume the 
mantle of reform and institute their own preferences.  
The New Politics movement would never regain the initiative following this 
series of defeats. While a succession of new reform commissions would continue to 
operate with the license of national party authority through the rest of the 1970 and on 
into the 1980s, their proposals reinforced the redirection of reform the CDM had charted 
in the wake of the 1972 electoral disaster.  
 This chapter will describe the final episode of the reform movement as its 
activists struggled to press the Democrats in the direction of programmatic party politics, 
specifically concerning full employment policy as the decade’s economic crisis continued 
to deepen. Contrary to the claims of its critics, who railed against the New Politics’ 
purported turn away from unifying “bread and butter” economic issues of the New Deal 
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era in favor of divisive “social issues” such as affirmative action, the reform movement, 
which always had the support of very important sections of organized labor, spearheaded 
the campaign to revive one of the most ambitious and unfulfilled goals of Franklin 
Roosevelt’s New Deal agenda.1 However, full employment policy failed to unify the 
Democrats in the 1970s due primarily to the weakness of the party’s programmatic 
capacities and its internal mechanisms of accountability, which could have applied 
pressure on the Democratic administration of Jimmy Carter. As we will see, New Politics 
advocates tried in vain to use the 1976 party platform and the 1978 midterm conference 
as vehicles for advancing their full employment policy agenda. The previous defeats 
inflicted by the CDM had reduced the New Politics to little more than yet another interest 
group within the Democratic coalition, albeit with a tenuous hold on the party’s 
institutional structure. However, as this chapter will show, it was not the CDM that 
delivered the final defeat to the New Politics; it was a sitting Democratic president. 
Despite Democratic majorities in Congress, President Carter resisted his own party’s 
platform – a development that congressional Democrats and party activists were 
powerless to overcome. The confrontation between the party and the president over full 
employment policy exposed in full detail the costs of the defeat of the New Politics 
movement.  
 
“The Party Is the Issue”: Program, Platform, and Accountability 
If the outcome of the struggle over the party charter and the 1974 midterm conference 
had indicated that the direction of reform had been subverted by the anti-reform wing of 
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the party, the subsequent creation of a new reform commission in the fall of 1975 by the 
Democratic National Committee (DNC) chair, Robert Strauss, confirmed it. As the first 
reform commission not to be sanctioned by the supreme authority of the national 
convention, Strauss’s top-down creation promised to and indeed eventually succeeded in 
further retrenching the advances made between 1968 and 1972. The new body, called the 
Commission on the Role and Future of Presidential Primaries (or the Winograd 
Commission, chaired by Michigan state chair Morley Winograd) did ostensibly respond 
to the growing concerns throughout the party over the proliferation of primaries in the 
presidential nomination process, including among reformers Donald Fraser and United 
Auto Workers (UAW) president Leonard Woodcock. 2  However, its composition 
provided anti-reformers such as the CDM’s Jeane Kirkpatrick, Evelyn Dubrow, Rochelle 
Horowitz, Austin Ranney, and James O’Hara with an official forum through which to 
continue to “nudge” the party away from the New Politics reforms.3 And while its final 
report, issued in 1978, said little to address the growing number of primaries in the 
presidential nomination process, it did issue revised delegate selection guidelines for 
1980, which reserved 10 percent of all state delegations for party and public officials, 
partially overturning the McGovern-Fraser guidelines’ ban on automatic delegates. As 
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Winograd commissioner Donald Fowler justified the revision, “these are people who are 
directly involved in the process of governing and whose support is needed by a 
Democratic President. Excluding them from the nomination process, as the present 
system does, by forcing them to run against their own constituents, can only make it more 
difficult for a Democratic President to govern.” 4  The Commission also instituted a 
“sliding window” that gradually increased the threshold necessary for proportional 
delegate allocation from 15 to 20 to 25 percent throughout the shortened three-month 
primary season, foreclosing the viability of a challenger to the incumbent Democratic 
president, Jimmy Carter.5 
It was in response to this conjuncture, and in recognition of the challenges facing 
the New Politics movement in the aftermath of the disappointing 1974 midterm 
conference, that Fraser suggested to fellow reformer James MacGregor Burns that 
“maybe for now some of us who believe these [midterm conferences] could be useful 
should sponsor one or more ourselves – an unofficial party conference.”6 They surmised 
that if many Democratic officials and public officeholders were skeptical about the utility 
of holding regular intraparty discussions of public policy, reformers could demonstrate 
that such conferences could have valuable party building effects by hosting their own 
outside the formal party framework. Calling themselves the Democratic Forum (and later, 
the Democratic Conference), Fraser and a coalition of New Politics groups, unions, and 
sympathetic officeholders sponsored the first National Democratic Issues Convention, 
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held in Louisville, Kentucky, in November 1975. Convened as a “public examination of 
the direction of the Democratic Party,” the gathering attracted seven of the ten expected 
presidential candidates for 1976, creating concern among some observers that while New 
Politics liberals had been given a serious setback in the official reform process, they 
continued to “tug to the left” from the outside.7 And while the agenda included the major 
issues of public policy confronting the United States in the 1970s, such as structural 
problems in the economy and the nature of post-Vietnam foreign policy, its promotional 
material continued to underscore that “the party is the issue.”8  
The New Politics forces were not the only ones who saw a pressing need to revive 
parties as vehicles for citizen engagement. Senator Walter Mondale, in anticipation of his 
own run for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1976, published a book addressing 
the crisis of confidence in America’s public institutions in the wake of the Vietnam and 
Watergate crises. One of the future vice president’s recommendations for restoring the 
accountability of those in power in Washington was a “strong and consistent party voice” 
in national affairs. Mondale bemoaned the absence of “institutional mechanisms” with 
which a party could register its dissatisfaction with or even restrain the presidential 
agenda. He wrote that “the responsiveness of our Presidents to their parties … cannot be 
reestablished unless the parties are themselves given new institutional life.” This included 
midterm party policy conferences such as the one held in Kansas City in 1974, but with 
“more clout” over party officeholders.9  
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But while the organizers of the Democratic Issues Convention saw themselves as 
responding to the continuing crisis of public confidence in America’s political institutions 
to develop effective solutions to its problems, they also recognized that the crisis of the 
late 1960s and early 1970s extended beyond politics to the entire postwar political 
economy. As Figure 8.1 below shows, the downward trend in the unemployment rate 
seen through most of the 1960s began a sharp climb upward between 1970-71, before 
spiking to a postwar high of 9 percent in 1975. However, as much as the growth of 
unemployment created cause for concern for politicians and policymakers, it was the 
simultaneous appearance of increasing unemployment and rising price inflation, coined 
“stagflation,” which overturned the core assumptions underpinning the postwar 
framework of Keynesian demand management. As Hubert Humphrey put it in an address 
to the Senate in 1975, “the old economic rules no longer apply.”10  
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Figure 8.1: Unemployment Rate, 1960-1980 
 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics 
 
Rather than requiring a mere technical fix, many agreed that the paradoxical 
nature of the crisis required new thinking. This was evident in the stated theme of the 
Issues Convention, whose statement of purpose read: “We come together not to hail past 
accomplishments or lament past mistakes – but rather to look at the future to raise some 
of the central questions that confront American society in the 1970s – to go beyond the 
New Deal and the Cold War and toward policies appropriate to a great but not 
omnipotent power.”11 And while the convention’s immediate purpose was to “offer new 
and relevant ideas” in the context of such a profound crisis, the vehicle through which 
these ideas was identified as “the party platform for 1976.”12 
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From the New Deal to Social Democracy: The Return of Full Employment Planning 
As many members of the New Politics movement planned for the Issues Convention in 
order to galvanize support for a project to shape the 1976 Democratic platform, others in 
the movement were already working in earnest to supply its content. Indeed, the need to 
go beyond the New Deal was made explicit by the UAW’s Initiative Committee on 
Economic Planning (ICEP). Beginning in the fall of 1974, the ICEP was born from a 
series of high-level UAW meetings with prominent liberal economists, including M.E. 
Sharpe, publisher of the journal Challenge, John Kenneth Galbraith, Leon Keyserling, 
Wassily Leontief, and Robert Heilbroner. The group’s self-defined purpose was to create 
“an instrument to channel, exploit and take advantage of [the] steady, ill-defined move to 
the left” they detected in the American populace. Public policy to plan for full 
employment, they surmised, could give shape and direction to the frenetic social activism 
of the 1970s during a temporary window of opportunity presented by the crisis. It was to 
be a left project, they asserted, but “written in centrist language.”13 The group sought to 
“make respectable the idea of planning in a democracy,” and “establish the machinery by 
which effective democratic planning is made real.”14 They reached out to many other 
progressive union leaders for support in their effort to put full employment planning on 
the national agenda, especially those who had supported George McGovern in 1972, such 
as the Machinists, the Electrical Workers, the Communication Workers, the American 
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), and the Oil, 
Chemical, and Atomic Workers. 
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The legislative vehicle they produced to channel left-liberal forces amidst the 
ongoing crisis was the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act. 
It was an ironic development in the rise and fall of the New Politics movement that its 
final chapter would feature Senator Hubert Humphrey, who had in 1948 done so much to 
promote party reform and in 1972 done so much to thwart it. Now, with structural reform 
largely sidelined as a pressing issue, and Humphrey’s own presidential ambitions 
sidelined due to a diagnosis of bladder cancer, the Minnesota senator again returned to 
the forefront of the long-standing tendency to push the Democratic Party in a more 
programmatic direction.  
Working with Humphrey and Representative Augustus Hawkins, chair of the 
Congressional Black Caucus, the ICEP produced draft legislation that sought to revive 
the promise of an American social democracy lost three decades earlier.  Humphrey-
Hawkins was introduced into Congress in 1975 as an amendment to the 1946 
Employment Act, which, before its dilution, had figured as the central pillar of the labor-
liberal vision for a postwar social democratic America. That bill had aimed to 
institutionalize one of the central planks in the late President Franklin Roosevelt’s 
“economic Bill of Rights,” specifically “the right to a useful and remunerative job.” In its 
original mandate, the federal government had to achieve full employment by means of 
national economic forecasting by the president’s office, systems of congressional review, 
and compensatory spending mechanisms designed to offset any shortfalls in production 
levels in the private economy. The 1945 Full Employment bill, however, generated 
intense opposition from congressional conservatives – Republican and Democrat alike – 
and their patrons in the business community. Led by Republican senator Robert Taft, 
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congressional committees stripped the legislation of its enforcement mechanisms, 
eliminated the explicit commitment to full employment, and inserted an additional 
government mandate to ensure price stability. The resulting act of Congress was an 
almost meaningless federal commitment to “maximum” – not full – employment, and 
created two exclusively advisory bodies, the president’s Council of Economic Advisors 
(CEA) and the congressional Joint Economic Committee.15 
As we have seen, the centrality of an ambitious return to the Rooseveltian “right 
to a job” had been a feature of the New Politics movement since 1972, when the 
reformed national convention enshrined “guaranteed full employment” in the party 
platform for the first time since 1944. In contrast to the critics who insisted on an 
unbridgeable gulf separating economic “bread and butter” demands of the New Deal 
coalition from the “social issues” of the New Politics, advocates of full employment 
policy in the 1970s saw in it the potential to rebuild the labor-liberal coalition on a new 
basis by uniting a racially diverse working class of men and women around the demand 
to extend the rights revolution into economic policymaking. In the tradition of A. Philip 
Randolph and the 1963 March on Washington that stressed the dual demands for jobs and 
freedom, the bill sought to connect the issue of civil rights to employment. From 
Representative Hawkins’s perspective, “it wouldn’t make any sense to be able to eat in a 
public restaurant … if one didn’t have the money.”16 For others, such as the Coalition of 
Black Trade Unionists’ Cleveland Robinson, full employment was “the basic ingredient 
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to successful affirmative action.” 17  Indeed, other New Politics advocates saw full 
employment as “the precondition for practically every other progressive program.”18 
The details of the original Humphrey-Hawkins bill, drafted by the ICEP, specified 
that full employment meant an unemployment rate of 3 percent or less, a target to be 
achieved within 18 months of the legislation’s passage. The president would be required 
to impose a system of wage and price controls and release an annual production and 
employment program to Congress’s Joint Economic Committee for review, revision, and 
approval. Local planning councils would undertake public and private investment 
projects designed to respond to community needs, such as childcare, transportation, 
housing, education, and recreation. While not displacing the private sector as the primary 
engine of job creation, the bill did mandate an expanded role for the federal government 
in creating a Job Guarantee Office to fund local projects as well as a Standby Jobs Corps 
for the placement of temporary workers in public sector jobs when the private sector 
failed to absorb labor market surpluses. Generating considerable controversy in the 
national press and in Congress was Humphrey-Hawkins’s provision for a legally 
enforceable right to work – that is, the right of chronically jobless citizens to sue the 
federal government for a job.19 
If the supporters of Humphrey-Hawkins viewed the bill as a means to go beyond 
the New Deal, there was no such ambition to move beyond the social democratic 
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framework characteristic of many European polities often romanticized by American 
liberals. While the original legislation included a comprehensive system of wage and 
price controls necessary to contain inflation, wage restraint mechanisms, like those of the 
incomes policies in European corporatist bargaining structures, imposed disciplinary 
constraints on industrial militancy.20 While they would eventually be stripped from the 
proposed legislation, it could well have been the case that Humphrey-Hawkins’s wage 
and price controls offered a means of restraining price instability by requiring the unions 
to rein in the rank-and-file revolts characteristic of the decade. That it could have 
effectively done so, however, is unlikely given the crisis that plagued the politics of wage 
restraint in the social democracies across the Atlantic – a development to which the US 
promoters of full employment capitalism paid precious little attention. 
As the Humphrey-Hawkins bill was being introduced into the House and Senate 
in the spring of 1975, the ICEP launched a national campaign “to promote public support 
for planning … and to lobby for passage” of the new legislation.21 They gathered lists of 
potential congressional sponsors, disseminated articles through the print media and 
specialized journals, and provided testimony on the Hill before the Joint Economic 
Committee, chaired by Humphrey himself – all of which generated an impressive amount 
of media attention.22 The ICEP was also joined in this effort by the Full Employment 
                                                
20 See Leo Panitch, Social Democracy and Industrial Militancy: The Labour Party, the Trade Unions and 
Incomes Policy, 1945-1974 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); Leo Panitch, Working Class 
Politics in Crisis: Essays on Labour and the State (London: Verso, 1986). 
21 Memo from M.E. Sharpe to ICEP, Box 201, Folder 1, Woodcock Collection. 
22  For just a sampling of the media coverage, see The Initiative Committee for National Economic 
Planning, “For a National Economic Planning System,” Challenge 18 (1975); Hubert Humphrey, “Planning 
Economic Policy,” Challenge 18 (1975); Derek Shearer and Lee Webb, “How to Plan in a Mixed 
Economy,” The Nation, 11 October 1975; Augustus Hawkins, “Full Employment: The HR 50 Approach,” 
New York Times, 10 October 1975; Ann Crittenden, “Pressure Seen for More Explicit Government Role in 
US Economic Affairs,” New York Times, 11 November 1975; Paul McCracken, “The Targets for Economic 
  341 
Action Council (FEAC), chaired by Murray Finley, president of the Amalgamated 
Clothing and Textile Workers Union, and Coretta Scott King, president of the Martin 
Luther King Center for Social Change. Drawing its staff from a variety of civil rights and 
church organizations, as well as the bulk of its funding from the AFL-CIO, the FEAC 
complemented the ICEP’s media blitz with sustained organizing efforts at the 
grassroots.23 
 
Democracy ’76  
While the ICEP, the FEAC, and many progressive union staffers did much to promote the 
value of full employment planning in the national spotlight and through their grassroots 
networks, it was work of the newly formed Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee 
(DSOC) that coordinated the full employment coalition with Donald Fraser’s party 
reform constituency to concentrate their efforts on getting a full employment plank 
inserted into the 1976 Democratic platform. Led by Michael Harrington, who had been 
an active proponent of continuing the 1968 antiwar insurgencies through the New 
Democratic Coalition (NDC) in the early 1970s, DSOC emerged in the wake of 
Harrington’s own resignation from the anticommunist Socialist Party when its AFL-CIO-
aligned majority voted in 1972 to oppose McGovern’s presidential nomination. In 
contrast to many of his socialist comrades, some of whom became intimately involved in 
the anti-reform work of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, Harrington challenged 
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the existence of irreconcilable divisions within the Democratic coalition. Contrary to the 
CDM’s claims that the New Politics movement was antagonistic to working class 
interests, Harrington saw the possibility of renewing labor-liberalism as a dynamic force 
for working class advocacy, broadly defined. He framed his project as “seeking to unify 
the Meany wing of the labor movement [with] the trade unionists who worked so hard for 
McGovern, and the best elements in the ‘New Politics’ camp.”24  
Harrington had attended the 1974 midterm conference in Kansas City as a 
delegate, but had left with a sense of “helplessness.” 25  As he later reflected, “the 
Democratic leadership had carefully structured the convention so that there was really 
nothing for anyone to do.”26 To avoid such a scenario in the future, Harrington sought to 
take the initiative from the party leadership by seizing on the platform as an arena of 
activist influence in the party. At the end of 1975, Harrington and other members of 
DSOC launched what they called the Democracy ’76 project, aiming to “have a 
programmatic impact on the Democratic Party and on public opinion generally.” 27 
Through its network of about 3,000 activists, DSOC orchestrated a campaign to insert the 
demand for full employment planning into the Democratic platform, irrespective of who 
the eventual nominee was. This included running its own members for delegates, 
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lobbying delegates once named to the Platform Committee, as well as providing 
testimony before the Platform Committee’s regional hearings.28  
Between the efforts of DSOC and the FEAC within their respective grassroots 
networks and the influence of the ICEP in the national media and within the halls of 
Congress, by the election year of 1976 full employment had become what economist 
Milton Friedman begrudgingly called the new “litmus test” for candidates in the 
Democratic presidential contest.29  Even Carter, the most reluctant of the Democratic 
candidates to endorse Humphrey-Hawkins, was compelled to identify unemployment as 
“the greatest problem facing the American people today” and affirmed that “every person 
has a right to a decent job.” As his aide Stuart Eizenstat wrote to him at the time, “I do 
not see that such a position in any way would jeopardize your standing with others in 
your constituency, while opposition to the [full employment] bill per se would be 
critically costly.” 30  However, within the platform hearings, the wording of Carter’s 
economic policy planks indicated the limits to how aggressively he would pursue full 
employment, packaging both the “achievement of full employment” and the achievement 
of “price stability” as coequal parts of a new Democratic administration’s “first 
priorities.” While he insisted that economic policy be expansionary “in the near future,” 
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he also believed that a balanced budget could be achieved “within the context of full 
employment” by 1979.31  
In contrast to Carter’s ambivalence about a full-throated commitment to achieving 
full employment, other prominent actors in the party leadership jumped aboard. Speaking 
for the House Democratic leadership, Tip O’Neill testified before the Platform 
Committee on the need to achieve a “3 percent unemployment [rate] … by the end of 
1981,” and said that the Humphrey-Hawkins bill should be “the centerpiece” of the 1976 
platform. 32  The AFL-CIO also endorsed full employment policy, specifying that 
Humphrey-Hawkins had “the full support” of the labor federation.33 However, it was 
UAW president Leonard Woodcock who explicitly connected the demand for full 
employment with the concern of the New Politics movement to create a meaningful role 
for the platform in a programmatic “party of principle [that is] ready to account for its 
performance.” While the platform must “include promises and programs,” it “should 
[also] define its own relationship to the party,” namely that “the national platform is 
supreme and pre-emptive with respect to general principles and broad national issues.” 
He continued:  
 
State and local platforms should be expected to conform … to the national 
platform. State and local independence and divergence would remain 
permissible, but there would be coherence on philosophical imperatives. 
… We would not bind our victorious candidates on the details of any 
legislation or specific program, but we would insist upon allegiance to 
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great principles and deeply held party commitments for all who run under 
the Democratic banner.34 
 
 While officially only the representative of the UAW, Woodcock articulated a 
perspective that many other labor leaders sympathetic with the New Politics shared. In 
fact, nine of the unions that had come to the assistance of McGovern’s campaign in 1972 
coordinated their political activity to elect convention delegates to the 1976 Democratic 
convention. Calling themselves the Labor Coalition Clearinghouse, they dedicated 
themselves to not only “achieving a 1976 Democratic Party Platform and presidential 
nominee acceptable to the nation’s working men and women,” but also making sure that 
“the Party’s nominee … is committed to that platform.”35 
While the issue of party accountability did not make it into the party platform as 
Woodcock had desired, the title of the platform, Contract with the People, did implicitly 
accept the arguments being advanced by the New Politics as well as others, such as vice-
presidential nominee Walter Mondale, who viewed parties as a vital linkage between 
citizens and the state. The issue of accountability, however, would return as the 
administration’s action on full employment policy appeared to many to be a breach with 
the party principles established in 1976. As we will see, this conflict unfolded within the 
party’s second midterm party conference, held in Memphis in 1978, which, while not 
mandated by the party charter, was passed by the 1976 convention itself “for the purpose 
of addressing issues embraced in the 1976 Democratic Party Platform and other national 
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issues and the for the purpose of discussing the state of the Democratic Party and its 
future.”36 
In the end, the New Politics movement’s Democracy ’76 campaign to promote the 
idea of full employment in public opinion and get it written into the 1976 Democratic 
platform was remarkably successful. The platform drafting process was itself overseen by 
New Politics veteran Joseph Duffey, serving as a member of Carter’s team. Even though 
the platform failed to mention the pending Humphrey-Hawkins legislation by name, nor 
did it call for mandatory wage and price controls, it did place “full employment” as the 
first plank in the document (followed by “price stability”) and “pledged” the 
administration to achieve 3 percent unemployment within four years (not in 18 months as 
the original legislation had demanded). 37  Harrington walked away from the national 
convention feeling that the platform “was probably the most liberal in the history of the 
Democratic Party.”38 
 
President Carter versus Humphrey-Hawkins 
Whatever semblance of consensus on the pressing need for bold full employment 
legislation appeared to be at hand in the presidential campaign and at the Democratic 
convention’s platform hearings evaporated soon after the inauguration of the new 
Democratic administration. As we will see, this was mostly a product of the opposition to 
any such measures from within the Carter White House itself. However, in contrast to 
those who have explained the policy shift of the Carter administration in terms of the 
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president’s own ideological inclination, whatever fiscally conservative tendencies Carter 
may have personally harbored must be contextualized within the political economy of the 
late 1970s. This is important in not only explaining the opposition of the White House to 
the original thrust of the Humphrey-Hawkins bill but also the weakness of the full 
employment coalition. 
Ironically, one important source of the administration’s hostility to the 
Humphrey-Hawkins bill developed when the principal sponsors in Congress sought to get 
George Meany and the AFL-CIO to support the bill. Meany, while eventually giving the 
bill his blessing, initially objected to its proposed mechanism of wage and price controls, 
necessary to restrain the inflationary pressures that the tight labor markets of a full 
employment economy were likely to produce. From Meany’s perspective, wage and price 
controls could easily function as a Trojan horse for state interference with labor’s 
jealously guarded prerogative of collective bargaining. Also, as the inflationary years 
during WWII, the Korean War, and the recent Nixon administration had taught the 
veteran labor leader, it is far easier (and politically expedient) for federal regulators to 
restrain wages rather than prices, shifting the burden of wage-and-price control measures 
onto labor rather than business.39  
Secondly, an increasingly paranoid and aggrieved business community mobilized 
around opposition to mandatory price controls, launching the Business Roundtable to join 
the newly revived and politicized US Chamber of Commerce and the National 
Association of Manufacturers in their collective effort to resist the expansion of the 
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regulatory state.40 Facing staunch opposition to such invasive regulations from both the 
business community and the labor leadership, Hawkins and Humphrey agreed to remove 
wage and price controls from the bill. Instead, it committed the federal government to 
achieving full employment, still defined as a 3 percent unemployment rate, but specified 
that such a goal could not be sacrificed in favor of restraining inflation.  
Finally, with the provision for wage and price controls removed, Humphrey-
Hawkins came under attack from policy-minded liberals and conservatives alike, fearing 
that tightened labor markets would promote inflation, thus exacerbating the crisis it was 
meant to resolve. Vocal criticisms from stalwarts in the previous Republican 
administration or conservative public intellectuals like Milton Freedman and Friedrich 
Hayek were to be expected. More devastating, however, was the defection of liberals 
from whom the sponsors had expected support. Brookings Institution economist and 
Carter’s chair of the Council of Economic Advisors Charles Schultze, for instance, 
testified before Congress that the bill’s “prevailing wage” clause threatened to drain 
workers out of low-paying private sector jobs into higher paying public sector positions, 
increasing the strain on federal budgets and pushing unemployment below its “natural” 
rate.41 
Another blow to the bill’s prospects came in the form of shifting concerns in 
public opinion, which began prioritizing inflation as a greater concern than rising 
unemployment.42 This had its own ramifications inside Congress, as the new crop of 
liberal Democrats, hailing from increasingly suburbanized middle-class districts, 
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registered their constituencies’ frustration with the pinch inflation put on consumption. 
With little inherent loyalty to either business or labor, many middle-class consumers were 
swayed by business propaganda claiming that inflation stemmed exclusively from 
excessive government spending and the shortsightedness of labor unions bidding up their 
wages.43 
Inside the White House, with the exception of Vice President Mondale and 
Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall, very few top members of the Carter administration had 
much interest in promoting full employment, and some, such as Schultze, explicitly 
sought to prioritize the fight against inflation instead.44 With reference to the pending 
Humphrey-Hawkins legislation, the White House was eager to avoid committing to 
numerical targets and specific timetables, such as achieving 3 percent unemployment 
within four years (let alone 18 months), and preferred to retain “flexibility” in 
circumstances where the twin goals of price stability and full employment were deemed 
to be in conflict. Michael Blumenthal, chair of Carter’s Economic Policy Group, viewed 
the proposed planning mechanisms as “extensive and costly,” and reported that in the 
eyes of the business community “these provisions seem to threaten a significant 
enlargement of governmental interference in the private economy.” 45  Additionally, 
Carter’s team voiced objections to the bill’s concept of a guaranteed right to a job, which 
they saw as “not … practically feasible” and having “enormous potential effects on the 
budget and inflation.”46 They insisted on either watering it down or including a “carefully 
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worded statement … indicating that establishing a right to work does not mean a legally 
binding commitment for the Federal government to provide a job.”47 Taken together, they 
acknowledged, “These disagreements go right to the heart of the Humphrey-Hawkins 
bill.”48  
This put the Democratic administration and its congressional supporters in 
increasingly tense opposition to the party’s labor-liberal wing. Such a tight spot was not 
lost on Carter’s top policy advisors. As one internal White House memo warned: 
 
This is a very sensitive issue, much broader than the legislation. It 
involves the leadership of major organizations throughout the country who 
suddenly feel cut off from this administration, an administration which 
they feel shows little concern about domestic issues. We are treading on 
very unstable grounds politically and socially. I’m getting nervous because 
we’re going to be blasted soon, due to our inactivity in this area.49 
 
Carter’s domestic policy advisor, Stuart Eizenstat, worried aloud to his deputy that “we 
are sitting on a time bomb here which will explode unless we move quickly.”50 
Rather than risk an all out confrontation with their liberal supporters, the White 
House took an evasive approach to the problem, never expressing outright opposition to 
Humphrey-Hawkins but seeking to transform the legislation into a symbolically 
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meaningful but economically innocuous law.51 To effect this, the White House composed 
a substitute bill, which, they planned, would “include enough of Humphrey-Hawkins’ 
language so that both sponsors might be able to adopt it, without our having to take a 
position on the current bill.” 52  They coordinated their strategy with the Democratic 
Speaker of the House, Tip O’Neill, who suggested the administration give ground on the 
low unemployment target and then “just not worry about it.”53 The president and his 
advisors, however, were not content to ignore the potential backlash that could come 
from the liberal wing of the party if they were perceived to simply be “not worried about 
it.” As a White House memo warned the president: “We believe it is important for the 
administration to do everything we can to secure consideration and passage of the 
Humphrey-Hawkins bill. If we are not seen as doing everything we can, criticism from 
the Black Caucus and others may escalate, and, we are afraid, spill over into the midterm 
convention.”54 
 
Trying to Hold the President Accountable: The Democratic Agenda 
The senior staff of the Carter White House was not off base in fearing that the president’s 
failure to support aggressive action on full employment would be a potentially costly 
liability in the upcoming 1978 midterm party conference in Memphis. As members of 
DSOC watched negotiations over Humphrey-Hawkins stretch into 1977, the organization 
issued a call to the Democracy ’76 network “to reconstitute itself so that it could build a 
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movement that would call upon President Carter to live up to the Democratic Party 
Platform.”55 The reactivated network, calling itself the Democratic Agenda, coordinated 
its actions among the various groups that had initially pressed for the inclusion of the full 
employment plank in the party platform at the 1976 convention: Fraser’s Democratic 
Conference; the Full Employment Action Council; Americans for Democratic Action; 
and the leaderships of the progressive labor unions such as the UAW, the Machinists, the 
Communication Workers, AFSCME, and many others. The Democratic Agenda also 
made an alliance with the National Women’s Political Caucus (NWPC), which, since the 
1974 formation of the Coalition of Labor Union Women (CLUW), had become 
increasingly engaged in explicitly working class feminist advocacy, evidenced by the 
UAW’s own Mildred Jeffrey taking on the direction of the NWPC’s Democratic Task 
Force.56 As she put it during her testimony at the 1976 Democratic convention: “We’re 
not here to ask for invitations for tea at the White House. We’re here to be heard about 
people’s needs – job guarantees, decent housing, national healthcare, education – all free 
of discrimination.”57 
The Democratic Agenda focused its efforts on the opportunity to have what they 
called an “accountability session” with the administration at the upcoming midterm party 
conference, scheduled for December 1978.58 The coalition, however, defined its intention 
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as more than “to just decry the inadequacies of the Carter program,” but to “present 
alternatives” that the administration could be made to accept.59 To build momentum and 
public support for their project, the Democratic Agenda sponsored a week of education 
and mobilization activities under the banner of Full Employment Week in the fall of 
1977, culminating in a Full Employment conference in Washington and a “mass lobby 
for jobs” outside the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee. 60  As 
Harrington put it: 
 
All of us voted for Jimmy Carter and some of us were involved in the 
platform process. It says right on the cover of that platform that it’s a 
contract with the people. … Well, we are here to collect on that contract.61 
 
By the middle of 1978, the upcoming midterm party conference threatened to 
become a showdown. Many members of the press framed the intraparty dispute as a 
personal political rivalry for the 1980 Democratic nomination between President Carter 
and Massachusetts senator Edward Kennedy, then receiving prods from liberals to run.62 
But as White House press secretary Jody Powell told the Boston Globe, “the dispute 
which appears to be on the horizon in Memphis is not between the President and Senator 
Kennedy … but between the Administration and the Democratic Agenda.”63 In an effort 
to foreclose the public relations disaster that could be viewed as the party’s return to the 
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chaos of 1968 and 1972, Carter signed the Humphrey-Hawkins Act into law in October 
1978, after extracting further concessions from its principals. While the bill’s final form 
established for the first time a formal procedure for coordinating government action to 
achieve full employment, it did not guarantee anyone a right to a job, nor did it even 
initiate any actual job-creating programs. It was, in the words of Margaret Weir, “a shell 
of the original bill, neither enhancing planning capabilities nor guaranteeing full 
employment.”64 With the main provisions stripped from the Act or compromised by an 
equal commitment to reducing inflation, the Carter administration had effectively 
neutralized the full employment legislative agenda of his own party. Under such 
circumstances, Hawkins later reflected, “the only thing you can do is [try] to hold the 
president accountable.”65 Accordingly, Hawkins sent a letter to all midterm conference 
delegates urging them to “take a firm stand” and push the party leadership to “reaffirm” 
the Democrats’ commitment to full employment.66 
Even with the Humphrey-Hawkins legislation no longer pending in Congress, the 
prospect of meeting his critics and being held to account publicly at the midterm 
conference was an enormous source of concern for Carter and his administration. 
Looking at it as the president’s “first speech as Party leader,” Carter’s speechwriters 
emphasized, 
 
This is one of the most important political speeches of your presidency. To 
the press you are Daniel going into the lion’s den to confront the left wing 
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of the party. How you emerge will greatly influence next year’s coverage 
of Democratic Party politics.67 
 
As numerous White House memos reveal, any opportunity for party activists to 
meaningfully participate in debate and discussion with the president or cabinet members 
was constrained or eliminated. Carter’s control of the Democratic National Committee, 
which was charged with planning the party conference, enabled his team to rest assured 
that they could “control all proceedings … screen all proposals … and screen any 
resolutions proposed for a vote.”68 Of the 150 resolutions proposed by the Democratic 
Agenda and other organized groups to the DNC Arrangements Committee, only twenty-
four were approved to be debate and voted on in Memphis, and their discussion was 
scheduled for the final hours of the final day of the conference. As DNC chair John 
White explained, “Of course we have a broad range of opinions on some issues within 
our party. But if we get foolish, if we go beyond proper political division and look 
quarrelsome, there are things that could hurt the Democratic Party and the Democratic 
president.”69 Further, to ensure that the proceedings went smoothly in Memphis, the 
White House created a “pro-Administration whip system” to control votes on the floor 
should a delegate revolt arise. However, the administration’s “public posture,” one 
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planning memo stressed, should be to insist that “this is going to be an open 
Conference.”70  
While the enactment of the compromised Humphrey-Hawkins bill robbed the 
Democratic Agenda of the main impetus behind their mobilization for an accountability 
session with the president, the Carter administration’s new federal budget, calling for less 
spending on social welfare provisions and more for defense, provided the liberal activists 
attending the midterm party conference with a new focal point on which to concentrate 
their frustrations. Ahead of the December gathering in Memphis, the UAW’s newly 
elected president Douglas Fraser (no relation to Donald Fraser) put out a call to the 
groups and organizations associated with the Democratic Agenda for a strategy meeting 
in Detroit in October. “It is legitimate to ask,” he wrote in his callout, “why, with the 
Democrats in control of more than two-thirds of the Congress and in the Executive 
Branch, has so little progress been made toward adoption of the Democratic platform the 
party worked so hard to develop?” While Fraser admitted that their policy agenda 
“cannot succeed unless we also … reform the American political system,” he argued that 
their Memphis strategy amounted to “mak[ing] the Democratic Party in fact what in 
principle it has proclaimed itself to be since the New Deal – a genuinely progressive 
people’s party.”71  
However, as the showdown in Memphis approached, cracks in the edifice of the 
reform coalition began to show. While most unionists were strongly dissatisfied with the 
administration and its turn to fiscal austerity rather than full employment, the coalition 
began to splinter under the strain of confronting the president – an act of defiance that 
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could jeopardize their access to the highest and most powerful political office. Carter’s 
operatives at the DNC sought to exploit this dependence to exacerbate divisions within 
the New Politics coalition. This was well illustrated in one DNC memo, which reported 
that the Communications Workers (CWA), who had been one of the most active unions 
in McGovern’s campaign and had generally supported the creation of a stronger, 
accountable Democratic Party, “are not interested in taking on the W[hite] H[ouse], 
especially since the Telecommunications Act, the one piece of legislation they care 
deeply about, is coming up in the next Congress.”72 Loath to risk the well-being of their 
dues-paying membership by burning their bridges with the Democratic leadership, 
despite their extreme dissatisfaction with the nature of that leadership, the CWA, like 
most progressive unions allied with the Democrats, found themselves facing a strategic 
conundrum and withdrew from the UAW-organized strategy meeting ahead of the 
Memphis conference. 
Nor was the onset of the CWA’s case of cold feet exceptional. Many leaders of 
progressive unions expressed hesitation about confronting the president in the months 
before the midterm conference. If they did challenge the president, they worried, they 
may not have the necessary numbers to win in a floor fight. And, if they did not have the 
sufficient numbers, “an outright political defeat at the Conference might then seriously 
threaten any hopes that we still have for the passage of other items on the liberal agenda.” 
Many unions were thus not inclined to “push strongly for voting at the Conference,” nor 
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were they willing “to be individually identified” with specific positions for fear of White 
House reprisals.73 
As the labor wing of the New Politics movement fractured in the face of 
confronting the president, others within the Democratic Party moved to limit the extent of 
the damage such a confrontation could entail for the president and, they feared, the party 
as a whole. Despite the growing personal animosity between George Meany and 
President Carter over the president’s failure to support labor law reform, the AFL-CIO’s 
Committee on Political Education vowed that it would “protect” the president from any 
“sharp criticism” at the Memphis conference.74 Detroit mayor Coleman Young, chair of 
the DNC’s Memphis Arrangements Committee, scolded the Democratic Agenda and 
others seeking to hold Carter to account. 
 
We have a platform. That’s enough. We don’t need a [midterm] 
convention. We must be sure that nothing we come up with repudiates the 
President. Are we here to give the President a mark?75 
 
While the activists of the New Politics were aware of the difficult odds they faced going 
into the conference, those odds worsened further as an eleventh-hour rules change 
engineered by DNC chairman White to restrict floor resolutions redefined the operative 
meaning of “majority” from half of those present and voting to half of all 1,633 
delegates. As an increasingly large number of Democratic officeholders decided to shun 
the midterm meeting and bad winter storms prevented many from the Midwest and West 
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from attending, White’s last-minute maneuver effectively prevented any serious 
challenge from emerging on the floor, which required a petition of 200 signatures to even 
be added to the agenda.76  
However, despite the odds, the Democratic Agenda did manage to get one 
resolution critical of Carter’s austerity budget on the floor for debate and a vote. Their 
budget resolution attacked Carter’s proposed spending cuts and charged that the resulting 
increase in unemployment would be “in direct violation of the Humphrey-Hawkins Full 
Employment Act.”77 While the Democratic Agenda won about 40 percent support for 
their budget resolution, it failed to gain the support of the majority. White House deputy 
press secretary Rex Granum spun the failed resolution as evidence of “strong support” for 
Carter’s austerity agenda, and reported that the president left Memphis “with an even 
firmer determination to lend his strength to the fight against inflation.”78 
 
Conclusion: The Limits of the New Politics 
In the end, the New Politics’ final attempt to press the Democratic Party toward a 
programmatic, accountable party organization through the activity of the Democratic 
Agenda at the Memphis midterm conference amounted to little. Their attempt to make 
meaningful the party principles and policy alternatives enshrined in the platform ran up 
against the limits of the New Politics movement. The previous struggle over the party 
charter had resulted in formally institutionalizing the power of officeholders and officials 
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over its rank and file activists. Thus, when it came time to put the midterm party 
conference to its intended use – to assess the party leadership’s record in office – the 
mechanisms of accountability proved too weak in the face of White House hostility. 
Without a sympathetic president in the Oval Office or a pragmatic reformer at the helm 
of the DNC, New Politics activists lost control over the planning, scheduling, and rule 
making that determined whether the midterm conference became an opportunity to build 
a party of a different type or simply a media event to showcase the president’s 
achievements and promote his reelection. Indeed, it is a measure of just how limited an 
impact the New Politics actually had on transforming the party structure that when the 
Democrats regained the White House for the first time since the 1968 crisis, the party 
became totally subordinated to the interests of the incumbent leader. 
 The disappointing results in Memphis for the advocates of the New Politics 
should have come as no great surprise. Some, such as Robert Strauss’s former assistant 
Mark Siegel, who had left the Carter administration on bad terms, attacked the 
Democratic administration for betraying the New Politics wing of the party: “a product of 
the reform dream,” he wrote in the Washington Star, “has been inverted by the Carter 
White House.”79 But such a shortsighted view ignores the redirection of reform that was 
already well underway before anyone had ever heard of Jimmy Carter (an “inversion” 
that Siegel himself played no small part in as Strauss’s staff director on the Charter 
Commission). Indeed, the decisive battles that shaped the possibilities for meaningful 
participation and intraparty accountability in Memphis had already been fought and 
decided in the Charter Commission in 1974 and in the election season of 1972. In 
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recognition of this, the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, whose spokespersons were 
hardline critics of Carter’s foreign policy, felt no compunction to recruit or influence the 
delegates at the 1978 midterm conference, confessing “we haven’t made any special 
effort to get delegates to this one”80  
 The late 1970s thus confirmed what was already evident by mid-decade: that 
rather than the reform movement transforming the Democratic Party, the Democratic 
Party had transformed the reform movement. Beginning with the second generation of 
reform commissions launched after McGovern’s defeat, the content and meaning of 
“reform” was converted into a vehicle to undo the most far-reaching affirmative action 
guidelines within the delegate selection process and completely subvert the intention of 
the party charter. While the Winograd Commission and its successors continued to push 
back against the participatory reforms of the 1969-72 period, the struggle over full 
employment displayed the extent to which the New Politics had already been defeated.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
I am not a member of any organized party – I am a Democrat. 
-- Will Rogers 
 
 
From New Politics to New Democrats 
In March 1980, The New Republic ran a front-page editorial urging the Democratic Party 
to “bring back the pols.” Reflecting the generalized dissatisfaction with the widely 
perceived incompetence of the Carter administration, the editors of one of the leading 
weeklies of American liberalism looked upon the upcoming presidential election pitting 
the Democratic incumbent against Ronald Reagan with a sense of despondency. The 
“major reason” for the discouraging state of American politics, they argued, was “the 
triumph of the movement known as ‘new politics.’” 
 
The product of idealistic impulses, worthy motives, and some real political 
necessities, the new politics reform movement of the 1960s and 1970s has 
contributed to the decline of political parties, has made the media the 
arbiter of political quality, has trivialized political debate, has virtually 
disqualified conscientious officeholders from presidential contention, and 
has created rigid procedures instead of the flexibility and openness it 
promised.1 
 
While the authors lauded the New Politics for “opening” national conventions to 
women and racial minorities, they attacked the reformers for abolishing the institution’s 
“deliberative function.” “Delegates now merely ratify the results of primaries. They 
decide nothing.” The New Politics had also “forced rigid and extreme views on the 
Democratic party” by “virtually bann[ing] state party leaders from automatic positions of 
influence at conventions and at other phases of the presidential nominating process.” 
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Democratic Party professionals now had “no ability to act as a keel for a party blown by 
popular winds.” Well-intentioned though they might have been, the reforms ultimately 
“created a cleavage between what it takes to run successfully for president and what is 
required to be a successful president.”2 
The solution, they continued, was not a return to the “old politics” of closed-door 
meetings, arbitrary decision making, boss rule, and the absence of written rules, but 
rather a process of “readjusting the new politics reforms in the direction of the old 
politics,” restoring “what was solid in the old system.” While the authors urged the 
upcoming Democratic convention to consider implementing new rules to roll back the 
growing number of state primaries in favor of party-building caucuses, they foregrounded 
the need to increase the “influence of party leaders and elected officeholders” in the 
nomination process. If the latter were granted uncommitted delegate seats, they proposed, 
presidential aspirants would feel pressure to cultivate the good graces of elected officials 
and party officeholders – at least to the same extent as the media and narrowly focused 
candidate enthusiasts. “Good government,” they concluded, “requires experience, 
knowledge, steadiness, and depth.” Who better to review these qualities in a potential 
president than experienced, knowledgeable party professionals?3   
 The logic of The New Republic editorial proved prescient. The 1980 presidential 
election delivered a new depth of defeat for the Democratic Party. While the 1968 
election had been a narrow loss for Vice President Hubert Humphrey, and 1972 a 
landslide defeat for an insurgent candidate against an incumbent, 1980 was not only a 
landslide loss for Jimmy Carter but also the first time a sitting Democratic president had 
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failed in his reelection bid since 1888. To top it off, the Democrats saw their majority in 
the House substantially reduced and lost control of the Senate for the first time since 
1949. Whatever optimism had returned to the Democratic Party with denying Nixon any 
coattails effect in 1972, sweeping Congress in 1974, and retaking the White House in 
1976 had been swept away in the earthquake that marked the beginning of the Reagan 
revolution. 
 Such a stinging defeat at the polls provided fertile ground for the soul searching 
that the editors of The New Republic had encouraged at the beginning of 1980. In a post-
election exit interview with the Washington Post, senior assistant to President Carter, 
Anne Wexler – a veteran of the New Politics movement – embraced the view that placed 
primary responsibility for the disarray of the Democratic Party on the New Politics.  
 
[W]hen you look at the [Democratic national] convention what you see is 
a collection of interest groups. You don’t see a political party anymore. … 
It’s because of the reforms. And it’s because of the dominance of the most 
activist people.4 
 
Yet another reformer, James MacGregor Burns, also saw a corrosive effect resulting from 
the party reforms imposed by the New Politics movement. This was less a matter of 
unintended consequences than it was a fundamental flaw in the project to democratize the 
party in the first place. “The reformers did not understand that the imperative task … was 
less to rectify or redeem [the party] than to repair and regenerate it. … Carried along by 
the anti-Establishment spirit of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the reformers tried to 
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cleanse the presidential primary system of its exclusive and elitist elements rather than 
contain it.”5 
 Clearly, by the early 1980s many American liberals had become disillusioned 
with the reform politics of the previous era, including some of its most prominent 
participants. These critiques, however, reveal a selective remembering of what the New 
Politics movement was about and reflect a certain nostalgia for what the party was like 
before it was reformed. While it may at first seem to constitute a paradox, critiques such 
as these give both too little as well as too much credit to the New Politics movement in 
the Democratic Party. On the one hand, the liberal skeptics implicitly collapse the 
outcome of the struggle to reform the party with the intentions of the reformers. As the 
editors at The New Republic framed it above, the problems afflicting American politics at 
the turn of the 1980s were attributable to the “triumph” of the New Politics. But as we 
have seen, the record of the New Politics in the Democratic Party fell far short of 
“triumph.” In fact, the reformers’ greatest failure was in not institutionalizing the 
“deliberative” party conventions that their critics, liberal and conservative alike, accuse 
them of dismantling. This was not due to their “anti-establishment spirit,” but due to the 
“triumph” of the anti-reform coalition of officeholders, state party chairs, labor leaders, 
and neoconservative intellectuals organized under the banner of the Coalition for a 
Democratic Majority. A national party organization that effectively “decides nothing” 
was not the goal of the New Politics movement, but a product of the struggle inside the 
party, which the New Politics largely lost. 
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 On the other hand, the liberal skeptics of party reform also give too much 
historical agency to the New Politics movement in the breakup of the New Deal coalition. 
Again, as we have seen, the political regime that the Democratic coalition constructed in 
the 1930s and 1940s eventual succumbed to its own internal contradictions, which 
married a universalistic, “rights revolutionary” liberalism with a sociopolitical bloc 
premised on second-class citizenship for African Americans. The explosion of those 
contradictions in the 1960s, and the spread of the rights revolution beyond the limitations 
imposed by Democratic Party structure, destroyed the foundations of the New Deal 
order’s continuing hegemony within American politics. Combined with the parallel crisis 
of the postwar political economy, the end of the New Deal opened up a period of 
sustained contestation for rival political projects throughout the 1970s. While it is no 
doubt true that by 1980 one could look at the Democrats and see “a collection of interest 
groups” rather than a unified political party, this points more to the unresolved nature of 
the crisis attending the end of the New Deal order than to the “dominance” of New 
Politics activists. Had New Politics activists in fact “dominated” the party reform process 
through the middle and late 1970s, the institutionalization of their envisioned party 
framework – in the form of regional organizations, national midterm policy conferences, 
and a policy agenda to move “beyond the New Deal” and toward full employment – may 
have been able to “repair and regenerate” a majoritarian Democratic project. 
 However, before the outcome of the 1980 election confirmed what many had 
feared, that the Democratic Party crisis of 1968 continued to persist, the national 
convention heeded the advice imparted by the editorial team at The New Republic and 
voted to create yet another reform commission to reconsider the party’s presidential 
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nomination process. The disastrous outcome of the election only reinforced the urgency 
of its task of revitalizing the party. Chaired by North Carolina governor James Hunt, a 
newly appointed Commission on Presidential Nominations had at the top of its agenda 
the elevation of party leaders and elected officials within the nomination process.6 As one 
white paper authored by a group of California Democrats put it, “by bringing the process 
‘to the people,’ the Democratic Party has lost its leadership, collective vision, and ties to 
the past.”7 In appointing the seventy-member Commission, DNC chair Charles Manatt, 
former chair of the California Democratic Party, screened every appointee to ensure that 
the body as a whole “held no strong reservations against expanding the role of party 
professionals” in delegate selection.8  
 That Manatt was determined to return the party to power through increasing the 
influence of party professionals was confirmed soon after his election as DNC chair. 
With the help and support of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (AFL-CIO), Manatt passed a resolution through the DNC Executive 
Committee to restrict attendance to the 1982 midterm conference, as mandated by the 
1980 convention, to only party officials or their appointees, overturning the convention’s 
decision that at least two-thirds of the conference delegates be elected at the 
congressional district level. 9  By effectively removing any direct participation by 
grassroots party activists, Manatt assured an even more inconsequential midterm 
conference than the one in 1978. And, in fact, when Democratic delegates arrived in 
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Philadelphia in December 1982 it was decided by a vote that due to costs no further 
midterm policy conferences would be held. That such a top-down scuttling of even 
nominally participatory party organs raised no organized outcry from reformers speaks to 
the virtual disappearance of anything called the New Politics movement. 
Within only six months after commencing its deliberations in August 1981, the 
Hunt Commission had held four regional hearings, three full Commission meetings, and 
issued its final report. In terms of demographic representation, the Commission 
maintained the 1973 mandate that state parties receive advanced approval for affirmative 
action plans for racial minorities and people under thirty. (Due to the efforts of the 
National Women’s Political Caucus and the success of the women’s movement more 
generally, the 1980 convention had mandated “equal division” of delegates between men 
and women. However, because this built on the tradition of equal division within the 
DNC, dating back to the 1920s, it was perceived by party moderates as “not a quota.”)10 
The Hunt Commission also maintained the McGovern-Fraser and Mikulski 
Commissions’ ban on the use of winner-take-all mechanisms in the presidential 
nomination system, despite the sustained attacks on proportional representation launched 
by the CDM in the 1970s and the continued broadsides it received as a “foreign idea” 
within the Commission’s deliberations.11 
 The singular contribution of the Hunt Commission, however, was its revision of 
the McGovern-Fraser guidelines’ abolition of automatic delegate status for party officials 
and officeholders, and the creation of what has come to be called “superdelegates.” As 
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11  See, for instance, the Testimony of William B. James to the Hunt Commission on Presidential 
Nominations, Box 282, Folder 3, NWPC Records. 
  369 
we have seen, the attendance rate of high level party officeholders, such as governors, 
senators, and House representatives at the party’s national conventions had fallen 
dramatically with the revocation of automatic delegate status in 1972. While McGovern 
had gone down to a dramatic defeat at the polls and the New Politics had been unable to 
dominate the presidential nomination thereafter, high ranking Democratic officials had 
not returned to the conventions. In fact, as Table 9.1 below demonstrates, with the partial 
exception of Democratic governors, even greater proportions of top party leaders 
withdrew their participation from national conventions in 1976 and 1980 than had those 
in 1972. 
 
Table 9.1: Participation of Major Democratic Elected Officials as Delegates at National 
Democratic Conventions, 1968-84 (%)12 
  
Year Governors Senators Representatives 
1968 92 67 36 
1972 67 35 15 
1976 44 18 15 
1980 74 14 14 
1984 83 62 66 
Source: Mayer, “Superdelegates,” 88, Table 5-2. 
 
 As we have seen, the moderate and conservative party members had been trying 
to pull leading officeholders back into the national conventions since 1973. The Mikulski 
Commission had made the first, partial step in the direction of reinstituting automatic 
delegate status when it extended an automatic invitation to top level Democrats, but 
without granting them full voting rights. The Winograd Commission went a step further 
when it reserved 10 percent of each state’s delegation for party officials, but continued to 
                                                
12 The percentages presented here differ slightly from those presented in chapter 6 above. This is due to 
whether primary consideration is given to if party officeholders participated as delegates at the convention 
(here) or if they merely attended the convention as guests or delegates (chapter 6). 
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require they attend conventions as pledged delegates. These revisions, however, evidently 
did little to stanch the bleeding of top officeholders or, as is evident from the outcome of 
the 1980 presidential election, introduce enough “experienced and knowledgeable” 
professionals to save the party from defeat.  
 The Hunt Commission took bolder steps than its predecessors in rolling back the 
McGovern-Fraser ban on automatic delegates. While it did not lift the ban as such, the 
Commission reserved another 20 percent for unpledged party leaders and elected 
officeholders (on top of the 10 percent of committed party leaders added by the Winograd 
Commission). Emphasizing the necessity of restoring automatic delegate privileges to 
party insiders, Hunt commissioner and future vice-presidential nominee Geraldine 
Ferrero said, “The bottom-line question is whether you want them to go [to the national 
convention]. Either they’re going to go as uncommitted delegates or they won’t go.”13 
Louisiana representative Gillis Long and his aide Al From introduced the 
recommendation for the superdelegate category in order “to temper the influence of 
interest group leaders and party activists in the nominating process.”14 Both the AFL-CIO 
and the Association of State Democratic Chairs (ASDC) proposed making the new 
superdelegate category as much as 30 percent of all convention seats, bringing the total of 
guaranteed seats for party officials and officeholders up to 40 percent of the national 
convention. After drawing fire from the women’s caucus for the provision’s likely 
violation of the “equal division” mandate, because most top officials and party leaders 
were men, the proportion was lowered in a compromise. As is clear from the data 
presented in Table 9.1 above, the advent of superdelegates in 1984 not only reversed the 
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decline of party leaders and officeholders participating in the national conventions, in the 
case of Democratic Representatives it brought it to new heights. 
 As Table 9.2 shows below, the total number and proportion of superdelegates as 
participants at national conventions has continued to grow since their introduction in 
1984. This has been a product of the gradual relaxation of the terms of the original Hunt 
Commission compromise as women and people of color have gained greater presence in 
the upper ranks of the party hierarchy. By gradually raising the ceiling on the proportion 
of superdelegates, as well as the absolute number of convention delegates, the category 
has been extended to not only all Democratic governors, members of the House and 
Senate, the Democratic National Committee, but also all former “distinguished” party 
officeholders such as presidents, vice presidents, congressional leaders, and chairs of the 
DNC. 
 
TABLE 9.2: Superdelegates at the Democratic National Conventions, 1984-2008 
Year Number of 
superdelegates 
Total number of 
delegates 
Percentage of 
superdelegates 
1984 568 3,933 14.4 
1988 645 4,162 15.5 
1992 772 4,288 18.0 
1996 777 4,298 18.1 
2000 802 4,399 18.5 
2004 802 4,322 18.6 
2008 853 4,419 19.3 
Source: Mayer, “Superdelegates,” 94, Table 5-4. 
 
 But the advent of superdelegates quickly proved to be no panacea for the ills of 
the Democratic Party in the 1980s. While the participation of senators and representatives 
improved dramatically for the 1984 convention, the presidential nominee, former vice 
president Walter Mondale, went down to a humiliating defeat against President Reagan, 
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carrying only his home state of Minnesota as well as the District of Columbia. In the 
aftermath of that defeat, Al From drafted a memo for Representative Long to be 
presented to a dinner of concerned party officials and public officeholders, convened “to 
discuss the future of the Democratic Party.” Al From’s diagnosis was as bleak as his 
recommendations were far-reaching: 
 
As a national party, Democrats are in deep trouble. … We cannot afford to 
become a liberal party; our message must attract moderates and 
conservatives, as well. … As elected officials and party leaders, we need 
to do a better job of steering our party away from trouble. … [The] lessons 
of this election all point to one thing: the need for our party to change, and 
change drastically. We need a new image; we need a new structure; and 
we need new spokesmen. If we don’t act now to develop and promote a 
new message, to rid the party of the cancer of single interest and single 
constituency caucuses, to showcase new leaders, to establish a nominating 
procedure that produces a candidate who can win a general election, then 
we are destined to become a minority party for the foreseeable future.15 
 
Al From cultivated a bloc of support for his vision to remake the Democratic 
Party within the Democratic House Caucus as well as the Democratic Governors 
Association. However, when From found little interest among members of the DNC, he 
founded the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC), which, he asserted, should “simply 
assume” the role of authority in party policymaking so that “we could operate without 
any party constraints at all.”16 The DLC would come to attract future party leaders such 
as Al Gore and Bill Clinton. It saw its role as “modernizing liberalism” for a post-New 
Deal era – a project From described as “saving liberalism from its excesses.”17 
                                                
15 From, The New Democrats, 50-1. 
16 From, The New Democrats, 52-3. 
17 From, The New Democrats, 113, 75. 
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 Shortly after forming the Democratic Leadership Council, From and his DLC co-
founder Will Marshall met with the senior leadership of the Coalition for a Democratic 
Majority: Penn Kemble, Peter Rosenblatt, and Ben Wattenberg. As we have seen, the 
CDM had become much less visibly involved in the struggle over party reform in the 
second half of the 1970s. During that time, the organization had assumed a sharply 
critical position to the right of the Carter administration, especially regarding foreign 
policy. Ironically, while the CDM has fashioned its critique of the New Politics as a 
means to draw back to the party those white, especially male, working class voters later 
dubbed “Reagan Democrats,” many prominent CDM members, such as Jeane 
Kirkpatrick, Max Kampleman, Richard Shifter, Wattenberg, and others all accepted 
foreign affairs related positions in the Reagan administration.18 The subject of discussion 
at the DLC-CDM meeting was the potential merger of the two intraparty organizations. 
But while the proposed merger never came to be, the meeting between the leaderships of 
the DLC and the CDM illustrated the continuity linking the two groups.19 Indeed, Al 
From acknowledged that it was the experience of the CDM in the 1970s that had inspired 
the formation of the DLC in the first place.20  
The DLC was in fact taking up the project of pulling the party away from the New 
Politics where the CDM had left off. The CDM had paved the way for the DLC by 
effectively halting the advance of the New Politics movement and neutralizing its 
institutional reforms. Moreover, the DLC appropriated some of the same substantive 
                                                
18 See Justin Vaïsse, Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement (Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 
2010), chapter 6. 
19 From, The New Democrats, 60. At the meeting the CDMers encouraged From and Marshall to take up 
the fight against the recent “equal division” mandate dividing convention delegates equally between men 
and women. However, the DLC founders balked at taking on a fight that would only highlight how few 
women were in their own organization, and one which they felt they were likely to lose anyway. 
20 Ben J. Wattenberg, Fighting Words: A Tale of How Liberals Created Neo-Conservatism (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 2008), 148. 
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critiques that the CDM had fashioned in its war against the New Politics. This was most 
evident in the DLC’s first major programmatic statement, The Politics of Evasion, 
produced in the aftermath of the Democrats’ 1988 debacle: the defeat of presidential 
nominee, Massachusetts governor Michael Dukakis. Drafted by William Galston and 
Elaine Kamarck, yet another protégé of CDM-supporter Nelson Polsby’s, the DLC 
manifesto elaborated Al From’s diagnosis of the party crisis. 
 
Democrats must now come face to face with reality: too many Americans 
have come to see the party as inattentive to their economic interests, 
indifferent if not hostile to their moral sentiments, and ineffective in 
defense of their national security. … Democrats have ignored [this] 
fundamental problem. This systematic denial of reality – the politics of 
evasion – continues unabated today. … It reflects the interests of those 
who would rather be the majority in a minority party than risk being the 
minority in a majority party.21 
 
The authors identified the root of the politics of evasion in the “liberal fundamentalism” 
that began with the “influx of upscale anti-war activists into the ‘reformed’ 1972 
convention and [which] continu[es] to this day.”22 Like the CDM before them, the DLC 
argued that by moving to the left since the late 1960s, the Democrats had moved away 
from where the majority of voters were. Strategies premised on mobilizing new voters 
suggested by the remaining elements of the New Politics movement, such as Jesse 
Jackson’s Rainbow Coalition, were flawed. The simple facts, they argued, were that the 
party’s open nominating system reflected the influence of “upscale liberals” and 
                                                
21  William Galston and Elaine Kamarck, The Politics of Evasion: Democrats and the Presidency 
(Washington, DC: Progressive Policy Institute, 1989), 3, available at www.progressivepolicy.org. See also, 
Kenneth S. Baer, Reinventing Democrats: The Politics of Liberalism from Reagan to Clinton (Lawrence: 
The University Press of Kansas, 2000), 161-2; Curtin Atkins, “Forging a New Democratic Party: The 
Politics of the Third Way from Clinton to Obama” (PhD diss., York University, 2015), 138-41. 
22 Galston and Kamarck, The Politics of Evasion, 3, 17. 
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produced candidates “without significant appeal to the demographic and political 
center.”23 However, these conclusions were no less selective and misleading in hands of 
the DLC in the 1980s than they had been in the hands of the CDM in the 1970s. 
For all the commonalities, however, there were significant differences between 
the CDM and the DLC in terms of their aims and their relative success. While the CDM 
ultimately triumphed over its New Politics opponents in the battle over party structure, 
the self-declared defenders of “vital center” liberalism failed to consolidate a new 
Democratic regime in the wake of the New Deal’s collapse. They ultimately found a 
more comfortable home in Reagan’s anti-New Deal administration than they did in the 
mélange of “special interest groups” that composed the 1980s Democratic coalition. The 
DLC, by contrast, not only inherited the fruits of this previous struggle, but did 
effectively install their own New Democratic vision of the party and redefine the 
parameters of centrist liberalism. While the CDM won decisive battles against the New 
Politics’ institutional reforms, the DLC won the war of ideas. 
Whereas the CDM and other cold war liberals looked back with nostalgia on the 
New Deal Democratic Party’s political hegemony of the postwar period, New Democrats 
explicitly rejected any possible return to the party’s golden age. If their broad goal of 
reconstructing a majority party capable of retaking the presidency was the same, the 
coalition that would sustain that effort nevertheless differed considerably. New 
Democrats directed their appeals toward the new dynamic economic sectors and 
boomtowns of the sunbelt South, such as North Carolina’s Research Triangle and 
California’s Silicon Valley, but also to those northern suburbs surrounding the high tech 
corridors of Massachusetts’ Route 128 and the professionals occupying the post-
                                                
23 Galston and Kamarck, The Politics of Evasion, 6, 7. 
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industrial landscape of rust belt cities.24 They articulated a vision of restoring American 
international competitiveness that promised continued progressive domestic programs at 
home (tempered ominously with respect for “law and order”) within an increasingly 
interconnected, globalized world. Promising to carve out a third way between Reagan 
Republicanism and New Politics liberalism, the New Democrats sought to return the 
party of the New Deal to power by turning it into a party of neoliberalism. 
 
Labor and Democracy in the Democratic Party 
In November 1981, a year after Ronald Reagan’s election to the presidency of the United 
States, the AFL-CIO held its annual convention in Washington, DC, ushering in a new 
era of leadership for the union federation. Outgoing president George Meany, who at the 
age of 79 had held the position for twenty-six years, passed the baton to his long-time 
protégé Lane Kirkland, while Committee on Political Education (COPE) director Al 
Barkan did the same with his top lieutenant, John Perkins. Yet while the new leaders had 
supported their former bosses’ campaign against the New Politics movement in the 
1970s, they came to power at the beginning of the new decade in a spirit of reconciliation 
with the new social forces mobilized since the late 1960s. This was a product of both the 
success of the anti-reformers in blocking the most ambitious items of the New Politics 
agenda, such as their original proposal for a new party structure, as well as the general 
recognition that any attempt to turn the clock back to the smoke-filled rooms of elite 
brokerage was futile. New labor-sponsored initiatives, such as a Solidarity Day of mass 
demonstrations of 250,000 union members in front of the Capitol in September 1981, 
                                                
24 John B. Judis and Ruy Teixeria, The Emerging Democratic Majority (New York: Scribner, 2002); Lily 
Geismer, Don’t Blame Us: Suburban Liberals and the Transformation of the Democratic Party (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2015). 
  377 
seemed to indicate that the new AFL-CIO leadership was going to turn over a new leaf 
and accommodate itself to the New Politics-oriented trade unions, their diverse 
memberships, and become a unified force for mass mobilization in the age of Reagan. 
Further, Perkins sought to innovate COPE’s campaign operations, decentralizing much of 
its financial and informational apparatus to state and local organizations, as well as 
individual unions. He also established the Labor Institute for Public Affairs to better 
equip the AFL-CIO to generate a competitive media presence. Meanwhile, in response to 
the anti-democratic charges lodged against the AFL-CIO’s decisionmaking process in the 
wake of Meany’s “neutrality policy” concerning the 1972 presidential race, Kirkland 
relocated political endorsement decisionmaking power from the federation’s then thirty-
five member Executive Council to the AFL-CIO General Board, composed of all ninety-
nine affiliated union presidents, with votes weighted according to the size of their 
memberships.25 
 However, if there were glimmers of a new kind of American unionism in the 
passage of power from the AFL-CIO old guard to the new, the Kirkland-Perkins 
leadership also sought to reestablish as best they could a bargaining relationship with the 
leadership of the Democratic Party. While the smoke-filled rooms at the nominating 
conventions had been dismantled, the union federation sought to gain a foothold in the 
reformed DNC, eventually picking up thirty-five seats of the 325-member national 
committee, and four seats on the party’s 35-member Executive Committee. From there, 
the labor members of the party’s governance structure supported the Hunt Commission’s 
                                                
25 Taylor E. Dark, The Unions and the Democrats: An Enduring Alliance (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1999), 126-9. 
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advent of superdelegates as well as its other reforms, which it saw as essential steps in 
restoring the Democrats to national power. 
 That organized labor as a whole was able to coordinate and unify around popular 
candidates in 1984, 1988, and 1992 suggests that Meany and Barkan’s fears of being 
disadvantaged by the party reforms of the early 1970s were misplaced. While the shift to 
participatory primaries and caucuses did redound to the benefit of certain unions, such as 
the United Auto Workers, the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal 
Employees, the National Education Association, and the Communication Workers, who 
were willing and able to adapt to the new system of party influence, the defeats of 1972 
and 1980 appear to have convinced the reform wing of the labor leadership that trade 
union unity was paramount if the party was going to halt and reverse the Reagan 
administration’s attack on organized labor. Indeed, by the late 1980s it was clear that 
even the non-reformist AFL-CIO unions had adapted to the new nominating system, 
deploying their campaign apparatuses within the primaries and coordinating their efforts 
behind acceptable candidates.26 While all unions continued to encounter their historic 
limitations in educating and mobilizing their mass base, the fears that labor had been 
deinstitutionalized from the Democratic Party appeared to have been overblown. 
 Even if labor was not cast out of the party at the hands of the New Politics 
movement, the fortunes of labor have continued to sink despite the party’s successful 
return to the White House in 1992, 1996, 2008, and 2012. As shown in Figure 9.1 below, 
                                                
26 Dark, The Unions and the Democrats, 133. 
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labor union density has continued its secular decline since the mid-1950s, coming to 
represent only 11.1 percent in 2015.27  
 
FIGURE 9.1: Total Union Membership in the United States as a Percentage of the Labor 
Force, 1983-2015  
 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics 
 
Yet the continuing fall in union density over the last thirty years, while important in 
itself, is not the best indicator of the general decline of organized labor as a powerful 
force in American politics. More significant has been the adoption of a neoliberal policy 
agenda by the DLC-influenced Democratic Party leadership, placing organized labor in 
the contradictory position of “lesser evilism”: continually campaigning on behalf of 
presidential nominees who endorse but ultimately fail to support labor’s priority 
legislative items, without a realistic option of throwing their support to a Republican 
Party that has moved farther and farther to the right at each election. The enactment of 
free trade agreements, welfare reform, as well as the failure of labor law reform, such as 
                                                
27 Figure 9.1 measures union density for public and private union members. This somewhat distorts the real 
trends at work in both private and public sectors: exaggerating the density of private sector unions and 
diminishing that of public sector unions.  
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the Employee Free Choice Act, has come from Democratic administrations nominally 
sympathetic to organized labor’s aims.  
 This development forces us to reevaluate the central and superficially plausible 
claim of the critics of the New Politics movement: did the democratization of the 
Democratic Party harm working class politics in the United States? After all, as we have 
seen, the New Deal regime of the 1930s brought American workers into the political 
process in an unprecedented way, integrating them as a virtual electoral apparatus of the 
Democratic Party. While there were shortcomings to the compromised New Deal regime 
of which they were a part, such as the primacy it gave to white male breadwinners, the 
period of the 1930s to the mid-1960s saw rising median wages, increasing unionization, 
and greater cultural prestige and cachet accorded to labor as a legitimate representative 
force in American politics and society more generally. Additionally, while organized 
labor never scored the legislative victories its Washington lobbyists most prized, such as 
labor law reform, its spillover effects in support of the civil rights movement, the early 
student movement, and, by the mid-1970s, the women’s movement were all beneficial 
contributions to the betterment of American workers both inside and outside the ranks of 
organized labor. 
 Are the reforms responsible for the decline of effective working class politics in 
the United States? For the critics of the New Politics, beginning with the CDM in the 
mid-1970s and continuing to echo in the supplementary academic scholarship, 
participatory democracy was bound to disadvantage the voice of poor and working class 
people in the political sphere. As we have seen, from the perspective of its detractors, 
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participatory democracy was inherently “an upper middle class sport.” 28  There is a 
seductive logic underpinning such a perspective: if the requisite resources to participate 
in politics, such as knowledge, time, education, and self-confidence, are not distributed 
equally throughout society, then more open decision-making procedures will inevitably 
benefit those in possession of such resources. In this sense, the neoconservative critics 
agree with the New Politics in viewing institutional arrangements as structures that are 
never neutral in their effects. It was not that the pre-reformed Democratic Party was a 
neutral playing field, open to all, which the New Politics inappropriately attempted to tilt 
in their favor. No critic defended the pre-1968 party in those terms. Rather, it was a party 
that had been institutionally biased toward working class interests, at least in the terms 
that the leaders of the AFL-CIO interpreted them. That this was not the result of an 
internally democratic party decision-making process was irrelevant. What was important 
was the effectiveness the politics of elite brokerage had in securing representation for the 
otherwise voiceless poor and working class people in American politics. 
 Underlying the critics’ arguments against the New Politics’ party reforms is a 
notion of democracy that Robert Dahl has appropriately labeled “guardianship.”29 For the 
anti-reformers, mass participation of poor and working class people in political 
decisionmaking is an impractical and unrealistic goal. Recognizing that political 
resources are unequally distributed in American society, the critics have held that the 
optimal set of institutional arrangements is one in which those who are best able to 
bargain on behalf of the disadvantaged are duly given the authority to do so. By 
                                                
28 CDM member, quoted in “Power Struggle,” The New Republic, 16 December 1972. See also, Byron E. 
Shafer, Quiet Revolution: The Struggle for the Democratic Party and the Shaping of Post-Reform Politics 
(New York: Russell Sage, 1983), 530. 
29 Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 69. 
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dislodging party and interest groups leaders from the smoke-filled backrooms of the 
convention hall, they conclude, the New Politics reformers effectively destroyed the 
institutional basis of working class politics in America. 
 While the logic of the guardianship argument has some plausibility to it, its 
fundamental premises are flawed. On the one hand, the present weakness of labor as an 
organized force in American politics has much more to do with the incapacity of the 
labor movement than it does with the new intraparty bargaining structures produced by 
the reformers. Neither returning to the smoke-filled rooms of the pre-reform period nor 
the launching of a third party will reverse this trend. Technical alterations of rules or the 
invention of wholly new institutions cannot resolve what is essentially a social problem: 
the decline of labor as a dynamic popular movement, one that has the capacity to secure 
policy victories whose effects spread far beyond its membership. This, of course, is partly 
the result of past failures, particularly labor’s inability to repeal Taft-Hartley’s limitations 
of the Wagner Act. But it is also a product of the internal limitations of the labor 
movement, even when it was a strong, dynamic force fighting for civil rights in the 
1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. Organized labor’s inability to effectively educate its members 
and bring them on board with its social democratic policy agenda imposed internal 
obstacles to its ability to lead the wide array of progressive forces that exploded in the 
late 1960s. Instead, its dependence on mechanisms of elite brokerage with political 
leaders hampered its ability to ally with the New Politics movement and its project to 
democratize the Democratic Party. 
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A New Politics for the Twenty-First Century? 
With the presidential administration of Bill Clinton in the 1990s, many have interpreted 
the election of one of their own to the presidency of the United States as the signal 
triumph of the New Democrats party faction. However, it is more accurate to view the 
election of Barack Obama in 2008 as the evidence of the ultimate achievement of the 
New Democrats within the Democratic Party. Despite his narrow victory over another 
Clinton in the nomination process, Obama’s post-partisan, post-ideological centrism 
reflected just how extensively the New Democrats’ “third way” ideology had permeated 
the political mainstream, constituting a new “common sense” within the Democratic 
Party and American society as a whole.30 Indeed, so close was Obama’s policy agenda to 
that of Hillary Clinton, the former distinguished himself from the latter only on matters of 
image, brand, and political style. Midway through Obama’s first term as president, the 
DLC officially closed its doors. As Al From later put it, “we had accomplished our 
mission and there was no reason to keep it going.”31  
 The principle of guardianship underpinning the critics’ attack on participatory 
democracy represented a call for political quietism amidst a period of upsurge that had 
many conservative commentators openly speculating about the governability of 
democratic polities. 32  But even beyond the immediate context of the democratic 
insurgencies of the late 1960s and 1970s, the critics share a deeper skepticism regarding 
the central premise of participatory politics, which continues to affect politics in the 
twenty-first century. As Carole Pateman has put it, “The major function of participation 
                                                
30 Atkins, “Forging a New Democratic Party.” 
31 From, The New Democrats, 255. 
32 See The Trilateral Commission, The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies 
to the Trilateral Commission (New York: New York University Press, 1975). 
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in the theory of participatory democracy is … an educative one,” in the sense that 
participation provides the “social training” necessary for cultivating democratic attitudes 
and the experience of collective decision making. In this way, “participation develops and 
fosters the very qualities necessary for it.”33 Moreover, it hypothetically also produces 
integrative effects, building a shared collective identity among participants, as well as the 
social capital that cultivates community, trust, and individual acceptance of collective 
decisions. 
 Yet advocates of participatory democracy recognize the central tension behind the 
critics’ skepticism: that “for a democratic polity to exist it is necessary for a participatory 
society to exist.” 34  It would seem, then, that participatory reforms, such as those 
envisioned and engineered by the New Politics movement, are confronted with a 
conundrum: without a participatory society – that is, without a broadly equitable 
distribution of the means to participate effectively – participatory political structures will 
bias those with relatively more resources while disadvantaging those with less.  
While this presents democratic reformers with a real tension that needs to be 
taken seriously, it does not present a genuine dead end. As we have seen, members of the 
New Politics movement took notice of the problem of unequal distribution of resources, 
although its extent far surpassed the means available to address it. At the very outset of 
the reform process, as the McGovern-Fraser Commission listened to testimony of the 
limits to political participation, the horizons of reform did occasionally stretch beyond the 
traditional boundaries of politics to the need for societal conditions, which constrain civic 
engagement, to be changed if a more deeply democratic party was to be built. Moreover, 
                                                
33 Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 
42-3 
34 Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, 43. 
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some of those testimonials also pointed to the need for parties to act less as electoral 
institutions dedicated to the winning of office and more as educative agencies in 
American public life, which not only offered up candidates for office but more generally 
took responsibility for developing the democratic capacities of the citizenry.  
 That the New Politics movement failed to transform the Democratic Party into a 
type of party that could take on such challenges is not surprising. Given the obstacles it 
faced within and without its own structures, its transformative project suffered 
insuperable limits. But while the New Politics movement in the Democratic Party does 
not offer a twenty-first century blueprint for achieving its laudable goals, it does point in 
the right direction, not in the immediate sense of reforming the Democratic Party, but in 
the sense of creating a political agent whose priority is building the democratic capacities 
of citizens to participate meaningfully in the decisions that effect changes in their lives.  
As the 2016 Democratic primary campaign between Senator Bernie Sanders and 
former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has already indicated, the inability of the 
nascent anti-neoliberal coalition to break into the mainstream and challenge the 
prevailing common sense has already begun to fashion a critique of the undemocratic 
practices of the Democratic Party. While their criticism of the role of superdelegates in 
helping clinch the nomination for Clinton is only the tip of the iceberg, it does indicate 
that the problem of democracy in America’s political parties may not remain only a 
historical curiosity for long. 
But as this dissertation has also sought to make clear, if the lack of party 
democracy is identified as an obstacle thwarting the transformation of society, party 
democratization is no panacea. Indeed, the experience of the New Politics in the 
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Democratic Party also serves as a cautionary tale, not in the normative sense that party 
amateurs have no business interfering in the affairs of seasoned professionals, but in the 
sense that democratization is likely to create as many problems as it is meant to resolve. 
None of the internal tensions that inhere in modern political parties are likely to disappear 
through a process of democratization. On the contrary, it may well exacerbate them. 
Without dismissing the intimate connections between political institutions and 
social relations, we must examine critically the tendency to view technical changes to 
organization – whether relatively minor, in the case of reforming superdelegate rules, or 
major, such as substituting a new third party for the Democrats – as measures that 
actually evade the more central question of building the social forces capable of shifting 
the balance of political power. This perspective tends to neglect the central role of 
politics in the formation of social groups and movements, implicitly suggesting that such 
a coalition already exists, waiting to be tapped. While the experience of the New Politics 
movement tells us that pursuing a new progressive agenda must be accompanied by 
democratization of our political institutions, the latter will face insurmountable odds if it 
is not sustained by dynamic social movement. If societal conditions constrain citizen 
participation in democratic institutions, then those conditions should be transformed. 
Internally democratic parties are not sufficient agents in this process, but they are 
essential. 
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